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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the significance of “decision” within Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s concept 
of the church and Carl Schmitt’s theory of the state, and their underlying structural 
differences. Bonhoeffer and Schmitt perceived, respectively, a constitutional and confessional 
crisis of significance that demanded an urgent decision. In the context of the approach of the 
National Socialist attempt to synchronize the Protestant Church to the National Socialist state 
in Germany during the early 20
th
 century, Bonhoeffer insisted on God’s decision in Christ.
Schmitt, in turn, insisted on Dezision, a specific jurisprudential form with regard to 
jurisdiction and content that is revealed by the exception. Bonhoeffer’s and Schmitt’s 
positions on “decision” are compared primarily through a study of their earlier work. 
Bonhoeffer’s brother-in-law and friend Gerhard Leibholz had a detailed knowledge of 
Fascism and Schmitt’s theories. This most likely provided Bonhoeffer with early insights into 
jurisprudential thought and the theory of state. Bonhoeffer’s and Schmitt’s respective 
concepts of the church and of the state built on the contemporary jurisprudential discourse on 
the juristic person and the natural person. Bonhoeffer drew upon codified juristic institutional 
models, modified them, and added a specific Christological center. Schmitt developed a 
method that used analogies for transferring the systematic structure of theological concepts to 
the modern theory of state. This thesis analyses their concept of “decision” using the 
indicators of choices between alternatives, the urgency of resolving the problem, the intended 
goal, and the active manifestation of their positions.  
For Schmitt, a constitutional compromise regarding political leadership had produced a 
choice between representation and identity which he attempted to solve with abstractions that 
separated metaphysical content from objective normative evaluation, a theory of linear 
history with successive ideas and elites, and an elevation of the significance of the self over 
content and subject in structural analogy to theological dogma and the representation of the 
idea of Christ through personality. Bonhoeffer discovered a modern version of the Docetic 
heresy at the root of the paradigm associated with Schmitt’s Dezision which abstracted idea 
from appearance. With God’s revelation in Christ at the center of the church, history, and 
human life, he challenged the structural elements of Schmitt’s Dezision. Bonhoeffer, one can 
argue, redirected Schmitt’s unity of identity to wholeness through reconciliation, Schmitt’s 
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political idea to God’s revelation, his synchronization (gleich-schalten) to conformation 
(gleich-gestalten), his representation of political ideas to Trinitarian identity, his idea 
“becoming human” (Mensch werden) in the appearance of personality to person “having 
become human” (Mensch geworden)  in the once-ness of Christ. 
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Opsomming 
Hierdie proefskrif stel ondersoek in na die belang van “besluitneming” in Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer se konsep van die kerk en Carl Schmitt se teorie van die staat, en hul 
onderliggende strukturele verskille. Beide Bonhoeffer en Schmitt het ‘n konstitusionele en 
konfessionele krisis bespeur wat ‘n dringende besluit sou vereis. In die konteks van die 
Nasionaal-Sosialistiese poging in die vroeë 20
ste 
eeu om die Protestantse Kerk met die
Nasionaal-Sosialistiese staat gelyk te stel, het Bonhoeffer aangedring op God se besluit in 
Christus. Schmitt het op sy beurt aangedring op Dezision, ‘n spesifiek regsfilosofiese vorm 
wat betrekking het op regspraak en -inhoud wat deur die uitsondering geopenbaar word. 
Bonhoeffer en Schmitt se opvattings oor “besluitneming” word primêr deur ‘n studie van hul 
vroeë werk vergelyk.    
Bonhoeffer se swaer en vriend, Gerhard Leibholz, het omvattende kennis van Fascisme en 
Schmitt se teorieë gehad. Dit het waarskynlik vir Bonhoeffer insig in regsfilosofiese denke en 
die staatsteorie gebied. Bonhoeffer en Schmitt se onderskeie begrippe van die kerk en die 
staat het op die jurisprudensiële diskoers van hul dag oor die regspersoon en die natuurlike 
persoon voortgebou. Bonhoeffer het van gekodifiseerde regsinstellingsmodelle gebruik 
gemaak, hierdie modelle aangepas, en hul van ‘n spesifieke Christologiese sentrum voorsien. 
Schmidt het ‘n metode ontwikkel wat van analogieë gebruik gemaak het om die sistematiese 
struktuur van teologiese konsepte na die moderne staatsteorie oor te dra. Hierdie proefskrif 
ontleed hul begrip van “besluitneming” deur die sleutelaanwysers van keuses tussen 
alternatiewe, die dringendheid van probleemoplossing, die beoogde doelwit, en die aktiewe 
manifestasie van hul posisies.   
Vir Schmitt het ‘n grondwetlike kompromie aangaande politieke leierskap ‘n keuse na vore 
gebring tussen representasie en identifikasie wat hy wou oplos deur abstraksies wat 
metafisiese inhoud van objektiewe normatiewe evaluering sou skei – ‘n teorie van liniêre 
geskiedenis met opeenvolgende idees en elites, en ‘n verheffing van die beduidendheid van 
die self bo inhoud en subjek in strukturele analogie tot teologiese dogma en die voorstelling 
van die idee van Christus deur persoonlikheid. Bonhoeffer het ontdek dat ‘n moderne 
weergawe van die Dosetiese dwaalleer, waar idee van voorkoms geskei word, by die bron 
van die paradigma wat met Schmitt se Dezision geassosieer word, te vinde is. Met God se 
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openbaring in Christus as middelpunt van die kerk, geskiedenis, en menslike lewe het hy die 
strukturele elemente van Schmitt se Dezision uitgedaag. Mens sou kon aanvoer dat 
Bonhoeffer Schmitt se denke radikaal heroriënteer: van eenheid van identiteit na heelheid 
deur versoening, van ‘n sekere politieke idee na die openbaring van God, van sinkronisasie 
(gleichschalten) na konformasie (gleich-gestalten), van sekere voorstellings van politieke 
idees na Trinitariese identiteit, van ‘n verstaan van ‘menswording’ (Mensch werden) in die 
verskyning van persoonlikheid na ‘persoonlikheid wat mens geword het’ (Mensch geworden) 
in die eens-heid van Christus.  
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Chapter 1: 
Introduction 
 
1.1  Scope of Dissertation 
 
The issue of “decision” runs like a thread through the work of the theologian Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer (1906-1945) as well as through the theories of the jurist Carl Schmitt (1888-
1985). Both responded to the socio-political crisis of the 1920s and 1930s in Germany. For 
Bonhoeffer ‘Christianity entails decision’.1 Even though he wondered about the amount of 
personal control over decisions, he realized that there were important things one has to stand 
up for without compromise.2 Schmitt’s “decisionist type”3 applies personal decisions in 
correctly identified political situations which prevents a romantic spirit that suspends 
decisions,4 and social power-groups that agree on parliamentary compromises in favour of 
their own calculated interests.5 The general problem of “decision” was for Bonhoeffer rooted 
in modern human subjectivism that demanded entirely new existential decisions in each 
moment instead of applying an ethics that is entirely concrete.6  In his understanding, 
modernity had replaced the question of faith with intellectual honesty in all things and thus 
had turned against Christ.7 Schmitt, though, saw the crisis of the modern times mainly in the 
fictional individual of liberalism and what he called the constitutional pretense-compromises, 
which prevented decisiveness. 
 
                                            
1
 DBWE 9:451.  
2
 DBWE 10:57-58; DBWE 13:285. Bonhoeffer’s focus on decision grew so strong that by the 1940s it led him 
to state that ‘compromise hated decision’; DBWE 6:156. He also applauded the strong who take clear positions 
to the great decisive questions while the weak decided between alternatives that were not their own; DBWE 
8:494. 
3
 Carl Schmitt, Preface to the Second Edition (1934) to Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of 
Sovereignty, trans. Georg Schwab (MIT Press, 1985; Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2005), 2-3, all 
subsequent citations refer to the 2005 edition. Carl Schmitt, Vorbemerkung zur zweiten Ausgabe to Politische 
Theologie: Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Soveränität, 8th ed. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2004), 8. 
4
 Carl Schmitt, Political Romanticism, trans. Guy Oakes (New Brunswick, NJ: Translation Publishers, 2011), 
56. 
5
 Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, trans. Ellen Kenney, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1985; paperback, 1988), 6. All subsequent citations refer to the paperback edition. 
6
 cf. DBWE 6:373-74. 
7
 cf. DBWE 6:115, 122. 
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The thesis attempts to show that Bonhoeffer and Schmitt both might have used theological 
and jurisprudential processes of thought in regards to their respective concepts of decision 
despite the 1919 Weimar Constitution’s first time official separation of the Protestant Church 
from the state. Although it is well known that Schmitt invoked a theological framework of 
thought in his Political Theology he might have also used it for the underlying structural 
features of his theory of state that carried his concept of Dezision.8 In Schmitt’s Dezision, an 
individual personality decides with finality on the time and the modus of implementing an 
abstract idea. It is the juristic form (Gestalt) over jurisdiction and content revealed by the 
exception. The fundamental structural elements may be a variation to the theoretical 
abstraction of intent from guilt which Schmitt had developed in his early work. The premise 
of this thesis is that, in reverse to Schmitt’s use of theology in his theory of the state, 
Bonhoeffer used the jurisprudential paradigm of thought within his concept of the church and 
in his theology. It is suggested that Bonhoeffer’s exposure to the jurisprudential paradigm led 
him to use in his theology some particular conceptual associations taken from the private law 
sector, which had developed in the course of the 19
th
 century’s constitutional fights of the 
bourgeoisie for asserting rights over against the state. It can be argued that in Bonhoeffer 
studies, for the most part, the jurisprudential connection in his theology has been overlooked. 
Thus the thesis is concerned with unlocking the specific use Bonhoeffer makes of the 
jurisprudential paradigm. An indirect comparison of Schmitt’s and Bonhoeffer’s position on 
decisions attemps to uncover that in the process of disclosing the structural elements that 
were foundational to Schmitt’s self-justifying abstract Dezision within his theory of state, 
Bonhoeffer might have redirected such elements theologically towards an understanding of 
responsible concrete decisions within the private and the public realm.  
 
The topic of decision around which this thesis revolves is neither the process of decision-
making nor the theory of decisionism. Even though a decision is always in some way 
interconnected with a certain process of how to reach a decision, the current topic is the 
decision itself. Heinz Eduard Tödt had connected moral decisions to a six step formative 
process that includes defining the moral problem, analysing the situation, discerning the 
option, discovering the norms, judging as deciding according to facts, option and norms, and 
                                            
8
 The word Dezision is used in the German language as well as in the English translations for describing 
Schmitt’s theory of an individual who decides on jurisdiction and content in the situation of exception. 
Therefore the term Dezision will be used in reference to Schmitt’s theory throughout this thesis.  
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finally reevaluating the result.9 However, in this decision-making schema the decision itself is 
only one of the steps. Similarly, in Schmitt’s theory of decisionism, which is defined as ‘a 
rightful deviation from law by personal decision-making in concrete circumstances’,10 the 
Dezision is only the central part of the process of decision-making. Decisionism comprises of 
a deviation from normal law, a decision-making sovereign, a mandate for restoring order, and 
a time-limitation for actions.11 Thus neither the process of moral decision-making nor the 
process of decisionism defines the internal elements of the decision itself. Instead, the 
structural analysis of “decision” in this thesis is based on research done by Tanja Pritzlaff12 
within the realm of political sciences. The underlying elements of collective and individual 
rational decisions that were identified in this study can be described with the terms of choice, 
resolve, and judgement, whereby the latter element intentionally positions the actor in 
relation to the material facts of the context. Against this backdrop, Schmitt’s and 
Bonhoeffer’s thought on “decision” will be compared according to a framework that 
discusses their perceived choices, the pressure of time that demanded a resolve, their 
respective intented goal, and the active manifestation of their positions. 
 
Set into a comperative relation will be Schmitt who supported the National Socialist regime 
of the 1930s and 1940s in Germany and Bonhoeffer who resisted this very regime as a 
founding supporter of the Confessing Church that distanced itself from the official Lutheran 
church, and with his involvement in the resistance and coup d’état against Adolf Hitler. 
However, the central attention will not be on Bonhoeffer’s personal decision to support the 
conspiracy to assassinate Hitler over against Schmitt’s Dezision that focussed on an unbound 
sovereign in exceptional circumstances. Rather, the focus will be on the underlying structures 
of their understanding of decision, that is, the structure that played into and carried all of their 
decisions  ̶ last but not least, also the one decision that was for both tied to an extreme, 
                                            
9
 Heinz Eduard Tödt, “Towards a Theory of Making Ethical Judgements”, The Journal of Religious Ethics 6 no. 
1 (Spring 1978):106-20. Etienne De Villiers, in a concise discussion of Tödt’s process of the steps towards 
moral decision-making, suggests that Tödt was too focussed on individual responsibility which disregards that 
in today’s world many decisions are made on a collective level; Etienne De Villiers, Revisiting Max Weber’s 
Ethic of Responsibility (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2018), 224-225. To this, one can add Tanja Pritzlaff’s 
research within the realm of political sciences, which is used as heuristic framework for this thesis, that in our 
increasingly individualistic world one could also say that collective decision-making is based on a sum of 
individual decision-making processes; cf. Tanja Pritzlaff, Entscheiden als Handeln. Eine begriffliche 
Rekonstruktion (Frankfurt/Main: Campus Verlag, 2006), 12-13. 
10
 Michael Hoelzl, “Ethics of decisionism: Carl Schmitt’s theological blind spot”, Journal for Cultural Research 
20, no. 3 (2016):235.  
11
 Hoelzl, “Ethics of decisionism”, 236. 
12
 Tanja Pritzlaff, Entscheiden. 
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exceptional situation which Schmitt called the Ausnahme, the exceptional case, that 
demanded the Führer principle, and Bonhoeffer called the Grenzfall, the borderline case, that 
opposed the Führer principle.  
 
Crucial for uncovering the structurally underlying elements of Schmitt’s Dezision and the 
objection and redirection Bonhoeffer might have levied with a theological position at 
Schmitt’s form of decision, is their very specific cultural, social, political, and, not least, 
legal-constitutional context of the 1920s and 1930s in Germany. This context brought them 
into close spacial and academic proximity and sent their personal life-trajectories towards 
opposite ends. By birth Schmitt and Bonhoeffer were distanced by one generation and the 
rigid social classes of imperial Germany. But, as Bonhoeffer noted in 1932, due to the quick 
succession of the political and socio-economic events around the turn of the century, this 
time-period amounted to more than one generation13 and the class boundaries were slowly 
liquefying after the Great War. Both Schmitt and Bonhoeffer, the former still educated in 
imperial Germany but the latter during the Weimar Republic, were not only knowledgeable 
of their contemporary philosophical and sociological discourses, such as Neo-Kantianism, 
Idealism, Historicism, phenomenology, and ontology, but were also on the cusp of the 
discourses within their specific professional paradigms of jurisprudence and theology 
respectively. By the late 1920s Schmitt had succeeded in stretching within academia the 
limiting class-confines of the so-called small bourgeoisie at exactly the moment at which 
Bonhoeffer took up his academic career in accordance with his class of the higher educated 
bourgeoisie. Thus between 1929 and 1935 both participated in the same academic space and 
political center of power in and around the University of Berlin. Indirectly their paths crossed 
due to Schmitt’s close professional and private connection to the jurist Gerhard Leibholz 
(1901-1982), Bonhoeffer’s brother-in-law and close friend. By 1929 Schmitt had already 
published the main features of his theory of state; including his Politische Theologie14 that 
established a sociological model for drawing analogies between theology and political 
structures and insisted on the need of sovereign decisions. At that point in time Bonhoeffer 
had already developed a theory of the church in independence of the state that seemed to refer 
to juristic concepts such as association, cooperative, and community of persons (Verein, 
Genossenschaft, und Personengemeinschaft) for the purpose of centering the church and 
                                            
13
 DBWE 12:268-75. 
14
 Carl Schmitt, Politische Theolgie; first published in 1922; a revised edition was published in 1934.  
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human inter-relations on God’s revelation in Christ which became subsequently the 
foundation for theologically defining human life under God’s decision. 
 
Overall, the focus of the thesis is the premise that there are strong indications that Bonhoeffer 
drew upon jurisprudential conceptual thought in his theological position on “decision” which 
could be read as uncovering, objecting, and redirecting the structural elements of Schmitt’s 
form of decision (known as Dezision) that made use of references to theology. 
 
1.2 Motivation and Background  
 
My motivation and interest in researching Schmitt’s and Bonhoeffer’s use of the theological 
and jurisprudential paradigms of thought in support of the structure of their concepts of 
decision as the central notion of their respective theory of state and theory of church is rooted 
in my own academic background in the jurisprudential as well as theological paradigms of 
thought. It is also supported by the fact that in Germany the studies of law are geared toward 
the ability of judging concrete factual cases, that is, towards decisions.   
 
From the moment I picked up an English translation of Bonhoeffer’s Ethics15 during my 
studies for a degree in theology at a Canadian University I became fascinated with his 
theology. However, as a native German speaker I shortly after read Bonhoeffer in the original 
German version and I was struck, not only by hearing in his words my grandfather speaking, 
a Lutheran-Prussian judicial civil servant who was born and raised in the vicinity of 
Finkenwalde and had practiced civil disobedience over against National Socialist demands. 
Most of all I heard in Bonhoeffer’s theology and use of language an underlying 
jurisprudential paradigm. As a lawyer with degrees in jurisprudence from a German 
university, I recognized that Bonhoeffer might have used legal collective structures in support 
of the argument of his 1927 Sanctorum Communio,16 and that he took recourse in his 
subsequent theology to legal concepts of civil law, such as Stellvertretung and 
Schuldübernahme. My interest was additionally perked by the opposing comments from 
Germans and Anglo-Americans upon learning of my dual degrees. While Germans saw 
                                            
15
 DBWE 6. 
16
 DBWE 1. 
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theology and jurisprudence “kind of connected”, Anglo-Americans were astonished about 
studying such unrelated academic fields. 
 
Although most of the theological topics which Bonhoeffer expanded on throughout his 
theological development were already visible in his 1928 Barcelona Lectures,17 they appeared 
to me foremost grounded in his foundational pronouncements of his doctoral dissertation 
Sanctorum Communio. And his immediately following Habilitation thesis Act and Being18 
which engaged the theological and philosophical paradigms of thought, mostly through 
Martin Heidegger’s (1889-1976) ontology, seemed to be concerned additionally with a 
peripheral issue. Bonhoeffer appeared to me to have also wanted to clarify the relationship 
between the theological and jurisprudential paradigms as the latter claims the place of a legal 
philosophy that transcends the “technical” application of legal concepts and norms. This was 
confirmed through my research into the factual circumstances surrounding Bonhoeffer’s 1929 
Habilitation thesis. His own work and the Habilitation thesis in jurisprudence of his close 
friend and relative Leibholz19 were indeed related in their topic and written simultaniously in 
1929 when both resided in Berlin. Both engaged with the question as to the extent of human 
knowledge ̶ Leibholz from the jurisprudential and Bonhoeffer from the theological 
perspective. Bonhoeffer’s interrelation with the jurisprudential paradigm of thought seemed 
further confirmed in the correlations between Bonhoeffer’s perspective in Ethics on the 
Roman legal principle of suum cuique and arbitrariness in regards to equality, and the main 
aspects of Leibholz’s 1924 doctoral thesis20 on equality before the law.21  
 
The definition of equality that Leibholz introduced to the interpretation of the 1949 Basic 
Law for the Federal Republic of Germany22 followed the pre-war discourse with Bonhoeffer 
                                            
17
 DBWE 10: 325-378. 
18
 DBWE 2. 
19
 Gerhard Leibholz, Das Wesen der Repräsentation unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des 
Repräsentativsystems: Ein Beitrag zur allgemeinen Staats- und Verfassungslehre (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1929). 
20
 Gerhard Leibholz, Die Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz: Eine Studie auf rechtsvergleichender und 
rechtsphilosophischer Grundlage (Munich: C. H. Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1959), first published in 
1925 by Otto Liebermann (Berlin). 
21
 Karola Radler, “Equality and Human Dignity – substantive foci of enduring significance in Bonhoeffer’s and 
Leibholz’ interdisciplinary discourse”, in Christian Humanism and Moral Formation in “A World Come of 
Age”: An Interdisciplinary Look at the Works of Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Marilynne Robinson, eds. J. 
Zimmermann, Natalie Boldt (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016). 
22
 Gerhard Leibholz was from 1951 until his retirement in 1971 one of the first Judges at the Constitutional 
Court of the Federal Republic of Germany; Manfred Wiegandt, Norm und Wirklichkeit: Gerhard Leibholz (1901 
– 1982) – Leben, Werk und Richteramt, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1995), 64, 73. 
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and provided a line to the post-apartheid definition of equality in the 1994 South African 
constitution, which containes a similar guarantee of equality.23 Indeed, there are many 
parallels between the Resistance to the racist persecutions of the National Socialist regime of 
the first half of the 20
th
 century in Germany and the Anti-Apartheid movement against the 
racist secregations in South Africa during the second half of the 20
th
 century. In this regard, it 
is especially the 1934 Barmen Theological Declaration in Germany,24 written to a large extent 
by Karl Barth, and the 1986 Belhar Confession in South Africa that the Dutch Reformed 
Mission Church adopted that stand out. Both proclaimed the essential truths of the Gospel in 
opposition to the false doctrines of the established Lutheran Church and the Dutch Reformed 
Church respectively which were supporting the oppressive regimes. While the Barmen 
Declaration does not explicitly condemn race-based persecution, the Belhar Confession 
rejected any doctrine that sanctioned ‘in the name of the gospel or the will of God the forced 
separation of people on the grounds of race and colour’25 which obstructs reconciliation in 
Christ. While the Barmen Declaration does not explicitly condemn race-based persecution, 
the Belhar Confession echoes Bonhoeffer’s theological demands that the gospel of Jesus 
Christ is not defined by the state and that race is neither a precondition nor a contradiction to 
the gospel of Jesus Christ. Bonhoeffer’s influence is most visible in the Belhar Confession’s 
adoption of the term status confessionis. It followed Bonhoeffer’s 1933 assessment26 that the 
church needed to confess because the gospel itself was at risk and the state had exceeded its 
limits over against the church.27 Additionally, Bonhoeffer has been brought into connection to 
the 1986 Kairos Document28 that challenged the tyrannical apartheid regime with a “prophetic 
                                            
23
 Laurie Ackermann, Human Dignity: Lodestar for Equality in South Africa, (Cape Town: Juta, 2012), 223. 
24
 Theological Declaration of Barmen (29-31 May 1934). Accessed February 06, 2018. http://www.sacred-
texts.com/chr/barmen.htm. 
25
 The Belhar Confession as quoted in Piet J. Naudé, Neither Calendar nor Clock: Perspectives on the Belhar 
Confession (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2010), 15. 
26
 In his April 1933 essay on “The Church and the Jewish question” Bonhoeffer referred for the first time to a 
statu confessionis in regards to the state’s introduction of the Aryan legislation and the attempt to implement the 
exclusion of pastors of Jewish heritage; DBWE 12:366. 
27
 Dirkie Smit, “What does status confessionis mean?”, in A Moment of Truth: The Confession of the Dutch 
Reformed Mission Church 1982, ed. G. D. Cloete and D. J. Smit (Grand Rapids: Erdmans, 1984), 9. 
28
 The Kairos Document: Challenge to the Church: a theological comment on the political crisis in South Africa 
(Braamfontein: Skotaville, 1986). Bonganjalo Goba, “The Kairos Document and its implications for liberation 
in South Africa”, The Journal of Law and Religion 5, no. 2 (Summer 1987): 313-25, https://www-jastor-
org.ez.sun.ac.za/stable/1051239. Peter Beyerhaus, The Kairos Document: Challenge or Danger to the Church?: 
a critical theological assessment of South Aprican people’s theology (Cape Town: Gospel Defence League, 
1987). 
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theology” over against the “state theology” and the “church theology”.29 Preceeding and 
subsequent to the Belhar Confession, Bonhoeffer helped many South African theologians to 
recognize the evil and heresy in apartheid and that there was a need for Christian resistance 
towards ending the regime.30 Beyers Naudé (1915-2004) found inspiration in Bonhoeffer’s 
theology and support of the Confessing Church for his own theology and his vision for the 
ecumenical Christian Institute as a Confessing Church for South Africa.31 Allan Boesak 
(1946) was significantly influenced by Bonhoeffer’s choice and actions for justice in 
recognition that grace was never cheap and that reconciliation calls for sacrifice, even unto 
death.32 Bonhoeffer’s influence was also visible in Russel Botman’s (1953-2014) theology 
which promoted justice, transformation, and reconciliation based on Bonhoeffer’s 
Christology.33 For John de Gruchy (1939) Bonhoeffer remained an important conversation 
partner throughout his critique against the Apartheid legislation34 as well as during the 
transition period to democracy.35 And he continues ‘to bring Bonhoeffer’s life and work into 
fruitful conversation with challenges arising from the South African context’.36   
 
The connection between Bonhoeffer studies in Germany and South Africa, and possible 
structural parallels between both situations and perspectives,37 prompted me to pursue a 
                                            
29
 John W. de Gruchy, “The Reception of Bonhoeffer in South Africa”, in Bonhoeffer for a New Day: Theology 
in a Time of Transition, ed. John W. de Gruchy (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), 359. 
30
 John W. de Gruchy, “Bonhoeffer and Public Ethics: South Africa Notes”, in Interpreting Bonhoeffer: 
Historical Perspectives, Emerging Issues, ed. Clifford J. Green and Guy C. Carter (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
2013), 17. 
31
 De Gruchy, “Bonhoeffer and Public Ethics”, 15. 
32
 Allan Boesak, “What Dietrich Bonhoeffer has meant to me”, in Bonhoefer’s Ethics: Old Europe and New 
Frontiers, ed. Guy Christopher Carter, René van Eyden, Hans-Dirk van Hoogstraten, and Jurjen Wirsma 
(Kampen: Kok, 1991), 21-29; Allan Boesak, Running with Horses: Confessions of an Accidental Politician 
(Cape Town: Joho Publishers, 2009). 
33
 Russel Botman, “Discipleship as Transformation? Towards a Theology of Transformation” (unpublished PhD 
diss., University of Western Cape, 1994). 
34
 John W. de Gruchy discussed the fruitfulness of a dialogue with Dietrich Bonhoeffer during the 1980s in his 
book Bonhoeffer and South Africa: Theology in Dialogue (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1984). 
35
 The usefulness and influence of Dietrich Bonhoeffer on the 1989 movement in Germany that led to the fall of 
the Berlin Wall as well as the connection of that movement and Bonhoeffer as regards the transition to 
democracy in South Africa, has been discussed by John W. de Gruchy in his essay “Dietrich Bonhoeffer and the 
Transition to Democracy in the German Democratic Republic and South Africa”, Modern Theology 12, no.3 
(July 1996): 325-66, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.ez.sun.ac.za/journal/10.1111/j.1468-0025.1996.tb00094.x.   
36
 Robert R. Vosloo, “Interpreting Bonhoeffer in South Africa? The Search for a Historical and Methodological 
Responsible Hermeneutic”, in Bonhoeffer and Interpretive Theory: Essays on Method and Understanding, ed. 
Peter Frick (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2013), 126. 
37
 Ralf K.Wüstenberg, Die politische Dimension der Versöhnung: Eine theologische Studie zum Umgang mit 
Schuld nach den Systemumbrüchen in Südafrika und Deutschland (Gütersloh: Chr. Kaiser/Gütersloher 
Verlagshaus, 2003); Ralf K. Wüstenberg, „Philosophische und Theologische Grundprobleme beim Verstehen 
des Südafrikanischen Versönungsprozesses“, Religion & Theology 7, no. 2 (2000): 169-92, 
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doctoral dissertation at the University of Stellenbosch. However, my thesis is concerned with 
the interplay of the views of a German jurist and Bonhoeffer set within the context of German 
law, that is, within the constitutional framework of the Weimar Republic. Thus, the South 
African context and especially South African jurisprudence is outside the scope of the 
research of this thesis. Research into interrelations between anti-apartheid theology and South 
African law is a concern that differs from the focus of this thesis and is best left to those who 
command knowledge over South African law. Additionally, because the German and South 
African contexts are distanced by time and place and Bonhoeffer influenced the later South 
African context, this cannot be reversed by applying aspects of the South African theological 
and jurisprudential context to the theology of Bonhoeffer and Schmitt’s jurisprudence within 
the earlier Germany situation. Instead my thesis is concerned with the interplay of Schmitt’s 
jurisprudenial and Bonhoeffer’s theological perspectives as they played out within their early 
work under the conditions of the 1919 Weimar Constitution, and as they pertain to the 
structural elements of their respective concepts of “decision” and Dezision that might entail a 
rebuttal on the part of Bonhoeffer to Schmitt’s position on form.  
 
The indirect interaction between Bonhoeffer and Schmitt within this thesis concerns the 
broader field of political theology in general. Post-war political theology is differentiated by 
attaching the prefix “new” for the purpose of primarily separating theology that is concerned 
with politics from Schmitt’s Political Theology which received the prefix “old”. This 
differentiation gains significance in regards to the recent surge of renewed interest in 
Schmittian theories and rising authoritarianism in many countries around the world. Francis 
Schüssler Fiorenza
38
 has noted that in the United States of America this interest in Schmitt is 
largely channelled through Schmitt’s student Leo Strauss’s critique of modernity and 
liberalism,
39
 and appears increasingly in practical matters of decision-making beyond the 
theoretical. However, the 20
th
 century has shown that authoritarian governments often do not 
bring order over against violent excesses as the reactionaries to the French Revolution had 
                                                                                                                                       
DOI:10.1163/157430100X00036. Ralf K. Wüstenberg, „Reformierte Identität in Südafrikas politischer 
Transformation: Das Beispiel Christiaan Frederick Beyers Naudés (1915-2004)“, in Reformierte Theologie 
weltweit: Zwölf Profile aus dem 20. Jahrhundert, eds. Marco Hofheinz and Matthias Zeindler (Zürich: 
Theologischer Verlag, 2013). 
38
 Francis Schüssler Fiorenza, “Prospects for Political Theology in the Face of Contemporary Challenges”, in 
Political Theology: Contemporary Challenges and Future Directions, ed. Francis Schüssler Fiorenza, Klaus 
Tanner, and Michael Welker (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2013), 37-59, specifically 39-42. 
39
 Fiorenza, “Prospects”, 40-41; also William T. Cavanaugh, Migrations of the Holy: God, State and the 
Political Meaning of the Church, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 100. 
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hoped, but instead are those who lead to the worst atrocities against humanity. Although not 
explicitly mentioning Bonhoeffer’s theology, Fiorenza pleads for a mobilization of religious 
traditions for the purpose of building an awareness of a sinful human nature, concern for and 
respect of the other, and for undercutting with transcendence the self-interest of nations 
beyond the friend-enemy dichotomy. And he calls for a commitment to the embodiment of 
justice within law, specifically for constitutional rights.
40
  
 
Bonhoeffer studies became increasingly immersed over the last two decades in the realm of 
the “new” political theology especially regarding the anthropological question and the 
communal dimension. The upsurge of interest in the political dimensions of Bonhoeffer’s 
theology is mirrored in his inclusion into The Blackwell Companion to Political Theology, 
edited by Peter Scott and William T. Cavanaugh,41 which holds also a contribution on 
Schmitt. The political aspects of Bonhoeffer’s theology resonate especially in South Africa 
which continues to wrestle in the public discourse with ‘symbols, statues, and institutional 
practices associated with the country’s colonial and apartheid past’ as is shown in Robert 
Vosloo’s essay “Time Out of Joint and Future-Oriented Memory: Engaging Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer in the Search for a way to Deal Responsibly with the Ghosts of the Past”.42 
Additionally, John W. de Gruchy, in The Blackwell Companion to Political Theology, has set 
the South African experience into the broader context of the involvement of the churches for 
building democracy.43 Bonhoeffer’s theology is increasingly also set into relations to urgent 
contemporary problems, such as global warming in the age of the Anthropocene.44  
 
My thesis attempts to show that Bonhoeffer’s theology differs decisively from Schmittian 
“old” and the “new” political theologies in a distinct way. Bonhoeffer appears to have used 
                                            
40
 cf. Fiorenza, “Prospects”, 57-59. 
41
 Peter Scott and William T. Cavanaugh, ed., The Blackwell Companion to Political Theology (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2004). 
42
 Robert Vosloo, “Time Out of Joint and Future-Oriented Memory: Engaging Dietrich Bonhoeffer in the Search 
for a way to Deal Responsibly with the Ghosts of the Past”, Religions 8, 42 (2017): 7; 
www.mdpi.com/journal/religions; doi:10.3390/rel8030042.  
43
 John W. de Gruchy, “Democracy”, in The Blackwell Companion to Political Theology, 439-454. 
44
 Larry L. Rasmussen, “Bonhoeffer: Ecological Theologian”, in Bonhoeffer and Interpretive Theory: Esseys on 
Methods and Understanding, ed. Peter Frick (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2013). Larry L. Rasmussen, “The 
Brothers Bonhoeffer on Science, Morality, and Theology”, Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science 44, no.1 
(March 2009):97-113, DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9744.2009.00988.x; Larry L. Rasmussen, Normand M. Laurendean 
and Dan Solomon, “Introduction to ‘The Energy Transition: Religious and Cultural Perspectives’”, Zygon: 
Journal of Religion and Science 46, no. 4 (December 2011):872-89; DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9744.2011.01230.x.  
Dianne Rayson, “Bonhoeffer’s Theology and Anthropogenic Climate Change: In Search of an Ecoethic,” (PhD 
diss., University of Newcastle, 2017), http://hdl.handle.net/1959.134/1349861. 
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links to jurisprudential concepts of the German private law sector over against the public 
sector for the purpose of clarifying the separation between church and state. Legal concepts 
appear to provide the elements for developing a form for the church apart and different from 
existing legal forms – a form of sui generis for ‘the empirical church brought about by the 
spirit’45 and for establishing Christ at the center of the Protestant Church. In this form he then 
reintroduced his theological thought back into the public space regarding ethical problems. 
Therefore I am inclined to call Bonhoeffer’s theology a “theology as politics.”46 This may 
clarify Bonhoeffer’s contribution to the realm of politics, and may distinguish it from 
Schmittian analogies between theology and jurisprudence within the “old” political theology 
but may also keep Bonhoeffer’s theology relevant for any questions of public ethics in any 
specific political context.  
 
Finally, even though for a German student of law Schmitt’s constitutional theories47 are 
almost unavoidable, it nonetheless appears a daring task to set Bonhoeffer’s views, which 
resisted the evils of National Socialism, into any kind of comparative relation and even lived 
personal proximity to the polarizing thought and figure of Schmitt, who has been called the 
‘theorist for the Reich’48 and has been judged as characterless evil49 for his involvement with 
the National Socialist state.50 However, a precise investigation into the structures of their 
                                            
45
 DBWE 1:263. 
46
 Karola Radler, “Theology as Politics versus ‘Political Theology’”, in Dem Rad in die Speichen fallen: Das 
Politische in der Theologie Dietrich Bonhoeffers, ed. K. Busch Nielson, R. Wüstenberg, and J. Zimmermann, 
(Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2013), 270-86. 
47
 Schmitt’s analysis of the shortcomings of the 1919 Weimar Constitution and his theory of core elements of a 
constitution which need special protection, contributed to protecting with a guarantee of perpetuity 
(Ewigkeitsguarantie) in article 79 para 3 of the 1949 German Basic Law the essence of the basic rights (article 1 
to 18, 19 para 2), and the essential core principles of social justice (Sozialstaatsprinzip), democracy 
(Demokratieprinzip), and the rule of law (Rechtsstaatsprinzip) of article 20. Additionally, Schmitt’s book Gesetz 
und Urteil is still today an interesting read for a student of jurisprudence in Germany. Because legal studies in 
Germany are focussed mainly on the work of a judge, Schmitt’s book addressed many questions that are still 
relevant for the position in which a judge is placed, even though one should remain critical of Schmitt’s 
conclusions. 
48
 Michael Hollerich, “Carl Schmitt”, in The Blackwell Companion to Political Theology, 108. Joseph J. 
Bendersky, Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014) describes in detail 
how Schmitt’s transformation unfolded from a scholar in the 1920s to a supporter of the National Socialist 
regime. Andreas Koenen, Der Fall Carl Schmitt: Sein Aufstieg zum Kronjuristen des Dritten Reiches 
(Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1995). 
49
 Hannah Arendt to Karl Jaspers, September, 29, 1949 in Briefwechsel 1926-1969, ed. Lotte Köhler and Hans 
Saner, (Munich: Piper, 1985), 178; Arendt called Schmitt characterless in the sense that he has none at all, not 
even a bad one, despite living with a deep passion.  
50
 A lot has been speculated as to why Schmitt turned to National Socialism in 1933. Schmitt himself never 
explained his reasons. A broad overview of possible reasons can be found in Reinhard Mehring, Carl Schmitt: 
Aufstieg und Fall - Eine Biographie (Munich: Beck, 2009), 310-12. 
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understanding of decision as it was embedded in their contemporary context of the early 20
th
 
century should avoid preemptive characterizations that may influence the research, even 
though, this does not exclude assessing the consequences of their respective attitudes to their 
polarized reality. 
 
1.3 Research Question and Hypothesis 
 
This thesis takes seriously Bonhoeffer’s theology and Schmitt’s juristic, jurisprudential realm 
within the contextual socio-economic and political dynamics of their time and place in the 
early 20
th
 century. The primary focus is on Bonhoeffer’s early theology and Schmitt’s early 
jurisprudential theories. Bonhoeffer’s and Schmitt’s work will be set into indirect relation for 
the purpose of contributing further depth to our understanding of Bonhoeffer’s theology, his 
use of language, and his ethics. Reading Bonhoeffer with the jurisprudential paradigm and 
juristic concepts in mind, and engaging in such a paradigmatic comparison, will open a 
further dimension from which Bonhoeffer’s work can be accessed.  
 
Thus, in a comparative study that indirectly engages Bonhoeffer’s theology with Schmitt’s 
theories, this thesis askes in what way possible exposure to the jurisprudential paradigm 
might have prompted Bonhoeffer to use juristic concepts within his theology and might have 
entailed uncovering, objecting to, and redirecting with his theological understanding of 
“decision”, the foundational structural elements that underlay Schmitt’s jurisprudential 
concept of Dezision in which an individual personality decides with finality over jurisdiction 
and the implementation of an abstract idea? 
 
Central to this study is thus the question of whether, and if so how, Bonhoeffer engaged with 
his theological understanding of “decision” Schmitt’s concept of Dezision. It will seek to 
establish that Bonhoeffer drew upon juristic concepts in his theology that is focused on a 
divine decision in Jesus Christ, just as Schmitt turned to theology within his jurisprudence 
regarding the decisions of a sovereign personality. Because a better knowledge of Schmitt’s 
position will help us with understanding Bonhoeffer’s objection, the former’s work will be 
presented in detail. A comparison hopes to show that Bonhoeffer’s theology spoke to the 
underlying structural elements of the paradigm associated with Schmitt’s concept, refocused 
such elements, and thus entailed a challenge to Schmitt’s overall claim.  
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Researching and comparing Bonhoeffer’s and Schmitt’s reasoning in regards to their 
oppositional positions on decisions presents a variety of further questions that reveal the 
particular details concerning the overall research question:  
 
- Was Bonhoeffer exposed to the jurisprudential paradigm of thought in such a way that 
it enabled him to make use of juristic concepts, informed him on the theory of state, 
and on Schmitt’s theories? 
- Was there an overall reason for Bonhoeffer and Schmitt for engaging with the topic of 
“decision”?  
- What did Bonhoeffer and Schmitt perceive as possible choices for bringing an end to 
their contemporary problems? 
- Did Bonhoeffer make use of jurisprudential concepts within his theology? 
- Was the topic of decision tied to a particular time-frame? 
- Did Bonhoeffer develop a specific method for the application of juristic concepts that 
corresponded to Schmitt’s method of structural analogies?  
- What are the underlaying structural elements in Bonhoeffer’s understanding of 
“decision” and Schmitt’s theory if Dezision?  
 
The above questions lead to the hypothetical assumptions that a comparison of Bonhoeffer’s 
and Schmitt’s early work, as it developed during the early 20th century in Germany, will show 
that  
 
- In some way Bonhoeffer was exposed to the jurisprudential paradigm of thought 
which enabled him to make use of this intellectual framework within his theology and 
be at least indirectly informed on the theory of state and Schmitt’s theories; 
- The circumstances of their place prompted a concern for engaging with the topic of 
“decision”;  
- Both, Bonhoeffer and Schmitt, identified alternatives that they perceived as leading 
towards a decision;  
- Bonhoeffer used juristic concepts in his theory of church and theology;  
- For both the time-element of urgency was present, a situation which rested on their 
respective understandings of history; 
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- Bonhoeffer did not develop a specific method for the application of juristic concepts 
as, reversely, Schmitt did for the application of theological concepts;  
- Bonhoeffer’s theology of “decision” entailed an objection and redirection of the form 
of Schmitt’s structure of Dezision towards espousing an understanding of responsible 
concrete decisions within the private and the public realm. 
 
The method employed for proving the hypothetical assumption involves comparisons of 
different paradigms of thought, as well as academic and cultural linguistic differences which 
are explained in the following chapter.  
 
1.4 Methodology, Paradigms, and Translation 
 
The method applied in this thesis is that of comparative qualitative research with 
Bonhoeffer’s and Schmitt’s original German texts as primary sources for the purpose of 
discovering in a hermeneutical process the continuity and discontinuity of Bonhoeffer’s and 
Schmitt’s understanding of “decision”. The hermeneutical process of extracting from the 
case-data, that is, from Bonhoeffer’s and Schmitt’s texts, the differences and similarities in 
structuring their theories regarding decisions must pay attention to their immersion within the 
cultural context of their kinship group of Germany during the early 20
th
 century, to their 
language and professional paradigms, and to translations. 
 
Comparing Bonhoeffer’s and Schmitt’s thought can be seen as a legitimate approach, 
especially due to the suggested indirect link between both, Bonhoeffer’s possible exposure to 
and use of jurisprudential thought, and because it is in line with many previous comparative 
projects in Bonhoeffer studies. Such studies can be categorized into three groups. They have 
either compared Bonhoeffer’s theology to that of his teachers for the purpose of assessing 
their influence on him, or have set Bonhoeffer in relation to the thought, theories or theology 
of another thinker, or have investigated a particular topic in the thought of Bonhoeffer in 
comparison to other thinkers. An example of the first category is Martin Rumscheidt’s essay 
on “The formation of Bonhoeffer’s theology” which discusses the influence the professors 
Adolf von Harnack, Karl Holl and Reinhold Seeberg et al had on Bonhoeffer’s theology.51 
                                            
51
 Martin Rumscheidt, “The Formation of Bonhoeffer’s Theology”, in The Cambridge Companion to Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer, ed. John W. de Gruchy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999; reprinted 2005), 50-70. 
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The anthology Bonhoeffer’s Intellectual Formation, edited by Peter Frick,52 exemplifies the 
second category and contains comparisons of Bonhoeffer’s theology to other thinkers such as 
Augustine, Kant, Hegel, Barth, Heidegger. Additionally, Bonhoeffer has been researched in 
comparison to Martin Luther53 and Friedrich Nietzsche.54 Almost endless examples exist for 
the third category in which the comparison evolves around a particular theme. Bonhoeffer’s 
Christology and his concepts of the penultimate and discipleship have been set in connection 
to Søren Kierkegaard.55 Bonhoeffer’s vision of humanity and his understanding of 
‘togetherness’ and of ‘revelation as being’ have been compared to Martin Heidegger.56 Christ 
and revelatory community has been the topic for a comparison between Hegel and 
Bonhoeffer57 and the topic of secular spirituality centered on Bonhoeffer and Nietzsche.58 
Moreover, the majority of comparision’s set Bonhoeffer in relation to Karl Barth,59 because 
of their personal relationship and their cooperation as well as their disagreements on a variety 
of theological issues, not least regarding the Bethel Confession and Barmen Declaration. This 
thesis’ comparative study between Bonhoeffer and Schmitt regarding the issue of decision 
fits within the third category.  
 
                                            
52
 Peter Frick, ed. Bonhoeffer’s Intellectual Formation (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008). 
53
 Michael DeJonge, “The Ubiquity of Luther in Bonhoeffer, with a Glance at Ecumenical Implications”, 
Theologia Wratislaviensia 11 (2016):19-28. 
54
 Frits de Lange, “Aristocratic Christendom: On Bonhoeffer and Nietzsche” in Bonhoeffer and Continental 
Thought: Cruciform Philosophy, eds. Brian Gregor and Jens Zimmermann (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2009), 73-83. 
55
 Philip G.Ziegler, “Christ for us Today – Promeity in the Christologies of Bonhoeffer and Kierkegaard”, 
International Journal of Systematic Theology 15, no. 1 (January 2013): 25-41, DOI:10.1111/j.1468-
2400.2012.00656X. David R. Law, “Redeeming the penultimate: discipleship and Church in the thought of 
Søren Kierkegaard and Dietrich Bonhoeffer”, International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church 11, 
no.1 (2011):14-26, DOI:10.1080/1474225X.2011.547317.  
56
 Jens Zimmermann, “Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Martin Heidegger: Two Different Visions of Humanity”, in 
Bonhoeffer and Continental Thought: Cruciform Philosophy, eds. Brian Gregor and Jens Zimmermann, 102-33. 
Josh de Keijzer, ““Revelation as Being” Bonhoeffer’s Appropriation of Heidegger’s Ontology”, The Journal of 
Reigion 98, no. 3 (July 2018): 348-70, DOI:10.1086/697981. See also Charles Marsh, “Bonhoeffer on 
Heidegger and togetherness”, Modern Theology 8, no. 3 (July 1992):263-283.  
57
 David S. Robinson, Christ and Revelatory Community in Bonhoeffer’s Reception of Hegel (Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2018). 
58
 Peter H. Van Ness, “Bonhoeffer, Nietzsche, and secular spirituality”, Encounter 52, no.4 (1991):327-41, 
http://www.cts.edu.  
59
 Examples are: Tom Greggs, Theology against Religion: Constructive Dialogue with Bonhoeffer and Barth  
(London: Bloomsbury, 2011); Philip G. Ziegler, “Graciously commanded: Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Karl Barth 
on the Decalogue”, Scottish Journal of Theology 17, no. 2 (2018):127-41, https://doi-
org.ez.sun.ac.za/10.1017/S0036930618000030; Jordan J. Ballor, “The Aryan Clause, the Confessing Church, 
and the ecumenical movement: Barth and Bonhoeffer on natural theology”, Scottish Journal of Theology 59, no. 
3 (August 2006):263-80, https://journals.cambridge.org/SJT, IP address: 146.232.129.75; Michael DeJonge, 
Bonhoeffer’s Theological Formation: Berlin, Barth, and Protestant Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012).  
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In this study Bonhoeffer’s and Schmitt’s thought processes of theology and jurisprudence are 
referred to as paradigms. Because there is not one single definition available for what 
constitutes a “paradigm”, it is necessary to clarify its meaning for the purpose of this thesis. 
Generally, paradigms are being brought into relation to scientific thinking, knowledge, 
statements, and tradition and have been described as “disciplinary matrix” and “discursive 
formations”. The former description is meant to denote a common set of techniques, models, 
and values of members of a scientific community.60 As connected to a set of characteristic 
procedures and effects that are accepted within a specific domain and its specific discourse at 
a given point in time paradigms thus would connect to knowledge.61 But if described as 
discursive formations, they are not positivities in the sense of a status of definitive 
knowledge.62 Then they are rather concerned with the internal regime that governs statements 
into scientifically verifyable and falsifyable propositions.63 However, paradigms have also 
been understood as historical phenomena that ‘constitute and make intelligible a broader 
historical-problematic context’.64 This is closer to an understanding that even in the absence 
of rules, such as matrixes or formations, it is possible to articulate a comprehensible tradition 
through using an example as paradigm. For the purpose of this thesis, theology and 
jurisprudence are understood each as a paradigm that displays all three markers. They are 
disciplinary matrixes which each display discursive formations and are expressions of a 
broader historical context. Both express a particular set of knowledge in disciplinary 
languages whose linguistic forms are governed by statements that are in German 
jurisprudence as well as in Lutheran theology called dogmatics, and which both have 
developed in the course of the post-Enlightenment scientific age. 
 
A comparitative study that uses as its source to a large extent Bonhoeffer’s and Schmitt’s 
original German texts is justified because the connection of Bonhoeffer’s theology to German 
jurisprudence is not easily detectable in the English translation. Thus the comparison of the 
primary texts attempts to draw out this underlying jurisprudential feature within Bonhoeffer’s 
                                            
60
 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 182. 
61
 cf. Michael Foucault, The Politics of Truth, trans. Lysa Hochroth and Catherine Porter (Los Angeles: 
Semiotexte, 2007), 60-61.  
62
 Michael Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Routledge, 
2002), 200. 
63
 cf. Michael Foucault, “Truth and Power”, in Power, vol. 3 of Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, ed. 
James D. Faubion, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: New Press, 2000), 3:114. 
64
 Giorgio Agamben, The Signature of all Things: On Method, trans. Luca D’Isante with Kevin Attell 
(Brooklyn: Zone Books, 2009), 9. 
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theology. Because translations are primarily a form of interpretation65 a translated text is 
always only an approximation and never a full equivalent to the original text. Therefore it is 
difficult, and in some instances even impossible, to transfer into a translation the cultural 
background in which the text originated. Not only have the German and the English language 
their own special tradition, cultures, and history, but some words and sets of ideas have no 
exact parallels in the other language which makes comprehending and appropriating 
difficult.66 Even facts behind a given text are not easy to discover and to communicate in the 
translation.67 Thus the complexities of the German culture of the Weimar period may be 
difficult to discern in Bonhoeffer’s rather complicated academic language. One of 
Bonhoeffer’s translators states that Bonhoeffer owes the phrasing of his texts to the long 
history of European intellectual development and is often full of allusions from the German 
culture of his time.68 Therefore it was necessary to existentially enter into the culture, 
historical, and theological otherness of Bonhoeffer’s time, culture and person. This 
connection of the editorial team to Bonhoeffer’s writings was fascilitated by the belief in a 
deep unity that rested within the life and resurrection of Jesus Christ.69 This meant that 
Bonhoeffer’s texts were approached from a perspective strongly centered on the theological 
paradigm of thought. This becomes visible for example in the translation of the only sentence 
that the jurist Leibholz quoted from Bonhoeffer in November 1932.70 The German word Amt 
is translated in Bonhoeffer’s text as “ministry” which has a clear theological connotation. 
However, Bonhoeffer’s sentence addressed the functions of the state, which is confirmed in 
the form of Leibholz’s citation, and therefore the word Amt refers to the office or official task 
of the state which has an additional legal-administrational connection. Similarly, the German 
word Gesellschaft, translated as society of purpose, can refer in its original German context to 
particular structural forms as defined in the 1897 German Commercial Code.71 Thus by using 
                                            
65
 Lisa E. Dahill, “Bringing Voice to Life: Bonhoeffer’s Spirituality in Translation”, in Interpreting Bonhoeffer, 
80. 
66
 cf. Hans Pfeifer, “Cultural Elements in Theology and Language: Translation as Interpretation”, in Interpreting 
Bonhoeffer, 61. 
67
 Pfeifer, “Cultural Elements”, 62. 
68
 Pfeifer, “Cultural Elements”, 62. 
69
 Pfeifer, “Cultural Elements”, 69. 
70
 ‚„Nicht Schöpfung neuen Lebens, sondern Erhaltung gegebenen Lebens” ist das Amt des Staates.’; Gerhard 
Leibholz, Die Auflösung der Liberalen Demokratie in Deutschland und das autoritäre Staatsbild (Munich: 
Duncker & Humblot, 1933), 74-75, emphasis added. ‘Not the creation of new life, but preservation of existing 
life is its ministry.‘; DBWE 12:293, emphasis added. 
71
 Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB). Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz. Accessed March 30, 
2018. https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/hgb/HGB.pdf. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
18 
 
this word Bonhoeffer may have used juristically defined forms as possible foundation for the 
institutional form of the Protestant Church. 
 
The location of a language’s origin and its development are reflected in the language’s 
cadence, and the conceptual juristic or constitutional structures that reverberate behind a 
particular phrase or word can remain hidden in a translation. Therefore the juristic resonance 
within Bonhoeffer’s theology may not easily be recognized by a reader of the English 
translation, especialy those readers who are unfamiliar with the specific details and 
background of the historical close connection in Germany between church and state, their 
close paradigmatic expressions, and their official first-time separation in 1919. 
 
Both Bonhoeffer’s and Schmitt’s writings make expert and refined use of German cultural 
references and the German language which is in line with their knowledge of the extensive 
European intellectual history as well as paradigmatic language. Schmitt’s immersion into the 
Continental legal tradition which differs in method and reasoning from the Anglo-American 
legal tradition
72
 seems to have been often overlooked or not recognized. This appears to be 
the case in regards to the linguistic arrangement of his Political Theology. In this text, which 
advances the theory of a decisionist sovereign beyond legality, he applied a reflection of the 
“decision style” in which German judges are trained. Schmitt stated the result of his thoughts 
in a precise summarizing statement prior to his reasoning; a juristic method he had previously 
analyzed in Gesetz und Urteil.73 Therefore Schmitt’s Political Theology may also be 
understood as a contribution to the controvercies on method and direction that was embedded 
within the Weimar Republic’s discourses on the theory of state.74 
 
For their part, Bonhoeffer’s writings are translated in a comprehensive series and with a high 
degree of consistency as to the use of terms. In comparison, Schmitt’s main jurisprudential 
                                            
72
 The most profound methodological difference is the Anglo-American juristic method of case law over against 
the German method of grounding the evaluation of a case in a norm, that is, in a promulgated law. A concise 
comparison can be found in Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Vom Ethos der Juristen, 2
nd
 reviewed ed. (Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot, 2011), 20-36. 
73
 Carl Schmitt, Gesetz und Urteil: Eine Untersuchung zum Problem der Rechtspraxis, 2
nd
 ed. (Munich: C. H. 
Beck, 1969, reprint 2009), all subsequent citations refer to the reprint edition. 
74
 Regarding the controvercy on method see: Max-Emanuel Geis, „Der Methoden- und Richtungsstreit in der 
Weimarer Staatslehre“, Juristische Schulung (C.H.Beck Munich, Frankfurt), no. 2 (1989): 91-96.  
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writings have a variety of unconnected translators.75 Thus the translations are not coordinated 
and uniform in the use of jurisprudential terms. This can be confusing as many of Schmitt’s 
terms are expressions of juristic elements and method specific to German jurisprudence. 
Without them directly correlating to concepts in the Anglo-American legal system there are 
no corresponding expressions in the English language. A consistant translation of terms could 
provide some clarity. For example the word Eigenbedeutung within Schmitt’s Political 
Theology is translated as ‘proper meaning of the subject’76 instead of using a translation such 
as “significance of the self”. The former translation obscures the connection of the original 
phrase to the self-elevation of Schmitt’s sovereign. The word “meaning” does not reflect the 
“significance” the sovereign gives to himself by stepping beyond legal boundaries and loses 
the connection to Schmitt’s earlier work on the significance (Bedeutung) of the individual.  
 
Additionally, not all of Schmitt’s work is yet translated into English; especially some of 
Schmitt’s earliest work which is of high relevance to this thesis. This pertains to Schmitt’s 
1910 doctoral thesis, published as Über Schuld und Schuldarten77 and the book Gesetz und 
Urteil which he wrote in 1912 during his period of articling at the courts and which addresses 
the correctness of judgements. Both books are foundational to Schmitt’s subsequent many 
abstractions and are exclusively concerned with German jurisprudence. The former is a 
discourse on the relationship between intent and guilt within criminal law and the latter 
analyses jurisprudential method within German law. 
 
Because of its focus on the theological paradigm and despite the consistency in its wording 
the official Bonhoeffer translation has difficulties with capturing the possible undertone of 
the jurisprudential paradigm in Bonhoeffer’s texts. Within Schmitt’s texts the translations 
                                            
75
 Schmitt’s texts were not translated as part of an overarching project but by interested individuals: George 
Schwab (political scientist) translated Schmitt’s Political Theology in 1985 and The Concept of the Political in 
1976; Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. George Schwab, ex. ed. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1995; reprint 2007). Ellen Kennedy (political scientist) translated The Crisis of Parliamentary 
Democracy in 1985. G. L. Ulmen translated Roman Catholicism and Political Form in 1996; Carl Schmitt, 
Roman Catholicism and Political Form, ed. and trans. G. L. Ulmen (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1996). Jeffrey 
Seitzer (political scientist) translated Schmitt’s Verfassungslehre in 2008; Carl Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 10th 
ed. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2010). Guy Oakes (philosopher) translated Schmitt’s Political Romanticism in 
2011. Graham Ward (theologian) and Michael Hoelzl (political philosopher) translated Schmitt’s Die Diktatur 
in 2014; Carl Schmitt, Die Diktatur: Von den Anfängen des modernen Souveränitätsgedankens bis zum 
proletarischen Klassenkampf, 7
th
 ed. (Duncker & Humblot: Berlin, 2006). Interestingly, there is a lack of 
German jurists among the translators. 
76
 Schmitt, Political Theology, 35. 
77
 Carl Schmitt, Über Schuld und Schuldarten: Eine terminologische Untersuchung, Strafrechtliche 
Abhandlungen 120 (Breslau: Schletter, 1910). 
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often focus less on the actual words, despite the importance of accuracy of language within 
German law, and instead often resort to transmitting the sense of a text. This carries the 
danger of diverging from the intended meaning by the author of the text. Based on these 
reasons, I proceeded in this thesis from Bonhoeffer’s and especially Schmitt’s original texts 
in all areas where it was of high importance. Therefore, the translations are mostly my own. 
If a particular term was concerned I provided the original German word or phrase in brackets 
immediately following their English translations. If longer passages needed to be translated I 
added for reasons of clarity or accuracy the matching original passages of the text in the 
footnotes. This provides transparency and adds more context and substance to the argument. 
Where additional translational substance was not needed, I proceeded in regards to 
Bonhoeffer from the official translations of the Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works. The footnotes 
always identify exactly whether the German original text or an English translation was used. 
Wherever a German text was used, the English translation is always entirely my own if not 
otherwise noted. Also, translations of titles of books that are only available in the German 
language and translations of legislative acts are my own. 
 
For systematic clarity and for focussing the argument and comparison between the data, 
between the professional theories of Bonhoeffer and Schmitt, quantitative limitations were 
applied. Limits are set to the time-frame of their writings and include a prioritization of the 
sources. Central attention will be directed at Bonhoeffer’s and Schmitt’s early texts because 
this permits extracting and comparing the foundations to their conceptual thought. The scope 
of the research, despite two exceptions, concentrates on Bonhoeffer’s and Schmitt’s writings 
within the contextual developments up to 1935. At this point in time Hitler’s totalitarianism 
began to sideline Schmitt within the National Socialist movement. Setting the time-limit to 
1935 excludes, on Bonhoeffer’s part, his participation in the underground resistance to 
National Socialism and in the 1940s conspiracy and attempted coup d’état. However, 
included are nonetheless texts written up to Bonhoeffer’s incarceration in April 1943 and 
which were published after his death in 1945 as Ethics. These essays provide depth to the 
features of his previously developed theology. Schmitt re-addressed many of his pre-war and 
war-time topics in the post-war years, especially the issues of political theology and the 
friend-enemy dichotomy. But the latter post-war contributions were excluded, especially his 
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Political Theology II,78 because Bonhoeffer’s early death prevented him from continuing his 
own post-war thought in response to the developing context and thus prevents a comparison. 
An exception on Schmitt’s part is made regarding the only self-reflective writing he ever 
published and which dates from the time of his incarceration in the immediate post-war years 
between 1945 and 1947. These are included.  
 
Although Bonhoeffer’s sermons which explore biblical texts and Schmitt’s many literary, 
non-jurisprudential writings from his student years and his early career are interesting parts of 
their work, they were not analysed given the main thrust of this thesis. The sermons and the 
literary writings may be used to extract to some degree personal aspects of their inner selves 
or may bring insights into their spirituality, that is, into how they discerned the Word of God 
for their own lives. Aspects of personal discernment might even intersect with their 
understanding of a particular element of decision. Such intersecting underlying aspects 
between decisions and discernment may regard their personal understanding of what the 
“truth” of the embodied Word is behind generalizations and abstractions. But discernment, as 
the other side of the coin to the theme of “decision”, reached the surface of Bonhoeffer’s 
attention only in his late writing and ‘he never had a chance to reflect systematically on the 
significance or practice of discernment for his spirituality.’79 And because Schmitt was a very 
private person, with the one-time exception during his incarceration, any inquisitive attempt 
to extract from the early literary writings insights into Schmitt’s personal understanding of 
the Word of God for his own life is questionable and may lead to speculations. But the self-
awareness needed for the personal discernment of God’s word is not central to this thesis’ 
focus on structural forms.  
   
Certain sub-themes pertaining to Schmitt’s Catholic orientation, the correctness of Schmitt’s 
and Bonhoeffer’s statements regarding Catholicism, and Schmitt’s statements about the 
Lutheran faith were not addressed in this thesis. A specific Catholic-Lutheran discourse 
would have distracted from the main focus on the theological and jurisprudential paradigms 
of thought as they relate to the structural elements of Schmitt’s and Bonhoeffer’s position on 
the topic of decision. To include questions such as whether Schmitt’s presentation of the 
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 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology II: The myth of the closure of any political theology, ed. And trans. Michael 
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institutionalism of the Catholic Church and the role of the pope, in fact, correspond to the 
Catholic Church’s official position and whether Schmitt’s remarks about the Lutheran faith 
correlate to the Lutheran church’s position would have been distracting. Schmitt never 
claimed to be speaking on behalf of the Catholic Church or to have particular knowledge of 
Lutheran dogma. Similarly, the many remarks throughout Bonhoeffer’s writings that address 
Catholicism and the Catholic Church were disregarded because a discourse on the correctness 
of their substance would not have enhanced the argument of the thesis. Nonetheless, the fact 
that Bonhoeffer as Lutheran theologian and pastor was speaking from and for the Lutheran 
faith remains an important part of the argument.  
 
1.5 Literature Review 
 
The decades since the end of the Second World War have seen the publication of Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer’s writings, the re-publication of Carl Schmitt’s pre-war books as well as new 
publications and an explosion of secondary literature on both.
80
 While often Schmitt’s ‘self-
dramatization’81 continued to draw attention to his publications, interest in Bonhoeffer’s 
writings emerged only two decades after his death, and has increased steadily ever since. In 
Schmitt-studies the main attention was, and to a large extend still is, drawn toward Schmitt’s 
involvement with National Socialism, his weight on sovereignty, and the salient friend-
enemy concept which served as anthropological principle for exclusion and totalitarianism. 
Many Bonhoeffer-studies emphasize his participation in the underground resistance and 
conspiracy around the attempt to assassinate Hitler on 20 July 1944. Schmitt’s theory of the 
sovereign with its state of exception and situation of emergency, which draws easy attention 
due to its terse arrangement in Schmitt’s Political Theology and his particular use of 
theology, seems to have set, for the most part, the agenda for those Bonhoeffer-studies that 
interact with Schmittian theories. In the present study, however, the topics of sovereignty and 
exception are peripheral to the disclosure of the underlying structures in their understanding 
of the issue of decision. The primary focus is on comparing Schmitt’s and Bonhoeffer’s pre-
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 An overview of the Bonhoeffer-scholarship can be found on the official website of the International 
Bonhoeffer Society – English Language Section, The Bonhoeffer Center, updated December 16, 2018, accessed 
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1935 jurisprudence and theology respectively with a view to Bonhoeffer refuting with his 
theological position on the topic of “decision” the foundational structural elements that 
underlay Schmitt’s Dezision.  
 
1.5.1 Schmitt Studies 
 
Schmitt-studies focus heavily on the state of exception, situation of emergency, and the 
sovereign leader. This concentration is reflected in the intellectual discourses of Giorgio 
Agamben
82
 and many others.
83
 Paul W. Kahn also proceeds from Schmitt’s succinct 
definition of the sovereign and the state of exception in his book Political Theology: Four 
New Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty.
84
 He calls Schmitt’s argument in Political 
Theology obscure and based on ‘impenetrable considerations of lost German theoreticians’ of 
long-gone European theorists
85
 and disregards the larger context of its emergence in the 
Continental legal tradition. Instead he proceeds from his Anglo-American legal 
understanding
86
 and expert knowledge of US American jurisprudence.
87
 For example, Kahn 
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(London: Routledge, 2005; reprint 2008). 
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85
 Kahn, Political Theology, 4-5. 
86 One major difference between the two legal traditions is the Anglo-American concept of “Equity”. The 
discourse Kahn discusses under “Equity” was within the Weimar context part of the discourse on “Equality 
before the law” (Article 109, para 1 Weimar Constitution), especially its definition and connection to 
arbitrariness. In fact, the 1924 doctoral dissertation of Bonhoeffer’s brother-in-law Gerhard Leibholz dealt with 
the topic of equality and became a foundational work for the post-war constitutional definition of equality. 
Furthermore, the post-war German constitution, the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) -  precisely in acknowledging that 
law and politics are often intertwined - established a Federal Constitutional Court with constitutionally exactly 
defined competencies (Articles 61, 93, 94, 100 Basic Law). During the Weimar era both, Schmitt and Leibholz 
were involved in the discourse regarding the need for a keeper of the Constitution; a Constitutional Court was 
thought of as one option. In 1951 Leibholz became one of the first judges to the Federal Constitutional Court of 
Germany. This court decisively differs in its function and position from the American Supreme Court within the 
American legal system which self-assumed some functions similar to a constitutional court. 
87
 Not taking into account the difference in the two legal traditions risks falsifying Schmitt’s assertions and leads 
to “discoveries” as for example that Schmitt’s reasoning is founded on a philosophy of freedom that can be 
realized only when the freedom of philosophy is ensured and thus ‘draws out philosophical implications of 
which Schmitt himself may not have been fully aware.’; Dick Howard, foreword to Political Theology, by Paul 
W. Kahn, vii. The wider context of Schmitt’s arguments shows that his concern was the freedom and other 
rights of the individual within liberalism even though he assessed them as a fiction. Also, already in 1963 
Schmitt’s student Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde had stated that the liberal secular state is based on conditions 
which itself cannot guarantee but has to risk in the name of freedom. Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Recht, 
Staat, Freiheit: Studien zur Rechtsphilosophie, Staatstheorie und Verfassungsgeschichte, 2nd ext. ed. (Frankfurt 
am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2009), 112. And in 1990 he added that freedom does not exist abstractly but 
receives its form through legal formation. The historical-political controversies of the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century 
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admits that a decision lies between norm and application
88
 but rejects Schmitt’s argument in 
Political Theology that content alien to the norm enters the judge’s decision which lies 
between norm and its application and connects to Schmitt’s earlier analysis of German 
jurisprudential method in Gesetz und Urteil. Furthermore he compares American 
constitutional theory and law with the contemporary European Union
89
 instead of Germany’s 
present post-war constitutional Basic Law, the Grundgesetz. A comparison with the Basic 
Law, would have led to engaging with Schmitt’s contextual jurisprudential discourse because 
the German post-war constitution owes much to Schmitt’s analysis of the shortcomings of the 
Weimar Constitution in his 1928 Verfassungslehre which was written between the first and 
second publication of Political Theology.  
 
Somewhat differently to Kahn, William T. Cavanaugh in his Migration of the Holy
90
 limits 
his discourse with Schmitt explicitly to the concrete context of the United States’ civil 
religion. He addresses Schmitt’s sovereign exception in connection to evangelical 
Christianity that uses this concept for the purpose of legitimizing America’s exceptionalism 
in the world and for creating a messianic nation which, in Cavanaugh’s assessment, displaces 
the church.91 And in contrast to Kahn, Ellen Kennedy’s Constitutional Failure: Carl Schmitt 
in Weimar
92
 sets Schmitt’s jurisprudence and theory of state within the developing context in 
Germany of the early 20
th
 century and is an important source of information.  
 
Hasso Hoffman in his 2001 foreword to the fourth edition of his 1964 Legitimität gegen 
Legalität: Der Weg der politischen Philosophie Carl Schmitts
93
 insists that Schmitt’s texts are 
not simply semantic deposits from the epoch of crisis during the transition to an industrial 
mass-society. Also Schmitt’s political and jurisprudential theories cannot be simply reduced 
to or dissolved in a political theology, despite the increasing interest in debating whether 
Schmitt’s religiosity was genuinely Catholic, Catholic ecclesiastic, a personally defined 
                                                                                                                                       
were essentially a fight for developing the right form of freedom; a fight that continues in our present time; 
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Catholicism, or of an antique-pagan form.
94
 Instead, to Hofmann, Schmitt was by profession 
a professor of law whose most important work was focussed on constitutional theory and 
international law.
95
 Hofmann is astonished that the majority of works on Schmitt are now 
written by non-jurists such as Heinrich Meier.
96
  
 
In The Lesson of Carl Schmitt: Four Chapters on the Distinction between Political Theology 
and Political Philosophy
97
 Meier appeals to Schmitt’s context in the sense of a ‘foundational 
context of a thought’ that precedes Schmitt’s doctrines. To Meier, if a political theologian 
wishes to remain in accord with himself, he must apply the fundamental demands of his 
theory to his own activity and grasp his theorizing as historical action that is subject to the 
commandment of obedience.
98
 According to Hofmann’s summary of Meier’s perspective, 
Schmitt’s political theology stresses obedience to the enmity mentioned in Genesis 3:15 and 
the story of Cain’s animosity toward his brother Abel in Genesis 4:1-16, because Original Sin 
had brought this conflict to human beings. This finds expression in dichotomies such as good 
and evil, God and Satan, and obedience and disobedience. This is, according to Meier, the 
foundational context to the friend-enemy dichotomy behind the concept of the political. Thus 
to obey God necessitates for Schmitt to insist on this concept of an enemy and to resist the 
satanic temptation of natural goodness or appeals to humanity. Hoffman observes that if 
Meier’s assessment was correct it must be concluded that Schmitt’s anti-Semitism rooted in 
holding the Jews responsible for this universalistic vision.
99
  
 
However, Meier states that the decisive determinations of the ‘political theologian from 
Plettenberg’ are authority, revelation, and obedience100 and that the real drama of Schmitt’s 
existence is to discover the intentions behind Schmitt’s concepts.101 For this purpose Meier 
consulted foremost the three editions of the source of Schmitt’s friend-enemy distinction, The 
Concept of the Political, as well as Political Theology and Schmitt’s post-war writings in 
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Glossarium
102
 with its Anti-Semitic excesses, as well as Schmitt's last publication Political 
Theology II,103 and states that he wrote his book on Schmitt while still being influenced by 
Leo Strauss.
104
 Thus Meier’s evaluation of Schmitt stretches essentially from the National 
Socialist experience to the post-war Schmittian texts. Missing from Meier’s research are 
Schmitt’s very early publications, Über Schuld und Schuldarten, Gesetz und Urteil, Der Wert 
des Staates und die Bedeutung des Einzelnen,
105
 and, interestingly, also the essay “The 
visibility of the church”.106 These are exactly the texts that are most relevant to this present 
thesis. 
 
Schmitt’s 1910 doctoral thesis Über Schuld und Schuldarten on guilt and the types of guilt, 
and the 1912 booklet Gesetz und Urteil which he published under the impressions of articling 
at a court in the Rhineland provide for this thesis basic insights into Schmitt’s subsequent 
theories. While the former became relevant regarding Schmitt’s intention and abstractions, 
the latter disclosed the origin of a need for personality in the sovereign, and the quality of his 
ties to legal norms. Furthermore, Schmitt’s 1917 essay on “The Visibility of the Church” in 
combination with the 1923 booklet on Roman Catholicism and Political Form unlocked the 
most important abstraction when it was read together with Political Theology whose first 
German edition (1922) was written almost simultaneously with the first German language 
edition of Roman Catholicism (1923).  
 
The present thesis takes serious Bonhoeffer’s theology and Schmitt’s juristic, jurisprudential 
realm as they were connected to the contextual socio-economic and political dynamics of 
their time and place. With Hofmann, I understand Schmitt foremost as a jurisprudential 
scholar, a professor of law who practiced law and was rooted in the Continental legal 
tradition. This does not exclude religious convictions on Schmitt’s part but also does not 
neglect Schmitt’s immersion in the Continental legal tradition that was underlying his 
theories and political perspectives. 
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1.5.2 Bonhoeffer Studies 
 
Bonhoeffer’s resistance to National Socialism was the focus of very recent scholarship. 
Michael DeJonge’s Bonhoeffer on Resistance: The Word Against the Wheel107 focussed on 
Bonhoeffer’s resistance and the Jewish Question from a strong Lutheran perspective. 
Christiane Tietz’s concise introductory biography highlighted Bonhoeffer as Theologian of 
Resistance.
108
 In the concluding chapter,109 Tietz states that Bonhoeffer’s decisions and his 
‘radicality and refusal to compromise’ cannot simply be adopted for today. But nonetheless 
his theology retains a ‘particular social and political function’ for what ‘more recently has 
been described as “public theology”’. Bonhoeffer ‘tried to preserve the relationship between 
faith, theology, and life’ in a way that corresponds to reality for the purpose of living 
responsibly in a modern world that takes serious faith in God as well as a human autonomy 
that is available “for” others. This thesis may add to this perspective that the structural 
elements behind Bonhoeffer’s understanding of decision and his refusal to compromise on 
them are of enduring applicability to issues of significance. 
 
Another study that attends to the topic of resistance is Christine Schlieβer’s Schuld durch 
rechtes Tun? Verantwortliches Handeln nach Dietrich Bonhoeffer.110 Central is here the issue 
of responsibility as it bears down on Bonhoeffer’s specific decision of joining the conspiracy 
for killing Hitler. Her aim is to establish Bonhoeffer’s objective guilt for acting responsibly in 
this particular borderline case. Responsibility is defined as responding with the own life to 
Christ’s life. Thereby responsibility is marked by a bond to God and other human beings in 
the form of Stellvertretung within concrete reality and by the freedom to risk the act of taking 
on guilt.111 It is an act beyond law and in conscious transgression of the law, of an ought, of 
the normal case, that remains inactive unless an order is endangered.112 Asserted is that the 
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transgressed, but it is nonetheless at all times active, not inactive, because the aim of a prohibition is to at all 
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willingness to take on objective guilt is the “innermost part” of Bonhoeffer’s decision which 
is grounded in Christ who had stepped into human guilt as the one who had become human. 
However, the “objective” guilt is not set into relation to a possible subjective aspect with 
regards to the innermost part of a decision. It is conceivable that a relation between the 
objective and the subjective can either prevent or establish responsibility and that 
responsibility and guilt are not necessarily the same.  
 
Recent research that sets Bonhoeffer’s theology into relation to Schmitt’s theories mirrors the 
current concentration within Schmitt studies on sovereignty and exception and fits into 
Hoffman’s observation of a rising interest of non-jurists in studying Schmitt. In “The 
‘Borderline Case’ in Bonhoeffer’s Political Theology” Matthew Puffer113 compares 
Bonhoeffer’s understanding of the Grenzfall, defined as an ‘uncommon occurrence of a 
conflict between ethical norms’,114 to Schmitt’s definition of the sovereign who defines and 
solves the problems of the Ausnahme (exception), the case beyond the Normalfall (normal 
case).  The translation of the Normalfall as “routine”, “everyday”, and “quotidian”115 removes 
Schmitt’s Ausnahme to the moral realm. I would argue that more can be gained by keeping 
the language in the jurisprudential paradigm because Schmitt had given throught to the 
relation of the legal and moral realms since his earliest work.116 Also Petra Brown’s doctoral 
thesis117 and in her essay “Bonhoeffer, Schmitt, and the state of exception” move Schmitt 
outside the jurisprudential framework.118 She sees in Bonhoeffer’s as well as Schmitt’s 
writings a “single individual” who is enacting a suspension of “ethical” law.119 
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as Kierkegaard’s ‘Single Individual’, 258, 172, 255, emphasis in original. For Schmitt the sovereign was tied to 
the norm, that is, he was authorized to act beyond the norm for the purpose of restoring the norm. Schmitt called 
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This thesis is in line with previous work in which I have compared Bonhoeffer’s theology 
with Schmitt’s jurisprudence as immersed in his Continental legal thought and context. 
Instead of focusing on the sovereign, exception, or the concept of the political, I compared 
Schmitt’s jurisprudential concept of representation and Bonhoeffer’s theological concept of 
Stellvertretung,120 as well as the consequences of their different paradigmatic thought for 
human freedom.121 And a comparision between Bonhoeffer’s view on equality and that of his 
brother-in-law, the jurist Leibholz, revealed that both rejected arbitrariness based on their 
respective positions to the Roman legal principle of suum cuique.122  
 
This study’s comparison between the theological and the jurisprudential paradigm as 
immersed within the discourses of the early 20
th
 century may add extra validity to Clifford 
Green’s view in The Sociality of Christ and Humanity: Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Early Theology 
1927-1933 that Bonhoeffer developed his theology around a concept of person,
123
 and to 
DeJonge’s understanding in The Fact of the person of Jesus Christ.124 In this regard the 
jurisprudential debate of the early 20
th
 century on the Romanist-Germanist discourse within 
jurisprudence regarding the juristic person and the natural person might be of interest. This 
present study on possible interrelations between theology and jurisprudential aspects in 
Bonhoeffer’s theology may also add to Joachim von Joosten’s125 investigation into the 
interconnection between theology and sociology in Bonhoeffer’s Sanctorum Communio, 
especially as it pertains to the relation of person to institutionality. 
  
                                                                                                                                       
this a commissarial dictatorship; Carl Schmitt, Die Diktatur; first published in 1921. Only by 1934, with the 
second edition of Political Theology the decision of the “single individual” became the final decision of one 
particular human judge. Also for Bonhoeffer, an exeptional act is tied to restoring normality. A leader is called 
to lead to responsible life in existing community and is thus restricted in his authority; DBWE 12:280. 
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For establishing Bonhoeffer’s and Schmitt’s lived immersion into the context of the early 20th 
century two informative biographies fulfill the precondition. Reinhard Mehring’s biography 
Carl Schmitt: Aufstieg und Fall is still the only and most comprehensive work which not only 
details the rise and fall of this jurist, but also interweaves his life and work as it happened 
within the realm of law and politics. The most comprehensive biography on Bonhoeffer is the 
one written by his long-term close friend Eberhard Bethge.
126
 However, Bonhoeffer’s early 
friendship to the jurist Leibholz is represented only in passing because he did not witness the 
early Bonhoeffer-Leibholz friendship first-hand. Bethge met Bonhoeffer only by the time the 
Jewish born Leibholz was forced to emigrate with his family to England. Therefore 
information regarding the Bonhoeffer-Leibholz-Schmitt line of connection relied on 
Mehring’s references to Leibholz within his Schmitt-biography, a comparison between the 
forewords to Gerhard Leibholz’ 1929127 and 1960128 editions of his Habilitation thesis, and 
the very recent publication of Schmitt’s diaries from 1925 to 1929 which were edited by 
Martin Tielke and Gerd Giesler
129
 as well as the diaries from 1930 to 1934 edited by 
Wolfgang Schuller and Gerd Giesler.
130
  
 
In his concise biography on Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ferdinand Schlingensiepen
131
 provided 
information regarding the interchange of the topic of decision in Bonhoeffer’s theology to the 
historical events of the 1930s and 1940s in Germany. He points to the importance of the issue 
of decision for Bonhoeffer. He establishes that the theme of decision runs through all of 
Bonhoeffer’s early work, from his first sermon in 1925, through the time of establishing the 
Confessing Church, until about 1940 when this topic appears to have lost its importance for 
Bonhoeffer.132 Schlingensiepen attributes this to Bonhoeffer’s decision of joining the 
underground resistance and Bonhoeffer’s assessment of the importance of personal strength 
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over against choices between alternatives that are made by weak people.133 Additionally 
Schlingensiepen’s reference to Schmitt’s legal theory certainly evokes interest. He writes that 
Bishop Oberheid, a member of the National Socialist Party and the German Christians who 
supported the official Lutheran church, had learned during his studies in theology through 
personal contact with Schmitt that the National Socialist revolution’s all-embracing, all-
pervading idea of a total state had created an order that diametrically differed from the 
Weimar Consitution’s democracy. Therefore following Carl Schmitt, it should be possible to 
establish by force a Protestant “Reich-church”.134 For a study on a comparison between 
Schmitt’s theory and Bonhoeffer’s theology around the issue of decision, Schlingensiepen’s 
presentation raises the question of accuracy regarding Schmitt’s position vis-à-vis the 
Weimar Constitution, his “idea” of a total state, and the use of “force” over against the 
church. 
 
Bringing Bonhoeffer and Schmitt into conversation, and explicating Bonhoeffer’s effective 
opposition to fundamental elements of Schmittian juristic theory, necessitated foremost to 
locate both within their realities of the early 20
th
 century’s context. For establishing the 
broader historical context to Bonhoeffer’s and Schmitt’s intellectual conditioning V. R. 
Berghahn’s Modern Germany: Society, Economy and Politics in the Twentieth Century135 
contributed in-depth information which was supplemented, especially in regards to the socio-
economic realities, by Gunther Mai’s concise book Die Weimarer Republik.136 In regards to 
constitutional aspects Hans Vorländer’s Die Verfassung: Idee und Geschichte (The 
constitution: idea and history) provided specific information to the wider historical facts 
surrounding the Weimar Constitution. For the position of the Protestant Church as it 
developed throughout the constitutional fights of the 19
th
 century from the “two persons” of 
the Prussian King and his division of executive powers into an iura circa sacra and iura in 
sacra until the separation of the church from the state in the Weimar Constitution, Axel 
Freiherr von Campenhausen and Heinrich de Wall delivered insights with their 
Staatskirchenrecht: Eine systematische Darstellung des Religionsverfassungsrechts in 
Deutschland und Europa (The law of church-state relations: A systematic presentation of the 
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constitutional law regarding religions in Germany and Europe).
137
 Details of Schmitt’s 
contributions to and immersion in public law and Leibholz’s contributions to German law 
were taken from Michael Stolleis’ A History of Public Law in Germany 1914-1945.138 
However, as regards placing Schmitt’s theories within the general jurisprudence and among 
other jurists of his time, as well as its Romanist-Germanist discourse that was decisive for the 
theory of the fiction of the juristic person and its relation to the natural person, such deeper 
insight into German legal history was afforded by Friedrich Ebel’s and Georg Thielmann’s 
Rechtsgeschichte (History of law).
139
. Helpful in addition to historic aspects of law was the 
commentary to the Weimar Constitution which was written by the widely influential jurist 
Gerhard Anschütz.
140
 And the Palandt,
141
 the widely known commentary to the German 1900 
Civil Code, provided necessary information on legal institutes of private law in connection to 
establishing Bonhoeffer’s possible use of such legal institutes.  
 
Last but certainly not least, Bonhoeffer’s and Schmitt’s writings, mostly in their original 
German versions, were of foremost importance to this study. In the initial chapters of this 
thesis Bonhoeffer’s doctoral thesis Sanctorum Communio and his Habilitation theses Act and 
Being recived special attention. The former engaged in the discourse of the constitutionally 
prescribed external form of a juristic person which set the church apart from the juristic 
person of the state which Schmitt discussed. But while Schmitt retained his constitutional 
theory in the institutional, Bonhoeffer included the natural person as focus of confession and 
the church. Act and Being made it possible to proceed intellectually beyond thinking within 
enclosed systems, ultimately also regarding the legal system, but found limits to thinking in 
transcendence. In a sense, Bonhoeffer’s two earliest publications represent Bonhoeffer’s 
grounding for his objections and resistance, even though his theology continued to evolve. 
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Thus of further relevance for the topic of decision were especially Bonhoeffer’s Lectures on 
Christology and his Ethics.  
 
1.6 The Structure of the Thesis 
 
The present research pertains to Bonhoeffer’s and Schmitt’s perspectives on the importance 
and content of “decision”, which involves legal theory as well as theology within a particular 
historical context. The investigation of this thesis argues that Bonhoeffer was exposed to the 
jurisprudential paradigm of thought, which enabled him to make use of juristic concepts in 
his theology. This familiarized him, at least to some extent, with the theory of the state 
associated with Schmitt’s theories. The dissertation intends to show that Bonhoeffer’s 
theology entails an alternative to the underlying structural elements of Schmitt’s 
understanding of decision as a Dezision that is part of his theory of the state and that 
Bonhoeffer’s position refuted this structure with his central focus on Christ as part of his 
concept of the church. This will be done by considering in Chapters 2-3 their reasons for and 
the necessity of locating the form of decisions within a concept of state and a concept of 
church respectively. The contextual facts are placed ahead of the comparison of the two 
patterns of thought and their distinct sets of concepts. This will contribute to the clarity of this 
thesis’ argument because it will prevent the inter-paradigmatic quality of their engagement 
and the structural elements of their respective positions from being obscured by the facts of 
their cultural, political, and socio-economic context. The main part of the thesis will compare 
in Chapter 4 Bonhoeffer’s and Schmitt’s thought according to the indicators of “Choices”, 
“Resolve”, “Intent”, and “Active Manifestation”. They are summarized features of an 
established definition for the concept of decision within the realm of political sciences and 
are concerned with possible alternatives, a conceivable time factor, an envisioned goal, and 
the visible active implementation of the goal. The actual engagement with their respective 
positions will follow the logical pattern of describing Schmitt’s position ahead of 
Bonhoeffer’s position because the former, being older, had developed his theories prior of 
Bonhoeffer. Chapter 5, finally, will summarize the result of the research. 
 
Chapter 2 takes the approach of establishing the political and socio-economic context of 
Bonhoeffer’s and Schmitt’s work prior to engaging with the specifics of their writings. 
Because both Bonhoeffer and Schmitt were deeply engaged with and involved in the 
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developments of their time, pre-extracting the context from their work is not only meant to 
situate their work but also to enable a clear focus on the structural elements of decisions in 
the later part of the thesis, and to prevent impediments due to necessary recourses to the 
circumstances under which some of the elements arose. After a short recourse to the state-
church relations and constitutional developments during the second half of the 19
th
 century, 
attention will turn to the ecclesiastic and constitutional particularities of the first German 
republic, the Weimar Republic. The bulk of this chapter is concerned with the socio-
economic and political disintegration of the Republic, the rise of National Socialism, and, 
most importantly, with placing Bonhoeffer and Schmitt within such dynamics as well as with 
establishing their indirect personal proximity. 
 
Chapter 3 will draw attention to Bonhoeffer’s and Schmitt’s specific professional assessment 
of the Krisis of their time and place. The focus will be on the issue that each respectively 
perceived as most pressing and in need of a solution. This chapter will set Schmitt’s initial 
attempts at formulating a theory of state and Bonhoeffer’s earliest work on the concept of the 
church into a preliminary relation. This engages with their contemporary juristic Romanist-
Germanist discourse on the difference between a juristic person and a natural person and the 
relation of multiplicity to unity.  For Schmitt the state emerges as the mediator between meta-
physical Justice and reality which uses in times of a Krisis of mediation the tool of law to 
enforce an essence onto the individual. On Bonhoeffer’s part, the crisis will emerge as one of 
the magnitude of a status confessionis that demanded from 1933 onward a decision of faith 
because of the state’s attempt of replacing the significance of the person of Jesus Christ, the 
mediator of God’s revelation, with the significance of a single human leader and his 
persecutory legislation.  
 
Chapter 4 will take up the main theme of the de-cision as Ent-scheidung. It will be concerned 
with extracting what a decision entailed for Bonhoeffer as well as for Schmitt. Thus this 
chapter, drawing on the work of Tanja Pritzlaff,  is structured according to the indicators of a 
decision which relate respectively to the options as they were perceived (choice), the urgency 
of a solution (resolve), the intended goals (intent), and the factual realizations of their 
positions as they were flowing from the aforegoing assessments (active manifestation).  
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The “Choices” Bonhoeffer and Schmitt viewed as possible alternative options for a decision 
are disclosed in this chapter. For Schmitt, an alternative between identity and representation 
will emerge that is meant to solve the vagueness of the constitutional pretense-compromises 
regarding questions of political leadership. The unit of the people, which as the subject prior 
to the constitution is of equal consistency that exludes the inequal and had decided on the 
constitutional core of a parliamentary democracy, will have to decide either on parliamentary 
responsibility or trusting an autoriarian leader. Bonhoeffer’s concept of the church, one that 
takes the constitutional separation from the state seriously, will emerge as an alternative form 
for life in community parallel to the state, but with nonetheless both being parts of God’s one 
kingdom. His “Christ existing as church community” combines the juristic person and the 
private person to an institutional-spiritual form of sui generis in which God is the subject 
whose revelation is prior to the community. Apart from this vertical dimension, a horizontal 
dimension exists among the equally sinful human beings.  
 
The chapter on “Resolve” attends to the urgency of the “moment” that Bonhoeffer and 
Schmitt perceived in their contemporary situation, and its connection to their respective 
understandings of history. For Schmitt, a depoliticized and neutralized moment of 
nothingness had been reached on a trajectory of ever changing domains of central ideas and 
their connected elites. This demanded in their secularized world, where God and theological 
concepts had lost their essence, human creativeness ex nihilo and objective structural 
analogies.  Bonhoeffer’s account which sets Christ at the middle of salvation and of worldly 
history, separates God’s creation ex nihilo from the subjective moment of nothingness on the 
cross. This makes analogies impossible and it will emerge as foundationational for the 
following elements of Bonhoeffer’s view of decision.   
 
The ”Intent” as the central and internal part of any decision and the invisible turning point 
from choice to action, will disclose the difference in Schmitt’s understanding of intent as 
abstraction based on the rejection of a dolus directus in contrast to Bonhoeffer’s perspective 
of an actus directus that defines God’s intentionality for immediacy without interpretation. 
Schmitt’s early-career abstraction between objective intent and subjective guilt became 
foundational to his theory of state. Christ, the God become human, became the non-conflicted 
archetype for ideas that could be represented and implemented through formal institutional 
office for the purpose of shaping the material substance of earthly reality. In Bonhoeffer the 
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reality is reconciled to God and the human being returns to wholeness through faith in Christ. 
As intended by God, the human being will hear and act on God’s revelation with obedient 
non-conflicted simplicity and wisdom. While for Schmitt the human act-of-will (Willensakt) 
is subject to an objective legal decision, Bonhoeffer’s human being lives despite human 
decisions in an act-of-relating (Aktbezug) under God’s decision. 
 
With regard to the “Active Manifestations”, the final step of the decision, Schmitt proceeds 
with a structural analogy between the Roman juristic rationality of the Catholic Church and 
the state for the purpose of synchronizing all life to the Führer-principle. Bonhoeffer instead 
proceeded by disclosing an underlaying modern version of the Docetic heresy that separates 
idea and appearance. On this basis, Bonhoeffer redirected the meaning of Schmitt’s Gestalt 
from personality to person, replaces forced identity with reconciled wholeness through 
Stellvertretung, and clarifies that representation was incompatible with the Trinitarian 
presence in the Church. It is not the process of the “how” to turn an idea into personality that 
is decisive, but instead it is Christ as the “who”, the person. It is the difference of “becoming 
human” (Mensch werden) or “having become human” (Mensch geworden). God’s vision for 
humanity and community is not synchronizing (gleich-schalten) human beings to one human 
personality but instead it is con-forming (gleich-gestalten) the human beings to Christ’s 
person. God’s decision of fulfilling his promise of preserving humanity in the penultimate 
world ends divisions in the true sense of the word Ent-scheidung. 
 
The short Afterword will reflect on self-justification and divine justification as personal 
consequences, as these relate to Bonhoeffer’s and Schmitt’s respective positions regarding 
ending the urgent Krisis of their time and place with a “decision”.  
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Chapter 2: 
The Context: Schmitt and Bonhoeffer in “Weimar” 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Decisions depend on context just as context depends on decisions. In other words, context 
exerts influence on decisions and decisions on context, but this is not to say that such 
influence is singular and exclusive. Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s (1905-1945) and Carl Schmitt’s 
(1888-1986) context was the post-1918 Weimar Republic of Germany.
142
 “Weimar”, as the 
Republic was and often still is referred to, was not simply the prelude to the catastrophe of 
National Socialism. But neither was it an empty space, a vacuum, that resulted from replacing 
the monarchy with democracy and its concomitant jump from discipline and obedience to co-
determination and emancipation that demands debates, majorities and compromises. It was 
rather a vibrant place filled with many social and economic problems but also hope, 
creativity, and experimental imagination that was fueled by longings beyond rationalist and 
positivist constraints. It searched for a new human being (Mensch) under the conditions of a 
technological modernity in which previous certainties had become fluid. 
 
The first German Republic was divided geographically, culturally, socially, economically, 
and intellectually. It was a product of 19
th
 century Christian ideology, constitutional fights, 
growing nationalism, industrialization, social movements, economic competition between the 
European nations, and the Great War. Within the constitutional framework of the 1919 
Weimar Constitution social boundaries liquified and uncertainty produced reactionary as well 
as creative impulses. A “new human being” was meant to turn the post-war disenchantment 
with technology into a meaningful relationship between human beings and science and a life 
physically and mentally worth living. Arts, architecture, literature, film, theatre, design, and 
music all reflected the fears and insecurities set free by the energies of insecurity and 
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change.
143
 But a population already desensitized to violence by the devastating Great War 
also fought over polarizing political convictions which were aggravated by economic 
instability, widespread unemployment, poverty, and starvation. Thus promises of a strong 
leader, a new people, and a great future fell on parched but ready ground, even though the so 
called National Socialist’s “legal revolution” – a contradiction in se144 – was not inevitable. 
But grasping its chance, it eroded the republican character of so called “Weimar” within the 
short time span from 1933 to 1935. The Weimar Constitution’s mechanism for finding 
decisions turned into a totalitarian decisionism which reduced the constitutional democracy to 
an empty shell that reversed the 19
th
 century’s separation of powers and the individual’s 
distance from the state. And for the Protestant Church, a fight ensued with the state for 
keeping the institutional independence of the iura circa sacra, and for finally achieving and 
keeping the full independence as to the theological and liturgical content, the iura in sacra.  
 
Bonhoeffer and Schmitt
145
 recognized the importance of their contemporary context’s 
emergence from the past and the past’s formative influence on the changing present and the 
future. Thus to fully understand Bonhoeffer’s and Schmitt’s perspectives requires one to 
existentially enter into the otherness of their time, culture and person.
146
 Therefore this 
chapter outlines the emergence of so called “Weimar” from the major developments of the 
19
th
 century that led from a Christian state ideology to a Protestant institution apart from the 
state, followed by describing the immediate context of Bonhoeffer and Schmitt as it was 
defined by the decisions and compromises of the 1919 Weimar Constitution. Summaries of 
the disintegration of the Weimar Republic, and Bonhoeffer’s and Schmitt’s life trajectories 
within this immediate setting, will assist the subsequent comparative discourse on the 
structures that underlay their respective views on decisions and the resulting implications. 
 
 
 
                                            
143
 New art and architectural forms developed such as the Bauhaus in the city of Weimar, Gestalt theory, 
cubism, Dadaism, the expressionism of the New Objectivity, and the music form of cabaret. In the area of 
health, ideas of self-improvement flourished with the Lebensreform (Life Reform) that included Pilates, nudist 
culture, biodynamic agriculture, and homeopathy. Philosophy inquired into the scientific fields of mathematics 
and physics, advancing ideas such as phenomenology, existentialism, hermeneutics and deconstruction.  
144
 Hans Vorländer, Die Verfassung: Idee und Geschichte, 3rd ed. (Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck, 2009), 76. 
145
 Schmitt, Political Romanticism; Mehring, Schmitt, 117. 
146
 cf. Pfeifer, “Cultural Elements”, 68-69.   
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2.2 From Christian Ideology to Protestant Institution  
 
In the build up to the Weimar Republic of the early 20
th
 century, the inner make-up of the 
state of Prussia and the subsequent 1871 German Empire moved during the “long” 19th 
century from a romantic rural tranquility to an urban industrial mechanization with 
competitive nationalism as well as from a state-imposed Christian unity to a Protestant 
institution that distanced itself from the state. 
 
The post 1815
147
 Prussian façade of peaceful political stability disavowed the facts that 
press
148
 and university
149
 were censored, that those demanding republican and liberal 
reforms
150
 were persecuted, and that the previously granted liberation of the peasants was 
revoked. But Jewish citizens remained legally integrated in the societal three estates of 
aristocracy, bourgeois citizen, and peasants.
151
 A comprehensive administrational 
reorganization abolished the servants of dukes and established the Prussian civil service
152
 
with a three-tier hierarchical structure of parallel streams for state-administration, judiciary, 
military and the Protestant Church.
153
 The Summus Espicopus, in the legal construct of the 
“two persons” of the Prussian king,154 became the final decision making authority for the 
state and the “Prussian Union” which combined the Calvinist and Lutheran confessions under 
one common administrational, pastoral and spiritual oversight.
155
 Vesting the king with these 
comprehensive powers, and the manifestation of ruling the constitutional monarchy by God’s 
                                            
147
 At the end of the Napoleonic Wars the 1815 Vienna Congress had reorganized the power relations between 
the European Monarchies which provided to Europe for some time a relatively secure political stability.  
148
 The Karlsbad Resolution of the German Federation (Deutscher Bund) repealed in 1819 the previously 
granted freedom of the press; Vorländer, Verfassung, 64. 
149
 Among others, the first professor of theology at Berlin University, the liberal theologian Friedrich 
Schleiermacher, lost his teaching position; Sebastian Haffner, Preuβen ohne Legende, 3rd ed. (Munich: 
Goldmann Verlag, 1998), 306, 315. 
150
 This targeted mostly the “Friends of Freedom and Equality,” the Jacobins, who took their name from the 
Parisian Dominican monastery of Jacobin. It was the most well-known political group of the French Revolution 
of 1789. They stood for supporting rights to property and a strong government which was able to deal with 
economic chaos, internal rebellion, and external war. Under the leadership of Robespierre they established a 
revolutionary dictatorship which turned into a reign of terror; The Columbia Encyclopedia, 6th ed., s. v. 
“Jacobins”, accessed November 25, 2017, http://www.encyclopedia.com/history/modern-europe/french-
history/jacobins. 
151
 Haffner, Preuβen, 285, 288. 
152
 Jürgen Osterhammel, „Das 19. Jahrhundert“, Informationen zur Politischen Bildung 315, no. 2 (2012): 7. 
153 
This remained ever since the basic administrative structure of Germany; Haffner, Preuβen, 288-90. 
154
 Campenhausen and Wall, Staatskirchenrecht, 16, 29. 
155
 The Lutherans and the Calvinists kept separate creeds and confessions but were subjected to a common 
administrational organization, supervision and liturgy which led to constant disputes.   
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grace and mercy (Gottesgnadentum),
156
 turned institutionalized Protestant piety into an 
overall unifying state-ideology.
157
 This state-prescribed Christian Pietism
158
 of idyllic, 
romantic “Biedermeier” ambience took recourse to the powers of the soul and feeling, the 
forces of mind and heart, for the purpose of politically undermining the Enlightenment’s 
claims of individual human reason. Among the Protestant population this gradually turned 
into a perception of a common German cultural connectedness. However, it distanced the 
mainly Catholic population in the Rhineland/Ruhr area along the French border, and in the 
post-1870/71 German Reich also in Bavaria around Munich. Then the specifically anti-
Catholic politics (Kulturkampf)
159
 of the Protestant Prussian chancellor Otto von Bismarck 
(1815-1898) added an atmosphere of “foreignness” which extended to the Jewish 
population.
160
  
 
Despite the official reactionary piety, the demands of a strengthening bourgeoisie for 
implementing the 1789 French revolutionary liberal rights of freedom, equality, and 
democratic participation
161
 eventually found public expression in the 1849 Frankfurt 
Paulskirchen Constitution.
162
 A group of academic professors added the Basic Rights of 
freedom of the person, of religion, of assembly and movement, as well as equality before the 
law, abolishment of different social estates, legal property protection, and the end of the state 
                                            
156
 During the 19
th
 century the constitution was celebrated as a “secular Bible”. During constitution celebrations, 
resembling religious processions, two tablets inscribed with the rights of the citizens, similar to the Ten 
Commandments, and the Bible were paraded side-by-side through the streets; Vorländer, Verfassung, 66-67. 
157
 Haffner, Preuβen, 290-91, 314. 
158
 In defense to outer and inner aggression and revolution Protestant Prussia (as well as Orthodox Russia and 
Catholic Austria) used a romantic pietism that revived the idea of the Christian kingdom of the Middle Ages 
even though Prussia had not existed then. Nonetheless, a genuine unofficial, emotional Pietism in form of a 
revival movement grew in the 1830s/40s that turned Pomeranian agricultural estates into private prayer centers; 
Haffner, Preuβen, 291-93. 
159
 To Bismarck the “party spirit” of the Deutsche Zentrumspartei (German Centre Party), founded in 1870 and 
representing Catholic Germany and political Catholicism in Germany, was an undue influence of the “infallible” 
Pope’s “Rome-centered institution” in Protestant Prussia’s political matters. A line of repressive laws were 
meant to reduce the “foreign” influence of this Catholic “state within a state.” Among others, the “pulpit 
paragraph” of the Criminal Code prohibited clerics to use the pulpit for political statements. Civil law marriages 
became mandatory which ended Catholic interference into mixed marriages in Prussia. Also administrational 
state supervision of the Catholic Church was introduced, and any state funding was cancelled; Gerhard 
Czermak, Religions- und Weltanschauungsrecht: Eine Einführung (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 2008), 7-8. 
160
 Campenhausen and Wall, Staatskirchenrecht, 28; Osterhammel, “Das 19. Jahrhundert”, 69. 
161
 Ebel and Thielmann, Rechtsgeschichte, 337, 340-41 
162
 The 1848 Constitution is of enormous importance for the history of Constitutional Law in Germany. Its 
catalogue of basic rights was almost verbatim adopted by the 1949 Basic Law (Grundgesetz) for the Federal 
Republic of Germany; Ebel and Thielmann, Rechtsgeschichte, 343, 477. 
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church.
163
 Insisting on the “monarchic principle”, of the monarch being the sole bearer of 
sovereignty and ruling by God’s grace from “above,” the Prussian king refused the Emperor’s 
crown for a German Reich that was offered to him from “below” by the “people” of the 
Frankfurt Assembly.
 164
 Despite choosing a repressive military solution to the constitutional 
challenge, his 1850 Prussian constitutional reform from “above” granted freedom of religion, 
press and assembly, and established an independent judiciary. But parliamentary 
representation remained limited and based on a three-class electoral system that was tied to 
the amount of tax contributions levied on male-owned property which favored the land 
owning aristocracy in the east.
165
 Using in 1870/71 a crisis–decision dynamic, growing 
nationalistic tension in relation to France, and a swift war, the Prussian chancellor Bismarck 
united the German countries and the Prussian king became nonetheless Emperor of the 
German Reich.
166
  
 
However, regarding the Protestant Church, the 1850 Prussian reforms divided the king’s 
ecclesiastic powers of the Summus Episcopus into the iura circa sacra and the iura in sacra. 
The former he retained in form of fiduciary, administrative, and, especially, representational 
powers over the Protestant Church. The latter, the theological dogmatic and liturgical 
competencies, he transferred to the federal level of the ecclesiastic organizational stream. 
Thus as head of the state-administration, the king nonetheless kept final decision-powers over 
the Protestant Church.
167
 Yearning for more independence, the Protestant Church responded 
with developing a Church constitution which, albeit adhering to the state-installed 
administrative three-tier ecclesiastic hierarchical structure, moved the administrational head 
offices to the middle, the Provincial level. In effect, this removed the final authority for the 
iura in sacra-decisions out of the Monarch’s reach.  
 
Within jurisprudence, the continued struggle of the bourgeoisie for a constitutionally 
guaranteed legal sphere outside the influence of the monarch’s powers led to a private law 
realm apart from the state’s public law. On the sub-constitutional level the 1900 Civil Code 
                                            
163 
Ebel and Thielmann, Rechtsgeschichte, 339-40. 
164
 Vorländer, Verfassung, 64, 68-69. 
165  
Creifelds Rechtswörterbuch, ed. Hans Kaufmann, 11th rev. ed. (1992), s.v. „Dreiklassenwahlrecht“. 
166 
Haffner, Preuβen, 357, 395. 
167
 Campenhausen and Wall, Staatskirchenrecht, 29. 
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(Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch)
168
 regulated individual contractual freedom, freedom of attestation 
of the personal will, and the freedom to own property, especially the means of production, but 
disregarded the non-propertied social classes. Historically tied to natural law thinking, and to 
the two foundations of property and association of the 1794 Prussian General Law Code 
(Allgemeine Preuβische Landrecht),169 the 1900 Civil Code provided basic regulations for 
contractual relationships, including organizational forms, the age of maturity for decision-
making (Mündigkeit), the delegation and acceptance of responsibilities, including 
Stellvertretung, as well as rules for balancing contractual disruptions and all other property 
related matters.
170
 This development of a differentiation between a public and a private legal 
realm, combined with the necessity of the element of publicity within political representation, 
parted the public concept of representation from the private concepts of “standing in for 
someone else” as e.g. in Stellvertretung.171 
 
At the the turn from the 19
th
 to the 20
th
 century, domestic and international tensions 
accelerated. In the western industrial area and the commercial centre of Berlin, the 
industrialization-induced movement of large parts of the rural population to the cities, which 
coincided with a large demographic surge,
172
 led to social tensions. A fourfold growth of 
German import and export
173
 amplified international competition, nationalist sentiments, and 
imperialist ideologies with its interest in acquiring export markets or production areas. The 
tensions accelerated an armament race between the European nations that unloaded with full 
force in the 1914 Great War. The human suffering that mechanized ferocity unleashed had 
                                            
168
 The Civil Code for the whole of Germany was developed during the late 1880s and the 1890s and came into 
effect on 1 January 1900. Heinrich Lehmann, Allgemeiner Teil des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches, 6
th
 ed. 
(Berlin:Walter de Gruyter, 1949), 3-7. 
169
 The Civil Code is based on the Prussian General Law Code (Allgemeines Preuβisches Landrecht) of 1794 
which was commissioned under the Prussian king Frederick the Great and drew on the many local legal 
practices. Although it had no democratic foundation, the king nonetheless had encouraged and included public 
input. Long before the constitutional fights of the 19th century the code stipulated that in relation to the Prussian 
subjects, the state’s authority and powers, including the King’s, were bound to the regulations of the code and 
that the general rights of the human being were based on the natural, pre-law freedom of the human being to 
pursue and further his well-being, albeit without offending the rights of others. Freedom of religion and the 
demand for tolerance among religious communities was also included; Ebel and Thielmann, Rechtsgeschichte, 
256-58, 260 
170
 Such matters regard those of Family Law and Inheritance Law. 
171
 Giuseppe Duso, Die moderne politische Repräsentation: Entstehung und Krise des Begriffs, trans. Peter 
Paschke (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2006), 154 with information to further literature, especially from the 
early 20th century.   
172
 The population grew from 41 million in 1871 to 65.3 million by 1913. This added within one generation 
more than 12 million people to the workforce in Germany; Berghahn, Modern Germany, 3-4.  
173
 Berghahn, Modern Germany, 3-4. 
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been unforeseeable by any of the involved nations.
174
 All sides had been convinced that the 
new machines of war would make wars short and precise events, but they disregarded the fact 
that all nations had built up arsenals of equally destructive mechanized weaponry. Finally, by 
late 1918 physical and material exhaustion at the western front, the Russian revolution in the 
east, and the mutiny of German sailors in the north
175
 led to the end to the hostilities, the 
abdication of the German Emperor, and the first German Republic. 
 
A problem of legitimacy that arose with a faulty transfer of power from the Monarch to the 
newly proclaimed German Republic on 9 November 1918 remained a burden throughout the 
duration of the Republic’s existence. The Reich-chancellor had announced prematurely the 
abdication of the Emperor, had resigned as chancellor, and had appointed the leader of the 
Social Democratic Party Friedrich Ebert (1871-1925) as his successor.
176
 At the same time 
Ebert’s party comrade177 and the Spartacus league178 had proclaimed two different versions of 
a Republic. This confusion had turned Ebert into a Chancellor over a no longer existing Reich 
and without parliamentary or monarchic legitimacy.
179
 Determined to prevent a bolshevist 
system, Ebert secured military support and negotiated temporary authority with the politically 
moderate Worker’s and Soldier’s Council180 of Berlin which claimed representative powers 
based on countrywide election-rallies.
181
 Subsequently a National Constitutional Assembly 
developed a parliamentary-representative legal foundation for the new German Republic,
182
 
the 1919 Weimar Constitution.
183
  
                                            
174
 Of the 13.2 million men who were drafted by the German Reich, 2.4 million or 18.5% died and of the 4.75 
million injured men 2.7 million were invalids. Left behind were 0.6 million widows and 1.2 million orphans; 
Mai, Weimarer Republik, 32. 
175
 Berghahn, Modern Germany, 60. 
176
 On 9 November 1918 Max von Baden (1867-1929) and Friedrich Ebert met before the Emperor had 
abdicated. 
177
 Philipp Scheidemann (1865-1939) proclaimed the republic from the steps of the parliament building, the 
Reichstag. 
178
 The Spartacus League, founded by Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg and Clara Zetkin, developed as 
extreme left revolutionary socialist offshoot from the German Social Democratic Party and proclaimed a far left 
“free and socialist Republic of Germany”; Marlis Steinert, Hitler, trans. Guy Montag and Volker Wieland 
(Munich: C. H. Beck, 1994), 101. 
179
 Steinert, Hitler, 102. 
180
 The Worker’s and Soldier’s Councils were not Bolshevik autonomous political factors as in Russia but rather 
pursued traditional objectives of mainstream Social Democracy based on the 1891 Erfurt Program; Berghahn, 
Modern Germany, 63. 
181
 Mai, Weimarer Republik, 21-23; Berghahn, Modern Germany, 62-63. 
182
 Berghahn, Modern Germany, 65. 
183
 The Constitution was adopted in Third Reading on 31 July 1919 with 262 votes out of 337 votes. The far left 
and the far right provided the 75 rejecting votes; Steinert, Hitler, 103. 
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In sum, the 19
th
 century was marked by a comprehensive state reorganization, strengthening 
constitutional demands for the bourgeois liberal rights of the 1789 French Revolution, a 
weakening Christian state ideology, a beginning distancing of the Protestant Church from the 
monarchy, and a domestic and international economic and military competition that was 
induced by the processes of industrialization. The bourgeois, mainly economic, independence 
from monarchic influence became codified on the sub-constitutional level of private law in 
separation of the Reich’s public laws. The destructive force of the first industrialized warfare, 
the Great War, led to revolutions and the 1919 Weimar Constitution for Germany.  
 
2.3 The 1919 Weimar Constitution 
 
The 1919 Weimar Constitution for the first German Republic
184
 was the contemporary 
backdrop to Bonhoeffer’s and Schmitt’s discourse on decision. The Weimar Constitution 
officially severed the institutional bond of “throne and altar”,185 between the state and the 
Protestant Church, and attempted to balance the social-economic shifts by combining a 
consensus-finding parliamentary mechanism for decision-making with a subsidiary 
authoritative presidential option for decisions, and by tying the separate legislative, executive, 
and judicative powers of the state to specific authorities, responsibilities, and accountabilities 
on a collective as well as individual level. 
 
In the pre-democratic German Reich, law was separated from politics and reduced to 
administrative acts. They were legitimate if civil servants from offices firmly in the hands of 
the educated bourgeoisie applied in an orderly, legally blameless fashion the rights the 
monarch had granted.
186
 This detached individual rights from political freedoms and made 
popular decision-making illegitimate. Rights to personal freedom, mainly for bourgeois 
property owners, were secured on the private law level. Equality was reduced to the realm of 
taxes, state-services, and access to office (Ämter).
187
 The Weimar Constitution, for the first 
time in German history, replaced sovereignty based on the monarchic principle with that 
based on the popular principle. It introduced the separation of powers and universal suffrage 
                                            
184
 The 1919 Weimar Constitution was to a large extent written by the jurist Hugo Preuss (1860-1925)
184
 and the 
jurist Friedrich Naumann (1860-1919), with the support of the sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920) and the 
theologian Adolf von Harnack (1851-1930). 
185
 Campenhausen and Wall, Staatskirchenrecht, 32. 
186
 Ebel and Tielmann, Rechtsgeschichte, 352. 
187
 cf. Vorländer, Verfassung, 64, 71-72. 
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that was independent of property ownership and inclusive of women, and programmatically 
acknowledged basic liberal and social rights. But in bourgeois distrust of the politically 
inexperienced “masses” of the now politically emancipated proletarian class the Constitution 
compromised on authoritarianism and democracy. As a remnant of the 19
th
 century lawgiver 
from “above” the Constitution provided for times of crisis outside of the collective decision 
making process according to elected parliamentary representation, the “subsidiary reserve-
constitution”188 of an authoritarian president who was authorized by direct plebiscitary vote 
to decide individually and to suspend certain liberal rights. 
 
2.3.1 The Ecclesiastic Decision: Church as Juristic Person 
 
The removal of the monarch as the head of the state and the Weimar Constitution’s 
declaration that there was “no state-church”189 dismantled the position of the Summus 
Episcopus, the “two persons” of the monarch, and transferred comprehensive authority in all 
internal, external, and institutional matters, including representational and final decision-
making powers, the iura circa sacra, officially to the Protestant Church. It lastingly replaced 
the remnants of the 19
th
 century Prussian state-ideology of Christian Protestant piety with the 
idea of a secular state with independent churches. Legally the churches became juristic 
persons in the form of a corporation of public law (Körperschaft190 des öffentlichen Rechts) 
but with civil law regulating its legal competency.
191
 Thus as a public collective unit, with a 
private legal personality, the Church became a carrier of legal rights and duties in fictional 
similarity to a natural person. Full independence from the state meant for the Protestant 
Church not only losing its worldly representative but also access to political power and 
financial security. Threatened thus in its very existence, a comprehensive compromise 
incorporated guarantees to property and tax income and permitted continued limited 
cooperation between the church and the state.
192
  
 
                                            
188
 Vorländer, Verfassung, 74. 
189
 Article 137, para. 1 Weimar Constitution, in Die deutschen Verfassungen des 19. Und 20. Jahrhunderts, ed. 
Horst Hildebrandt, 11th enl. ed. (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1979), 102. 
190
 Literally translated the term Körperschaft means “embodiment”. It is here translated with the juristic term 
“corporation” that includes the element of collectivity and is rooted in the Latin word “corpus” and its German 
translation as "Körper”.  
191
 Article 137, para. 4 and 5 Weimar Constitution, in Hildebrandt, Verfassungen, 102. 
192 
Articles 135-139; 146, para 2; 149 Weimar Constitution, in Hildebrandt, Verfassungen, 101-5. 
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Even though it was not expressly spelled out in the Constitution, nonetheless, in reverse to 
the church’s independence from the state, the state also became independent from the 
churches. Consequently, the church and the state could enter as parties into contractual 
relations (Staatskirchenverträge), which the Protestant Church used to secure contractually 
its freedom to practice its confession publically, a guarantee given in the constitution only to 
individuals.
193
 Although the reciprocity of the independence was not explicitly written into 
the constitution, it became subsequently captured in the jurisprudential concept of the state’s 
neutrality
194
 in all religious and worldview matters that flowed from the general constitutional 
provisions of freedom of religion, the prohibition of religious and faith-based 
discrimination,
195
  and the prohibition of a state-church. Historically it was grounded in the 
development since the 16
th
 and 17
th
 century’s confessional religious wars.  
 
2.3.2 The Republican Decision: Compromise and Decree 
 
The Weimar Constitution neither fulfilled President Ebert’s wish of a constitutionally 
recognized party system,
196
 and an imperative mandate that ties parliamentary representatives 
to the will of their parties, nor the Council movement’s demand that the delegates should be 
accountable to their constituency. Instead each parliamentary representative was solely 
accountable to his personal conscience.
197
 In the prevailing jurisprudential opinion this meant 
a ‘not simply ethical but legal duty in the dissemination of his parliamentary call (Beruf) to 
determine the interest of the Reich, which is inseparable from the good for the whole of the 
people, according to his best knowledge and conscience in personal responsibility, from 
                                            
193
 Campenhausen and Wall, Staatskirchenrecht, 31-34. 
194
 The concept of Neutrality means that the state is absent in organized religion and matters of faith which 
includes an institutional separation (Trennungsgebot) and a prohibition of an identity of content or faith between 
state and church (inhaltliches Identifikationsverbot). The neutrality of the state is meant to prevent a return to a 
Summus Episcopus who absorbs the iura circa sacra and the iura in sacra into one representative. As a 
consequence to the concept of neutrality, the principle of parity prohibits that a particular confession or religious 
community is favored. Thus additionally to churches all other religious and worldview communities also are 
given an equal legal opportunity to attain under certain conditions the position of a society of public law and 
with it also access to funding. This recognizes the ordering powers of religious and worldview communities 
within society and at the same time acknowledges the right of the citizen to freedom from ecclesiastic 
interferences; Article 137, para 5-7 Weimar Constitution, in Hildebrandt, Verfassungen, 10; Campenhausen and 
Wall, Staatskirchenrecht, 370. 
195
 Articles 135, 141 Weimar Constitution, in Hildebrandt, Verfassungen, 101, 103. 
196
 For Heinrich Triepel, the supervisor of Gerhard Leibholz’s Habilitation thesis, political parties were extra-
constitutional phenomena. Vorländer, Verfassung, 81. 
197
 Article 21 Weimar Constitution, in Hildebrandt, Verfassungen, 75. 
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which he cannot be relieved’.198 Fearing ‘parliamentary absolutism’199 the authors of the 
Constitution insisted on a President with comprehensive ‘dictatorship powers’200 parallel to 
the Parliament, the Reichstag. Thus the Constitution determined that both the parliamentary 
representatives
201
 and the Reich-president
202
 were to be elected by popular vote. The 
president was to represent to foreign powers the unity of the people,
203
 while the parliament, 
the Reichstag, was meant to represent the “numerical” rather than the “true” will204 of the 
people as a whole.  
 
The competencies given to the Reichstag and the Presidency moved the former collectively, 
and its representatives individually, into a constant tension and competition with the 
individual decisions of the latter. Because the President could overrule with very limited 
checks almost every decision of the Reichstag, the parliament held the weakest position 
within the republican order. Despite the Reichstag being the legislative organ,
205
 the Reich-
president could demand a plebiscitary referendum on any parliamentary approved 
legislation.
206
 The President also appointed and dismissed the Reich-Chancellor and the 
ministerial cabinet,
207
 while the Reichstag could only collectively withdraw its confidence 
from the Chancellor or single members of the executive government who then had to 
resign.
208
 Therefore the Chancellor could be dismissed from his position by the President’s 
individual or the Reichstag’s collective decision and was thus accountable to both. However, 
the President could circumvent a parliamentary collective non-confidence vote by disbanding 
the Reichstag and triggering new elections.
209
 But reversely, should a collective 
parliamentary decision ask for a plebiscitary vote to dismiss the President, the parliament 
would by exercising this option dissolve itself.
210
 Should the President become incapacitated 
                                            
198
 Anschütz, Die Verfassung, 165; own translation. 
199
 Mehring, Schmitt, 220; own translation. 
200 
Mai, Weimarer Republik, 29; own translation. 
201
 Article 22 Weimar Constitution, in Hildebrandt, Verfassungen, 75. 
202
 Article 41, para. 1 Weimar Constitution, in Hildebrandt, Verfassungen, 80. 
203
 Article 45, Weimar Constitution, in Hildebrandt, Verfassungen, 81. 
204
 Mai, Weimarer Republik, 28. 
205
 Article 68-74 Weimar Constitution, in Hildebrandt, Verfassungen, 85-87. 
206
 Article 73, para. 1 Weimar Constitution, in Hildebrandt, Verfassungen, 86. 
207
 Article 53, Weimar Constitution, in Hildebrandt, Verfassungen, 82. 
208
 Article 54, Weimar Constitution, in Hildebrandt, Verfassungen, 82. 
209 
Article 25, Weimar Constitution, in Hildebrandt, Verfassungen, 75-76. 
210
 Article 43, para. 2 Weimar Constitution, in Hildebrandt, Verfassungen, 80. 
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the Chancellor would assume his powers
211
 which would reduce the chance of the latter’s 
dismissal by the Reichstag’s collective non-confidence decision because in the process of 
removing a Chancellor-now-President the Reichstag would dismantle itself. 
 
The position of the Chancellor was lodged between the individual political decision-making 
powers of the President and the collective non-confidence decision of the Reichstag, that is, 
unless the President invoked his emergency decree powers
212
 in which case he could direct, 
appoint, and dismiss the Chancellor according to his individual decision without any 
accountability to the parliament or his conscience. The Chancellor was for his individual 
decisions accountable to the President. However, the Constitution made neither the President 
nor the Chancellor accountable to their conscience for their individual political decisions. 
This accountability to personal conscience was reserved for the representatives of the 
Reichstag
213
 which not only individualized but personalized their collective political 
decisions. Nonetheless, an individual presidential decision could call into question the 
parliamentary representative’s conscience by asking for a plebiscitary confirmation of their 
collective, yet individual and personal legislative decisions. 
 
The compromises of the 1919 Weimar Constitution left undecided whether the Republic 
wanted to be a pluralistic representative or an authoritarian presidential state. “Weimar” had 
not yet fully embraced replacing the unifying idea of the Protestant ideology with the 
republican idea of participating individual citizens. The non-binding secondary status of the 
basic rights here especially reflected the undecided double-character of the constitution. 
Listed in the Constitution’s second section and structured as a combination of classical 
French revolutionary demands and communal, religious, educational, and economic 
mandates,
214
 the basic rights remained at the level of programmatic pronouncements. The 
individual citizen had no legal right to appeal to the basic rights and the prevailing 
                                            
211
 Article 51, Weimar Constitution, in Hildebrandt, Verfassungen, 82. On December 17, 1932 the article 51 was 
amended to the effect that should the Reich-president become incapacitated the president of the Federal Court 
(Reichsgericht) would assume the duties of the Reich-president. However, with combining upon President 
Hindenburg’s death the Chancellorship and Presidency on August 1, 1934 Hitler both reversed and abolished 
the 1932 constitutional amendment. 
212
 Article 48, para. 2 Weimar Constitution, in Hildebrandt, Verfassungen, 81. 
213
 Article 2, Weimar Constitution, in Hildebrandt, Verfassungen, 75. 
214
 The mandates were guided by the idea of social justice (Gerechtigkeit) and were meant to enable a dignified 
existence and to connect ownership of property to communal obligations. They thus reflected the political 
interests of those who drafted the Constitution; Vorländer, Verfassung, 73. 
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jurisprudential opinion understood them, similar to pre-Weimar times, as binding only for the 
administrative power. Their observance by the executive and legislative powers of the state 
was not subject to judicial review.
215
 Thus the realization of the basic rights remained 
dependent on the prevailing political constellations. The strongest confirmation of their 
ambivalent status was the constitutional presidential permission to suspend the most 
significant liberal rights in favor of emergency decrees.
216
 This most far reaching provision 
gave the President the power to suspend by emergency decree the rights to privacy of the 
home, free movement, expression, assembly, property, and to rule beyond the parliamentary 
legislative process. Although presidential decrees were constitutionally restricted to times of 
danger to public security and order, their application was with the onset of the effects of the 
Great Depression in 1930 unofficially extended to include economic dangers.  
 
The decision to adopt the 1919 Weimar Constitution provided for Germany the normative 
basis for the organizational form of a secular state. In its material content it was meant to 
legitimize sovereignty, authority, accountability, and a modus of political decision finding. In 
its attempt to incorporate a wide range of different political demands, the Constitution settled 
on a mixed system of individual and collective authority and accountability that was only 
loosely tied to programmatic liberal rights. It built on the personal conscience of some of the 
decision makers, the parliamentary representatives, but not on the personal conscience of 
those equipped with the most far reaching powers, the president and the chancellor, and thus 
restrained the “ethical” behind the “legal”. Because the Weimar Constitution remained in the 
public opinion without widespread continual support, which is imperative for enfolding a 
normative force over an extended period of time,
217
 the onset of severe economic difficulties 
and the frailness of the part-parliamentarian, part-presidential character provided to 
extremist-totalitarian political forces a pseudo-legal possibility for dismissing the 
constitutional liberal rights and dissolving in 1933/34 the republic into a totalitarian 
dictatorship.
218
 The process of this constitutional disintegration was the immediate backdrop 
to the Schmitt and Bonhoeffer discourse and therefore will be summarized in the following. 
 
 
                                            
215
 cf. Ebel und Thielmann, Rechtsgeschichte, 395.  
216
 Article 48 Weimar Constitution, in Hildebrandt, Verfassungen, 81. 
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Vorländer, Verfassung, 16-18. 
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2.4 The Disintegration of the Weimar Republic 
 
The civil war conditions and the Putsches of the early years of the Republic gave way by 
1923/24 to a false calmness. With the onset of the Great Depression in Germany in 1930 the 
radical ideology of National Socialism re-surfaced and proceeded to dismantle the Weimar 
Republic within the relatively short period between 1933 and 1935. It was not primarily the 
Weimar Constitution’s indecisiveness regarding parliamentary representation and presidential 
authority that prevented compromises between the parliamentary political parties and created 
a leadership vacuum. Compromises were not reached because of the economic interests that 
were represented in the parliament and which reflected “Weimar’s” permeating social 
disunity, the staggering unemployment, huge national debt, and widespread starvation. In 
order to gain power and to “revolutionize” Germany, Hitler exploited constitutional 
provisions, used conspiracy theories, scapegoated sectors of society, used the new mass 
technology of radio and film for propaganda, and channeled disappointed sectors of the 
population into paramilitary groups for inciting violence on the streets. 
 
Subsequent to interventions by the Reich’s army,219 in the nation-wide unrests of the early 
years
220
 of the Republic, the 1914 state of emergency which had suspended liberal rights and 
had permitted summary court martial to imprison or execute revolutionary leaders finally 
ended in 1925.
221 
In Munich the extreme right had used the civil war conditions to fuel 
ideological animosities against the “red” socialist Berlin,222 and thereafter became a 
laboratory for putsches, including the 1923 unsuccessful Hitler-Ludendorff “Beer Hall 
Putsch” with its attempted “march on Berlin”.223 Despite Hitler’s short-term imprisonment224 
                                            
219 
Berghahn, Modern Germany, 62-66. 
220
 In the industrial Ruhr area, an extended civil war situation ended with the intervention of the Reich-army 
against left wing militias despite previously having been reluctant to act against right leaning Free Corps units in 
Berlin; Berghahn, Modern Germany, 75. The 1920 right-wing Kapp-Putsch in Berlin was unsuccessful due to 
the general strike of the working class movement; Mai, Weimarer Republik, 40-41. In 1922, right wing 
militarists assassinated in Berlin the German Foreign Minister Walter Rathenau; Mai, Weimarer Republik, 48. 
221
 Schiffer, „Die deutschen Kriegsgesetze“, Deutsche Juristenzeitung, 19 (1914): 1014-1024, http://dlib-
zs.mpier.mpg.de/mj/kleioc/0010/exec/bigpage/%222173669_19%2b1914_0547%22. 
222
 The first President of the Weimar Republic, Friedrich Ebert, and the first three Chancellors of the Weimar 
Republic were members of the Social Democratic Party (SPD). 
223
 Mai, Weimarer Republik, 43. Hitler’s attempted “March on Berlin“ was fashioned after Mussolini’s “March 
on Rome“ in 1922.  
224
 For his role in the 1923 unsuccessful “Beer Hall Putsch” Hitler received a lenient prison term; Heribert 
Ostendorf, “Politische Strafjustiz in Deutschland”, Informationen zur Politischen Bildung 306 (January 2010): 
23, 30. 
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and the 1922 prohibition of the extreme right wing National Socialist German Workers Party 
(NSDAP)
225
 in German provinces, with the exception of Bavaria, the party expanded nation-
wide and absorbed other right-wing radical groups.
226
 The Party’s general unscrupulousness 
and uncompromising brutality differentiated it from other nationalist and populist 
movements.
227
 They exploited the socio-economic conditions of the immediate post war era 
which saw widespread food scarcity.
228
 The 1923 hyper-inflation
229
 and spiking 
unemployment
230
 were used for the conspiracy narrative that the Social Democrats, 
supposedly supported by an ambiguous international “Jewry”, had “seized” in 1919 the 
power from the Monarchy, had lost the war,
231
 and had been responsible for the harsh terms 
of the Peace Treaty of Versailles
232
 which, by assigning sole moral responsibility for the 
Great War to Germany, thereby probided legal justification for demanding large reparation 
payments.
233
 The successes of the Weimar middle period from 1923 to 1929, which saw the 
acceptance of the Republic to the League of Nation, border stability, and a steadying of the 
economy due to the re-negotiation of the reparation debt,
234
 had little impact on extremist 
methods, especially once the economic effects of the Great Depression gripped Germany.
235
 
                                            
225
 National Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei. 
226 
Mai, Weimarer Republik, 41, 43. 
227
 The methods of the NSDAP combined aggressive propaganda, militaristic uniforms, marches, and armed 
para-military groups; Mai, Weimarer Republik, 43. 
228 
By 1915 especially employees in the cities and civil servants lived below the existential minimum and 
starved; Mai, Weimarer Republik, 34. Starvation became a widespread problem especially after the industrial 
production reached an all-time low and returning soldiers flooded the labor market. Then the real wages fell 
well below pre-war levels and the cost-of-living index; Berghahn, Modern Germany, 68-69. 
229
 Until 1920 the rate of inflation was “normal” in comparison to other European nations but then skyrocketed 
until it reached its zenith at the end of 1923; Mai Weimarer Republik, 35-36. 
230
 Unemployment, before 1914 at 2-5%, did not drop below 10% after 1923; Mai, Weimarer Republik, 74. 
231
 This conspiracy theory disregarded the fact that the Monarch and his army had started the Great War and 
with abdicating the former had refused to take responsibility for the war. 
232
 Berghahn, Modern Germany, 71-73. 
233
 Berghahn, Modern Germany, 67. The moral-responsibility clause was written into article 231; Treaty of 
Versailles (June 28, 1919), Bingham Young University, World War I Primary Document Archive, 2009, 
accessed February 20, 2018, https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Peace_Treaty_of_Versailles. 
234 
The Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann, an economist by profession and leader of the Democratic People 
Party (DVP), successfully negotiated in the 1924 Dawes Plan and in the 1929 Young Plan revisions to the 
reparation payments. With the 1925 Locarno Pact he successfully ended the Ruhr occupation by France and 
stabilized the German borders. In 1926 Stresemann achieved Germany’s admittance to the League of Nations; 
Mai, Weimarer Republik, 84-89. 
235
 Berghahn, Modern Germany, 100. 
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Then 43% of the population became unemployed
236
 and in the winter of 1932/33 about 15 
million people went hungry.
237
  
 
The threat of death by starvation increasingly turned for whole sections of society into fears 
of “social death” when a downward social mobility and cultural marginalization, due to the 
loss of property, legal privilege and political rule, endangered aristocracy, educated 
bourgeoisie, agrarian estate owners, and the trade-based middle class. This redistribution of 
wealth favoured the industrial sector and those with the means of production but levelled the 
difference between the middle class and proletariat.
238
 93% of the population belonged in 
1925 to the lower class comprised of workers, employees, and household servants. About 6% 
belonged to the educated bourgeoisie of doctors, lawyers, theologians, scientists, and 
professors and about 1% belonged to the aristocratic class.
239
 The aristocracy insisted on the 
exclusivity of their Estate (Stand),
240
 their social network, and a strong presence in politically 
powerful positions within administration, military, parties and associations.
241
 Social 
advancement through education remained limited for the lower classes because the educated 
bourgeoisie held on to their control over the higher educational institutions despite the severe 
reduction of their material base and a surplus of unemployed young academics.
 
In response to 
being removed by the approaching mass culture of cinemas, sport clubs and radio from their 
position of independent intellectual interpreters of culture they extended their scientific 
professional expertise. Additionally, they retreated into a local network of personalities, 
clubs, and places of communication.
242
 Overall the economic classes solidified into social-
moral milieus of homogeneous value and experience communities. Belonging was 
determined by status (worker, bourgeois), way of life (living quarter), symbolic practices 
(cloths, behaviour, celebrations), values (marriage, achievement, education, solidarity, 
religion), and worldviews.
243
 The proletarian class unified around war experience, worker 
                                            
236
 M. Rainer Lepsius, “From fragmented party democracy to government by emergency decree and National 
Socialist take over: Germany”, in The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Europe, ed. Juan J. Linz and Alfred 
Stepan (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1978), 52. 
237 
Mai, Weimarer Republik, 112-13. 
238
 Mai, Weimarer Republik, 36-37. 
239 
Mai, Weimarer Republik, 74-76. 
240
 Because the 1918 revolution did not lead to a land reform, the estate (Stand) of the aristocratic “Junkers” 
remained attached to the ownership of large parcels of land in eastern Germany.  
241
 Mai, Weimarer Republik, 62, 75-76. 
242 
Mai, Weimarer Republik, 74-75, 78-79. 
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 Mai, Weimarer Republik, 75, 77. 
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strikes, and revolutionary demands for equality. Only the catholic milieu stretched across all 
economic differences, but weakened with increasing mobility, urbanization, and general 
secularization.
244
  
 
The structural social shifts were interpreted foremost in political and cultural terms as loss of 
values and order, and loss of national sovereignty.
245
 The political parties mirrored the 
hardened differences between the social groups
246
 and proved unable to arbitrate between the 
classes and economic interests. With their unwillingness to compromise on content that might 
be detrimental to their voters, the parliament withdrew from its responsibility and created a 
political vacuum which President Hindenburg
247
 increasingly filled by applying his 
authoritarian decree powers to economic situations and for backing the Chancellors he 
appointed. This usage went beyond the constitutionally permitted situations and reduced the 
parliament’s options to either collectively tolerating the President’s individual decision on 
economic issues, or facing being dissolved as a consequence to a non-confidence vote.
248
 The 
shift of power from Parliament to President replaced collective decision-making according to 
legal procedures with autocratic decisions determined by personal relations.
249
 
 
A succession of chancellors, all backed by presidential decree,
250
 was unable to stem the 
onslaught of the economic depression. After three elections between September 1930 and 
November 1932, and under civil war conditions fanned by the military wing (SA) of the 
NSDAP
251
 which sought to “politicize” the population, a group of conservative and right 
wing party leaders convinced President Hindenburg in negotiations behind the closed doors 
of the presidential offices to install on 30 January 1933 a cabinet under Adolf Hitler (1889-
                                            
244 
Mai, Weimarer Republik, 77, 79. 
245 
Mai, Weimarer Republik, 108. 
246 
Mai, Weimarer Republik, 77. 
247 
Paul von Hindenburg (1847-1934) was a general during the Great War and became the second President of 
the Weimar Republic after Friedrich Ebert’s death in 1925. Under his presidential rule above the parties the 
subsidiary presidential powers surpassed the representational arm of the Weimar Constitution; Mai, Weimarer 
Republik, 57. 
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 Article 54 Weimar Constitution, in Hildebrandt, Verfassungen, 82.  
249 
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2012), xiv. 
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1945) as Chancellor,
252
 despite the fact that the NSDAP had passed its height of electoral 
success already in July 1932. After the November 1932 election in which two thirds of the 
votes had been cast against Hitler, a left wing compromise based on the combined votes of 
the Social Democratic and Communist Parties could have prevented a decreed Hitler 
government.
253
 The Preuβenschlag, the coup d’état against the Social Democratic (SPD) 
Prussian provincial government in Berlin on 20 July 1932, which replaced the Prussian 
Provincial government with a Reich-Commissioner,
254
 and Hitler’s ascent to the 
Chancellorship, not only finally replaced the red “left” with the “right” but also expanded the 
“Catholic” south and Munich into the “Lutheran” Prussian north and Berlin. 
 
In line with his decision of obtaining power “legally”255 Hitler immediately proceeded to 
exploit the parliamentary and plebiscitary parts of the Constitution with a succession of 
tactical decisions. He revived the parliamentary arm of the Constitution for the sole purpose 
of obtaining the legislative sanction for the Enabling Act of March 24, 1933 
(Ermächtigungsgesetz).
256
 This mantle of positivist legality, which concealed the abolition of 
the rule of law,
257
combined unlimited legislative powers with executive powers and thus 
effectively sidelined the parliament and collective decision-making. It gave Hitler advance 
blanket-approval for promulgating emergency laws for the purpose of alleviating crisis 
                                            
252
 Berghahn, Modern Germany, 124; Lepsius, “Fragmented party democracy“, 49; Schlingensiepen, 
Bonhoeffer, 132. 
253
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with little resistance from the SPD. The Prussian government chose to retaliate according to the rule of law with 
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already adopted measures in place which, in effect, side-lined the Prussian SPD government as political factor; 
Ebel and Thielmann, Rechtsgeschichte, 411-12. 
255
 His incarceration in 1923/24 Hitler used for writing his infamous program, Mein Kampf, which proclaimed 
his anti-Semitism and his intention of achieving power by constitutional means; Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, 417-
418th ed. (Munich: Zentralverlag der NSDAP, 1939); Berghahn, Modern Germany, 110. 
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Weimar Republik, Reichstag, Gesetz zur Behebung der Not von Volk und Reich [Act to alleviate the 
emergency crisis off the people and the Reich], documentArchiv.de der historischen Dokumenten- und 
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situations solely based on his individual decision and without parliamentary participation and 
presidential signatures. Thus covered, Hitler proceeded to invalidate individual rights, 
dismantle unions and professional associations, establish a one party system, and reverse the 
19
th
 century emancipation of the Jewish citizens.  
 
With the Reichsstadthaltergesetz
258
 of 31 March 1933 and 7 April 1933, the provinces were 
synchronized with the Reich to ensure the enforcement of the Reich-Chancellor’s decisions in 
all provinces. Simultaneously, further legislation on 7 April 1933 provided for the dismissal 
of non-Aryans and other “undesirables” from public service and employment in the state259 as 
well as from the legal profession.
260
 At the University of Berlin alone a total of 234 
professors of Jewish ancestry left by late March 1935.
261
 In July 1933 all political parties, 
save the NSDAP, were declared illegal
262
 and shortly thereafter the identity of Party and state 
proclaimed.
263
 After violently eliminating all possible opposition in the Röhm-Putsch of 30 
June/1 July 1934,
264
 Hitler labeled such acts as self-defence of the state because in an hour of 
                                            
258 
Weimar Republic, Reichstag, Vorläufiges Gesetz zur Gleichschaltung der Länder mit dem Reich vom 31. 
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 Weimar Republic, Reichstag, Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums vom 07. April 1933 [Act 
to reinstall the professional civil service of 7 April 1933], documentArchiv.de der historischen Dokumenten- 
und Quellensammlung zur deutschen Geschichte ab 1800 (2000-2004), accessed January 30, 2018, 
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Quellensammlung zur deutschen Geschichte ab 1800 (2000-2004), accessed January 30, 2018, 
http://www.documentarchiv.de/index.html. 
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crisis he had carried, as the highest judge of the German people and in his personal 
responsibility, the destiny of the whole nation.
265
 Three days after the violent execution of his 
orders he demanded after-the-fact plebiscitary confirmation and legitimacy.
266
 This demand 
finally destroyed the last remnants of legal formal process. Thus the Act that consolidated on 
1 August 1934 the chancellorship with the presidency
267
 served only as clarification of his 
totalitarian leadership. It secured his Chancellorship against a dismissal by the president from 
above, and beyond the danger of being vetoed by the parliament from below. With his 
totalitarian powers in place he proceeded to secure the specific National Socialist worldview 
beyond Fascism that included the anti-Semitic question of race. With the Nuremberg Racial 
Laws of 15 September 1935
268
 he escalated the legal and subsequently physical persecution 
of Jews and other “undesirable” parts of the population. 
 
Regarding the Protestant Church, the National Socialist regime focused on a de facto return 
to the pre-1919 state-church situation. Its policy played on the inexperience of the Protestant 
Church in maintaining an active legal and spiritual self-reliant position over against the 
state.
269
 Almost immediately after the promulgation of the Enabling Act, the process for 
rewriting the Church Constitution commenced on 25 April 1933. The purpose was to 
implement the Führer-principle and to pursue the election of regime-loyal German Christians 
                                                                                                                                       
For more details see Heinz Höhne, Mordsache Röhm: Hitlers Durchbruch zur Alleinherrschaft, 1933-1934, 
Spiegel-Buch 52 (Rheinbek: Rowohlt-Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1984). 
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into the offices of the Church after the adoption of the changes to the constitution.
270
 On 24 
August 1933 the Aryan paragraph of 7 April 1933 became extended to apply to church 
officials. Nonetheless, National Socialism was unsuccessful in repeating the “seizure of 
power” in the church. It failed in its legalistic attempt of fully synchronizing (gleichschalten) 
the Protestant Church in a manner similar to the synchronization of the provinces to the state. 
At the basis of the synchronization attempt was the differentiation between a juristic person 
of public law (juristische Person des öffentlichen Rechts) and a juristic person of private law 
(juristische Person des Privatrechts) as it had developed in the course of the 19
th
 century’s 
process of the emancipation of the bourgeois person from the state and the development of 
law into the two sectors of private law and public law. The “new order” focussed on 
reversing this process by forcing the Protestant Church out of its constitutionally provided 
status of a juristic person in the form of a corporation (Körperschaft) of public law
271
 into that 
of a private law association (Verein),
272
 albeit in the form of a non-registered association 
(nicht eingetragener Verein).
273
 This latter form would have meant a loss of contractual 
maturity (Geschäftsfähigkeit) which would have severely affected the financial foundations 
of the institutional organization of the church.
274
 It would have made the single members 
jointly fiscally responsible on a private law level (Gesamthänder). Also the legal maturity in 
general (Rechtsfähigkeit) could have been withdrawn and the church’s wealth could have 
been absorbed by the state.
275
 By reversing the Körperschaft-status and turning the church 
from a corporate juristic person of public law into a group of many single natural persons the 
latter, the natural persons, could have been absorbed into the state’s identity, albeit only those 
unaffected by the Aryan paragraph, that is, those of non-Jewish ancestry. Once in place, only 
a church built on a concept of a private natural person who was also independent of the 
juristic person of private law could have prevented public control and the absorption into the 
state identity.  
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However, facing Church opposition to the synchronization efforts the state soon tried to de-
politicize the church and to de-confessionalize public life by submitting the church to a 
“shrinking process” that was focussed on influencing their communal life.276 Wanting to limit 
the ecclesiastic activity of worship, the state tried to cut off the church’s access to the youth 
by increasing the right to membership in churches to the age of legal maturity and by 
prohibiting double-membership in churches and in mandatory national-socialist 
organizations.
277
  
 
The synchronization and de-confessionalization measures of the National Socialist state 
finally led to a dispute in principle about the Protestant Church’s inherited intellectual and 
spiritual (geistige) closeness to the state.
278
 To rely, as in pre-Weimar times, on the state for 
the protection of the Protestant Church and the Christian faith had become dangerous to the 
church’s very existence. The National Socialist political idea endangered the institution and 
the faith of the Protestant Church. For those who realized this, a serious rethinking of the 
church’s confession began which led to the Theological Declaration of Barmen in 1934,279 
the founding document of the Confessing Church.  
 
The turmoil of civil war, putsches, economic upheavals, unemployment, starvation, and shifts 
in the social structure within the Weimar context prevented parliamentary compromises 
which in turn undermined the constitutionally democratic, parliamentary-representational arm 
and strengthened the presidential, authoritarian-plebiscitary arm of the Weimar Constitution. 
The unscrupulousness of the NSDAP under Hitler, and their violent “politicization” of the 
population, exploited the decision mechanisms provided by the Constitution and established a 
totalitarian dictatorship. But attempts of the state to usurp the Protestant Church through 
legislation and juristic manipulation initiated an in principle review of the church’s 
relationship to the state and its confessional substance. Schmitt’s and Bonhoeffer’s respective 
biographic immersion in these developments and discourses of the German context of the 
1920s and early 1930s will be traced in what follows.  
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2.5 Lives within Context  
 
Weimar, the home of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832), the 18
th
 and 19
th
 century 
giant of German literature and liberal arts, reflected the epitome of German culture and 
symbolizes Bonhoeffer’s and Schmitt’s dissimilar attitude towards the Weimar context. 
Goethe’s memoirs of his travels to Rome280 had inspired generations of Protestant educated 
bourgeois for whom “Rome ranked above all other centers of learning.”281 For Bonhoeffer’s 
great-grandfather, who had been called to his professorship in Jena by Goethe himself,
282
 for 
his parents,
283
 and in 1924 for Bonhoeffer himself,
284
 Rome was a destination. There 
Bonhoeffer became enchanted with the structure and universality of the Roman Catholic 
Church and Italian culture.
285
 In contrast, for Schmitt a bourgeois humanist “Goethe-mask”286 
seemed to define an intellectual type which combined the three faces of a preacher, professor, 
and performer, and imprinted the soul of the youth with an apparent potestas spiritualis.
287
 
And in 1923 he detected in ‘whole generations of pious Protestants’ an ‘anti-Roman temper’ 
due to a ‘fear of the incomprehensible political power of Roman Catholicism’ that was rooted 
in the Reformation and was more recently expressed in Bismarck’s Kulturkampf.288 
Therefore, tracing in the following Schmitt’s and Bonhoeffer’s childhood, studies, and social 
network will be conducive to the analysis of their respective approaches to decisions. 
 
2.5.1 Carl Schmitt 
 
The Weimar Republic coincided with the middle years of Schmitt’s lifespan and with his 
pursuit of jurisprudence as a university career. Originally interested in the public law field of 
criminal law, he turned to constitutional law with a view to politics and increasingly adjusted 
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his attitude to law from a position of a jurisprudential observer and commentator to a 
politically involved player.  
 
Almost a generation older than Bonhoeffer, Schmitt was born in 1888 into a lower 
middleclass Catholic family in the western Ruhr area, the Catholic diaspora within Protestant 
Prussia since 1815. An excellent student, he decided early against his parent’s wishes to 
pursue Catholic theology, but remained undecided between philology and jurisprudence until 
the last possible moment on the day of his enrolment at the University of Berlin. Settling on 
jurisprudence, he never regretted it. His schooling and part of his academic studies in Berlin, 
Munich, and Strasbourg were financed by a stipend provided for by his entire extended 
family but without their further academic involvement.
289
 As an obscure young man with 
modest economic means, he was in Berlin not courted by any student fraternity or political 
party which made him feel excluded and his intellectual abilities disrespected – a feeling that 
would remain with him throughout his life.
290
 In 1910, subsequent to his graduation291 and 
simultaneous dissertation in criminal law on the topic of guilt,
292
 he started at a Regional 
Court in the Rhineland area in the customarily unpaid articling service, the Referendariat.
293
 
During this time he published as Gesetz und Urteil his academic investigation into the 
“right”-ness of a judge’s decision that is placed between norm and legal judgement. Poverty, 
hunger, desperation about his future, and dependency on the fiduciary goodwill of 
acquaintances characterized the following years. He lamented that in the hope of receiving a 
loan or a financial gift he was forced to be the drinking companion of acquaintances with 
financial means.
294
 His work-related contact to aristocratic circles made him especially aware 
of his socio-economic predicament. While he could not pay his own rent he would be a guest 
at the castles of clients.
295
 To augment his financial situation he published articles on non-
jurisprudential, general cultural themes and, starting in 1912, lectured at the University of 
Strasbourg in law with an integrated perspective on politics; activities that stretched beyond 
his graduation with the Second State Examination in Jurisprudence (Assessorexamen) and his 
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1914 Habilitation at the University of Strasbourg on the value of the state and the 
significance of the individual.
296
 
 
Schmitt’s supervisor of his dissertation saved him from the frontlines of the Great War. In 
1915 he organized for Schmitt to serve his military time at the Deputy General Command in 
Munich.
297
 Not a friend of the “ideas of 1914”,298 Schmitt experienced compulsory military 
duty as a slavery which destroys individuality, assessed the war as injustice and international 
mutual genocide, and wished for peace, not victory.
299
 At the Military Command, Schmitt 
was ordered to develop a legal justification for extending beyond the end of the war the 1914 
state of emergency with its suspension of liberal rights.
300
 In 1921 this research became a 
major part of his publication on dictatorship, Die Diktatur. With the 1918 re-annexation of 
Strasbourg by France
301
 Schmitt lost his lectureship and moved in 1919 to commence 
teaching at the College of Commerce in Munich. Among other topics he taught the history of 
political ideas since the Reformation, including the French Revolution and the jurisprudential 
developments of the 19
th
 century.
302
 Living now full time in Munich and at the same time 
being transferred to the City Command, the post-war revolutionary unrest came dangerously 
close to his personal safety.
303
  
 
In Munich, as in previous times of existential distress, Schmitt took recourse to reading Søren 
Kierkegaard’s theology, which convinced him that piousness can also exist within doubt.304 
Reading also other theologians, including Adolf von Harnack (1851-1930),
305
 led him to 
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reflect on the form of the church and the state, and their relation to each other.
306
 Despite his 
post-1945 self-characterization as a ‘Catholic layperson of German ethnicity and 
citizenship’,307 his life’s path that included a confessional “mixed” first marriage (1915), a 
divorce (1924), excommunication, second marriage (1926),
308
 and his distancing from 
political Catholicism as represented by the Centre-Party (Zentrum Partei),
309
 rather suggests 
no specific ties to official Catholic dogmatic teachings and interpretations.
310
 Even his 1922 
book Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty,
311
 although written 
while socializing in the Bonner Catholic milieu, was conceived as a response to Max 
Weber’s312 three types of legitimate rule – of impersonal rational-legal, traditional, and 
charismatic leadership.   
 
Schmitt’s university career, bringing the long wished-for bourgeois relative financial stability 
– despite despising bourgeois aura and ethos – unfolded exclusively at Prussian 
Universities.
313
 His call in October 1933 to the University of Berlin, Schmitt assessed as the 
highest honour of his professional career. It was the first specifically National Socialist 
appointment to the Berlin faculty of law after the dismissal of non-Aryan faculty members in 
April 1933.
314
 Nonetheless, his time in Bonn in the 1920s was the most productive period of 
his University career. This time saw the publication of many of his major works, including 
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Political Theology, Roman Catholicism and Political Form, The Crisis of Parliamentary 
Democracy,
315
 and The Concept of the Political.316  
 
In his 1919 Political Romanticism, Schmitt had criticized the 19
th
 century romantics for 
creating occasions of never-ending discussions without decision and of moving closure to a 
“higher level”. In Political Theology (1922), then, he discussed the extent of the authority of 
a sovereign leader regarding decisions. In support of his argument, and in rejection of liberal 
de-politicizing indecisiveness, Schmitt used the secularization theory that all theological 
concepts had turned into concepts of modern thought in order to make available for his 
theories the Christian themes of Original Sin, miracle, Trinity, Cain and Abel and creatio ex 
nihilo. In Roman Catholicism and Political Form (1923) he moved materialism over against 
rational creativity and humanity, and located the strength of the Roman Church in the 
institutional which he qualified as being essentially jurisprudential. In The Crisis of 
Parliamentary Democracy (1923) he added his view of an incompatibility of liberalism and 
democracy. With The Concept of the Political (1927) Schmitt defined the “political” as an 
existential, unity creating friend-enemy antagonism that was necessary for the decision of 
sacrificing oneself for the cause of the state, a justification which liberalism was unable to 
provide. And in his 1929 essay The Age of Neutralizations and De-politicization,
317
 Schmitt 
added his interpretation of history as a succession of exchanges of elites and central ideas. 
His purely jurisprudential 1928 book on constitutional theory
318
 finally led him to being fully 
respected and acknowledged among professors of law. He analysed the Weimar Constitution 
and criticized its built-in self-destructiveness that was rooted in its dual structure and the 
prevailing opinion that it was not above the legislative power but could be changed and even 
abolished altogether by a simple legislative act.
319
 In October 1932, subsequent to the 
                                            
315
 Political Romanticism in 1919; Political Theology in 1922; Roman Catholicism and Political Form in 1923; 
The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy in 1923; second edition of Political Romanticism in 1925; second 
edition of The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy in 1926; The Concept of the Political in 1927; Constitutional 
Theory in 1928. 
316
 Schmitt, Concept, 39. 
317
 Carl Schmitt, “Das Zeitalter der Neutralisierungen und Entpolitisierungen, 1929“ [The age of neutralizations 
and de-politicization, 1929],  in Positionen und Begriffe im Kampf mit Weimar – Genf – Versailles 1923-1939, 
3rd ed. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1994), 138-50. 
318
 Schmitt, Verfassungslehre. Although written in the summer of 1927 it was published in early 1928. Mehring, 
Schmitt, 204-06. 
319
 Vorländer, Verfassung, 75. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
64 
 
Preuβenschlag, he led the legal team320 on behalf of the Reich against the Prussian Social 
Democratic government in the court proceedings “Prussia against the Reich” at the state 
tribunal in Leipzig. Subsequently, he contributed major parts to the act that synchronized the 
provinces under the power of the Reich (Reichsstatthaltergesetz).  
 
Schmitt, despite not being a particular friend of the Weimar Constitution nonetheless 
supported all chancellors and the position of the Reich-president and rejected up to April 
1933 the “seizure of power” and the ‘totalitarian Führer-state’.321 On 15 December 1932 he 
declined his participation in an NSDAP claim at the Leipzig court.
322
 In an open letter on 30 
January 1933, the day of Hitler’s appointment, Schmitt lent his jurisprudential support to the 
essence (Sinn) of the Constitution based on refusing to relativize the theory of state and to 
abuse it in a way destructive to state and constitution.
323
 In a radio interview on 1 February 
1933, he described his role as a theorist, political scientist, and scholar of a meta-positively 
grounded substantial law for a concrete people.
324
 However, since 1929 he had gradually 
shifted the identity of the keeper or protector of the Weimar Constitution from the Reich-
supreme court
325
 to the Reich-president, first limited to commissarial powers but 
subsequently, in light of the mounting economic difficulties, to dictatorial decree powers.
326
 
But finally he settled on the need of a strong “decisionist” personality.327  
 
In late April 1933, he accepted the new ground under his feet
328
 and republished with 
changed forewords Political Theology and The Concept of the Political. The March 1933 
Enabling Act’s relegation of parliamentary competencies to obscurity he declared a 
‘provisional constitution’, and the April 1933 Reichsstatthaltergesetz became the ‘new 
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constitutional law’.329 With this leap from legality to a higher meta-physical legitimacy330 he 
synthesised old and new, cut himself off from the bourgeois idea of the rule of law, and 
justified this as participating in a common decision in favour of the spirit (Geist) of the 
German National Socialist revolution.
331
 But his article written for the first anniversary of the 
“seizure of power” on 24 January 1934 was greeted with rejection and was partly prohibited 
because it was considered to be “liberalist” or even adhering to a positivist rule of law. The 
Reichsstatthaltergesetz, which was used to implement the Führer’s will in the provinces, he 
had interpreted literally and had extracted the provincial governors (Statthalter) from the 
immediate power under the Reich-chancellor.
332
 Nonetheless, shortly after, he was called to 
the Council of the Prussian state (Staatsrat) under the Prussian governor.
333
 But imagining its 
change into a Führerrat that would eventually exert influence as the ‘Führer of the 
Führer’334 he miscalculated the Führer’s violence and the fierce competition within a 
Führer-state.
335
 The June/July 1934 Röhm-Putsch, Hitler’s violent solution to tensions among 
leading members of the National Socialist movement, Schmitt survived solely due to the 
intervention of the Prussian governor.
336
 Despite this display of Hitler’s murderous attitude, 
Schmitt did not take leave from National Socialism. Instead, on the very day of the “legal” 
consolidation of the office of the President with the Chancellor, Schmitt published a paper in 
which he declared the Führer to be the highest Judge of the German people, being beyond 
jurisdiction, and whose decision and action had dispensed true avenging justice, flowing from 
the right to life of a people.
337
 After this move from protecting to creating law, Schmitt 
abandoned his previous idea, published in 1934 in Über die drei Arten des 
rechtswissenschaftlichen Denkens,
338
 that the National Socialist “revolutionary” idea could be 
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grounded in the jurisprudential institutional essence (Sinn) of a constitution.
339
 Instead he 
turned to justifying the violence from an anti-Semitic attitude.
340
  
 
Schmitt was under no illusion that turning to the National Socialist worldview meant, in 
difference to Fascism, accepting Hitler’s anti-Semitic “problem of race”.341 Thus in early 
1933 Schmitt severed contact to many previously close friends of Jewish background.
342
 In 
May 1933, he had publically anticipated punitive expatriations of Jewish scholars due to their 
missing German spirit (Geist) or ties to the German people, in distinction from German 
intellectuals.
343
 By 1935 he praised the Nuremberg Racial Laws as a “constitution of 
freedom”,344 and organized a conference on Judaism within Jurisprudence,345 because in the 
jurisprudence of the Führer-state, the plan and will of the Führer replaces the rule of law 
(Rechtsstaat).
346
 This ludicrous polemical attempt of turning anti-Semitism into an academic 
science would overshadow forthwith his entire work.
347
 But this demonstration of his 
willingness to assimilate without reservation to the regime
348
 could not prevent SS-lawyers 
and emigrants to play Carl Schmitt against Carl Schmitt.
349
 They reminded him and the 
public of his previous connection to a “Jew-friendly” political Catholicism and Jewish 
colleagues, and his support of the presidential system even after the “seizure of power”. 
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Publically ridiculed,
350
 he lost in disgrace all of his party offices in early 1936.
351
 He would 
be dismissed from his professorship at the University of Berlin at the end of World War Two. 
Despite being twice interned and interrogated by the American Forces, he was never 
criminally charged. Post-war, he retreated to his hometown in the Ruhr area and never again 
received a call to any university but maintained throughout the remaining years of his life a 
lively correspondence with many students and intellectuals.  
 
2.5.2 Dietrich Bonhoeffer 
 
Choosing theology, Bonhoeffer, similar to Schmitt, decided on his professional path at an 
early age. During his youth and early adulthood, his decisions were directed towards 
travelling, accumulating knowledge, and advancing his academic career. Originally focused 
on developing a theory of church, he turned to the problem of the difference between 
philosophical knowledge and theological revelation. His engagement in the international 
ecumenical movement in the interest of peace turned, in late 1932 in close coordination with 
his brother-in-law and constitutional lawyer Gerhard Leibholz, into theological opposition to 
the approaching National Socialist state and into support for the Protestant Church’s 
confessional self-determination. His decision to join the underground resistance to the 
National Socialist state led to his death in April 1945. 
 
Born in 1906 in Breslau as a twin and youngest boy among eight siblings, Bonhoeffer was 
raised within the economic stability of a Protestant family of the upper-class, the partly 
aristocratic educated bourgeoisie.
352
 During his childhood and youth in Berlin, he was 
surrounded by academics and intellectuals of the same class and attended a private seminar 
for select students at the home of Adolf von Harnack.
353
 Because of ties to the agricultural 
estates in the eastern part of Germany, the family’s food supply was augmented with fresh 
produce during economically strained years which kept severe hunger at bay.
354
 Valuing the 
safety of a ‘good home’ where one could find ‘counsel, calm, and clarity’ and where ‘amid 
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the general impoverishment of spiritual life … a treasury of spiritual values and a source of 
inspiration’ could be found, the family unit remained central to Bonhoeffer’s life.355 Here he 
found advice from his mother and learned self-assertiveness and decisiveness towards setting 
and pursuing self-set goals,
356
 as exemplified in ‘his father’s unimpeachable judgement’.357 
To his brother’s not so subtle criticism of his announcement to pursue a career in the church, 
he responded in brotherly competitiveness that he ‘shall reform’ the institution they called 
‘poor, feeble, boring, petty bourgeois.’358 Driven by a competitive wish for independence and 
self-realization
359
 Bonhoeffer set out to focus on ecclesiology and to develop a theory of 
church while his brother Klaus and his friends, especially Leibholz,
360
 were within the 
academic stream of jurisprudence engaged with the theory of state. Nonetheless, all were 
concerned with the human being as part of the collective structure of their respective focus. 
 
After starting university at his father’s Alma Mater in Tübingen and joining his father’s 
former fraternity
361
 in 1923, the year of the hyper-inflation,
362
 Bonhoeffer travelled in 1924 to 
Rome for an extended study leave. There he approached the Roman Church and Catholicism 
with the academic interest of gaining knowledge about the institution and concept of 
church.
363
 Thus inspired he reflected on the German situation in which he saw the form of the 
gospel still tied to the state despite the Protestant Church’s official separation from the state. 
He wondered about the relation of an established church to piety within changing political 
situations and concluded that the Church’s complete separation from the state was 
desirable
364
  ̶  a topic that subsequently would run through his entire theological work.365 In 
                                            
355
 DBWE 8: 385. 
356
 cf. Hans Pfeifer, editor’s afterword to the German edition in DBWE 9:565. 
357
 DBWE 9:567. 
358
 Bethge, Bonhoeffer, 36. 
359
 Bethge, Bonhoeffer, 37, 44. 
360
 Bonhoeffer and Gerhard Leibholz shared the same circle of friends. At confirmation classes Bonhoeffer’s 
brother Klaus befriended Leibholz and Hans von Dohnanyi. All spent hiking vacations together at least since 
1922. In 1924 Leibholz and Bonhoeffer’s twin sister Sabine became engaged and they married in 1926; Bethge, 
Bonhoeffer, 18, 29; DBWE 9:51; Sabine Leibholz-Bonhoeffer, The Bonhoeffers: Portrait of a Family (London: 
Sidgwick & Jackson, 1971), 61, 65. 
361
 Bethge, Bonhoeffer, 46. 
362
 The Bonhoeffer family managed to keep four children at university during the hyper-inflation of 1923 when 
unemployment skyrocketed because his father, a psychiatrist at the renowned Charité hospital in Berlin, was 
paid by international clients in coveted foreign currencies; Bethge, Bonhoeffer, 48. 
363
 DBWE 9:89.  
364
 While in Rome, Bonhoeffer also experienced a Vatican-celebration on Constitution Day; DBWE 9:106-07. 
This celebration was similar to the 19
th
 century public celebrations in Germany that connected the Bible and the 
Constitution by carrying both in a procession through the streets. At the time of Bonhoeffer’s visit the “Roman 
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his 1925 dissertation, Sanctorum Communio,
366
 which simultaneously qualified as the thesis 
part of the graduation requirements,367 Bonhoeffer developed in a half-historical and half-
systematic way a theory of church for the Protestant religious community.
368
 In a theological 
dialogue with social philosophy and sociology, he set a Christian concept of person in 
relation to community for the purpose of articulating with the assertion of ‘Christ existing as 
church community’369 the essence of the empirical church and of overcoming the 
contradictions between sociology and revelation. During his immediately following 1928/29 
one year licentiate (Lizensariat) in a paid position at a German congregation in Barcelona, 
Bonhoeffer experienced for the first time close contact with people in need and people who 
were ‘difficult to classify socially’,370 as well as those of lower class ‘with whom you 
otherwise would hardly ever have exchanged even a single word.’371 Missing the intellectual 
exchanges of ideas customary to his life in Berlin, Bonhoeffer took the initiative to organize a 
lecture series
372
 for the purpose of alleviating his academic drought.
373
  
 
On his return to Berlin in February 1929, he immediately immersed himself in his 
Habilitation thesis, Act and Being,
374
 which he completed in record time in July 1930. 
Bonhoeffer had conceived the idea for his Habilitation thesis on ‘the question of 
consciousness and conscience in theology’,375 parallel to Leibholz’s Habilitation thesis.376 
                                                                                                                                       
question” between the Catholic Church and the Italian kingdom was still undecided. Only by 1929 would the 
Lateran Contracts separate the Roman Church and the Italian state by creating the Vatican State and 
guaranteeing its political and territorial sovereignty in exchange to the Pope’s recognition of Rome as capital of 
Italy. 
365
 DBWE 6:388-94; DBW 12:349-58; DBW 15:431-60, esp. 445-52; DBWE 16:502-28. 
366
 The dissertation was accepted at the University of Berlin already on December 17, 1927 but published only 
in September 1930; published as DBWE 1. 
367
 Erstes Theologisches Staatsexamen (First State Examination in Theology). 
368
 DBWE 9:148-49. 
369
 DBWE 1:121, 189, 199, 211, 231, 260, 280, 288. 
370
 DBWE 10:72. 
371
 DBWE 10:110. 
372
 The full titles of Bonhoeffer’s public presentations are “The Tragedy of the Prophetic and Its Lasting 
Meaning” (13 November 1928), “Jesus Christ and the Essence of Christianity” (11 December 1928), “Basic 
Questions of a Christian Ethics” (8 February 1929); DBWE 10:325-78. 
373
 cf. DBWE 10:116. 
374
 The thesis was accepted on July 12, 1930 at the University of Berlin but published more than a year later in 
September 1931; published as DBWE 2. 
375
 DBWE 10:122. Bonhoeffer mentioned an interest in “consciousness” for the first time on 14 June 1928 to 
Walter Dreβ; DBWE 10:101-02. He discussed this topic with Professor Reinhold Seeberg on 20 July 1928; 
DBWE 10:119-22, esp. 122 and referred various times to “conscience” in his February 1929 presentation to the 
Barcelona congregation; DBWE 10:359-378, esp. 374, 377, 378. 
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Leibholz, the husband to Bonhoeffer’s twin-sister Sabine, worked on a phenomenological 
inquiry into the essence of representation within the Weimar constitutional system
377
  which 
demanded a conscience of its parliamentary decision makers.378 Leibholz’s and Bonhoeffer’s 
topics were related as the former’s jurisprudential-philosophical and phenomenological gaze 
at the representational essence (Wesensschau) tried to prove that a priori supra-temporal 
concepts of state theory are knowable to human beings, and that the parliamentary 
representative bundled the spiritual essence within the self.
379
 Bonhoeffer’s investigation into 
the existence of ideas within transcendental philosophy and ontology in their relationship to 
systematic theology established that the philosophical concepts of knowledge, of which 
jurisprudence is one, closes human decision makers in on themselves and prevent access to 
knowledge revealed by God and openness to neighboring human beings. He then proceeded 
to focus on theological access to God’s revelation through the directness of faith in Jesus 
Christ at the center of the church. 
 
With his Habilitation and his final major theological examinations380 completed, and his 
inaugural lecture at the University of Berlin on The Anthropological Question in 
Contemporary Philosophy and Theology
381
 read, Bonhoeffer departed for a 1930/31 
scholarship year at Union Theological Seminary in New York City. This year stood at the 
borderline between student life and work life, between accumulating knowledge and 
disseminating knowledge. His father’s efforts during his absence to find, on his behalf, 
adequate employment
382
 in academia paid off a few months after Bonhoeffer’s return from 
America. At the very height of unemployment in the winter of 1931/32, Bonhoeffer began 
work as student chaplain and in a special academic position, first unpaid but shortly after 
                                                                                                                                       
376
 Gerhard Leibholz, Das Wesen der Repräsentation unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des 
Repräsentativsystems. 
377
 Leibholz began his work on the essence of representation already in 1926 while both, Bonhoeffer and 
Leibholz resided in Berlin. Leibholz completed the work on his Habilitation thesis in 1928, but published it only 
by mid-1929; Leibholz, Vorwort to Wesen der Repräsentation unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des 
Repräsentativsystems. At the time also Bonhoeffer worked on his own Habilitation and, again, both resided in 
Berlin.  
378
 Article 21 Weimar Constitution: ‚Die Abgeordneten … sind nur ihrem Gewissen unterworfen und an 
Aufträge nicht gebunden‘; Hildebrandt, Verfassungen, 75. 
379
 Stolleis, History of Public Law, 194. 
380
 Zweites Theologisches Staatsexamen (Second State Examination in Theology). 
381
 DBWE 10:389-408. Bonhoeffer also delivered his trial lecture on “The Concept of Dialectic in the So-Called 
Dialectic Theology”; DBWE 17:68. 
382
 DBWE 10: 288-89. 
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retroactively paid, as teaching assistant at the department of Systematic Theology at the 
University of Berlin.
383
  
 
Although Bonhoeffer had embarked for America with “semi-pacifist” thoughts384 that were 
filled with emotions regarding Germany’s experiences in regards to the Great War and the 
rejection of the Versailles Treaty,
385
 especially the moral guilt clause, he returned with a 
sharpened interpretation of “pacifism.” This became determinative for his subsequent 
involvement in the international ecumenical movement.
386
 He also attained an understanding 
of the ‘Negro problem,’387 mostly through immersing himself in the work of the black 
community of the Abyssinian Baptist Church in New York City. But he did not draw a 
connection to any “Jewish problem” in Germany even though he received information from 
home that Leibholz, who was of Jewish ancestry, feared ‘the Nazis as far as his job is 
concerned’.388 Bonhoeffer instead concurred with his brother Karl-Friedrich’s assessment389 
that fears were exaggerated and the Negro and Jewish situation were not comparable.
390
 
Nonetheless, he cannot be called ‘unpolitical’, as a friend did,391 or be interpreted as remote 
‘from contemporary political events’392 because belonging to his social upper class came with 
an expectancy to be current on political developments
393
 and being able to discuss them as 
well as academic topics with friends and family at any given time. Thus he could in 1922 
                                            
383
 Immediately on his return from America but before commencing his work in Berlin, Bonhoeffer traveled to 
Bonn to meet the theologian Karl Barth and attended two ecumenical conferences in Britain; DBWE 17:70-72. 
384
 Reinhard Staats, editor’s afterword to the German edition in DBWE 10:609. 
385
 DBWE 10:411-18. 
386
 The strongest expression of his commitment to peace was his talk at the ecumenical conference of the World 
Alliance for Life and Work in Fanø on 28 August 1934; DBWE 13:307-10. At the same conference a resolution 
in support of the Confessing Church was passed under the protest of the German Christians who where 
represented by Bishop Heckel. 
387
 DBWE 10:276. 
388
 DBWE 10:289. 
389
 DBWE 10:276. 
390
 DBWE 10:293. By 1939 Bonhoeffer had made this connection as during his second visit to America he 
mentioned in his diary the “Negro Question” and immediately after a “great increase in anti-Semitism” in 
America; DBWE 15:230. 
391
 DBWE 10:283. Already in his February1929 lecture in Barcelona Bonhoeffer discussed “political” issues 
such as the distinction between enemy and neighbor which came close to Carl Schmitt’s political distinction 
between friend and enemy; cf. DBWE 10:370. 
392
 Staats, editor’s afterword in DBWE 10:610. Regarding the amount of information sent to Bonhoeffer in New 
York see DBWE 10:289. 
393
 Because it was customary to read the newspaper regularly, Bonhoeffer’s mother, Paula Bonhoeffer, was 
worried that Dietrich may not have access to German newspapers in New York. DBWE 10:371. 
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immediately comment of Walter Rathenau’s (1867-1922) assassination394 and wondered in 
1944 what his brother and brothers-in-laws’ juridical perspectives to particular topics might 
be and about the ‘differences between theological existence and that of the legal 
profession.’395  
 
With the jurist Leibholz, his friend since the early 1920s, Bonhoeffer enjoyed a particular 
bond. Their ‘old topic of discussion … the doctrine of the lex naturae’ he still recalled and 
added to in 1940.
396
 And they shared a common fascination with Italy. Leibholz was since 
1928 an internationally renowned specialist on the Fascist theory of state as exemplified in its 
prototype of the Duce’s Italy.397 Leibholz’s knowledge of Fascism and his knowledge in 
Protestant Church Law (Evangelisches Kirchenrecht), gained through lecturing on this topic 
from November 1929 to October 1931 at the University of Greifswald,
398
 provided to 
Bonhoeffer a well informed source for updates on the developments in Germany after his 
return from America in 1931.  
 
Again exposed to his family and especially Leibholz’s insight knowledge, and now no longer 
a student but an educator, a shift in his attitude towards the political developments in 
Germany is evident in his work between early and late 1932.399 His first lecture course upon 
his return from America in the summer semester of 1932 on The Nature of the Church400 was 
still inspired by and is an updated version of his dissertation Sanctorum Communio with 
integrated aspects from Act and Being. However, in November 1932 Bonhoeffer presented, in 
                                            
394
 He wondered after Walter Rathenau’s assassination what would become of Germany if its best leaders were 
killed. This echoed a comment his brother Klaus made to his friend Hans von Dohnanyi about the leadership 
quality of people who abuse those who support democratic principles; Bethge, Bonhoeffer, 33-34. 
395
 DBWE 8:304. Bonhoeffer’s brother Klaus and the husbands to his sister Ursula, Rüdiger Schleicher, to his 
sister Christine, Hans von Dohnanyi, and his twin-sister Sabine, Gerhard Leibholz, were all lawyers. Leibholz, a 
baptized son of Jewish parents, emigrated to Britain in 1938. Klaus, Rüdiger, and Hans were involved with the 
assassination attempt on Hitler on 20 July 1944 and executed in 1945. 
396 
DBWE 15:300-02 and 6:450. 
397
 Wiegandt, Norm und Wirklichkeit, 22, 24. Starting 1 October 1926 Leibholz worked at the Italian section of 
the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Foreign Public Law and International Law. On 30 June 1928 he presented his 
inaugural lecture; Gerhard Leibholz, Zu den Problemen der fascistischen Verfassungsrechts (Berlin: de Gruyter, 
1928). In Italy this publication became known as full introduction to the Fascist form of rule. 
398
 Wiegandt, Norm und Wirklichkeit, 27. 
399
 Karola Radler, “The Leibholz-Schmitt connection’s formative influence on Bonhoeffer’s 1932-33 entry into 
public theology”, Stellenbosch Theological Journal 4, no 2 (December 2018): 683-702. 
400
 DBWE 11:269-332; 17:73. 
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coordination with Leibholz,
401
 the paper Thy Kingdom Come!,
 402
 at the same time with 
Leibholz speaking on The Disintegration of Liberal Democracy and the Authoritarian Theory 
of State.
403
 Both published their papers in January 1933. For both these presentations were, 
from their respective theological and jurisprudential perspectives, revisions of their earlier 
1928/29 positions on German political developments, even though both did not yet refer to or 
connect “racial” anti-Semitism to the National Socialist wave in Germany. Bonhoeffer 
centered this initial theological public opposition on the separation between the Fascist theory 
of state and the Protestant Church, as well as problems of Führer-ship.
404
 Leibholz’s paper 
which quotes Bonhoeffer in support of his own objection
405
  is an insider criticism of Fascism 
and it warns the Protestant Church about the approaching collectivism. 
 
In line with their general context both, Bonhoeffer and Leibholz had still been leaning in 
1928/29 toward authoritarian political ideas and visions of Volk and Vitalism. In his 1929 
Barcelona lecture on the Basic Question of a Christian Ethics, Bonhoeffer had referred to 
‘my own people’406 who are similar to individuals full of strength, power, youth, and 
victoriousness, because ‘God creates youth in the individual as well as nations’ and because 
he ‘himself is eternally young and strong and victorious.’ Therefore God would call every 
people ‘to create its history, to enter into the struggle that is the life of nations.’ The human 
being who surrendered the ‘own selfish will to the divine will that guides world history’ 
would determine the moment of action.407 Slightly earlier, in his 1928 inaugural lecture 408 at 
                                            
401
 Bonhoeffer‘s partly recovered library holds two of Gerhard Leibholz’s books: Leibholz, Die Gleichheit vor 
dem Gesetz and Die Auflösung der Liberalen Demokratie in Deutschland; Christoph Strohm, Theologische 
Ethik im Kampf gegen den Nationalsozialismus: Der Weg Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s mit den Juristen Hans von 
Dohnanyi und Gerhard Leibholz in den Widerstand, (Munich: Chr. Kaiser, 1989), 89. However, it can be 
assumed that Bonhoeffer had also read Leibholz’s Habilitation thesis Das Wesen der Representation unter 
besonderer Berücksichtigung des Repräsentativsystems, as well as Leibholz’s connected inaugural lecture 
published as Zu den Problemen des faschistischen Verfassungsrechts (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1928), especially, as 
the latter became widely recognized as fundamental jurisprudential publications and the basis of Leibholz’s 
academic successes in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Also, in a letter from Barcelona, dated July 3
rd
, 1928, 
Bonhoeffer had congratulated Leibholz on the successful completion of his post-doctoral degree, the 
Habilitation; DBWE 10:109. Leibholz had presented his inaugural lecture only a few days prior, on June 30
th
 
1928; Wiegandt, Norm und Wirklichkeit, 22. This suggests a constant flow of information to Bonhoeffer. 
 
402
 The lecture “Thy Kingdom Come” Bonhoeffer presented on 19 November 1932; DBWE 12: 285-97. It was 
published in January 1933 in the summarized version of What is Church; DBWE 12:262-66.  
403
 Leibholz presented his paper Auflösung also in November 1932. Leibholz, foreword to Auflösung; own 
translation of the title.  
404
 The radio version of this lecture “The Führer and the Individual in the Younger Generation” was delivered 
on 1 February 1933; DBWE 12:268-82. 
405
 Leibholz, Auflösung, 75 and footnote 196. 
406
 DBWE 10:370, 372. 
407
 DBWE 10:373. 
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the University of Berlin, Leibholz had analysed in depth the Fascist system as implemented 
in Italy since 1924. He had described how this system permeated all aspects of the state with 
new life, leaving no spheres such as law, economy, or religion outside the influence of the 
state. His analysis had determined that one of the central characteristics of Fascism was 
revising the essence of the constitution
409
 for the purpose of creating community. This would 
be done by infusing the mechanized society with “new life” which the dynamic decisions 
(Dezisionen) of the Duce continually actualized.
410
 Such personal decisions of this creative 
charismatic personality replaced the state’s law and strengthend the executive beyond the 
separation of power. This political ideal unit (ideele Einheit) combined the plurality of wills 
and brought dynamic vitality which was legitimized by a national myth.411 He had ended his 
presentation with the somewhat enthusiastic statement that Fascism liberated the individual 
because ‘Fascism wants to be life, wants to create life.’412  
 
However, in November 1932 Leibholz’s essay on the disintegration of the liberal democracy 
in Germany almost climaxed in the revision of his previous positive assessment of the Fascist 
idea of creating new life.413 He warned about the ‘new political faith movement’ in which 
correct faith (Rechtgläubigkeit) would give access to the ruling minority.414 He criticized the 
young generation’s focus on a new human being who was willing to sacrifice the own life in 
faith to one holy authoritative personality.415 In this collectivization under the leader principle, 
hierarchy would destroy the natural authority of office and legitimize obedience, devotion, 
and command.416 Leibholz specifically warned the Lutheran church that the idea of a new 
Reich meant a comprehensive mythical ideology which would absorb all eternal, earthly, and 
religious life.417  Spiritual content would be absorbed and the constitutionally given form of a 
society of public law would be remodeled which would lead to losing spiritual and 
                                                                                                                                       
408
 Gerhard Leibholz, Zu den Problemen des faschistischen Verfassungsrechts. This lecture was presented on 30 
June 1928; Wiegandt, Norm und Wirklichkeit, 22. 
409
 Leibholz, Zu den Problemen, 8. 
410
 Leibholz, Zu den Problemen, 41. 
411
 cf. Leibholz, Zu den Problemen, 22-24, 37-40. 
412
 Own translation; ‚Der Fascismus will Leben sein, will Leben spenden.‘; Leibholz, Zu den Problemen, 41. 
413
 Radler, “Leibholz-Schmitt connection”, 690. 
414
 Leibholz, Auflösung, 56, 57, 70, own translation. 
415
 Leibholz, Auflösung, 57, 66. 
416
 cf. Leibholz, Auflösung, 60-61, 64. 
417
 Leibholz, Auflösung, 56. 
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institutional independence.418 Because the state was ‘not the only “holy place”’ he demanded 
that just as the state limits the church so it reversely finds its own limits in the God-given 
church which teaches and proclaims God’s revealed word and that the state must respect the 
naturally given orders.
419
 And quoting Bonhoeffer,420 he stated that ‘“not creation of new life, 
but preservation of the given life” is the office of the state.’421  
 
And Bonhoeffer, in November 1932, turned the final words of ‘your kingdom come’422 of his 
last 1929 Barcelona lecture into the title of Thy Kingdom Come,423 which inaugurated the 
revision of his earlier position and the start of a series of essays424 as well as the university 
lectures on Creation and Sin,425 the Lectures on Christology,426 and the Review and 
Discussion of New Publications in Systematic Theology.427 In the first Bonhoeffer presented 
God’s word and message to humanity and the topics of Original Sin, creation ex nihilo, and 
Cain and Abel as of primary relevance for ‘our earth and humankind’.428 The second 
focussed on Christ’s person, work, presence, humanity and past issues of heresy. With the 
third lecture, Bonhoeffer introduced his students to contemporary ethical and theological 
perspectives on politics as well as the boundaries and laws of the state by way of reading 
recent publications. 429   
                                            
418
 cf. Leibholz, Auflösung, 75. 
419
 Own translation; ‚Daher ist nach evangelischer Staatsgesinnung auch der Staat nicht der alleinige „Ort der 
Heiligkeit“, ...  Der protestantische Staat ist vielmehr der grenzbewuβte Staat, der die Kirche ebenso begrenzt 
wie er selbst an der von Gott gestifteten, Gottes Word lehrenden und verkündenden Kirche seine Grenze findet, 
und der darüber hinaus auch die natürlich gegebenden Ordnungen wie vor allem den geschichtlich gebundenen 
Beruf und Stand, die Familie ... respektiert.‘; Leibholz, Auflösung, 74. 
420
 ‚Nicht Schöpfung neuen Lebens, sondern Erhaltung des gegebenen Lebens ist sein Amt.‘; DBW 12:273. 
421
 Own translation; ‚„Nicht Schöpfung neuen Lebens, sondern Erhaltung gegebenen Lebens” ist das Amt des 
Staates.‘; Leibholz, Auflösung, 74-75. 
422
 DBWE 10:378. 
423
 DBWE 12:285-97. 
424
 What is Church?,  DBWE 12:262-66; The Younger Generation’s Altered View of the Concept of Führer, 
DBWE 12: 266-68; The Führer and the Individual in the Younger Generation, DBWE 12:268-82. 
425
 This lecture was pubished later under the title Creation and Fall, DBWE 3. 
426
 DBWE 12:299-360. 
427
 DBWE 12:191-213. This lecture took place from November 8, 1932 to February 21, 1933; DBWE 12:191, 
note 1. 
428
 DBWE 3:74. 
429
 The publications Bonhoeffer reviewed in his lectures during the Wintersemester 1932 to 1933 were Karl 
Heim’s Glaube und Denken (Berlin: Fuchse, 1931), Paul Schütz’s Säkulare Religion (Tübingen: Mohr, 1932), 
Karl Barth’s Fides quaerens intellectum (Munich: Kaiser, 1931), Friedrich Gogarten’s Politische Ethik (Jena: 
Deiderichs, 1932), Hinrich Knittermeyer’s Grenzen des Staates (Berlin: Runge, 1932), Alfred de Quervain,‘s 
Das Gesetz des Staates (Berlin: Fuchse 1932), Wilhelm Stapel’s Der christliche Staatsmann: Eine Theologie 
des Nationalismus  (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1932), Emil Brunner’s Das Gebot und die 
Ordnungen (Tübingen: Mohr, 1932); DBWE 12:191. Also included in the readings was the the text ‚Wort und 
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In his paper Thy Kingdom Come Bonhoeffer stated as regards the main points of his revisions 
to his 1929 perspectives and in correspondence to Leibholz’s view that ‘the church limits the 
state, just as the state limits the church’430 because ‘the church is the limit of politics.’431 
God’s kingdom was not a new kind of ‘visible, powerful empire’, but as miracle and order 
the church and the state were two forms within God’s kingdom on earth.432  It was the state’s 
office to prevent the destruction of life through recognizing and maintaining the order of 
preservation of life.433 In this new ‘political-messianic idea’434 of the Reich, the chosen 
leader’s authority was not given qua office but depended on the leader’s personality to which 
the led, especially the young generation, abdicated with unconditional obedience their own 
rights and responsibility.435 In this collective extreme individualism436 the leader will fail 
because he ignores his penultimate responsibility before God and God’s ultimate authority.437 
He transgresses the eternal limitations, that is, the boundaries to human possibilities.438  
 
Although at the turn of the year 1932 to 1933 Leibholz thought that within the German 
circumstances a Fascist style radical collectivization of the individual and a mass-absorption 
of the intellect was improbable439 this changed with the 7 April 1933 legislated dismissal of 
all non-Aryans from public service. Bonhoeffer, however, preferred to listen to his superiors 
who advised him not to officiate at the funeral of Leibholz’s father who had died a few days 
earlier on April 11
th
. Although he wrote an essay on The Church and the Jewish Question, he 
did not publish it until June 1933. During this 1933 period from April to June, Leibholz, by 
then professor of constitutional law at the University of Göttingen, began to experience, due 
to his Jewish ancestry, acute discrimination and the rejection by many collegues, including 
and foremost by Schmitt. 
 
                                                                                                                                       
Bekenntnis Altonaer Pastors‘ which was an early (January 11, 1933) theological protest by Protestant clergy 
against German Christians; DBWE 12:192 note 3. 
430
 DBWE 12:294. 
431
 DBWE 12:265. 
432
 DBWE 12:295, 292. 
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 DBWE 12:293. 
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 DBWE 12:276, 278. 
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 cf. DBWE 12:277. 
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Since 1926 Leibholz had been in close professional-personal contact with Schmitt and they 
had met frequently.440 Schmitt had proof-read his 1928 Habilitation thesis
441
 and Leibholz 
had even delayed its publication until 1929 in order to integrate Schmitt’s ‘valuable’ and 
‘exceptional’ presentation of the problems of representation in his just published 1928 
Verfassungslehre. Leibholz also had stated that Schmitt’s position ‘largely corresponds to my 
own fundamental statement.’442 In return for Schmitt’s interest in his Habilitation thesis, 
Leibholz had read the galley-proof of Schmitt’s Beckerath recension in which Schmitt had 
highlighted Leibholz’s excellent publication ‘on the problems of the Fascist constitutional 
law’.443 And in the published version of his inaugural lecture on Italian fascism Leibholz had 
referred only to Schmitt within the body of the text and had praised Schmitt’s convincing 
presentation that the concept of dictatorship necessitates identifying an enemy.444 Thereafter, 
at least until September 1932, they had continued their friendship which had included 
Leibholz’s wife Sabine Bonhoeffer, Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s twin sister.445 And according to 
three of his students, Bonhoeffer referred in his 1932/33 lecture to Carl Schmitt while 
reviewing and discussing in Stapel’s publication446 the position that the friend and enemy 
contrast follows from God’s kingdom being faced by that of Lucifer.447 This indicates that 
Bonhoeffer was aware of the person of Carl Schmitt and of at least some of his theories.  
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 Leibholz, foreword to Das Wesen der Repräsentation unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des 
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 The content of Bonhoeffer’s 1932/33 lecture Review and Discussion of New Publications in Systematic 
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However, in April 1933 Schmitt changed publishers because he no longer wished his books 
to appear in the same series with Jewish authors such as Leibholz.
448
 In May 1933 Schmitt 
differentiated between Jewish scholars and German intellectuals and anticipated the former’s 
expatriation from Germany,449 and at the start of the summer semester of 1933 members of 
the National Socialist SA-storm troopers
450
 enforced a boycott of Leibholz’s lectures at the 
University of Göttingen.
451
 Then Bonhoeffer finally realized that the National Socialist 
ideology and theory of state was intrinsically connected to a hatred of Jews, defined as race, 
not as religion. In the June 1933 publication on the Jewish question, Bonhoeffer calls any 
attempt of the state for an ‘obligatory exclusion of baptized Jews from our Christian 
congregations’ an attack on the nature of the church which would ‘find itself in statu 
confessionis.’452 In November 1933, with a reference to ‘all that happened during the past 
months,’ Bonhoeffer apologized to Leibholz453 for his fears454 and earlier behavior.455 
 
Thus primed by Leibholz’ knowledge and experience, Bonhoeffer engaged in 1933 in 
opposing the National Socialist’s attempt to synchronize the church to the state by way of 
rewriting the Church Constitution and enforcing the Aryan paragraph. Implementing the 
Führer-principle into the Church constitution and adopting the state’s Aryan legislation into 
the church amounted for Bonhoeffer not only to a transgression by the state of the boundaries 
between church and state, but it also endangered the Christian faith as such, that is, it 
amounted to a statu confessionis.456 Thus in June 1933 he spoke up against the changes to the 
church constitution at a student assembly at the University in Berlin457 to demand a doctrinal 
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statement and subsequently, in August, engaged in writing a draft for the Bethel confession.458 
But he disagreed with the watered down compromises of the later editorial draft and refused 
to work on its final edition.459 For him, the Bethel confession had been stuck in its opposition 
to the changes to the church constitution, while the central question of ‘Germanism or 
Christianity’ had not been sufficiently addressed.460 An engagement in the Pastor’s 
Emergency League which formed in September 1933 was more promising because it 
addressed the immediate plight of the pastor’s that were affected by the state’s demand that 
clergy had to unconditionally support the National Socialist state and the German Protestant 
Church and were of the Aryan descent.461 However, his plea to pastors for a widespread 
resignation remained unresponded to, and even Barth, although agreeing that a status 
confessionis existed, recommended to wait for a ‘more principled attitude’ than that of a 
racial conformity to the Civil Service law.462  
 
Following his father’s advice to ‘save oneself for the right moment’463 Bonhoeffer withdrew 
in mid-October 1933 to a Lutheran pastorate in London, albeit clarifying to the Reich bishop 
that he would not represent the National Socialist infused perspectives of the German 
Christians.
464
 His continued involvement in the ecumenical movement on behalf of the 
opposition within the Lutheran church led in May 1934 to a pastoral statement by the Bishop 
of Chichester George Bell (1883-1958) which spelled out the grievences regarding the 
Führer principle, a violent regime, and radical discrimination incompatible with the Christian 
principle.465 Encouraged by the Bishop’s letter, the Barmen synod condemned in May 1934 
the “false teachings” of the German Christians. The Barmen Declaration, the founding 
document for the Confessing Church in Germany, was for Bonhoeffer an anti-heresy 
declaration466 which meant that the false teachings of the German Christians had no place in 
the one true church of Jesus Christ, the Confessing Church, from which the Reich church had 
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separated itself.467 Bonhoeffer intended to bring the Barmen Declaration without compromise 
to the youth programs of the ecumenical movement.468 However, his demand for decisive 
action towards peace at the Fanø conference
469
 and his push for an ecumenical confessional 
statement failed.
470
 His continued insistence on a confession and the repudiation of heresy 
rather isolated him.471 
 
Assuming in 1935 the task of organizing and directing the preacher’s seminary of the 
Confessing Church led him to return from London.
472
 After the seminary was prohibited and 
forcefully closed in 1937, he continued for some time with underground collective pastorates 
which in turn were forcefully closed in 1940. The work at the seminary inspired his books 
Life together
473
 and his interpretation of the Sermon on the Mount in Discipleship.
474
 With 
his right to teach at universities revoked on 5 August 1936,
475
 the Confessing Church’s 
seminary closed in 1937, banned from Berlin since 1938, and in light of the Leibholz 
family’s emigration in 1938, he agreed to embark for a lecture series in America which his 
friends had initiated. But within a fortnight, only two months prior to the start of the Second 
World War on 1 September 1939, he decided to return to Germany because he could not 
separate himself from the impending catastrophe in his homeland.
476
 To save him from 
military service at the front-lines, family members arranged a position with the Intelligence 
Services (Abwehr) where he utilized, as a double agent, his international contacts in support 
of the secret resistance organization’s effort. His theological writings of the post-1940 period, 
published post-humously as collection under the title Ethics,477 returned to many theological 
topics already raised in the years 1932 and 1933. His arrest in 1943 and the resistance’s failed 
assassination of Hitler on 20 July 1944 led to his execution on 9 April 1945, only a few days 
shy of the end of the war on 8 May 1945.  
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2.6 Conclusion: Ideology or Confession? 
 
The 19th century’s constitutional fights, resulting in an emancipation of a private sphere free 
from the interference of the state and public law, brought in motion questions of the relation 
between the church and the state, between ideological and confessional content of 
constitutional institutions. The period of industrialization, the Great War, and the following 
complexity of socio-economic disunity pulled the Weimar Republic apart geographically, 
intellectually, and politically and endangered the free space of the private over against the 
public sphere. Both, the ecclesiastic and republican decisions and compromises of the 
Weimar Constitution proved insufficient for solving the many problems of the first German 
Republic. Jurisprudential and theological discourse, wrestling with finding the most central 
essence and substance for the form and content that is needed to overcome the frailness of the 
situation and for devising a new structure for society and community, glanced at 
interdisciplinary perspectives, and solutions found in neighboring countries such as in Italy. 
But in the competition between extreme right wing nationalism and National Socialism on 
one side, and extreme left wing communism and moderate socialism on the other side, the 
democratic option of finding compromises lost out to an exploitation of the Weimar 
Constitution, to violence, and to the call for a status quo ante of a monarchic style figure; 
eventually in the extreme version of a decisionist totalitarian dictator. Those within the 
Lutheran church who insisted on the independence of the church resisted the domination by 
the National Socialist state by starting a discourse on confessional clarity free from state-
ideology.  
 
Almost one generation apart and originating from different socio-economic, geographic and 
confessional backgrounds, the aspired university career was for Schmitt a steep arduous 
social climb compared to the relative ease of Bonhoeffer. They also experienced differences 
which mirror the overall tensions of the Weimar Republic. At the time of the National 
Socialist “seizure” of power, Schmitt was at the height of his jurisprudential career and 
Bonhoeffer was just beginning to establish himself in the theological academic, ecumenical, 
and ecclesiastical spheres. Schmitt fully assimilated himself to National Socialist ideology, 
including expelling Jewish acquaintances from his private life, accepting Hitler as source of 
law and final judge, and embracing anti-Semitism in jurisprudential scholarship. But fierce 
competition in this Führer-state sidelined his career and instead of revolutionizing the 
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Constitution and public life with “new meaning”, his own life was largely expelled from the 
official public realm of the National Socialist state. Bonhoeffer’s early drive to independence 
and self-realization over against his peers, who were immersed in jurisprudential studies and 
theories of state, led him to formulate a theory of church and to position revelation over 
against philosophical, including jurisprudential, conscience and consciousness. Through his 
close friendship to the Jewish born Leibholz, his brother-in-law and a close acquaintance to 
Schmitt, Bonhoeffer had access to insight information on the Fascist theory of state. Together 
with Leibholz’s experience of discrimination, not least by Schmitt, he was well prepared for 
opposing the National Socialist state’s attempts of synchronizing the Protestant Church to the 
Führer-principle and to the Aryan state legislation. Recognizing this as a heresy and a status 
confessionis, he pressured the church opposition and the ecumenical movement for a 
confessional statement. He welcomed the 1934 Barmen Theological Declaration and the 
Confessing Church as its consequence to the schism with the German Christians, but his 
insistence on heresy isolated him within the ecumenical movement. 
 
Schmitt’s jurisprudential and Bonhoeffer’s theological response to a crisis and decision 
dynamic within the Weimar context and the interconnected questions of urgency, form, and 
figure, as well as their glances at each other’s academic disciplines is the focus of the 
following chapters. 
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Chapter 3: 
The Krisis: Locating the Problem 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
During the Weimar Republic the so called “age of crisis” that started in the mid-1800s 
peeked in a crisis and decision dynamic. A crisis conceals a need, an essential want, and also 
a solution which lends the term “crisis” a quality that is useful to different groups for 
advancing decisions that match their political goals. The Berliner Tagesblatt diagnosed in 
January 1931 that the crisis-psychosis was exceeding even the war-psychosis, and made 
people in their ‘holy simplicity’ susceptible to the National Socialist ‘doctrine of salvation’ 
and dubious pseudo-religious practices.
478
 The change from monarchy to democracy, from 
Christian state-ideology to the separation of state and church, had replaced a previously 
perceived unity with a questionable continuity of personal and communal life. For theorists of 
state, the jurisprudential caesura meant a discontinuity of established governmental power 
structures and the church lost contact to power and influence on communal life. This brought 
a process of mourning, uncertainty, and insecurity. External forces, such as industrialization, 
technology, capitalist mass culture, social movements, war-loss and revolution enfolded 
causal powers which were blamed for having destabilized, even destroyed, social orders, and 
having replaced formerly secure expectations with an indeterminate, instable future. Held 
responsible were, either in singularity or in combination, liberalism, relativism, historicism, 
rationalism, idealist optimistic progress, democracy, secularization, dissolution of Christian 
values, Enlightenment’s scientific methodology, and many other points of reference. Overall, 
the Weimar crisis was understood either as a pessimistic downward spiraling decay or as an 
optimistic positive development to a new, different and better life. Thus despite, or because 
of, the difficulty of locating the exact problem, the change to the National Socialist 
government in early 1933 was variably greeted with excessive hope or as a massive crisis 
exceeding any of the previous crises. Therefore the following will define the term “crisis” 
prior to identifying the issue Bonhoeffer and Schmitt saw as the most pressing one of their 
time in Germany of the Weimar period. 
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3.2 The Concept of Krisis and its Kierkegaardian Link 
 
The word “crisis” originated etymologically from the Greek term Krisis which means divide, 
select, evaluate, compete, dispute, fight and is related to decision, but it is not yet the 
decision. It depicts the build up to a particular point at which from options a definitive 
direction appears. As a political concept it meant also the process of dividing and disputing 
and to find the regulative political order that ends the conflict.
479
 Its roots are steeped in the 
medical, jurisprudential, and theological fields of antiquity were it depicted the respective 
harsh and life-relevant alternatives between life and death, just and unjust, and salvation or 
damnation. The inescapable pressures of objective crisis together with subjective criticism 
reduced the scope of action to the dilemma of a choice between exclusive alternatives.
480
  
 
Objective observations, the scientific discussion, and evaluation (judicium) of the current 
state in comparison to a state of normal during a phase decisive for life or death were the 
elements of the medical use of Krisis.
481
 The jurisprudential use originally did not 
differentiate between process, legal findings, and judgement but was of constitutional 
significance because its intrinsic pro and contra considerations defined justice, the order of 
rule by governmental resolutions, and the decisions on war, peace, and death sentences, and 
bound the single citizen to the political order of the community.
482
 Within theology, Krisis 
received an eschatological component by referring to the time of theological tension before 
the anticipated final cosmic decision; the period at which the grace of God was already 
present and eternal life in the future was promised, that is, at which a transformation process 
from an old life through death into a new life of faith in Jesus Christ takes place.
483
  
 
The three classical usages of Krisis became in the modern era increasingly metaphorically 
combined. The French and American Revolutions of the late 18
th
 century turned Krisis into 
an epochal historical-philosophical concept. It expressed that not the divine but the human 
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acceptance of moral responsibility and the either-or decision for a constitution with a new 
species of government had brought about a transformative salvation for life in the here and 
now.
484
 In Germany Krisis acquired during the “age of crisis”, as this began with the 1848 
revolutionary activities, an organic and humanistic-individualistic characteristic that mirrored 
in its semantic usage the unfolding political dynamics. The structural changes in society were 
associated with human nature and life that constantly pushed for change and a new humanity, 
i. e. an internally changed human being.
485
 This was connected by the early 20
th
 century to a 
transitional gap in solving socio-economic and political problems with decisions between the 
either-or alternatives of peaceful reforms or unlawful but eschatologically enriched hope for 
revolutionary transformation.
486
 
 
In the search for the content of reforms on one side, or revolutionary results on the other side, 
it was under the modern conditions of fact-based science that the theories of 
phenomenology
487
 and ontology
488
 as well as the empirical disciplines of sociology
489
 and 
psychology developed.
490
 In jurisprudence topics on methodology, positivism, and 
conceptualization of form and essence dominated the discourses. It was especially the 
problem of the relation between normativity and facticity that provoked a controversy on 
method, and called into doubt jurisprudence’s very foundation by questioning if it was a 
scientific discipline (Wissenschaft) or rather a political forum. Theology in turn asked if 
science, rooted in evidenced facts, may have severed Christian truth and the real from 
traditional myths. “Demythologizing” the biblical text in a critical process could expose the 
true core of the New Testament’s teachings and make it accessible to the modern mind.491 
Similarly jurisprudential positivism stripped legal concepts (Rechtsätze) of any presumably 
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distractive content of metaphysical, ethical, or political nature. In search for their precise 
core-meaning, they were dissected into the smallest conceivable elements of thought for the 
purpose of using such particles as factors in the logical calculation of a decision 
(Begriffsjurisprudence).
492
 
 
Under the words “crisis” and “questionable” many Weimar theologians perceived the 
dissolution of moral foundations. They blamed the destructiveness of a limitless 
individualism with its optimism and faith in progress and the self-assurance of reason
493
 and 
called for a cultural innovation that was carried by a new theological orientation.
494
 The lost 
direct influence on the state was diagnosed as causal to the crisis of the Protestant Church and 
the wide-spread theological opposition to the Weimar Republic found common ground in a 
German idea of state that was carried by a consciousness of the importance of the Lutheran 
Reformation.
495
 For Friedrich Gogarten (1887-1967) and Karl Barth (1886-1968) the thought 
of a permanent Krisis between time and eternity was at the heart of the general consciousness 
of crisis. Their dialectic theology gathered followers around the publication Between the 
Times (Zwischen den Zeiten).
496
 In Gogarten’s widely influential theology,497 it was not the 
1918/19 revolutions but the growing mistrust in a world directed by human will and human 
wisdom that had abandoned the human being in the middle, in an empty space. Here the 
autonomous human being was forced to press toward progress and was mistaken for the 
divine.
498
 The cultural decay was the result of modern scientific methods which had achieved 
the standing of being the sole legitimate instance for defining the world. But instead the 
break-down of all authority, historical norms, and values had proven the particularity and 
transience of all products of human work. It was a theological task to redefine the normative 
basis for political action because with God as the first and decisive standard theology was the 
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science that was able to provide the true and final norms of a political ethics.
499
 For Barth, the 
existential struggle within history for the advantage of power of men over other men was 
hypocritically described by 19
th
 century’s liberalism as a struggle for justice and freedom.500 
In his “theology of crisis”, a radical chasm separates the divine’s transcendent reality from 
humanity and the truth of divine revelation becomes manifest in the human experience of 
inadequacy. Therefore, ‘in the light of ultimate and all-embracing KRISIS God is known to 
be God, and His sovereignty is seen.’501  
 
Within jurisprudence and theology Kierkegaard’s existentialism became a point of reference 
because his work, which was written in the 19
th
 century Danish context of industrialization 
and its accompanying cultural and social upheavals, appeared to be speaking to a similar 
situation in the early 20
th
 century in Germany.
502
 Kierkegaard thought that the approaching 
depersonalized, anonymous “mass”, the mass society, “the crowd”, threatened passionate true 
Christian faith,
503
 and he rejected the closeness of church and state, of “Christendom”, which 
he considered a phenomenon of cultural history.
504
 To him this demanded speaking up and 
intervening in contemporary politics. Kierkegaard had dismissed the “system” of Georg 
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) that had claimed logical science could access the 
absolute knowledge and mind of God.
505
 To Kierkegaard this was a misguided hubristic 
attempt to ascend to the divine and heaven with the help of a human-made dialectic ladder of 
thesis, anti-thesis, and synthesis. In a play on Either-Or
506
 he juxtaposed the aesthetical with 
the ethical for the purpose of exposing the missing element of novelty, or rather the 
                                            
499
 Tanner, Die fromme Verstaatlichung, 64. 
500
 According to Tanner, Barth criticized political liberalism and the trust in the ability of the reasonable human 
being to insights, decisions, and democratic compromise. Thus he stood in opposition to the Weimar 
Constitution. In this hostility to Enlightenment reason and emancipation, the 1933 political change to National 
Socialism evidenced to Barth the falsity of the liberalism of the 1789 French revolution. Focused on rejecting 
liberalism prevented him from recognizing that National Socialism’s discrimination against Jews injured the 
humanity of the state and society; Tanner, Die fromme Verstaatlichung, 65-66. 
501
 Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, trans. Edwyn C. Hoskyns, 7
th
 ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 
1965), 91, emphasis in original. 
502
 Burkhard Conrad, Der Augenblick der Entscheidung. Zur Geschichte eines politischen Begriffs, (Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 2008), 28. 
503
 Frederick Sontag, A Kierkegaard Handbook (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1979), 57.  
504
 Søren Kierkegaard, Attack on “Christendom”, trans. with introduction Walter Lowrie (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press: 1968; 10
th
 reprint 1991). 
505
 See Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, ed. James Black Baillie, Dover 
Philosophical Classics (Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications, 2003). 
506
 See Søren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, 2 vols. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1959). 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
88 
 
“movement”, in the Hegelian synthesis that would elevate it over the thesis and anti-thesis.507 
But the aesthetic remains caught in possibility without actuality, in imagination and 
sensation, in which the occasion presents an event for romantic reflection for the purpose of 
avoiding boredom, presenting pleasures, and celebrating life from a spectator’s perspective. 
However, over against the aesthete, the judge, who chooses ethical commitment, 
communication, and procedures, recognizes the limitations of the self but nonetheless 
remains trapped in claims of eternal values and civic duty to others. Thus while the aesthete’s 
desire turns him into a creator-god of unconstrained possibility, and the ethicist judge 
perceives his love for others as dialectic advancement over against aesthetic selfishness, both 
nonetheless remain stuck in the choice between the aesthetic and the ethical without 
advancing to the higher religious phase of existence, the paradoxical Christian faith. The 
“movement” to the beyond of aesthetical possibility and of ethical social mores remains 
absent.  
 
Kierkegaard assessed that the missing ingredient was faith in the “absurd idea” of 
transcendent origin that the eternal, infinite God could be incarnated as a human being who 
would die on the cross; the absurdity of faith in the God-man Jesus Christ. This paradox of 
the simultaneity of transcendence and immanence, this instant at which time and eternity 
intersect,
508
 is an offence to Hegelian reason and logical systems which incorporate the whole 
of reality. Instead, the paradox makes apparent the gap, the hole, the disconnection between 
God and human being, and the human’s complete dependence on the divine’s gracious gift of 
faith.
509
 In being confronted with this gap the human being’s fascination, fear, anxiety, 
despair, and sin-consciousness is confronted with the need to choose, to act freely, and to 
“leap” from unbelief to the relationship of faith.510 The human being is faced with failing to 
find the self in the synthesis of finite and infinite, and of instead remaining in self-enclosed 
narcissism without relations to others. Even though existence is prior to the Christian 
essence,
511
 reaching the latter demands the teleological suspension of socially prescribed 
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decision procedures and replacing them with free obedience to the divine command.
512
 This 
crisis requires existential choices between good and evil in the instant of the paradox of faith, 
in this moment of decision, of leaping in faith across the divide between finite and infinite, 
between existence and transcendence.  
 
Just as in the etymological and semantic development of the term crisis so also for 
Kierkegaard the Krisis of the divide was not yet the decision. Krisis only pointed to choices 
which would consolidate to alternatives and lead when the right moment appeared to a 
decision. The following will turn to disclosing the crisis that Bonhoeffer and Schmitt, who 
were also inspired by Kierkegaard, the “father of existentialism”, perceived as the most 
pressing need, the hole, the gap, or as in Gogarten’s thought the empty space in the middle, of 
their time and place. 
 
3.3 Schmitt’s Crisis of Insignificance (Bedeutungslosigkeit) 
  
Schmitt identified several crises which each sidelined the human being in its specific position 
to a gap, a divide. He first located a disconnection in judicial decision-making, followed by a 
gap in the state’s application of meta-physical Justice and then a gaping discord within liberal 
democracy. An intellectual line reaches from his early discovery of arbitrariness within legal 
positivism, to ascertaining the individual human being and ethics as insignificant 
(bedeutungslos) to the state’s function of mediating meta-physical Justice to empirical 
facticity, and to exposing an only fictional free individual of liberalism who stood in 
disconnect to bourgeois parliamentary democracy.  
 
While lecturing in 1912 at Kierkegaard’s Alma Mater, the University of Strasbourg, Schmitt 
located a gap between a judgement (Urteil) and the parliamentary statutes (Gesetz) which the 
judge is bound to use as foundation of a decision.513 To him neither methodological formation 
nor legal reasoning was sufficient for filling the gap and establishing the required legal 
correctness of a judgement, and for delivering legal certainty (Rechtssicherheit). This was the 
case despite of Hans Kelsen’s (1881-1973) “pure positivist theory of law”514 which claimed 
                                            
512
 cf. Come, Kierkegaard, 280-82. 
513
 In Continental jurisprudencial method every legal evaluation begins with a norm, that is, a promulgated law. 
514
 Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory, trans. Bonnie Litschewski Paulson and Stanley 
L. Paulson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). Ebel and Thielmann, Rechtsgeschichte, 354.  
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
90 
 
that parliamentary statutes could command obedience to the legal essence of their words 
simply because of having been promulgated according to due process. This positivist theory 
of law insisted that the empirical world could be correctly evaluated by applying abstract 
concepts, categories, and Weberian typologies
515
 independent of social reality, politics, 
sociological and historical analysis, and most decisively without supra-jurisprudential 
metaphysical speculative content.
516
 In methodological self-restriction the boundaries 
between normativity and facticity, i.e. between legal compulsion (Zwang) and ethical 
obligation were not to be blurred.
517
  
 
Despite the “Goethe of jurisprudence’s”,518 Friedrich Carl von Savigny’s (1779-1861) 
objection to codifying law, the 19
th
 century’s struggle between the mainly Berlin-based 
educated bourgeoisie and the Prussian monarchic powers
519
 as regards securing their 
economic and property interests had resulted in codexed statute law.
520
 For Savigny abstract 
rights that were independent of duties, such as they were found in the Roman Corpus Iuris of 
the Middle Ages, prevented an “organic” growth of customary law. As the latter’s elementary 
source, he had identified the ethically bound natural person, i.e. the lawyer, who was 
cooperating with others within a collective juristic person (Juristische Person), the peoples. 
In this sphere of legal relations (Rechtsverhältnisse) the subjective right of the autonomous 
personality to will and act on legal transactions existed parallel to that of others.
521
 However, 
growing late 19
th
 century nationalist sentiment increasingly insisted on stating cultural 
interpretations of law in German codifications
522
 which led to the positivist interpretations of 
their “black letters”.  
 
                                            
515
 ‘… Kelsen shared with Weber a neo-Kantian methodology and epistemology, which emphasized the 
formulation of highly refined, abstract categories with which the empirical world could be evaluated.’; John P. 
McCormick, “Legal Theory and the Weimar Crisis of Law and Social Change”, in Weimar Thought: A 
contested Legacy, eds. Peter Gordon and John P. McCormick (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 56. 
516
 Ebel and Thielmann, Rechtsgeschichte, 354. Main supporters of positivism were Hugo Preuβ, one of the 
authors of the Weimar Constitution, Gerhard Anschütz and Richard Thoma. The latter two had been the 
supervisors of Gerhard Leibholz’s philosophical dissertation on Fichte und der demokratische Gedanke: Ein 
Beitrag zur Staatslehre (Freiburg i.B.: Julius Boltze, 1921). 
517
 Klaus Tanner, Die fromme Verstaatlichung, 41. 
518
 Ebel and Thielmann, Rechtsgeschichte, 328. 
519
 Ebel and Thielmann, Rechtsgeschichte, 333-35. 
520
 The legal struggle resulted in the 1897 Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch) and in the 1900 Civil Code 
(Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch). 
521
 Ebel and Thielmann, Rechtsgeschichte, 329. 
522
 Ebel and Thielmann, Rechtsgeschichte, 354. 
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But by the early 20
th
 century, positivism became seen as an expression of neo-Kantian 
rationalism and was accused of having lost guiding ideals and standing in unethical distance 
to the reality of the chaos of life-experiences.
523
 Thus it was unable to integrate the 
substantial obligations that came with the changes to a pluralistic and antagonistic class 
society.
524
 This one-dimensional rationalism of objective legal formalism was accused of 
replacing values and ideals with empty concepts apart from reality and in false analogy to a 
mathematical logic.
525
 Thus, the missing substance turned law (Recht) into an open form 
available for random content. In this context a methodological controversy on the Romanist 
formalism versus Germanist substance, with ties to the earlier codification debate, resurfaced 
in regards to the concept of person.
526
 Otto Friedrich von Gierke
527
 had alleged that in the 
Romanist absolute concept of person a natural person’s essence becomes irrelevant once it 
was constituted as juristic person. He instead preferred the Germanist concept of person 
which allowed a multiplicity within unity, that is, that the juristic person’s common 
personality (Gesamtpersönlichkeit) is grounded in the ethically interconnected “organic” 
relations of the wills of natural persons which are inherent to a totality of persons 
(Personengesamtheit). The Strasbourg professor Paul Laband (1838-1918) had contested this 
position with a radical formalism in which the essence of a person in the juristic sense was 
exhausted in the independent juristic subject without recourse to ethics or freedom. For him 
law turned the sum of single existences into a new basic unit, a collective person, which 
becomes an independent bearer of rights and duties without internal multiplicity.
528
 
 
                                            
523
 While all criticized liberalism, they differed in their position towards democracy and the Weimar 
Constitution. See Manfred Friedrich, „Der Methoden- und Richtungsstreit: Zur Grundlagendiskussion der 
Weimarer Staatsrechtslehre“, Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts (AöR) 102, no. 2 (1977): 168, 173, 175, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/44305769. 
524
 cf. Tanner, Die fromme Verstaatlichung, 40-42.  
525
 Hermann Heller, „Die Krisis der Staatslehre“, Archiv für Sozialwisenschaft und Sozialpolitik 55 (1926): 305. 
526
 For a short summary of the famous methodological controversy of the Romanist versus the Germanist 
concept of person between Otto Friedrich von Gierke and Paul Laband see Heller, „Die Krisis der Staatslehre“, 
295. 
527
 Otto Friedrich von Gierke, Das deutsche Genossenschaftrecht, vol. 1: Rechtsgeschichte der deutschen 
Genossenschaft, vol 2: Geschichte des deutschen Körperschaftsbegriffs, vol. 3: Die Staats- und 
Korporationslehre des Altertums und des Mittelalters und ihre Aufnahme in Deutschland, vol 4: Die Staats- und 
Korporationslehre der Neuzeit (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1868, 1873, 1881, 1913). 
528
 ‚Das Recht mache ‚aus der Summe von Sonderexistenzen eine neue Grundeinheit, innerhalb deren es keine 
Vielheit gibt.‘; Laband quoted in Heller, “Krisis”, 295. Hermann Heller, though, insisted that although the 
collective unit stands independently above the concept of person, the collective unit nonetheless remains in 
relation to the multiplicity of its parts a “unity in multiplicity” precisely because of the cooperative Germanist 
essence; Heller, “Krisis”, 315. 
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It was into the discourse on logical formalism and anti-positivist openness to material reality 
that Schmitt inserted the missing link between abstract statute-law and concrete application to 
a case. He introduced the moment of arbitrariness (Willkür)
529
 which he found in the gap 
between a correct interpretation of the written, formal statute-law on one side, and the 
“rightness” (Richtigkeit) of a legal judgement on the other side.530 According to him, in 
applying the statute-law to a concrete case the act of interpreting and deciding changes the 
statute’s function and abstract content.531 This gap could neither be closed with the help of 
the criteria of lawfulness (Gesetzmäβigkeit)532 or legal accuracy (Rechtsbestimmtheit),533 as 
they had been developed by the judicial praxis, nor with interpretive methods, psychology, 
extra-positive meta-norms, or teleological perspectives. Rather the ‘persisting living force’534 
of the statute was controlled by the principle of collegiality according to which a judgement 
is correct (richtig) if another judge would have decided likewise.
535
 The judge is here 
understood as an empirical normal type, not an ideal type,
 
of the whole body of modern 
jurists who are educated in the legal profession.
536
 The written reasons for a judgement are 
paramount for satisfying this methodological circle of collegiality, independent of their 
significance for the parties of the case. Designed to create calculable correctness and 
predictability, the principle not only excludes subjective personal, moral, cultural and 
political elements
537
 but also discharges the judge from personal legal responsibility for his 
judgement even if it was objectively contra legem.
538
 The legal concord of collegiality 
precludes subjective intent and negligence of the judge.
539
 Nonetheless the gap, the ‘moment’ 
of arbitrariness, remains tied to the personality
540
 of the judge who is independent of orders 
                                            
529
 ‚Ein solches Moment inhaltlicher Willkür ist in allem Recht enthalten …‘; Schmitt, Gesetz, 46. 
530
 ‚… auf jeden Fall fehlt die Verbindung des abstract und unberührt von dem wirklichen Leben geltenden 
Rechtssatzes mit der konkreten Anwendung auf den Einzelfall, sobald die Richtigkeit der Interpretation ... und 
die Richtigkeit der konkreten Entscheidung für ein und dasselbe erklärt werden.‘; Schmitt, Gesetz, 28. 
531
 ‚Der als geltend anzunehmende Inhalt des Gesetzes tritt dadurch, daβ der Richter ihn anwendet, in eine 
andere Sphäre, seine Funktion wird eine andere, wie denn auch tatsächlich der abstrakt geltende Gesetzesinhalt 
durch die Bezugnahme auf einen konkreten Fall sofort ein anderer wird.‘; Schmitt, Gesetz, 28. 
532
 Schmitt, Gesetz, 37-38, 40. 
533
 Schmitt, Gesetz, 44-67. 
534
 ‚Das Gesetz ist kein unabänderlich feststehender Inhalt, sondern eine „konstante lebendige Kraft“ (Wach).‘; 
Schmitt, Gesetz, 26, own translation. 
535
 ‚Eine richterliche Entscheidung ist heute dann richtig, wenn anzunehmen ist, daβ ein anderer Richter ebenso 
entschieden hätte‘; Schmitt, Gesetz, 68. 
536
 Schmitt, Gesetz, 68, 75, 111. 
537
 cf. Schmitt, Gesetz, 70, 75, 92-96. 
538
 Schmitt, Gesetz, 107. 
539
 Schmitt, Gesetz, 114. 
540
 Schmitt, Gesetz, 94. 
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and protected by the legitimacy the statute-law provides. But because a judgement cannot set 
precedent the judge cannot replace the legislator.
541
 Overall, for Schmitt, the principle of 
collegiality, which turns the multiplicity of the voices of single judges into one united single 
juristic voice, not only separates the office of the judge, the official juristic type, from the 
person of the judge but also protects the latter from personal responsibility while it sidelines 
the individual parties of a case. 
 
Turning his interest in 1914 toward the theory of state
542
 Schmitt now replaced the judge as 
mediator between statute-law and empirical case with the state that uses statute-law to 
mediate between the normativity of meta-physical Justice and the facticity of the empirical 
world. In this the individual human being remains incidental to the state’s activity, in 
similarity to the position of the parties to a legal case. The missing link is now located 
between Justice and its application in the empirical world, between “ought” and being - the 
“is” - between normativity and facticity, and with consequences for the relations between the 
collective unit of the state to the single person, the individual. Schmitt’s point of entry was 
the prevalent thesis that Justice (Recht) was the result of the factual circumstances of power 
(Macht) and force (Gewalt).
543
 This not only engaged with Kelsen’s resistance to 
hypostasizing the state to a subject sui generis, in separation from and metaphysically above 
law (Recht), one which would permit using law for enforcing political interests.
544
 It also 
addressed the Romanist Georg Jellinek’s (1851-1911) legal fiction545 of the “normative 
power of the factual.”546 Jellinek’s fiction contributed to the earlier Gierke-Laband 
controversy in which for Gierke the law had provided the continuity of the multiplicity within 
the unity. The latter’s “organic” theory of state stated that insisting on an exclusive reality of 
the individual and denying a common personality, a juristic person, would be the demise of 
the state. The pluralistic element, the cooperative element, needs to be balanced with the 
                                            
541
 cf. Schmitt, Gesetz, 98-99, 103-04. 
542
 Schmitt, Der Wert des Staates und die Bedeutung des Einzelnen. 
543
 Schmitt, Wert, 22. 
544
 Tanner, Die fromme Verstaatlichung, 42. 
545
 According to Schmitt a legal fiction turns interpretative results into a will which tends to treat a thought as 
reality. Assuming reality is meant to remove the tension which appears with the arbitrary and wrong assumption 
of the fiction. Thus the fiction turns into dogma, the ‘as if’ turns into ‘therefore’. Carl Schmitt, “Juristische 
Fiktionen”, Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung 12 (15. June 1913): 805. 
546
 This theory became instrumental for the fragile acceptance of the Weimar Constitution by the “republicans 
by reason” such as the lawyers Gerhard Anschütz and Richard Thoma; see Anschütz, Die Verfassung, 6. Ebel 
and Thielmann, Rechtsgeschichte, 389. For a short concise discussion of this legal fiction see Ellen Kennedy, 
introduction to The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy by Carl Schmitt, xxxv-xxxvi. 
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dominant role (Herrschaft) of the state and its laws. Within the state, law established the 
connection to the multiplicity while human societal existence was the product of the forces of 
individual interaction as expressed in sociology, teleology, jurisprudence, and ethics.
547
 
Laband’s theory of state differed insofar as for him the state was exhausted in a closed legal 
system, solely comprised of logical-jurisprudential “objective” absolute concepts, which 
excluded any social or individual values, or political relative purpose.
548
 To this Jellinek 
added that the normative force, the law, as the ethical minimum of society integrates the 
social reality into the one juristic person, the state. For him the state was a unit of resident 
human beings, equipped with original power to rule which binds itself to its own law in 
normative self-obligation of the will.
 549
 For Schmitt, however, the state, which knows 
Justice, uses law to mediate to the empirical world this Justice, the ought, the norm, which is 
not derived from but is indifferent to the facts of reality (Tatsachen).
550
 The state is the 
mediator (Mittler) between Justice and empirical reality. The law is the means of the state to 
implement Justice. In difference to Kelsen, Schmitt differentiated between Justice and law
551
 
and placed Justice before and above the might of the state and its law. The state is a legal 
construction whose sole essence, purpose, and task (Zweck) is the realization of Justice within 
reality.
552
 Thus it also differs from Laband’s closed system of human concepts. The state 
mediates normativity, Justice, from the middle of reality to the facticity of the world, the 
being.  
 
According to Schmitt, the state enforces an extra-empirical legal idea by drawing it into 
temporality
553
 but, in difference to Jellineck, the state does not integrate Justice and ethics. 
                                            
547
 cf. Otto Friedrich von Gierke, Grundbegriffe des Staatsrechts und die neuesten Staatsrechtstheorien 
(Tübingen, Mohr, 1915), 79, 88, 96-97, 114. 
548
 See Heller, „Krisis“, 297-98.  
549
 Georg Jellineck, Allgemeine Staatslehre, vol. 1: Das Recht des modernen Staates, 2nd rev. and ext. ed. 
(Berlin: O. Häring Verlag, 1905). See also Hofmann, Legitimität, 18, 18n85; Jens Kersten, “Georg Jellinek”, in 
Enzyklopaedie Rechtsphilosophie, accessed April 05, 2018, http://www.enzyklopaedie-
rechtsphilosophie.net/inhaltsverzeichnis/19-beitraege/102-jellinek-georg?tmpl=component&print=1&page= 
550
 Schmitt, Wert, 42. 
551
 Because Schmitt used repeatedly the German word Recht for both, meta-physical Justice as well as 
law/statutes his theory is at times confusing. However, a close reading reveals that Schmitt was differentiating 
between Recht in the sense of Gerechtigkeit, i.e. Justice, and Recht, in the sense of statute-law and promulgated 
acts; see e.g. Schmitt, Wert, 75. In regards to the relationship of the state to the individual he used the term 
Recht in the sense of legal system; see e.g. Schmitt, Wert, 86, 101. 
552
 Schmitt, Wert, 56. 
553
 Schmitt, Wert, 76.  
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For Schmitt, ‘Justice is not will but norm, not order but command’.554 The concept of the 
state stands in relation to Justice analogous to the position the concept of God takes toward 
ethics and the necessity of realizing moral within the real world.
555
 The essence of the juristic 
subject, the state, is the task of connecting the ‘two kingdoms’ (Reiche)556 of Justice (Recht) 
and might (Macht), of normativity and facticity. Although Schmitt recognized ethics, it is, in 
difference to Gierke, an independent task separate from that of the state.
557
 Just as it is 
impossible to capture within one concept outer and inner freedom, the visible and the 
invisible, the temporal and eternal, so neither law nor state end in the individual; this is, 
because both do not know fulfillment in a single holy one.
558
 Thus Schmitt claimed that meta-
physical Justice, the normativity, is command but not God, and that the state, the facticity, 
and God do not intersect in the ethics of Jesus Christ. After stating that ‘there is a holy one, 
but not a just one in the desert’,559 Schmitt points to Luther’s word in his call that lawyers 
should not interfere within the kingdom of God just as ethicists should respect the 
‘methodological autochthony’ of the kingdom of the world.560 Nonetheless, because of the 
difference between theory and praxis and despite the state’s rational self-binding to Justice, at 
the “moment” the state mediates normativity to facticity, Justice to reality, an empirical 
element infiltrates the norm of Justice and transforms it into a proclaimed legal norm. The act 
of mediating, which draws the idea into the temporal, moves the state into the empirical 
mechanism of means and ends. It introduces empirical will and legal enforceability which are 
unknown to the norm of Justice.
561
 This stands in similarity to the character-qualities of the 
“personality” of a judge which infiltrates the statute-law at the moment of transforming it into 
a judgement, a decision.
562
 In executing their office in abstraction to their person, the 
                                            
554
 ‚... Recht ist nicht Wille, sondern Norm, nicht Befehl, sondern Gebot, ...‘; Schmitt, Wert, 42, own translation. 
555
 Schmitt, Wert, 59. 
556
 Schmitt, Wert, 43. 
557
 ‚… daβ das Recht der Ethik gegenüber selbständig wird, ...Die Konsequenz, daβ das Recht nicht aus der 
Ethik abgeleitet werden kann, ...‘; Schmitt, Wert, 18. 
558
 ‚Die Forderung einer Trennung … müβte sich schon aus der Unterscheidung von äuβerer und innerer 
Freiheit und der Unmöglichkeit, das Sichtbare mit dem Unsichtbaren, Zeitliches und Ewiges unter einen Begriff 
zu bringen, leicht schliessen lasse. Weder das Recht noch der Staat enden im Individuum: sie kennen nicht die 
Vollendung in einem Einzelnen, nicht den Heiligen.‘; Schmitt, Wert, 18. 
559
 Schmitt, Wert, 18; own translation.  
560
 ‚Wenn, nach Luthers Wort, die Juristen »sich in das Reich Christi nicht mengen« sollen, so sollen auch die 
reinen Ethiker wenigstens die methodische Autochthonie des Reiches der Welt gelten lassen.‘; Schmitt, Wert, 
18-19, own translation. 
561
 Schmitt, Wert, 75-76. 
562
 Schmitt, Wert, 75. 
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“personality” of the state and of the judge edge and infiltrate the “moment” of transforming 
Justice into law and law into decision. 
 
The significance of the individual in relation to this mediating state is dependent on executing 
tasks for the state
563
 and is not connected to values central to ‘a certain theory of state’.564 
‘Just as Justice provides continuity to the state, it is the state that provides continuity to the 
individual who lives within the state.’565 Therefore the state constructs the human being and 
not the reverse.
566
 It is unthinkable that an extraneous essence can jump into the world of 
Justice, into the state that knows Justice, and claim the self’s value by “nature”567 and bring to 
it a dignity of empirical form (Gestalt), uniqueness and individuality.
568
 Rather the worth of 
the single person in its physical, biological concreteness as a coincidental cluster of atoms 
and dust
569
 does not go beyond the state’s sphere of tasks and their execution. Within the 
mediating state of Justice, the human’s worth depends on the norms of law and not on criteria 
‘endogenous’ to the single person.570 Instead, dignity comes from office which is 
abstracted
571
  from the single concrete person because the individual is only incidental to the 
state’s task of realizing Justice.572 And the abstraction of office from empirical embodiment 
constitutes the prototype for personality within law. ‘Respect is not owed to the human being 
simply by existing but is due to the human being who is worthy of respect.’573 To provide 
                                            
563
 ‚Aus dem Begriffe des Staates als einer Aufgabe folgt, daβ die Bedeutung des Individuums innerhalb des 
Staates sich gleichfalls nur nach einer Aufgabe bemessen kann.‘ ‚Für den Staat ist das Individuum als solches 
der zufällige Träger der allein wesentlichen Aufgabe, der bestimmten Funktion, die es zu erfüllen hat.‘; Schmitt, 
Wert, 87. 
564
 Schmitt, Wert, 98, own translation. Schmitt uses this wording to paraphrase the liberal theory of state. 
565
 ‚... wie sich die Kontinuität des Staates nur aus dem Rechte ergibt, so flieβt die Kontinuität des Individuums, 
das im Staate lebt, nur aus dem Staat.‘; Schmitt, Wert, 86, own translation. 
566
 ‚Somit ist nicht der Staat eine Konstruktion, die Menschen sich gemacht haben, er macht im Gegenteil aus 
dem Menschen eine Konstruktion.‘; Schmitt, Wert, 93. 
567
 ‚..., denn von »Natur« hat nichts einen Wert ...‘; Schmitt, Wert, 98. 
568
 cf. Schmitt, Wert, 101. 
569
 ‚Das leibliche konkrete Individuum ist, wenn die Betrachtung sich nicht über die materielle Körperlichkeit 
erhebt, eine gänzlich zufällige Einheit, ein zusammengewehter Haufen con Atomen, dessen Gestalt, 
Individualität und Einzigartigkeit keine andere sind, wie die des Staubes, der vom Wirbelwind zu einer Säule 
gefügt wird.‘; Schmitt, Wert, 101. 
570
 ‚Der Wert im Recht und dem Mittler des Rechts, im Staat, bemiβt sich demnach nur nach den Normen des 
Rechts, nicht nach Dingen, die dem Einzelnen endogen sind.‘; Schmitt, Wert, 101. 
571
 Schmitt, Wert, 91. 
572
 cf. Schmitt, Wert, 87. 
573
 ‚Nicht der Mensch, weil er Mensch ist, sondern der Mensch, der gut und achtungswürdig ist, verdient 
Achtung.‘; Schmitt, Wert, 106, own translation. 
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‘methodological clarity’574 Schmitt points to the infallible pope who is not a person but as 
governor of Christ on earth is his instrument of Justice. Thus the jurisprudential teaching of 
the Roman Catholic’s charisma veritatis bases office (Amt) not on charisma, but granting 
office constitutes charisma.
575
 Accordingly a god-like absolute monarch is not a human being 
but ‘living law’ (Gesetz) within the bounds of Justice, which corresponds to the omnipotent 
God of the theologians who cannot want anything bad or unreasonable apart from Justice.
576
  
 
Only the extra-individual state is equipped with original authority
577
 and is the bearer of 
autonomy,
578
 not the individual.
579
 For executing state-functions the biological specimen does 
not require Kantian rational autonomy. Therefore the demand that the human being always 
has to remain an end in itself and should never become a means does not apply.
580
 
‘Autonomy of the individual in the state differs from autonomy in ethics where the individual 
is its bearer.’581 To advance to the truth of the state as the highest moral order in a Hegelian 
sense, the steps require at times more and at times less state in the relation between Justice 
and the empirical reality of the single human being. Individual autonomy fits only to the kind 
of power-complexity in which the individual, as a bearer of political material demands, 
opposes the arbitrariness of might.
582
 This had met the concrete historical time of immediacy 
(Unmittelbarkeit) when Justice was self-evident to the human being but this did not earn the 
human being respect from other human beings by virtue of birth.
583
 In times of mediation 
(Mittelbarkeit) when the means of the state require imparting Justice to the essence of the 
human being,
584
 the freedom of the individual does not limit the state because the state does 
                                            
574
 Schmitt, Wert, 95. 
575
 ‚... liefert auch hier die römisch-katholische Lehre mit ihrer Konstituierung des charisma veritatis durch 
bloβe Verleihung des Amtes, womit das Amt nicht mehr auf dem charisma beruht, sondern die Verleihung 
konstitutiv für das charisma wird.‘; Schmitt, Wert, 102. 
576
 cf. Schmitt, Wert, 95-96. 
577
 Schmitt, Wert, 86. 
578
 ‚Es gibt eine Autonomie im Recht, aber ihr Träger ist nur der Staat als das einzige Subjekt des »Ethos im 
Recht«, ....‘; Schmitt, Wert, 100-01, emphasis in original. 
579
 ‚Kein Individuum hat im Staate Autonomie.‘; Schmitt, Wert, 100-01. 
580
 Schmitt, Wert, 89. 
581
 ‚Die Autonomie bedeutet im Recht etwas anderes wie in der Ethik, wo das Individuum als ihr Inhaber 
angesehen wird.‘; Schmitt, Wert, 100-01, own translation. 
582
 cf. Schmitt, Wert, 99, 106. 
583
 cf. Schmitt, Wert, 106-07. 
584
 cf. Schmitt, Wert, 107-08. 
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not interfere as a deus ex machina into the sphere of the individual.
585
 In the supra-individual 
state, the decisive relation is not that between Justice and individual, but between Justice and 
state.
586
 Thus Schmitt had established that the concept of the individual was for the state 
insignificant and remained isolated from the state. 
 
After separating law and ethics and siding in his theory of state with a Hegelian-type idealist 
system that ends in the state as the highest order of Justice, Schmitt approached also, in an 
arguable analogy to Kierkegaard, aesthetic considerations and German romanticism. With a 
view to politics, he framed romanticism as a critique of the bourgeoisie with roots in the 
Reformation as well as the French and 19
th
 century German revolutions. As ‘subjectified 
occasionalism’,587 romanticism appeals to ‘aesthetic sensitivity’ but never ‘forges ahead to a 
concept.’588 Consequently liberal individualism preferred compromises over decisions. Its 
basic ‘principle of unclarity’ employed ‘historical events as the occasion for a distinctive 
literary productivity instead of apprehending them in a matter-of-fact way.’589 It draws all 
intellectual productivity, ‘religion, the Church, the nation, and the state’ into the new 
aesthetic center of ‘irresponsible private feeling’ and the ‘intimacy of the emotions’.590 
Substantive oppositions and differences such as ‘good and evil, friend and enemy, Christ and 
Antichrist,’ become means of intrigues based on the occasio in negation of calculable causa 
and binding norm.
 591
 Located at the decisive point, dualisms are shifted ‘into a 
comprehensive third sphere’, an authoritative action of God. A deus ex machina slips the 
interest to a “higher” and “true” unity, the higher organism of the state, the people, or Church, 
in which the opposition between body and soul or between individuals becomes 
suspended.
592
 The power to employ the opposition as occasion identifies the higher reality.
593
  
 
However, since the process of secularization has replaced God with mundane and worldly 
metaphysics, such as humanity, nation, individual, historical development, life as life for its 
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own sake, or thought and feeling, so also the final authority has shifted from God to the 
genius of the “ego.” For this isolated and emancipated individual the world arises ever new 
from ever new opportunities, chances, or intrigues of one reality against another ego, people, 
idea, state, history, or church, but without substance, fixed direction, consistency, that is, 
without decision.
594
 This makes the romantic susceptible to becoming subservient to alien 
power and alien decision.
595
 Schmitt insisted that only in a bourgeois, individualistically 
disintegrated society the intellectual center could shift into itself. Although the ultimate roots 
of this shift lay in the Reformation’s private priesthood, it is the word “individualism” that 
captures the ideas of the French Revolution.
596
 Despite the ‘sovereignty of the ego’ and its 
feature of being non-committal, the romantic heralded the new realities of community and 
history but discovered that this meant to have to give up subjectivism.
597
  
 
After having exposed in sequence the individual’s insignificance, isolation, and indecision 
Schmitt turned his attention to disclosing an only fictional quality of the free individual of 
liberalism which was hidden within the liberal-democratic theory of state of the Weimar 
parliamentary system. According to Schmitt, the Weimar state suffers from a triple Krisis: the 
general Krisis of the modern state, a Krisis of democracy and a Krisis of parliamentarism.
598
 
This system contained ‘the inescapable contradiction of liberal individualism and democratic 
homogeneity’.599 It concerned a crisis of identity between those governed and the governing 
and of substantial equality.
600
 The liberal-democratic model of representative parliamentarism 
did not deliver on the demand of freedom from oppression through a balanced equilibrium 
between the powers of the state
601
 and on equality for all humankind. With parliamentary 
representatives partaking in government
602
 not only the separation of powers was broken. But 
also the democratic demand of selecting the most able political leaders and of decision-
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making in public forum was rescinded. And the party system prevented the members of 
parliament from representing the people as a whole, independent of instructions, and 
answerable only to their personal conscience.
603
 Thus ran empty the liberal constitutional 
guarantees of freedom of speech, press, assembly, and discussion
604
 in the sense of a public 
exchange of persuading opinions.
605
 The representational indirectness of parliamentarism and 
the praxis of a few party leaders making the most important decisions in secret committee 
meetings behind closed doors, not only precluded the parliament’s function as mediator 
between the rulers and the ruled, the people, but also violated the democratic requirement of 
identity between both. The latter could only be provided with homogeneity 
(Gleichartigkeit)
606
 between both as is found in the modern myth of nationality.
607
 By 
distinguishing between citizens and foreigners
608
 only those who belong to the equals are 
included. Because of equality’s logical counterpart of inequality,609 the former term’s 
substance must be defined as meaning that ‘not only are equals equal but unequals will not be 
treated equally’610 which requires ‘elimination or eradication of heterogeneity’.611 Thus 
universal equality of humanity could not solve the problem of democracy’s necessity of 
substantial equality and homogeneity.
612
 The need of identity as homogeneous equality at the 
core of modern democracy was irreconcilable with the liberal notion of absolute equality of 
all humankind. Therefore for Schmitt, even though liberalism and democracy appeared 
compatible the nation-state of modern parliamentary mass-democracy exposed that the liberal 
idea of individual equality is an elusive liberal extra-empirical fictive idea which is 
irreconcilable with democracy’s need of identity and with an outdated parliamentarism.613 
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In sum, inspired by Kierkegaardian thought, Schmitt dismissed ethics and romantic aesthetics 
to find in the state the knower, mediator, and enforcer of the meta-physical normativity of 
Justice. Picking a jurisprudential position between Kelsen, Gierke, Laband and Jellineck, 
Schmitt rejected positivism but nonetheless excluded ethics based on distinguishing 
absolutely between the two kingdoms of Justice and the might of the world, and moreover 
pointed to a variety of dichotomies such as norm and law, ethics and state, the holy and the 
just. Along with anthropological pessimism,
614
 he assessed the state as indifferent to the 
concrete individual, which is simply a biological category and an objective for the state’s 
mediation of the “ought” to the being. Worthiness and dignity of personality can be found 
only in the office of being a servant of the state, here in abstraction from the person. Dignity 
does not miraculously appear from outside by ‘nature’. The empirical type of the modern 
human being, imagined in the bourgeois liberal idea of being free and critical of authority, is 
a legal fiction from the time of the French Revolution,
615
 which in the age of technology, 
natural sciences, money economy, mechanical process, and codification with positivist 
application was stuck without content in absurdity.
616
 From Romanticism this empirical type 
inherited the propensity of remaining in possibility and occasion without advancing to a 
concrete reality and therefore celebrates balance, equilibrium, and compromises, without 
engaging in what is most human, in actions and decisions. This led within the Weimar 
context of liberal-democratic parliamentarism to an indirect representational governmental 
system removed from the people in regards to public leadership-selection and decision-
making. The missing identity between the rulers and the people, in combination with the 
requirement of homogeneity within the modern myth of nation, disclosed the incompatibility 
of democracy with the demand of equality among free individuals of the liberal theory of law. 
Overall, the identified disconnections between law and judgement, normative Justice and 
empirical facticity, between occasion and reality, and between liberalism and democracy 
revealed a crisis of Modern individualism and the Weimar theory of state. Democracy only 
pretends an identity of rulers and ruled and just as the “normative power of the factual” is a 
fiction so is the freedom and equality of the individual of individualism a fiction. And the 
individual is, at any rate, profoundly insignificant, isolated, and indecisive.  
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3.4 Bonhoeffer’s Crisis of Independence   
 
For Bonhoeffer the most pressing crisis of his time was that of interferences of the state in the 
independence of the church despite the prescribed prohibition of a state-church in the 1919 
Weimar Constitution. In line with his prediction in response to his brother’s teasing that he 
would reform the institution church, and his early 1924 assessment in Rome that it was best if 
the church and state were separated,617 he developed a theory of church in his 1925 
dissertation. In 1928/29 he detected a ‘crisis of contemporary intellectual movements’ that 
are characterized by ‘unclear political ideology’618 and which involve ‘the most profound 
matters we are facing, namely concerning our own lives and the life of our people (Volk)’.619 
However, the events that amounted to a Krisis whose underlying structural heresy needed to 
be exposed and solved became for Bonhoeffer in 1933/34 the implementation of the Führer-
principle into the church constitution and the adoption of the state’s Aryan legislation for the 
church. 
 
Bonhoeffer picked up those clues from his Weimar context that indicated a search for a new 
human being. He meant to solve the problem of the isolated Modern individual and the issue 
of ‘cultural confidence and idolization of creatures’.620 The contemporary crisis was a time 
that was ‘getting out of joint’621 because an ‘unprecedented crisis’ had brought a huge sense 
of instability which perplexes, produces suffering and searching, but also hope.
622
 From the 
revolutionary masses and the subsequent masses of unemployed people, he perceived the 
widespread ‘impression of the insignificance and loneliness of the individual and the stifling 
power of the masses’.623 Technology and war had destoyed the individual and the community. 
There was a serious desire of moving from ‘the individual to the collective, from lack of 
attachment to interdependence, from lack of authority to a new authority.’624 Consequently 
the form of life together in community and the human being as part of such community 
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became for Bonhoeffer a matter for the concept of church. Therefore he started his 
theological investigation ‘not with the doctrine of God but with the doctrine of church’, and 
he intended to show the ‘inner connection between the reality of the church and the entire 
reality of revelation’625 which sets the concept of the church apart from other concepts that 
are ‘derived from the social sphere’,626 such as the jurisprudential theory of state his brothers, 
and especially Leibholz, were concerned with. For this purpose he searched among 
jurisprudential concepts of juristic persons and their relation to natural persons and 
differentiated between society (Gesellschaft), community (Gemeinschaft) and association 
(Verein), i.e. between collective, communal, and purely legal concepts.627 
 
Although, inspired by Kierkegaard’s schism between the divine and the human being, the 
eternal and temporal, he sidelined the Kierkegaardian criticism of the idealist system that 
moved the aesthetical into a dialectic relation to the ethical. He criticised him for remaining 
within the idealist system and thus laying ‘the foundation for an extreme sort of individualism 
in which the significance of the other for the single person is no longer absolute but only 
relative’.628 Instead Bonhoeffer focussed on a relational dialectic that involved the ethical and 
the religious person over against the other person within community and on the single human 
being in relation to humanity. Thus he injected his theological voice into the Romanist versus 
Germanist discourse regarding “organic” community, its position to the multiplicity within 
the unity, and regarding its distinctiveness from positivist “objective” logical concepts. In 
tune with the constitutionally prescribed legal difference between church and state, he 
consigned Gierke’s concept of cooperative (Genossenschaft) to the legal sphere,629 even 
though he, in similarity to Gierke, included sociological and ethical considerations and agreed 
with his horizontal and vertical cooperative approach. The legal equality among the 
multiplicity which Gierke’s concept included is, according to Bonhoeffer, untenable within 
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sociology. This is because in a social form there was ‘no pure balance of power’,630 but 
rather, among the dynamic coordination of wills, there exists an ‘unequal relation of 
strength’, that is, ‘a relation of subordination’. ‘The idea of equality before the law, but also 
the rule of God, includes the coordination of those who are ruled’.631  
 
However, when discussing the empirical institutional form (Gestalt) of the church he 
nonetheless took recourse to Gierke’s discourse on the differentiations between forms,632 
which also lay behind the legal structures of commercial and private law. But regarding a 
‘community life according to the laws of organic life’,633 Bonhoeffer disagreed with Gierke. 
After a lengthy discussion of Paul’s assertion that ‘you are the body of Christ’634 he rejected 
as misleading the application of the ‘idea of organism to the church’635 because among 
human beings ‘there are no organic communities in the sense of purely vegetative growth’.636 
‘It is not the empirical church as such that is an organism’,637 but rather it is in the church-
community of God, that is, in the body of Christ ‘under the gathering and unifying work of 
the Holy Spirit’, that the single parts (Glieder) belong to the unity (Einheit) in Christ’s 
body.
638
 
 
Theologically, Bonhoeffer’s study hinged on the crisis of the Fall, as described in the biblical 
story of Genesis and the doctrine of original sin. Fall and sin are the Christian concepts that 
define the human being of this world and its social relationships as either before Christ or as 
in faith as regards Christ’s redemptive work on the cross, that is, in his Stellvertretung639 for 
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all humanity. Setting out from the assertion that person, community, and God are 
inseparable,
640
 Bonhoeffer investigated the Christian understanding of social-basic relations 
and the community that is marked by the human being’s status corruptionis, the world of 
“Adam”, the old humanity. The Adam-community is the place of selfishness and of structural 
legal order in which morality and religion are only formally visible.
641
 Adam’s sin is that ‘of 
the human race and of the individual’.642 Adam’s sin has spread through all of humanity,643 
that is, into a comprehensive community that embraces all communities and taking part in 
communal life demonstrates that this person of humankind (Menschheitsperson) exists.
644
 
The sinful humanity-in-Adam is the precondition for the miracle of the church as ‘Christ 
existing as church-community’,645 in which faith in the divine revelation in the form of the 
historical person of Jesus Christ is central. Faith in being reconciled with God through Christ 
includes that this reconciling mediator (Mittler) represents the gift of reconciling with divine 
love, as well as the humanity that is to be reconciled, that is, the Adam-humanity.
646
 In this 
Sanctorum Communio human beings are open to hearing the Holy Spirit and to submitting 
obediently to God’s revelation of His love in Christ and for other human beings. Through 
God’s Grace, the Adam-community is superseded by the Christ-community, the church as 
‘Christ existing as church-community.’647 
 
In 1928/29 an utmost crisis meant for Bonhoeffer a situation of war between peoples 
(Völker), in which the human being has to submit in conscience the ‘own selfish will to the 
divine will’.648 In line with other Weimar theologians and from a völkisch perspective 
Bonhoeffer declared that ‘all that seemed self-evident has become questionable – politically, 
literally, philosophically, ethically’,649 and that an ‘unclear political ideology’650 had 
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appeared that involved ‘our own lives and the life of our people (Volk)’.651 He stressed God’s 
absolute sovereignty, his utter superiority, transcendence and total difference, which stood as 
the eternally other in an unbridgeable chasm over against human beings and human nature.
652
 
For him Jesus demanded from the human being a ‘direct, uncompromising decision’ for or 
against God’s will which would lead ‘to participation in God’s kingdom’.653 Although posing 
a Kierkegaardian either-or question, taking Christ seriously could not mean explaining him 
according to aesthetic categories, as a religious genius, an author like Goethe, or as a great 
ethicist who sacrificed himself for his idea. In distinction from this, it rather meant ‘taking 
serious his absolute claim on human decisions’654 and his ‘crucial claim on our entire 
lives’.655 This ‘essence of Christianity’ the human being could not find through human 
knowledge, which would always remain ‘human, limited, relative, anthropomorphic 
knowledge’. Thus ‘Christ … speaks only and exclusively of the line from God to human 
beings’656 and to those of faith in Jesus, the bearer of God’s revelation on the cross.657 For 
Jesus not his individual personality as person but only the ‘urgent issue, the decision for 
God’s dominion’ was of importance.658 Confronted with an ethical dilemma leads the human 
being into a profound solitude which knows no law with a specific content but only the law 
of freedom and one’s sole responsibility before God.659  
 
In the problem of conscious control over decisions, Bonhoeffer perceived a deeper problem 
of consciousness and conscience. Starting now not from a concept of church but from a 
concept of God, he confronted in Act and Being God – defined as reality, before and beyond 
all thinking – with the philosophical presupposition that thinking in itself could give access to 
ultimate truth.
660
 This asked for a methodology that connected theological and philosophical 
traditions with the modern dynamics of power in which the human being desired to create 
                                            
651
 DBWE 10:342. 
652
 cf. DBWE 10:352-53. 
653
 cf. DBWE 10: 347-48. 
654
 cf. DBWE 10:343. 
655
 DBWE 10:342. 
656
 DBWE 10:354. 
657
 DBWE 10:356-57. 
658
 ‘… anything involving his own person as an individual personality, …, is infinitely insignificant to Jesus 
compared to the main issue, which is the decision for God’s will.’ ‘Jesus consistently turns attention away from 
his person and back to the only important and urgent issue, the decision for God’s dominion.’; DBWE 10:348-
49. 
659
 cf. DBWE 10:366-67. 
660
 cf. DBWE 10:452-53. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
107 
 
itself in its own image and resisted otherness, one that was perceived as threatening the 
sovereign position of the human subject’s “I”.661 He endeavoured to find in the concept of 
revelation a theological ‘epistemology of its own’662 which could mediate between the God-
reality and the human being’s philosophical thinking that was stuck with the possibility of the 
ego at the center of a closed circle.
663
 Proceeding from the Reformation insight of cor curvum 
in se (the heart turned in on itself)
664
 of the sinful human being, the central problem was how 
God’s message could penetrate the modern human being’s ego which stood since the Fall in 
self-enclosed distance from encounters with the other, the neighbor, the stranger.
665
 Using the 
framework of act to being, of faith to revelation, Bonhoeffer endeavoured to find in 
philosophical concepts implications for the epistemological paradigm of the subject-object, 
the God-human, relation. Agreeing with Karl Barth that God is transcendent subject, he 
nonetheless criticised him for confining God to a prolegomenon of theology.
666
 The 
dichotomy Barth placed in his theology of crisis between revelation as God’s free act alone 
and history as merely a crisis, Bonhoeffer closed with the mutual suspending (aufheben) of 
act and being, in each other, and through the person of Jesus Christ.
667
 The revelation in the 
historical natural person of Jesus Christ interconnects the act of faith with the being of the 
congregation of Christ,
668
 which is the continuity of God’s word in history in form of the 
church, that is, in the form of a juristic person.  
 
Bonhoeffer extended in Act and Being his previous work in Sanctorum Communio, namely, 
to build a theological anthropology that elaborated further on the concept of being-in-Adam 
as distinct from being-in-Christ. Jesus as a factual natural person within history, standing at 
the center between the concept of God and the sinful human being after the Fall, breaks open 
with God’s revelation in Christ the egocentric circle of sin of the human being. The eternal 
crisis of man is brought upon him by God’s direct act of bringing in the fact of the person of 
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Jesus Christ His word from outside of the world into historical reality.
669
 This stands opposed 
to philosophy’s own crisis670 of always knowing the human self, and knowing God only in 
reflection and interpretation, because ‘all philosophy is interpretation’671. For Bonhoeffer 
there was no bridge between philosophical system-thinking and the historical fact of the 
Christ-revelation. 
 
With the approach of the ‘crisis of 1933’672, that is, with the state’s attempt at synchronizing 
the church to the state through rewriting the church constitution and implementing the Aryan 
paragraph, it appears Bonhoeffer’s völkisch attitude vanished, due to contact with Leibholz’s 
expert insight into Fascism and his personal experience of persecution. Bonhoeffer’s 
academic engagement with the concept of church, as well as the concept of God, situated him 
well in recognizing the organizational and confessional dangers to the constitutionally 
prescribed independence of the church. Endangered became the fundamental changes the 
Weimar Constitution had brought for the Protestant Church through interconnecting the iura 
circa sacra and the iura in sacra and abolishing the Summus Episcopus.  
 
From the jurisprudential end, the state played on the fact that the Protestant Church had 
remained as a corporation of public law (Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts) a federation 
(Verband) without sovereign power and subject to and limited by the public law of the state. 
Thus despite the limitation of the competencies of the state, the ecclesiastic institutional 
independence remained a derivative of that of the state. It remained questionable if the 
church’s status as public-law-corporation lifted the execution of its determinative will 
(Willensbetätigung) which was subject to private law,
673
 nonetheless into the public legal 
sphere. Questionable was, moreover, if in this case, correlating to the Church’s elevated 
position the supervisory powers of the state went beyond the general supervision of the state 
over private law associations (Verein).
674
 A widespread legal opinion was that because the 
state had constitutionally vested the Protestant Church with legislative, disciplinary, and 
fiduciary powers, the correct application of such powers was subject to state-supervision and 
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that the church’s inner organization, that is, its constitutional and administrational norms, and 
their application to its members was ruled by public law.
675
 Thus, although the characteristics 
of an independent status as public-law-corporation were guaranteed, this did not include 
every legal detail that could possibly be deducted from the principle of the separation of 
church and state.
676
 However, interferences from the state into nominating for and filling of 
ecclesiastic positions and offices were excluded. Such internal affairs were understood as the 
sole right of the church and outside any legal or spiritual supervision from the state, and not 
superseded by state law. This included non-interference in questions of faith and dogma.
677
  
 
However, for Bonhoeffer the real danger was not primarily the institutional, constitutional 
independance, but the spiritual independence, even though the institutional form of church 
was a bodily prerequisite for faith in Christ. The legalistic intrusions contested the continuity 
of God’s word in the church, as revealed in the historical person of Jesus at the center 
between God and the world, at the cross. Thus he asserted that the church is the limit of all 
political action
678
 because the church and the state were two dual, but different, forms within 
the one kingdom of God in which the ‘church limits the state; state limits the church.’679 A 
superficial schematization of individualism, liberalism, and personality concealed the sincere 
will to be led from isolation (Vereinzelung) to the community (Gemeinschaft). The call for 
new authority, ties, and community (Gemeinschaft) had led to the desire of overcoming an 
unreal individualism with an equally unreal collectivism,
680
 in which the individualistic 
personality of a human leader claimed for himself not only absolute, but totalitarian 
unconditional allegiance to his person. The form (Gestalt) of the leader was ‘imagined in 
terms of a new human being’, who was grounded in ‘a new idea of life’681 and attached to 
reality.  
 
For Bonhoeffer the crisis of 1933, the idea of the Führer-principle and the myth of 
homogeneous Aryan identity, constituted a status confessionis because they directly 
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threatened the Church’s proclamation of God’s revelation in Christ and his redemptive work 
towards establishing true community. He insisted that in this status confessionis one should 
be prepared to differentiate between ‘the pure and true teaching of the gospel of Jesus Christ’ 
and the ‘human teachings, human laws, false doctrines, and idolatry.’682 Because the ‘truth of 
the gospel and Christian freedom are at stake’,683 the  crisis of 1933 reminded Bonhoeffer of 
the intra-Lutheran period of the 16
th
 century when the Formula of Concord settled a dispute 
in casu confessionis regarding interferences of the state authority into matters under church 
authority. While matters of the gospel such as preaching, confession of faith, and theology 
always belong to the church’s authority, the external, usually indifferent matters of 
adiaphora, such as the order and practice of the church, permit no compromises only in times 
of persecution.
684
 Then, in times of persecution, the adiaphora become more than just 
adiaphora. The state’s Aryan legislation that demanded the dismissal from office of all 
pastors of Jewish descent was the specific issue of persecution that turned the state’s 
interferances of the two-fold synchronization into an adiaphora of a magnitude that mattered 
to the faith of the Christian church. When the spiritual authority and the temporal authority 
collided, when the two kingdoms are concerned, that is, when the state dictated legal terms to 
the church due to political reasons,
685
 then ‘too much’ law and order was applied. Then, 
contrary to ‘too little law’, which deprives groups of people of its rights, the state robs by 
force the ‘Christian faith of its right to proclaim its message’.686 Then, when the state 
oversteps the limits of its actions, then, for the sake of the gospel the church’s confessional 
status must not deviate from the orders and practices of the church.
687
 Then it was the 
church’s task as a human institution within earthly boundaries to confess to the destruction 
and obliteration of worldly orders, from outside the boundary of human possibility, from the 
proclamation of the commandments and the grace of God,
688
 that is, to acknowledge the 
sinful transgressions and ask for redemption by faith in God’s grace.  
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Overall, the constitutionally prescribed relative independence of the Protestant Church 
steered Bonhoeffer to assess in a concept of church and a concept of God the institutional and 
the spiritual independence of the Protestant Church from the Weimar state. Through recourse 
to the jurisprudential discourse on forms for juristic persons and the difference to natural 
persons, Bonhoeffer assessed the form of the institutional church around faith in the natural 
person of Jesus Christ. Even though Bonhoeffer rejected the adjective “organic” for 
communal relations, he nonetheless built on the Germanist thought of the single person 
within multiplicity. In setting the concept of a natural person in the historical form (Gestalt) 
of Jesus Christ as God’s revelation at the center of his characterization of the church as 
juristic person, Bonhoeffer modified the Kierkegaardian divide and leap as well as the 
Bartian human’s absolute subject-object distance of the human being to the divine, and 
claimed to have found a way beyond the philosophical self-centered ego. His combination of 
a spiritual-institutional concept of church, centered on the transformation from humanity-in-
Adam to that in-Christ, and grounded in the person-concept, prepared him for confronting the 
crisis of 1933. The demand of total allegiance to a human leader and the persecution of 
members of the church presented a crisis of the magnitude of a status confessionis that 
endangered the spiritual independence of the church. 
 
3.5 Conclusion: Krisis of Significance (Bedeutung) 
 
Bonhoeffer and Schmitt used the term crisis with the organic and humanistic-individualistic 
characteristics of Krisis as it was typical in their contemporary surrounding since the start of 
the “age of crisis” during the 1848 German revolutions. Both inspired by the Kierkegaardian 
divide between the eternal and temporal, took the contemporary discourse on juristic and 
natural person as their point of departure. For Schmitt, the analysis of jurisprudential method, 
the assessment of a theory of state, as well as the investigation into liberal democracy led to a 
crisis of insignificance (Bedeutungslosigkeit) for the individual. Schmitt assessed the 
individual as peripheral to legal judgements, as of no value to the state except in state office, 
and as a fiction of liberalism. For him the individual was too insignificant to be able to be 
violated in its essence with the law which the mediating state (Mittler) used to impart Justice 
in the times of Krisis, in “times of mediation” (Mittelbarkeit). However, for Bonhoeffer the 
societal reaction to the widespread impression of the insignificance and loneliness of the 
individual had turned into the demand for new authority in the life of an absolute leader and 
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into extreme individulism. The implementation of the Führer-principle that demanded 
allegiance to the totalitarian leader as the only one of significance (Bedeutung), combined 
with the persecution embedded in the Aryan legislation, amounted to a status confessionis. 
“Too much law”of the state violated the significance of the person of Jesus Christ, the 
mediator (Mittler) between God and human being as well as the essence of human beings 
within the church. The demand of one single human being for significance (Bedeutung) that 
had absorbed the widely perceived insignificance (Bedeutungslosigkeit) of the individual of 
the “age of crisis”, had turned for Bonhoeffer in the “crisis of 1933” into a status 
confessionis, that is, into a Krisis of significant (bedeutende) magnitude that called for 
clarifying the Protestant Church’s independence from the state by way of a confessional 
decision of faith. 
  
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
113 
 
Chapter 4: 
The Decision: Structural Analysis 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Bonhoeffer and Schmitt preferred decisions over compromise. Both decisions and 
compromises end a particular situation of discord between different parties. Over against a 
decision, a compromise is an agreement or settlement between single persons or groups in 
which each side makes concessions that accommodate the other’s demands or wishes for the 
purpose of ending a dispute. However, Schmitt rejected the never ending conversations of the 
German romantics and the delaying attitudes they imparted. He admired the 
counterrevolutionaries of the 18
th
 and 19
th
 century, who, conscious of their time and age, 
insisted on decisions. Bonhoeffer criticised his own abeyance regarding dilemmas connected 
to his 1928 trip to Barcelona, wondered about the role one’s consciousness played in 
decisions,
689
 and called in the 1933 crisis for an uncompromising decision in all ecclesiastic 
matters. 
 
Generally a decision is defined as an active response to a problem that at a particular time 
combines, in an external expression, a choice with an intended will for the purpose of ending 
a separation or terminating a division. For Kierkegaard, decision is not idealism’s reflexion 
but the individualized subjectivity that enables a responsible life within reality and according 
to demands on human existence.
690
 Within philosophy it denotes an intentional act in which 
an act of will prior to an action performs a reason-based choice between at least two given 
options for action or reaction.
691
 Etymologically a decision is connected to a meaning in the 
sense of coming to an end or as a display of an attribute of strength. The prefix Ent- to the 
German word for decision, Entscheidung, clarifies that the meaning of the second part of the 
word, Scheidung, with its sense of separation, division, or even conflict, is to be abolished, 
removed, or ended. This can either be done through a choice that prefers one alternative over 
another. Or it can be an active turn toward an opposing other. The de-cision, the Ent-
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scheidung is usually understood in the sense of a resolution connected to the characteristics of 
determination or strength of will in the actor and may contain an element of time insofar as it 
points to a specific event of actualization.
692
  
 
The study by Pritzlaff693 into the concept of rational decisions within the academic discipline 
of political sciences indicated that in the increasingly individualistic modern society the 
concept of decision has become a central factor of incertitude as each person is progressively 
abandoned to the self without supportive communal structures.
694
 Thus the concept of 
decision coincides with the concept of freedom,
695
 and decisions made in social contexts, 
either within common groups or individualistically, are usually unconnected to specific 
formal process. And collective decisions remain in general at the individual level. This is the 
case where decisions are synonymous with a vote and therefore the decisions of single 
members are either absorbed, analogously, through an individual decision into one collective 
decision, or a collective decision is based on the mathematical sum of those of individual 
members.
696
 Additionally, the study discovered that the three central features, which can be 
summarized as choice, resolve, and judgement, underlaying the rational concept of an 
individual decision, are repeated on the collective level in a parallel way to their interplay on 
the individual level. Therefore collective decisions can be treated in the same way as 
individual decisions within a common group.
697
 Because this thesis involves collective and 
individual decisions within Schmitt’s theory of state and Bonhoeffer’s concept of church, it 
will follow Pritzlaff’s structural design for rational decisions. 
 
4.2 Ent-scheidung – De-cision 
 
The core elements of the concept of individual and collective rational decisions - choice, 
resolve, and judgement, i.e. intent, and active manifestation - which concern material options, 
a time-structure, and the positioning of the actor are interconnected and overlap in their 
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contexts.
698
 Factors such as the distribution of power, specific regulations of formal process, 
and the development of preferences are often regarded as influential for a decision, but 
concern only the specific material circumstances of facts and can be disregarded for defining 
a general concept.
699
 The first central element of “choice” structures the context of a decision 
into options and alternatives on a material, factual level. The characteristic of “resolve” adds 
the structural dimension of compressing the choices into a specific time-frame, while the 
feature of “judgement” intentionally positions the actor in relation to the material facts of the 
context.
700
 Thus at a more concrete level, Pritzlaff’s study discovered that a rational decision 
is comprised of a combination of the “choice” between external, contextual options and 
alternatives, plus a temporal structuring by way of a time-sensitive “resolve”, plus an internal, 
invisible “intent” that concerns questions of focus, ideas, and will, plus an external material 
structuring that is expressed in an “active manifestation” of the previous steps of the decision. 
Located at the interface between the external options and alternatives, and the temporal 
structuring of the resolve, that is, between choice and time, are factors such as subjective 
reflection, compassion, aesthetic views, locus in the world, as well as questions of authority 
and objective distance. These features precondition the “intent” which is the central, most 
inner step of the decision.  
 
The “intent” is located between the externality of the “choice” and the part-internal, part-
external “resolve” on one side, and the external action and its manifestation on the other side. 
This “intent” at the middle between these two sides could be understood in Kierkegaardian 
terms as the centre of a “gap”, divide, or need, or more generally of a Krisis, that confronts 
the human being and must be overcome by a “leap”, or a “solution”. In other paradigms then, 
such as political sciences, in jurisprudence and theology, this step of “intent” is also the place 
of, for example, ideas of rightness, Justice, as well as of faith in God’s revelation in Jesus, 
that is, in the cross. The “intent” is the location of the essence of the decision, and thus the 
most central place for faith, beliefs, convictions, and meaning. 
 
With Krisis defined as the existence and identification of the problem that calls for a de-
cision, an Ent-scheidung, in which particularly structured steps bring a solution, the following 
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will in a first step analyse and compare how and toward which options and alternatives 
Schmitt and Bonhoeffer sorted and structured their respective understanding of their 
contemporary Weimar crisis.  
 
4.3  Choices: Options and Alternatives 
 
A “Choice” is generally understood as an election of an act that is based on a will and 
connects cause and effect. To avoid a tautology between the definitions for choice and 
decision, the criteria of alternative is added, which reduces the complexity of the world to a 
limited number of variations or rather options. An alternative, then, confronts an option with 
another option under the condition that only one of them can be realized.
701
 The choice of one 
compels to renounce the other, which requires that both sides are identifiable and 
attainable.
702
 Bonhoeffer and Schmitt used sociological, philosophical, and jurisprudential 
tools taken from their academic context to structure and sort the particularities of the Weimar 
realities for devising a concept of church with a structure sui generis, centered on God’s 
purposive meaning for human beings, and a concept of state in the form of a constitution for a 
national unit, which for both presented particular alternatives. Their respective structuring 
towards alternatives is the focus of the following. 
 
4.3.1 Schmitt: Identity or Representation  
 
For Schmitt, the Weimar Constitution provided, apart from a core structure for the most 
important matters of bourgeois democracy, only false decisions in the form of pretense-
compromises. Such compromises regarding the separation of powers, the guarantee of basic 
rights and, most of all leadership, could not solve the Weimar Krisis but kept it open for a 
final decision within the political realm, that is, for a new theory of state with adequate 
leadership provisions. It was especially the four alternative constitutional types of rule that 
were unable to form a substantial compromise of a harmonious as-well-as (sowohl-als-auch), 
which could replace the unavoidable either-or question between the monarchic and the 
democratic principle.
703
  
                                            
701
 Niklas Luhmann, Organisation und Entscheidung (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2000), 125. 
702
 Luhmann, Organisation, 133. 
703
 Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 66. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
117 
 
According to Schmitt’s Verfassungslehre, the pre-existing political unit of the German 
Peoples had willed for itself, with the 1919 Weimar Constitution, a political and legal 
foundational form for their state. This unit was one of equals, that is, of substantial 
homogeneous sameness (Gleichartigkeit) and of national consciousness.
704
 Because 
homogeneous sameness is a political concept, it differs from the universal equality of 
humanity which belongs to the theory of liberal individualism.
705
 Instead, the equality that 
mattered as a part of the nature of democracy is focused inwardly on the equality of all 
citizens
706
 over against external groups. ‘A democracy knows only equality of equals and the 
wills of those who belong to the equals’,707 because mass-democracy and democracy of 
humankind cannot ground a state.
708
 The substantially equal unit of the German peoples had 
developed in the course of the historical process of 19
th
 century bourgeois opposition to 
monarchic rule and through a number of contractual and political alliances.
709
 In this process, 
a strengthening bourgeois social class had demanded legal protection for private property and 
personal freedom and thus had extracted a private sphere from the monarch’s and the state’s 
control.
710
 As the subject of the constitution-giving power,
711
 the national unit of the German 
people existed prior to the Weimar Constitution and with its unmediated will
712
 had decided 
on the form of their collective political existence. It is a unity that had existed already during 
the previous 1871 German Reich and continued to exist in its identity but in the new form of 
the Weimar Constitution.
713
 The act of the constitution-giving power was a one-time 
conscious political decision on the form and type of the already existing political unit.
714
 The 
Weimar Constitution was not a contract because that would presume some differentiations 
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and oppositional sides
715
 within the prior substantially equal unit. Rather, for Schmitt, the 
peoples as a unit create their state as their political status and form, and as documented in the 
constitution. 
 
The Weimar Constitution differed from previous constitutions of the 19
th
 century which had 
needed at least two subjects with political status,
716
 e.g. the monarch and the dukes. They 
incorporated in a status-contract the contractual parties’ entire relational life into a common 
order (Gesamtordnung) that could not be severed through termination or renunciation.
717
 
Such contracts were meant to bring into existence the very political unit of the peoples. This 
differs from a political unit that exists as constitution-giving power already prior to the 
constitution.
718
 Therefore, in the Weimar state the constitution cannot be the status, that is, 
the state’s ‘soul’, its concrete life and individual existence.719 On the contrary, the ‘state is the 
political status of the peoples’. The state is the type and form (Gestaltung) of the peoples.720 
The constitution was grounded in something existentially beyond itself, in the will of the 
German peoples, in the will of a political unit.
721
 As grounded in the concrete decision of a 
will – an existential, actual being and source of ought, a constitution-giving power and 
authority –722 it could neither be construed as collecting single wills into a combined will 
(Gesamtwillen) that unites the living parts (Glieder) into a state organism,
723
 nor as a social, 
societal, or state contract. Because this unit had no internal opposite a constitution also differs 
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from contracts or agreements of private and civil law
724
 in which single individuals are 
connected through legal relations of measurable, limited content. Such contracts can be 
terminated and dissolved by the single person and can never involve the single person in its 
entirety (Gesamtheit) which was considered unethical.
725
 
 
A constitution, based on a united will and grounding a legal order (Rechtsordnung), was 
derived of “political” existence and not of normative legality.726 This differs from Laband’s 
method
727
 and from a normative system as in Kelsen’s positivist unity of legal norms which 
both had been fitting to the developing bourgeois state of legality (Rechtsstaat) and to the 
bygone time of codification, with its faith in metaphysical individual rational and natural 
law.
728
 Such a system, this ‘norm of norms’,729 had replaced political being and becoming of 
state-unity and order with simple functionality.
730
 Positivism had substituted the human being 
with norms and thus had personified the written law. In this absolute state of legality the 
norm is sovereign,
731
 even though, correctly, sovereign can only be something of concrete 
existence.
732
 A norm cannot legitimize itself but depends on the existential will of the one 
who crafts it.
733
 Because the constitution did not come into existence by itself, it can neither 
be absolute nor claim normative correctness or systematic completeness. With an argument 
that parallels his earlier discourses on the rightness of legal judgements and the worth of the 
state, Schmitt declared that rightness or usefulness of norms cannot ground the worth of the 
political unit. Rather the constitution’s worth is found in its “right to existence.” ‘What exists 
with political greatness, is, from a jurisprudential perspective, of value and should exist.’ 
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Thus the unit’s ‘right to preservation’ focusses on ‘“its existence, its integrity, its security and 
its constitution” – all existential values.’734  
 
With its one-time decision, the constitution-giving unit of the German peoples had 
determined, according to Schmitt, the substance of the constitution as well as further 
constitutional statute-laws. The untouchable core substance, the constitutional essence, 
contained the concrete political decision on the political form of being (Daseinsform), 
fundamental rights that protect human freedoms from encroachment by the state, and the 
separation of powers that defuse the might of the state and prevent state arbitrariness.
735
 This 
core substance of the Weimar state of legality (Rechtsstaat) was foundational for the 
remainder of the constitution. With the German peoples’ choice for a constitutional 
democracy they kept in essence the status quo of a bourgeois order over against the either-or 
alternative of a proletarian Soviet type class-society.
736
 They also retained in the statute-laws 
of the constitution aristocratic and monarchic elements. At the same time, it was a decision 
against a pure democracy that would entail direct plebiscitary discussions and unmediated 
selection of leadership. The German peoples had cast themselves in the political form of a 
democratic republic with a federal-state structure and a parliamentary-representative form of 
legislative authority and government.
737
 This core decision, willed by the existential unit of 
the German people, Schmitt declared would stand removed from the parliamentary powers of 
amending the constitution.
738
 This was meant to prevent changing majorities, political parties, 
fractions, and coalitions of the legislative power from overriding the pre-existing will and 
decision of the German people as a whole, from adding compromises, and from even 
dissolving the very existence of the state.
739
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Nonetheless, the remainder of the constitution, the constitutional statute-laws, including the 
section on basic rights remained open to parliamentary amendments.
740
 Furthermore, in times 
of exception such constitutional statute-laws could be suspended in support of the existential 
core decision
 741
 by way of a presidential commissarial dictatorship.
742
 The constitutional 
statute-laws included, according to Schmitt, a long line of genuine social compromises and 
pretense-compromises (Scheinkompromisse) which reflected the circumstances of the year 
1919. The former are predominantly shown in organizational details and in the mixed 
character of the basic rights and duties of the second part of the Constitution.
743
 The latter 
pretend to reach a substantive decision by way of reciprocal concessions for accommodating 
the other’s demands or wishes but instead their sole intention lays in postponing a decision.744 
They contain no decision at all, not even a compromise decision.
745
 The most prominent 
examples for pretense-compromises were for Schmitt the relations between the state and the 
church and the four parallel possible forms (Gestalten) of governance.  
 
Schmitt assessed that as long as the church remained as a public-law-corporation a publically 
recognized concern of public life, the state could not be radically separated.
746
 Not turning the 
church into a private society and not treating religion as a private matter but instead keeping 
the church a public corporation meant retaining the status quo.
747
 The question that was left 
undecided was whether the public life in Germany should retain its specifically Christian 
character.
748
 This ambivalence was most visible in the ‘dilatory formal compromise’749 
                                            
740
 The Article 76 Weimar Constitution which demanded for amending the Constitution a two-thirds majority 
from those representatives who were present at the parliamentary vote, was highly contested during the 
ideological parliamentary infighting of the late 1920s; Article 76 Weimar Constitution, in Hildebrandt, 
Verfassungen, 97.  
741
 Article 48, para 2 Weimar Constitution, in Hildebrandt, Verfassungen, 81. 
742
 Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 27. The idea of the commissarial dictatorship connects to Schmitt’s theory of the 
keeper of the constitution. The identity of this keeper changed between 1928 to 1933 from the supreme court to 
the Reich-president, originally with commissarial powers, later with dictatorial decree-powers, and finally to a 
call for a strong decisionist personality and sovereign dictator; Carl Schmitt, “Das Reichsgericht als Hüter der 
Verfassung (1929)”, in Verfassungsrechtliche Aufsätze, 63-109; Schmitt, Der Hüter der Verfassung. 
743
 Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 30. 
744
 ‚... unechten Kompromisse. Man könnte sie Scheinkompromisse nenne, weil sie keine durch beiderseitiges 
Nachgeben gewonnene sachliche Entscheidung treffen, sondern ihr Wesen gerade darin besteht, diese 
Entscheidung hinauszuschieben und zu vertagen.‘; Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 31. 
745
 Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 34. 
746
 ‚Der Staat kann sich von einer als öffentlich anerkannten Angelegenheit des öffentlichen Lebens nicht radical 
trennen.‘; Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 33. 
747
 cf. Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 32-33. 
748
 ,Die Frage, ob die Öffentlichkeit des Lebens in Deutschland wie bisher einen speziefisch christlichen 
Charakter behalten soll, wird nicht klar verneint.‘; Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 33. 
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regarding taxation and education in public schools.
750
 Thus the Weimar Constitution 
distanced the state from the church and robbed it of its influence on the church but reversely 
the church was not removed from the state.
751
  
 
Regarding governance, Schmitt identified an unstable system
752
 of four options of leadership 
with none taking priority over the other - Parliament, Reich-chancellor, Minister-cabinet, and 
Reich-president. Although they balanced each other, their reciprocal relationship was the 
central problem of the Weimar parliamentary system.
753
 They compromised on the 
contradictory objectives of retaining the democratic ideal of a political leader, of recognizing 
the mistrust of parliamentary representatives and organized parties against institutions of 
unmediated democracy, of satisfying the liberal aim of balancing powers, and of maintaining 
in the influential president residues of the constitutional monarchy.
754
 Intended was a strong 
connection between parliament and executive government, but the executive had turned into 
a committee of the parliament, with a chancellor who was meant as a political leader but who 
remained removed from the executing administration. And at the same time, a president was 
to counterweight the power of the parliament through retaining the ideal of an unmediated 
democratic leader who was elected by plebiscitary vote.
755
  
 
Any of the four leadership options of the pretense-compromise could gain prominence over 
the others in times of changing political realities without needing amandments to the 
constitutional text or even a reinterpretation.
756
 The most decisive contradiction was in the 
democratic versus the monarchic leadership principle: a chancellor who leads but does not 
                                                                                                                                       
749
 ‚dilatorischer Formelkompromiβ‘; Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 34, own translation. 
750
 Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 33.  
751
 ‚Im ganzen kann man sagen, daβ nach den Bestimmungen der Weimarer Verfassung zwar der Staat von der 
Kirche getrennt und ferngehalten, also seines Einflusses beraubt ist, nicht aber umgekehrt die Kirche vom Staat 
getrennt wurde.‘; Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 34. 
752
 ‚Alle diese Bestimmungen ergänzen sich vielmehr zu einem labilen System, welches die verschiedensten 
Möglichkeiten offenläβt.‘; Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 258. 
753
 ‚… sind alle vier in Betracht kommenden Untersysteme des parlamentarischen Systems der Weimarer 
Verfassung potentiell anerkannt. Das gegenseitige Verhältnis der verschiedenen Möglichkeiten ist das 
eigentliche Problem der parlamentarischen Regierung.‘; Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 341. ‚...die 
verfassungsgesetzlichen Bestimmungen der Weimarer Verfassung haben keinen anderen positiven Inhalt als 
den, eine labile Balancierung jener vier Untersysteme zu ermöglichen.‘; Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 349. 
754
 Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 347. 
755
 cf.  Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 341. 
756
 ‚Alle diese Tendenzen können in der politischen Wirklichkeit, zu verschiedenen Zeiten verschieden stark, zur 
Geltung kommen und ohne Änderung des Verfassungstextes den Wortlaut in einem ganz neuen Licht 
erscheinen lassen.‘; Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 347. 
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command and is responsible over against the parliament,
757
 versus a president who can 
command and who focusses the peoples’ trust on his person.758 The alternative possibilities 
were reflected in the words “responsibility” and “trust”.759 In Schmitt’s assessment, the 
various chancellors of the Weimar Republic had refused to accept the risks of political action 
which was part of any true political leadership.
760
 Therefore, this dualism could lead to 
dangerous conflicts. It could lead to bypassing parliamentary majorities and to incessant 
plebiscitary calls on the peoples due to the presidential powers to dissolve the parliament and 
appoint a chancellor.
761
 Although governmental programs and political guidelines were 
meant to be developed between the fractions of the political parties prior to the appointment 
of a chancellor, it was constitutionally permissible to sideline the parties and appoint a 
chancellor with a set political program. If the chancellor was unable to gather a parliamentary 
majority for his program the president could dissolve the parliament and let the peoples 
decide on a new majority for the chancellor’s program.762 Because the state was not meant to 
be a neutral umpire but to render political decisions,
763
 Schmitt insisted that the pretense-
compromises, especially the contradiction between the democratic and monarchic principle, 
eventually would be decided in the realm of the political. 
 
The constitution as ‘form of forms’764 required, according to Schmitt, a final decision on the 
ruling order, on the issue of superiority and subordination (Über- und Unterordnung), on 
ruling from above or from below. Even if the state’s constitution rises from below to the 
above by providing the peoples’ will to a state, the state’s organisation nonetheless operates 
from above to below and demands obedience.
765
 Nonetheless, the alternative between the 
monarchic or democratic principle was at its center the choice between the two competing 
                                            
757
 ‚Der Reichskanzler bestimmt die Richtlinien der Politik und trägt dafür gegenüber der Reichstag die 
Verantwortung.‘; Article 56, para 1 Weimar Constitution; in Hildebrandt, Verfassungen, 83. 
758
 cf. Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 346, 347,  350. 
759
 ‚Die bisherige Übersicht hat gezeigt, welche verschiedenen Möglichkeiten in den gleichen Worten wie 
„Verantwortung“ oder „Vertrauen“ liegen können.‘; Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 348. 
760
 cf. Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 347, 349-50. 
761
 cf. Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 63, 211, 351, 358. 
762
 cf. Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 349, 358. Schmitt thus described in 1928 the embedded constitutional 
problems that were exploited in early 1933 with Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor: the immediate dissolution 
of the parliament, new elections, and the emergency powers of the Enabling Act.  
763
 Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 134. 
764
 Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 5. As the three forms of state Schmitt identified monarchy, democracy, and 
aristocracy which found expression in the bourgeois  idea of the division of powers, especially in the legislative 
and executive; Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 200. 
765
 cf. Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 5-6. 
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political form-principles of representation and identity. The monarch was grounded in an 
unmediated religious idea of representing divine essence, the image of God, and in the 
authority and power of the father of the family, the patria potestas of an emperor.
766
 As 
Caesarist monarch, he was a dictator based on the democratic will of the peoples.
767
 In the 
democratic idea a peoples of homogeneous substance form a politically existing identity that 
is determined according to the criteria of differentiating between friend and enemy,
768
 and 
thereafter identifies with a directly chosen leader. Democracy needs identity between ruler 
and the ruled. At the leadership level, the pretense-compromise left undecided the question of 
sovereign political leadership either as representation or identity. 
 
The open question that demanded a final decision on leadership led Schmitt to view other 
models of democracy apart from Weimar parliamentarism, such as various types of 
dictatorship, the ideologies of Bolshevism and Marxism, and Italian Fascism. He assessed, 
that in a direct democracy the people could express the public will through acclamation. In a 
dictatorial and Caesaristic method democratic substance and power could be expressed 
directly.
769
 The dictatorships of Bolshevism and Fascism, despite being anti-liberal, were not 
necessarily anti-democratic.
770
 But in the rationalism of the Marxist and Bolshevist 
dictatorship of the proletariat, Schmitt discerned and criticized a will to eliminate and not just 
to educate the bourgeoisie in the sense of Fichte’s “educational dictatorship”.771 This he 
assessed as clearly differing from Hegelian contemplative advancement. But he was 
fascinated by the Fascist use of the irrational power of a national myth
772
 which stood 
opposed to bourgeois intellectualism.
773
 Recognizing political myth as ‘the most powerful 
symptom of the decline of the relative rationalism of parliamentary thought’,774 he assessed in 
the irrational powerful emotion of nationalism a great abstract danger to the class conscious 
                                            
766
 ‚Die Monarchie wird religiös begründet.‘ ‚ Die Autorität und Macht des Vaters in der Familie, die patria 
potestas, wird auf den Staat übertragen ...‘; Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 282, 283. 
767
 ‚In der cäsaristischen Monarchie, ..., ist der Monarch nur Diktator auf demokratischer Grundlage.‘; Schmitt, 
Verfassungslehre, 284.  
768
 cf. Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 169, 247. 
769
 cf. Schmitt, preface to Crisis, 16-17. 
770
 Carl Schmitt, “Gegensatz“, 73. 
771
 ‘The kind of force to which it [the new rationalism] must resort cannot any longer be Fichte’s naïve 
schoolmasterly “educational dictatorship.” The bourgeois is not to be educated, but eliminated.’; Schmitt, Crisis, 
64, emphasis in original. 
772
 Schmitt, Crisis, 75-76. 
773
 cf. Schmitt, Crisis, 69. 
774
 Schmitt, Crisis, 76. 
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myth of ‘democracy of mankind and parliamentarism’. He understood national myth as a 
‘naturalistic conception of race and descent’, a ‘shared culture’, and an ‘awareness of 
belonging to a community with a common fate or destiny, a sensibility of being different 
from other nations.’775 For expressing this myth within the political realm, Schmitt turned to 
using secularized versions of theological structures provided in Christian dogma.
776
  
 
In sum, according to Schmitt, the closed positivist system had personified the written word of 
the law for the purpose of protecting a private sphere of freedom over against the state and 
for repressing a political realm.
777
 Schmitt defined the constitution not as contract but as a 
foundational decision, as the will of the historically grown existing unit of the German 
peoples, the state, which was of homogeneous, but not of universally equal nature. This 
turned ‘equality before the law’ into a pre-constitutional formative category for the existential 
unit of the peoples. He thus separated the concept of equality from the bourgeois liberal right 
to freedom that were part of the non-substantial genuine compromises of the amendable 
constitutional statute-laws. This meant that Schmitt assigned worth to an existential unit of 
political equals and to an untouchable constitutional substance but, similar to his previous 
position in Der Wert des Staates und die Bedeutung des Einzelnen, he rejected an 
untouchable essence of worth and dignity that was centered in natural persons, in the 
individuals.  
 
The pre-constitutional united will had decided in its power and authority to give itself the 
form (Daseinsform) of a constitutional democracy which defined the untouchable essence 
and form of the Weimar Constitution. The ‘dilatory formal compromises’ of the Constitution 
were still in need of being decided in the political realm. This included the need of a full 
expulsion of the Protestant Church from the political public realm of the state and a decision 
regarding the pretense-compromises of political leadership in the form of either a democratic 
or a monarchic type; between the alternative of the office of the Reich-Chancellor or of the 
person of the Reich-President. This concerned a choice between either responsibility or trust, 
between either representation or identity.  
                                            
775
 Schmitt, Crisis, 75. 
776
 ‘All significant concepts of the modern theory of state are secularized theological concepts.’; Schmitt, 
Political Theology, 36. ‘The juristic formulas of the omnipotence of the state are, in fact, only superficial 
secularizations of theological formulas of the omnipotence of God.’; Schmitt, Concept, 42. 
777
 Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 41. 
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4.3.2 Bonhoeffer: The Alternative sui generis 
 
For Bonhoeffer ‘compromise hates decision’.778 Compromise, he declared was an extreme 
solution just as was radicalism.
779
 The latter hates what exists, calls reconciliation a betrayal 
of Christ,
780
 and knows no distinctions (Unter-scheidungen) but only one division 
(Scheidung), that is, to be for or against Christ.
781
 Compromise absolutizes what exists,
782
 
manages the world by worldly means, accuses the Christian freedom from the world as 
unnatural and hostile to humanity, but declares that accommodation to the world is genuine 
Christian love for the world.
783
  It was the contradictions and Kierkegaardian either-or 
constellations between divine and human, between faith and revelation, that Bonhoeffer tried 
to overcome with concepts of church and God which he thought as true alternatives to the 
concept of state within the factual, empirical reality of the one kingdom of God. To 
Bonhoeffer, Christian life was neither a matter of radicalism nor of compromise.784 He 
insisted that the relations between community and human being were not, as in 
Enlightenment thought, an either-or alternative that was unable to recognize the as-well-as 
(sowohl-als-auch) that was intrinsic to this dialectic relational movement.
785
 In the church-
community that assembled its members in congregations,
786
 relations between God and His 
community intersected and, at the same time, it was situated between God and the world.
787
 
By God’s divine will the purpose (Zweck) of the church-community is directed toward the 
church itself, that is, it is an end in itself.
788
 At the same time the church is the means to the 
end of realizing God’s rule.789 In this God makes use of human wills, which are thus means to 
                                            
778
 DBWE 6:156. 
779
 DBWE 6:153 
780
 DBWE 6:155. 
781
 ‚Hier gibt es keine Unterscheidungen, es muβ alles ins Gericht; es gibt nur noch eine Scheidung: für Christus 
oder gegen ihn.‘; DBW 6:144; DBWE 6: 153. 
782
 DBWE 6:154. 
783
 DBWE 6:156. 
784
 DBWE 6:154. 
785
 cf. DBWE 1:76 note 46. 
786
 DBWE 1:208. 
787
 ‘The public assembly is thus both God’s will and act of the church-community, and therefore not only 
something that takes place between God and the church-community, but also something between the church-
community and the world.’; DBWE 1:231. 
788
 DBWE 1:261. 
789
 cf. DBWE 1:191 note 193. 
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an end but nonetheless remain ends in themselves.
790
 But neither personal being nor the 
social communal being has priority over the other.
791
 Instead they are held in equilibrium,
792
 
in a church defined by form, will, and meaning. In his quest for a concept of church he found 
in “Christ existing as church community” the form (Gestalt) of church sui generis, a form 
with similarities to, but nonetheless apart and different from, existing legal, sociological, and 
philosophical structures because the church was the sustained existence of God’s revelation 
in this world.  
 
Church and form: 
For developing a modern, contemporary form for the empirical church, Bonhoeffer took 
serious the constitutionally prescribed legal parameter of a public law cooperation with 
private law personality.793 Because, according to Bonhoeffer, God wills a historical church, 
this empirical institution of salvation needed a legal body with an organizational structure 
that included vertical and horizontal relational directions. Dismissing the Catholic Church as 
a fitting institutional concept for the Protestant Church, he examined sociologically grounded 
forms of legal structures that had become codified during the 19
th
 century. All but one of the 
organizational forms Bonhoeffer investigated are organizational frameworks regulated within 
law: the cooperative (Genossenschaftsverband), compulsory organization (Anstalt), 
community of persons (Personengemeinschaft), society of purpose (Zweckgesellschaft), 
foundation (Stiftung), and association (Verein). Only the federation of authentic rule, the 
Herrschaftsverband,794 is a Weberian sociological rather than a jurisprudential form. An 
association, a Verein, can either take the form of a registered (eingetragen) form or a non-
registered (nicht eingetragen) form.
795
 These legal forms vary in their strength of self-
governance and the intensity of their focus on a purpose or fulfillment of a task. At their 
                                            
790
 DBWE 1:279. 
791
 DBWE 1:75. 
792
 cf. DBWE 1:76 note 46. 
793
 Article 137, para. 4 and 5 Weimar Constitution, in Hildebrandt, Verfassungen, 102. 
794
 DBWE 1:89, 91, 92, 129, 174, 175, 181, 253, 255, 257, 261. The DBWE translates Genossenschaftsverband 
with „cooperative association“, Herrschaftsverband with „association of authentic rule“, and Verein with 
“voluntary association. However, legally a Verband and a Verein differ decisively. Only the latter, the Verein, is 
a legally defined concept within the Civil Code (Paras. 54-79 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch). Bonhoeffer appears to 
have recognized the difference when stating that Verbände have “grown” and “previously existed” while the 
others are “made” and “willed”; DBWE 1:89; DBW 1:57. For clarity reasons, I have therefore used the term 
“association” exclusively for the Verein and have translated the words Genossenschaftsverband with 
“cooperative” and Herrschaftsverband with “federation of authentic rule”. 
795
 Paras. 21, 54 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch. 
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essence are questions of authority, obedience, freedom
796
 and the bearer of the office.
797
 The 
forms of the association (Verein) he discarded because they are oriented towards a human 
goal which contravenes the symbolism and tradition of the church such as sin, grace, Christ, 
and the Holy Spirit.
798
 Bonhoeffer insisted that in a church the mutual relation of the three 
realities of unity, community, and singleness (Einzelheit), all established by the spirit, 
contribute to the theory of the form (Gestaltslehre) of the church.
799
 As community of spirit, 
but not a community of souls, the church’s nature is of transcendent foundation. It combines 
the elements of superiority and subordination found in a federation of authentic rule 
(Herrschaftsverband) with the purpose and meaning of achieving the certain end of God’s 
will.
800
 God’s self is the means to God’s own purpose.801  
 
However, the private law concept that is constitutionally prescribed to the church’s 
personality is that of the “common community” (Gesamthandsgemeinschaft).802 In this legal 
structural framework, the natural single person is preserved as carrier of rights and duties 
who are gathered around a purpose as their groups’s particular essence.803 Thus within the 
church as a juristic person of public law (Körperschaft) with a private law personality its 
members remain single persons in difference to a juristic person in which the organization as 
such has a collective personality which is the carrier of rights and duties, as this is the case 
for the associations (Verein), compulsory organizations (Anstalten) and foundations 
(Stiftungen).
804
 Such differentiating thought clearly resonated within Bonhoeffer’s concept of 
church when he declared that the human being remains a single person without being 
                                            
796
 DBWE 1:250-52. 
797
 DBWE 1:231-36, 256. 
798
 DBWE 1:254-55. 
799
 DBWE 1:208. 
800
 DBWE 1:261. 
801
 DBWE 1:262. 
802
 Article 137, para 4 Weimar Constitution, in Hildebrandt, Verfassungen, 102; and Helmut Heinrichs, „Para 
21“, in Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, ed. Otto Palandt, 22. 
803
 The Gesamthandsgemeinschaft, which is the strongest connection between persons next to the juristic 
persons, is gathered around a pupose that is focused on a particular wealth (Vermögen). The wealth, which 
forms the essence of the community (Gesamthand), can either be property or a monetary demand 
(Forderungen). According to the “individualistic Gesamthand-theory” of Bonhoeffer’s time, the 
Gesamthandsgemeinschaft in the form of a society of civil law (Gesellschaft des bürgerlichen Rechts, para 705 
Civil Code) had no collective legal standing. Only the individual members were carriers of legal rights and 
duties. Wolfgang Fikentscher and Andreas Heinemann, Schuldrecht, 10
th
 ed. (Berlin: De Gruyter Recht, 2006), 
381, 651. 
804
 Heinrichs, „BGB §§ 1-432“, in Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, 20. 
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absorbed by the church-community as a whole.
805
 Nonetheless, to him the starting point for 
assessing the empirical form of the church could not be individuality because it was 
impossible to move from multiplicity to unity.
806
 Engaging from a theological perspective 
with the jurisprudential Romanist-Germanist debate, Bonhoeffer clarified that ‘the person 
comes into being only when embedded in sociality and the collective person comes into being 
together with the single person.’807 The single person can be understood in his entirety only if 
the social interactions with the collectivity are taken into account.
808
 Because the collective 
person is experienced as concrete communal center of activities (Aktzentrum) with a specific 
will and goal, albeit in the form (Gestalt) of the will of all of its members, it is possible only 
were all single persons belong to the essence of concrete community.
809
 Paralleling the 
jurisprudential discourse on natural persons and juristic persons, that is, individual and 
collective persons, Bonhoeffer stated that because community is a concrete unity, and the 
collective person is only where there are single persons, the social communal person “is”, 
after all, also an individual person.
810
  
 
Even though this collective person and the individual person, in the eyes of the universal 
person (Allperson) God, were of the same structural type (gleichgeartet),
811
 this sameness of 
type (Gleichartigkeit) does not say anything about interpersonal relations in the sense of 
equal value. Because ‘God does not want a community that absorbs the single human being 
into itself, but a community of human beings’,812  they are not indifferently absorbed into a 
single unit. Within this unity, the plurality with all its concrete dissimilarities remains and 
each human being as a person is equal before God who declares the same judgement and 
                                            
805
 DBWE 1:80. 
806
 DBWE 1:78. 
807
 DBWE 1:78. 
808
 cf. DBWE 1:75. 
809
 ‚Die soziale Einheit wird als Aktzentrum erlebt, ... sie hat ihren eigenen Willen, freilich nur in der Gestalt 
ihrer Glieder.‘ ‚... nicht in jedem Glied, sondern nur in allen zusammen liegt das Aktzentrum.‘ ‚Da aber 
Kollektivperson als Aktzentrum nur möglich ist als konkrete Gemeinschaft mit inhaltlichen Zielen, so wird  sie 
nur dort möglich sein, wo zum Wesen der konkreten Gemeinschaft die Einzelperson gehört.‘; DBW 1:49. 
810
 ‚Wir behaupten, daβ die Gemeinschaft als Kollektivperson aufgefasst werden kann, mit derselben Struktur 
wie die Einzelperson‘; DBW 1:48; ‚Eine Gemeinschaft ist konkrete Einheit.‘ ‚..., daβ die Kollektivperson nur 
ist, wo Einzelpersonen sind.‘; DBW 1:49; ‚ Denn auch die Kollektivperson ist ja Individualperson.‘ DBW 1:50. 
811
 ‚... vor den Augen der Allperson Gottes ist dieselbe strukturelle Art von Kollektivperson und Einzelperson 
auszusagen‘; DBW 1:50; ‚Die Struktur der Kollektiv- und der Individualeinheit ist vor Gottes Augen 
gleichgeartet.’; DBW 1:51. 
812
 DBWE 1:80, translation altered. 
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grace on all.
813
 The dialectical relation between plurality and unity includes the concrete 
dissimilarity (Ungleichartigkeit) of all people.
814
 Christian equality means equal sinfulness 
that places everybody before God’s eye at the same separating and absolute distance.815 
Universal sinfulness and the need for redemption gives all human beings, existing and 
preserved as single persons within the whole,
816
 an equal share in God’s grace.817  
 
Despite the identical structural typology of communal and single persons, the applicability of 
collective types to the concept of church depended, for Bonhoeffer, on the question whether 
ethical categories are transferrable to a communal person (Gesamtperson) in the sense of an 
ethical personhood.
818
 However, due to the uniqueness of the church, the church of God in 
which meaning and revelation is brought about by the spirit, he argued that the empirical 
church reaches beyond all community that is humanly possible, even beyond the ethical.
819
 
Here the sociological-jurisprudential forms are connected to the divine self’s will and 
purpose, in the unique way that the Christ-person decisively indicates a theological direction 
beyond merely a human ethical sphere. Thus collective forms are applicable to the church but 
in a uniquely theological way which Bonhoeffer expressed by substituting “collective” for 
“communal” (gesamt) in regards to the church. 
 
The uniqueness of his concept of the church as Sanctorum Communio, the ‘Christ existing as 
church-community’, over against other social concepts of community, was highlighted by 
him in his usage of particular linguistic terms such as “single person” (Einzelner) and 
Gesamtperson, the latter in the sense of total, entire, or communal person. Only a few times 
does the term “individual person” (einzelne Person or Einzelperson) appear, but never the 
term “individual” (Individuum) in itself. Thus, he made a clear distinction over against the 
                                            
813
 cf. DBWE 1:205-06. 
814
 DBWE 1:206. 
815
 ‚So besagt auch die christliche Gleichheitsidee nichts über interpersonale Beziehungen, sondern stellt 
ausschlieβlich alle Menschen vor das Auge Gottes, indem zunächst der absolute Abstand statuiert wird, der das 
Geschöpf vom Schöpfer ... trennt: ...‘; DBW 1:137; DBWE 1:204, 207. 
816
 DBWE 1:76 note 45.  
817
 DBWE 1:204. 
818
 ‚...Frage, wie weit auf eine Gesamtperson ethische Kategorien anwendbar seien, im Sinne einer ethischen 
Personenhaftigkeit, ...‘; DBW 1:50; DBWE 1:79. 
819
 ‘… sociologists will have definitive proof that the church is a community when they consider that, like any 
other genuine community, it is an ethical collective person.’ ‘Its uniqueness becomes apparent, however, only 
where it is understood as the community and church of God that is based upon and brought about by the 
Spirit,…’; DBWE 1:260. 
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state, specifically regarding the “individual” of liberal political theory. Another clear 
distinction runs through the use of the terms Kollekivperson and Gesamtperson.
820
 The 
former term, the collective person, he attached only to communities, groupings, and juristic 
persons other than the church, or those that may or may not in general also include the 
church. However, when exclusively speaking about the concept of church in the sense of 
‘Christ existing as church-community’, he used the term Gesamt in various combinations, 
such as communal person (Gesamtperson), communal unity (Gesamtgemeinschaft), 
communal personality (Gesamtpersönlichkeit) etc.
821
 In this way Bonhoeffer clarified the 
church’s distinctiveness over against any theories of state as a collective person and the 
ambivalence of the applicability of private and public law that is contained in the 
constitutional classification of the Protestant Church as corporation of public law 
(Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts), whose legal personality as “common community” 
(Gesamthandsgemeinschaft) is nonetheless determined by the private law of the civil code.
822
    
 
Church and will: 
The empirical church could not be a society of purpose with a set goal (Zweckgesellschaft), 
whose parallel wills are focused on a particular goal.
823
 Rather, communal social ties 
necessitate acts of will which must go beyond the parallel existence of personal wills. Will 
Bonhoeffer defined as the ‘unified activation of self-determination and self-consciousness’ 
                                            
820
 The English translation of the DBW states that ‘There is no conceptual difference for Bonhoeffer between 
Kollektivperson and Gesamtperson’; DBWE 1:79 note 58. However, reading the original German version with 
the jurisprudential concepts in mind leads to accepting that the two terms function for Bonhoeffer as a 
clarification for the decisive differences between his concept of the church in the sense of Sanctorum Communio 
and other organizational forms, such as the concept of the juristic person and Verein. That Bonhoeffer makes a 
distinction between collective and communal becomes apparent in his statement that ‘Nur eine Gemeinschaft, 
nicht eine Gesellschaft, vermag Kinder zu tragen’ because ‘Kindertaufe ist in einem Verein sinnwidrig.’; DBW 
1:177. The Civil Code makes a fundamental differentiation between the legal form of an informal society of 
civil law (Gesellschaft des bürgerlichen Rechts) as a basic communal form and the Verein as basis for collective 
forms such as the societies (Gesellschaften) of the Commercial Code. Therefore, within such a collective juristic 
person as a society that is based on the concept of association the ‘Infant baptism … is an internal 
contradiction.’ DBWE 1:257. However, the difference in the concepts of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft is for 
Bonhoeffer not identical to the difference between Verband and Verein because a Verband is “grown” while a 
Gemeinschaft is “willed”;  DBWE 1:89; DBW 1:57. Even though the Verein is also “willed” its form is 
inappropriate for a church because it is compulsory and oriented toward a goal; DBWE 1:255.  
821
 DBWE 1:193, 120, 137 note 29. The term Gesamt is also used regarding congregation (Gesamtgemeinde), 
debt or guilt (Gesamtschuld), church (Gesamtkirche) as well as regarding totality (Gesamtheit); DBWE 1:224, 
135 note 29, 119. 
822
 ‚Religionsgesellschaften erwerben die Rechtsfähigkeit nach den allgemeinen Vorschriften des bürgerlichen 
Rechts.‘ and ‚Die Religionsgesellschaften bleiben Körperschaften des öffentlichen Rechts, soweit sie solche 
bisher waren.‘; Article 137, para 4 and 5 Weimar Constitution, in Hildebrandt, Verfassungen, 102. 
823
 cf. DBWE 1: 83 and 83 note 74. 
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which is present when purposeful acts are initiated.
824
 In an apparent analogy to the basic 
structure of a goods and services contract within private law,825 he stated that if such wills of 
separate persons are mutually directed with reciprocal attitude toward the person of the other, 
an agreement is reached that constitutes the essence of a community.
826
 ”Unity” of will thus 
signifies an identity regarding the intended and willed content despite ‘inner separateness of I 
and you.’827 Bonhoeffer summarized that ‘community is community of wills, built upon the 
separateness and difference of persons, constituted by reciprocal acts of will, finding its unity 
in what is willed, and counting among its basic laws the inner conflict of individual wills.’828 
Alternative wills of either willing ‘together’, or ‘beside’ or ‘against’ each other are despite 
their inherent strife, conflict, and relation of strength
829
 sanctified by God who created them 
by willing difference in human beings.
830
 But only the willing “together” can lead to the 
relevant empirical formation of being-with and willing-for one-another (Mit- und 
Füreinander) that is willed as an end in itself. The being-with-one-another can additionally 
be a means to an end.
831
 The option of “willing-for” expresses a will toward a meaning that 
recognizes the value of community; the option of “being-with” regards a rational will 
directed toward a purpose.
832
 However, structures of meaning cannot be focused on, nor 
interpreted with, a reference to a purpose.
833
 Even the institutional church’s purpose of 
collecting church-taxes in a regulated public law manner
834
 could not, according to 
Bonhoeffer, turn the church into a society because such activity was that of the private sphere 
on the level of a family unit’s will to sustain itself and make its life possible.835 
 
                                            
824
 DBWE 1:70. f 
825
 A basic Goods and Service Contract (Kaufvertrag; para. 433 Civil Code) demands a reciprocal will of the 
parties regarding its content of product and price.  
826
 cf. DBWE 1:83. 
827
 DBWE 1:83-4. 
828
 DBWE 1:86. 
829
 According to Bonhoeffer, the strength of wills connects to the unequal relations of strength in a federation of 
authentic rule (Herrschaftsverband) which corresponds to the equilibrium in a cooperative (Genossenschafts-
verband). Gierke’s famous distinction clarifies that the concept of community differs from the concept of 
cooperative in that the legal term of cooperative only expresses the legal, not the social, equality among 
members; cf. DBWE 1:92. 
830
 cf. DBWE 1: 84-87.  
831
 DBWE 1:88. 
832
 DBWE 1:88. 
833
 DBWE 1:88-89. 
834
 Article 137, para 6 Weimar Constitution; in Hildebrandt, Verfassungen, 102. 
835
 DBWE 1:260. 
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Church and meaning: 
The church is a community of meaning in which the ‘humanity-in-Adam’ becomes 
superseded by the ‘humanity-in-Christ’.836  God’s specific social relations to humanity 
transform the sinful humanity after the Fall which consists of nothing but infinitely 
fragmented single sinful persons who have sinned as collective whole into the new unity of 
the new humanity under grace in Christ.
 837
 This reconciliation to the new humanity as a 
whole is concentrated in the one single historical point, Jesus Christ. In establishing Christ as 
reconciler Bonhoeffer takes recourse to further legal institutes of contractual civil law, to 
Stellvertretung,838 a form of agency, and Schuldübernahme,839 the issue of taking on debt. 
Christ, the Lord of the new humanity, functions as the intentional Stellvertreter who on the 
cross took on humanity’s sin before God and in place of humanity and thus returned 
humanity to community with God. It reestablished life that abides in love and in responsible 
service to the other and one’s own community. He broke and continues to break the continual 
cycle of the historical process of egocentricity and falling into sin ever anew.
840
   
 
Bonhoeffer was determined to find in God’s revelation of Christ’s work on the cross an 
adequate theological epistemology,
841
 one that connects the human act of faith in God’s 
revelation with the divine being of God in Jesus Christ. Thus he searched for a theological 
concept that could be a de-cision as regards the mutually excluding alternatives of God’s 
revelation and the perceiving spiritual act,
842
 His substance (essentia) and existence 
(existentia), between actively ‘being given’ revelation or ‘being’ in revelation.843 With “act” 
never explained but only understood and “being” never proven but always presented,844 
Bonhoeffer asserted that the problem lay in the intentionality of the human being of either 
outwardly directed consciousness (actus directus) or a reflecting consciousness (actus 
                                            
836
 ‘… humanity-in-Adam is transformed into humanity-in-Christ.’; DBWE 1:147. 
837
 cf. DBWE 1:120-21. 
838
 Para. 164 and following Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch 
839
 Para. 414 Bügerliches Gesetzbuch. 
840
 cf. DBWE 1:146. 
841
 DBWE 2:31. 
842
 cf. DBWE 2:22, 23,  
843
 ,... ob ihm je nur im Aktvollzug Offenbarung „gegeben“ sei oder ob es für ihn ein „Sein“ in the Offenbarung 
gäbe.‘; DBW 2:23, emphasis in original. 
844
 cf. DBWE 2:29. 
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reflexus) that attends to the own as its object.
845
 Thus, in the last consequence, the meaning of 
the theory of knowing was anthropology.
846
  
 
Because the human being is capable by its own power to “justify” the self and the world,847 
the issue was that of either thinking within a philosophical system or beyond, of staying 
within the choice among possibilities or reaching beyond to the transcendent as the limit, to 
God’s will.848 In his inquiry into modern philosophical transcendental, phenomenological, and 
ontological attempts of explaining knowing, he found that Heidegger’s ‘Dasein’, the human 
substance’s temporal existence in historicity,849 was the only concept that was successful in 
forcing act and being together. In a concept of ‘real decision’,850 it made existentia the 
essentia of esse
851
 in a way that collapsed in the being (Dasein) the decision and the already-
being-decided into each other. The non-decision is already decided.
852
 In the overall ‘will to 
system’ as the goal of philosophical inquiry, the viewing “I” determined God’s existence over 
against which stands the “I” in freedom of vision.853 System was only possible with an 
immanent idea of God, that is, by excluding the God-idea and instead usurping the viewing of 
the divine by claiming divinity for the human “I”. The being that transcends what exists thus 
had been lost to sight, resulting in a system of pure immanence.
854
 However, Bonhoeffer 
countered that the theological concept of revelation understands the dialectic of act and being 
as the dialectic of faith and the congregation of Christ, that is, within the concreteness of the 
conception of the church. For him, it is in the church where act and being meet and are drawn 
together into one.
 855
 The church is the ongoing revelation of God in history to those with 
faith in Jesus Christ, in the church as the social communal person which “is” also a single 
person. 
 
                                            
845
 cf. DBWE 2:28. 
846
 DBWE 2:30. 
847
 DBWE 2:66. 
848
 DBWE 6:313 
849
 DBWE 2:69. 
850
 DBWE 2:68 
851
 DBWE 2:67. 
852
 ‚Entscheidung und schon Entschiedensein des Daseins fällt hier zusammen. In der Nichtentscheidung ist 
schon entschieden.‘; DBW 2:65. The English translation is here unclear as it uses the two verbs ‘to decide’ and 
‘to determine’ and their respective nouns for the German terms ‚entscheiden’ and ‘Entscheidung’; DBWE 2:71.  
853
 DBWE 2:67. 
854
 DBWE 2:67. 
855
 DBWE 2:31. 
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Overall, based on an evaluation of juristic forms as they were defined in the codes of private 
law, Bonhoeffer merged an intertwined combination of the legally grounded forms of 
community (Gemeinschaft), society (Gesellschaft), and a federation of authentic rule with 
hierarchical structure (Herrschaftsverband)
856
 into the structural form of sui generis for the 
empirical church. Its structural type does not absorb the single person indifferently into a 
single unit. In it the communal person and the single person exist in sociality, and the single 
persons share equally in sin and grace. The communal person of the church is centered on the 
divine meaning of God’s revelation beyond the human ethical sphere. This communal person 
differs from collective structural forms, because it comes into being only through the spirit of 
God’s will to rule in love.857 In this community of spirit, the divine will is directed toward the 
relations of persons to each other, of being-with and willing-for each other. At the same time 
it is as a purposive society, a means to God’s end and an end in itself.858 God seeks to 
implement his own self into the human heart but makes use of human wills to actualize the 
church of spirit and faith.
859
 The objective spirit of the church community is both 
representative (darstellend) and purposive, precisely because it obeys (unterwerfen) God’s 
will to rule.
860
 But the relations of persons to each other are those of members willing a 
community of spirit, not a society.
861
 The meaning of the concrete historical framework of the 
empirical church points to ‘Christ existing as church-community’, to Christ’s presence in the 
world with God’s Spirit at work in it. Receiving revelation in faith, which marks the 
difference between either remaining in-Adam or being reconciled to God in-Christ, depends 
for the human being on the alternative of outwardly directed consciousness (actus directus) to 
a reflecting consciousness (actus reflexus). Either the human being remains stuck within a 
philosophical system of possibilities in which the “I” usurps the God-idea. Or the human 
being is open to the church of God’s ongoing revelation in history, that is, to the message of 
the church of the reconciliation of humanity to God through the one person of Jesus Christ.  
 
 
                                            
856
 DBWE 1:264, 266. Also Clifford J. Green has noticed that ‘ultimately Bonhoeffer argues that the structural, 
sociological distinctiveness of the church consists in the fact that it combines characteristics of Gemeinschaft, 
Gesellschaft, and Herrschaftsverband.’; Clifford J. Green, The Sociality of Christ, 94 note 46. 
857
 DBWE 1:264. 
858
 DBWE 1:261. 
859
 cf. DBWE 1:261-62, 279 
860
 DBWE 1:266-67. 
861
 ‚Die Beziehung der Personen untereinander ist geistesgemeinschaftlich, nicht gesellschaftlich.‘; DBW 1:185. 
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4.3.3 Collectivity or Community? 
 
With his theory of church in the form of sui generis, which differs from all known legal 
structures, Bonhoeffer developed an alternative concept for life to Schmitt’s concept of state 
as documented in the constitution’s “form of forms”. In doing so, both engaged in the 
contemporary discourse on juristic and natural persons and Bonhoeffer addressed and 
redefined answers to questions raised by Schmitt, such as the relations of the multiplicity to 
unity and of defining equality. Their differences are grounded in the alternative between 
collective form over against communal (Gesamt) form, between collective person and 
communal person, even though both agreed on hierarchical elements. For Bonhoeffer, God’s 
revelation exists prior to community while for Schmitt the collective unit of the people is pre-
existing to the constitution. Thus in the subject-object problem, Bonhoeffer identified God as 
subject in difference to Schmitt’s subject, the unit of the people. But for both the word either 
as constitution or revelation is central in that it has a core or an essence of superior 
importance. For Bonhoeffer this essence is God’s message of reconciliation in Jesus Christ’s 
Stellvertretung and taking on humanity’s guilt (Schuldübernahme) on the cross. Bonhoeffer’s 
reference to legal institutes of civil law that had developed during the constitutional fights of 
the bourgeoisie over against the state are confirmed by Schmitt’s assessment of the content of 
the constitution’s core as representative liberal democracy and fundamental rights and the 
separation of powers as protection of the citizens from the state. Thus in the Weimar 
context’s separation of church and state Bonhoeffer’s reference to private law built on the 
19
th
 centuy’s movement of separating a space of freedom from the state and public law. 
Schmitt, however, by turning equality into a determinative element for the pre-constitutional 
existing unit used it as reason for either-or exclusions of inequal parts from the multiplicity 
and detached it from the constitutional basic right to freedom. In contrast, Bonhoeffer’s 
comm-unity preserved the single within a multiplicity that is open to human dissimilarities 
because of equal participation in humanity’s sinfulness and need for God’s grace. For 
Bonhoeffer the essence, God in Christ, was flawless, that is, was decisively, without 
compromise, the human being without sin.
862
 Schmitt’s constitutional core was defective in 
that it was indecisive in the leadership structure of the pretense-compromises that presented 
an either-or alternative between parliamentary representation and ruler-ruled identity, that is, 
                                            
862
 ‚Jesus war Mensch “ohne Sünde” (Hebr 4[,15]); das ist das Entscheidende.‘; DBW 6:149, emphasis in 
original. 
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between responsibility and trust. In the either-or option between being-in-Adam or being-in-
Christ, Bonhoeffer’s alternative sui generis provided reconciliation in faith that frees from the 
collective idea to communal life in the church as well as the state within the one kingdom of 
God. 
 
4.4 Resolve: Inescapable Pressures  
 
In Weimar’s time of Krisis, the time-element of the decision, the time of resolve, became for 
many, so also for Bonhoeffer and Schmitt, a Kierkegaardian “moment”. Kierkegaard had 
named the time-element of the decision the Øieblikket which, literally translated, means the 
“blink of the eye”. This is for him the instance, the moment of transfiguring vision, at which 
the immanent and transcendent, time and eternity, intersected and the man appeared.
 863 
But 
in modern organizational theory, the nature of time is seen as impossible to define.
864 
Time is 
characterized as the movement or process that separates the past and the future with the 
present.
865
 The present time by itself is undefined and burdened with having to define itself 
anew out of its own nothing.
866
 The present time is new in every moment, that is, every 
moment is the beginning of a new story (Geschichte). Thus the present time defines itself 
always in the middle of time (mitten in der Zeit).
867
 Every present is confronted anew with 
having to redefine its past and projecting its future. Memory assists in identifying from the 
past the problems, alternatives and resources that are relevant aspects of the present time.
868
 
That is, the past provides resources for the present time
869
 and by designating its past and 
future it defines the own form.
870
  
 
Time was for Schmitt a linear trajectory of history filled with a succession of ages, domains, 
ideas, and elites that changed at intermittant stages of vanishing legitimacy. For Bonhoeffer, 
time held a boundary in its middle that promised and provided transformation to new life. 
                                            
863
 Søren Kierkegaard, The Moment and late writings, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 338. 
864
 Luhmann, Organisation, 152. 
865
 Luhmann, Organisation, 142. 
866
 ‚Als reine Differenz ist die Gegenwart aus sich selbst heraus undeterminiert.‘ ‚...Notwendigkeit, aus ihrem 
eigenen Nichts heraus alles neu bestimmen zu müssen.‘; Luhmann, Organisation, 156, 165. 
867
 Luhmann, Organisation, 156-57. 
868
 Luhmann, Organisation, 142. 
869
 Luhmann, Organisation, 143. 
870
 Luhmann, Organisation, 156. 
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Despite their difference, both tied time to something concrete, a situation that compressed the 
alternatives they had identified into the need for an urgent choice. 
 
4.4.1 Schmitt: Exchange of Domains and Elites 
 
In the decision-style
871
 of a German jurist which starts with a short summary-statement, 
followed by an explanatory part, Schmitt succinctly stated in the opening of his Political 
Theology that ‘Sovereign is he who decides on the exception’.872 Using this style highlights 
that for Schmitt at that urgent moment in time a genuine decision ‘in the true sense of the 
word’873 is a ‘pure decision’ and not a ‘degenerate decisionism’.874 A pure decision is without 
discussion or self-justification
875
 ‘independent of argumentative substantiation and receives 
an autonomous value’876 outside the normal situation.877 The time element of the decision 
heightens the gravity of the situation to the ‘decisive point in the political’.878 In the ‘concrete 
situation’879 the criteria of the “political” provided for an urgency that turns the decision into 
a “genuine” one. It is the moment when ‘the most extreme point’ of ‘concrete antagonism’ is 
approached,
880
 which happens in ‘the extreme case’ that ‘exposes the core of the matter’, the 
conflict, the ‘exception’.881 It is a borderline moment when in the ‘outermost sphere’ ‘the 
power of real life breaks through the crust of a mechanism’.882 Every part of this line of 
descriptive characteristics Schmitt based on a particular concept of history and a critical 
                                            
871
 The decision style is used within a legal judgement as opposed to the opinion-style which argumentatively 
evaluates a case first before coming to a concluding result. The decision-style is the shortened reverse of the 
opinion-style. The former can appear more “judgmental” and “opinionated” than the latter but is always based 
on the latter. 
872
 Schmitt, Political Theology, 5. 
873
 Schmitt, Political Theology, 6. 
874
 Schmitt, Political Theology, 3. 
875
 Schmitt, Political Theology, 66. 
876
 Schmitt, Political Theology, 31. 
877
 cf. Schmitt, Political Theology, 12. 
878
 Schmitt, Concept, 39. 
879
 Schmitt, Political Theology, 10. 
880
 Schmitt, Concept, 29, 30. 
881
 Schmitt, Concept, 35. 
882
 Schmitt, Political Theology, 5, 15. 
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theory of the secularization of existence. This awareness of the present historical situation
883
 
runs as undercurrent through his whole work.  
 
The element of the present situation is for Schmitt the core of modern European history. ‘All 
historical knowledge is knowledge of the present’, ‘obtains its light and intensity from the 
present’, and only serves the present, ‘because all spirit is only spirit of the present’.884 The 
history of the previous centuries and the concept of secularization proved to Schmitt that the 
political has not been banished from the life of the present time. A decision on whether 
something is unpolitical is always already a political decision as becomes obvious in the 
supposedly “unpolitical” Protestant doctrine of God as the wholly other, that parallels 
“political” liberalism’s understanding of the state and politics as the wholly other. 885 Past 
history that defines the present is for Schmitt a succession of ages of time (Zeitalter). Every 
intellectual domain of immediate human existence, represented by an active elite’s 
intellectual life, changed at the decisive moment at which the legitimizing foreground 
vanished.
886
 Even though always a plurality of diverse stages coexisted, only the intellectual 
vanguard would change because it was their interests and convictions that were able to 
impress the masses.
887
 Schmitt identified four main domains which roughly coincided with 
the centuries since the Reformation. The Metaphysical domain of the 17
th
 century had 
replaced the theological domain of the 16
th
 century with a “natural system” based on new 
scientific insights. The humanitarian-moral domain with its deistic philosophy, 
enlightenment, rationalism, and a mythical pathos of virtue took over in the 18
th
 century. 
After a transitional stage of moralism followed by romanticism, the 19
th
 century economic 
domain, characterized by ‘technicism’ and industrialism, became dominant only to be 
replaced by the age of technology.
888
 These successive stages reflect the neutralizing effect of 
avoiding conflict with agreements and exchanges of opinion. A controversial central domain 
was first neutralized then replaced with a new central domain but only to create out of the 
neutral situation another increasingly tense struggle between the interests of men. Thus peace 
                                            
883
 ‘Thus we must first be aware of our own historical situation’; Carl Schmitt, “The Age of Neutralizations and 
Depoliticizations (1929)”, trans. Matthias Konzen and John P. McCormick, in Schmitt, The Concept of the 
Political, 81. 
884
 Schmitt, “Neutralizations”, 80. 
885
 cf. Schmitt, Political Theology, 2. 
886
 cf. Schmitt, “Neutralizations”, 81-82. 
887
 Schmitt, “Neutralizations”, 83. 
888
 cf. Schmitt, “Neutralizations”, 82-85. 
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remained elusive and wars moved from the religious kind to national wars and finally to 
economic wars.
889
 The more recent spirit of technicity and developing technology with its 
accompanying belief in the unlimited power of man over nature and even human nature
890
 
brought hope for neutral ground and peace. But precisely because technology can be used by 
every culture, peoples and religion,
891
 new struggles arise. In accordance with the changes of 
the central domains, the cleric as a type also changes, that is, ‘the typical representative of 
intellect and publicity’ whose characteristics are always determined by the central domain. 
The cleric of the 16
th
 century, a theologian and preacher, was replaced in the 17
th
 century 
with the scholarly systemiser, in the 18
th
 century with the aristocratic author of 
Enlightenment, and, after an intermezzo of the romantic genius, with the late 19
th
 century’s 
economic expert.
892
  
 
Parallel to the domains, elites, and the centers of intellectual life, all concepts and words also 
shifted, because ‘all essential concepts are not normative but existential.’893 Therefore ‘all 
concepts such as God, freedom, progress, anthropological conceptions, and finally the 
concepts of nature and culture itself derive their concrete historical content from the situation 
of the central domains’.894 Thus the concept of progress turned in the 19th century into a 
religion of technical progress in which belief in miracles and an afterlife became a religion of 
technical miracles, human achievement, and the domination of nature – ‘a magical religiosity 
became an equally magical technicity’.895 Theological concepts became uninteresting; God 
was removed from the world and was turned into a merely private matter. Reduced to a 
‘neutral instance vis-à-vis the struggles and antagonisms of real life’, God ‘became a concept 
and ceased to be an essence.’896  
 
‘But intellectual concepts could not simply be moved between the intellectual domains of 
different time-periods. Then egregious misunderstandings’897 would happen, as can be seen 
                                            
889
 cf. Schmitt, “Neutralizations”, 89-90. 
890
 Schmitt, “Neutralizations”, 94. 
891
 Schmitt, “Neutralizations”, 91. 
892
 Schmitt, “Neutralizations”, 86-87. 
893
 Schmitt, “Neutralizations”, 85. 
894
 Schmitt, “Neutralizations”, 87. 
895
 Schmitt, “Neutralizations”, 85. 
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 Schmitt, “Neutralizations”, 90. 
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 Schmitt, “Neutralizations”, 85. 
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among the supporters as well as the rejecters of the concept of the state as a juristic person 
who accuse each other of theologizing. They polemically compare collective juristic persons 
and theories of collective personality, such as Gierke’s organic doctrine of the state with the 
dogma of the Trinity. Others used in their polemics references to “Christ or Barabbas”, ‘Cain, 
the fratricide’, ‘Abel, the bourgeois’, and ‘God and sin’ as justification for domination and 
power.
898
  
 
Instead, Schmitt asserted, of the theological concepts only the “systematic structure” was 
transferrable to the modern theory of state. Again, using the decision-style, he declared 
therefore that ‘all significant concepts of the modern theory of state are secularized 
theological concepts’.899 A variety of structural analogies could be drawn between theology 
and the jurisprudential theory of state. A sociology of concepts which transcends juridical 
conceptualizations enabled such analogies. This sociological method discovers basic, 
radically systematic structures and compares them with the conceptual social structures of the 
same epoch. Therefore, it is sociology when the juristic construction of a historical-political 
reality can find a conceptual structure that corresponds to the general state of consciousness 
that was characteristic for the same time-period.
900
 Because in Schmitt’s understanding this 
radical conceptualization pushed into metaphysics and theology, he concluded that the 
metaphysical image that a particular epoch has of the world is of the same structure as that 
which is immediately understood to be an appropriate form for the political organization of 
that age.
901
 Even Kelsen, Schmitt asserted, stressed ‘the methodical relationship of theology 
and jurisprudence’.902  
 
                                            
898
 Schmitt, Political Theology, 62, 64. 
899
 Schmitt, Political Theology, 36.  
900
 Schmitt explained his “sociology of concepts” at length: ‘This sociology of concepts transcends judicial 
conceptualization oriented to immediate practical interest. It aims to discover the basic, radically systematic 
structure and to compare this conceptual structure with the conceptually represented social structure of a certain 
epoch.’ ‘…this sociology of concepts is concerned with establishing proof of two spiritual but at the same time 
substantial identities.’ ‘…it is a sociology of the concept of sovereignty when the historical-political status of the 
monarchy of that epoch is shown to correspond to the general state of consciousness that was characteristic of 
western Europeans at that time, and when the juristic construction of the historical-political reality can find a 
concept whose structure is in accord with the structure of metaphysical concepts. Monarchy thus becomes as 
self-evident in the consciousness of that period as democracy does in a later epoch.’; Schmitt, Political 
Theology, 45-46. 
901
 Schmitt, Political Theology, 46. 
902
 Schmitt, Political Theology, 40. 
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A systematic structural analogy between theology and jurisprudence was obvious in the 
theory of state of the 17
th
 century, which had identified the monarch with the Cartesian God 
by transposing the latter to the political world and giving the former an exactly analogous 
position in the state that even included continual creation. There is a complete identity ‘that 
postulate[s] the sovereign as a personal unit and primeval creator’.903 Similarly, structural 
metaphysical, political, and sociological parallels between the idea of God and the idea of 
sovereignty could be traced through the various historical ages until by the 19
th
 century 
‘conceptions of imminence’ could be seen in the ‘democratic thesis of the identity of the ruler 
and the ruled’, and ‘Kelsen’s theory of the identity of the state and the legal order’.904 In the 
latter’s positive jurisprudence the state intervenes, as some invisibly existing identity, e. g. as 
the invisible person of the lawgiver, whose omnipotence ‘is not only linguistically derived 
from theology’.905 And Laband’s and Jellinek’s concept of sovereignty and the sole 
supremacy of the state make the state an ‘abstract quasi-individual’ with a mystically 
produced monopoly on power, which is a juristic disguise of ruling by god’s grace and mercy 
(Gottesgnadentum). Here the juristic fiction replaces the religious fiction.
906
 He concluded 
that to contemporary people ‘conceptions of transcendence will no longer be credible’. 
Immanence philosophies, especially Hegel’s, have drawn the concept of God into the world 
and even proclaim ‘that mankind had to be substituted for God’.907 Immanence is also behind 
Schmitt’s assertion that ‘the exception in jurisprudence is analogous to the miracle in 
theology’.908 In a structural analogy between the modern constitutional state and deism 
Schmitt argues that the former had banished the miracle from the world because both rejected 
interventions; the constitutional state banned direct intrusions into the legal order and deism 
objected to interferences into the law of nature. And again referring to Kelsen’s positivism, 
Schmitt’ pointed to the former’s ‘entirely natural-scientific’ orientation that, ‘liberated from 
miracles and dogmas’, based democracy ‘on human understanding and critical doubt’.909 
                                            
903
 Schmitt, Political Theology, 47. 
904
 Schmitt, Political Theology, 49-50. 
905
 Schmitt, Political Theology, 36, 38. A few years later Schmitt writes that ‘the juristic formulas of the 
omnipotence of the state are, in fact, only superficial secularizations of theological formulas of the omnipotent 
God.’ Schmitt, Concept, 42. 
906
 Schmitt called Laband’s and Jellinek’s abstract quasi-individual (abstraktes Quasi-Individuum) polemically a 
‘unicum sui generis’; Schmitt, Politische Theologie, 45.  
907
 Schmitt, Political Theology, 50, 51. 
908
 Schmitt, Political Theology, 36. 
909
 Schmitt, Political Theology, 42. 
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Conversely, though, the counterrevolutionaries supported the personal sovereignty of the 
monarch with analogies from theistic theology.
910
 
 
Motivated to find for his present age a theory of state that corresponded to the secularized 
intellectual consciousness of the early 20
th
 century and, more precisely, to the confusing 
reality of the Weimar Republic, Schmitt declared that ‘nothing is more modern than the 
onslaught against the political’.911 Here connecting to his dissection of history into domains, 
he asserted that the 19
th
 century economic age had arrived at an entire system of demilitarized 
and depoliticized concepts.
912
 Where only economic interests and advantages count, the 
political vanishes into the economic, into the technical-organizational,
913
 and thus into 
perpetual discussions that make the state a compromise.
914
 The negation of the political that 
is inherent in the liberalism of free individuals turns into ‘competition in the domain of 
economics and discussion in the intellectual realm’.915 But after disposing its enemy, the 
‘absolute state and feudal aristocracy’ the ‘coalition of economy, freedom, technology, ethics, 
and parliamentarism’ had lost its meaning. Mass consumers and the culturally interested 
public had become anxious over the economy not being eo ipso freedom any longer, 
technology not only serving comforts, and progress no longer bringing humanitarian and 
moral perfection.
916
 The accompanying stages of abstraction from religion, theology, 
metaphysics, and state now threaten culture itself, ending in the neutrality of cultural death.
917
 
Alongside technology, intellectual neutrality had become intellectually meaningless.
918
  
 
But Schmitt predicted that in this stage of neutralized meaning, definitions and constructions 
of ethics and economics will not depoliticize the world. Thinly masked, he criticized the 
Republic’s leadership by voicing that the remaining non-political means evade political 
responsibility and visibility. Economic antagonisms become political
919
 by using investments 
                                            
910
 cf. Schmitt, Political Theology, 36-37. 
911
 Schmitt, Political Theology, 63. 
912
 Schmitt, Concept, 71. 
913
 Schmitt, Political Theology, 65. 
914
 Schmitt, Concept, 70. 
915
 Schmitt, Concept, 71.  
916
 cf. Schmitt, Concept, 72, 76.  
917
 Schmitt, “Neutralizations”, 93. 
918
 Schmitt, Concept, 93. 
919
 cf. Schmitt, Concept, 77-78. 
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of capital and intelligence for producing means of annihilation.
920
 New pacifist vocabulary 
condemns war and the adversary is designated an outlaw of humanity instead of enemy. But 
this cannot escape the logic of the political
921
 which is ‘the utmost degree of intensity of a 
union or separation, of an association or dissociation.’922  
 
Schmitt argued that already in the 19
th
 century, at exactly the moment when the democratic 
notion of legitimacy had replaced the monarchical,
923
 the counterrevolutionaries
924
 had 
heightened the moment of the decision to such an extent that the notion of legitimacy became 
dissolved.
925
 The state was reduced to the moment that called for an absolute decision created 
out of nothingness.
926
 When the legitimacy of the state disappeared into nothingness, the 
situation had reached the moment of the urgency of the borderline case that demands a 
decision out of nothing beyond the ‘normative power of the factual’927 - a phrase used as 
argument of reason by some supporters of the Weimar Constitution and which alluded also to 
Schmitt’s earlier work on the value of the state.928 Also alluding to his work on Gesetz und 
Urteil, Schmitt recalled that this is the moment of indifference that is contained in any juristic 
decision; it is the independently determining moment.
929
 Captured now with an existential 
addition in the formula of ‘friend and enemy’, it is for Schmitt the existentially extreme case, 
the exceptional case that exposes the core of the matter.
930
 For his present time, Schmitt 
assessed that with the threat to the cultural and social status quo, there appeared the anxiety-
ridden fear of nothingness. Despite calls for a rebirth of some original principle,
931
 in the 
present age of technology a conflict arises not between life and death. Instead, from the threat 
                                            
920
 As further antagonistic methods of economic imperialism Schmitt named economic sanctions and severance 
of food supply from the civilian population. He criticized the “peacefulness” of such means of economic power. 
Schmitt, Concept, 78-79. 
921
 Schmitt, Concept, 79. 
922
 Schmitt, Concept, 26. 
923
 Schmitt, Political Theology, 51. 
924
 Donoso Cortés (1809-1853) and Joseph de Maistre (1753-1821) were the counterrevolutionaries Schmitt 
referred to for this argument. 
925
 Schmitt, Political Theology, 65. 
926
 Schmitt, Political Theology, 66. 
927
 Schmitt, Political Theology, 3. 
928
 Schmitt, Der Wert des Staates und die Bedeutung des Einzelnen. 
929
 Schmitt, Political Theology, 30. 
930
 Schmitt, Concept, 35. 
931
 Schmitt, Concept, 94. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
145 
 
to physical destruction of one’s own way of life arises a struggle of spirit with spirit and life 
with life.
 932
 
 
Overall, Schmitt’s understanding of time is a concept of epochal history that is divided in a 
series of ages, domains and elites, as well as an attached secularization theory. His sociology 
of juristic concepts structurally paralleled legal theories of state with the predominant 
consciousness of the same time-period for the purpose of showing that the image of the world 
of a particular era is structurally mirrored in the political form of that same historical era. 
This provided to Schmitt the evidence of a transfer of the systematic structures of theological 
concepts to the structures of jurisprudential concepts, such as God to the political leader, 
miracle to exception, and it connected a loss of legitimacy to a situation ex nihilo. In his 
contemporary age, in his present time, the preceding process of secularization that had moved 
the intellectual sphere from transcendence to immanence had dismissed theology from the 
public space. Liberalism’s and technology’s neutralising and depoliticizing effect had 
resulted in a situation of nothingness in which economic imperialism was providing for new 
conflicts. The vanishing cultural and social status quo, and the vanished legitimacy of the 
liberal state, had heightened to such an urgent situation that it called for an immediate 
transformative political decision out of the nothingness of the present time and towards a new 
domain and its corresponding cleric. Distinguishing friend from enemy would provide the 
existential criteria needed for this political decision of life against life. In applying his theory 
of structural analogy to his secularized age, Schmitt declared that this political decision is not 
the rebirth of an outdated life-death principle. 
 
4.4.2 Bonhoeffer: The Eternal and Temporal Middle  
 
Bonhoeffer’s view of time, which underlay his entire theology, combined transcendence with 
matter-of-factness, that is, insofar as this was characterized foremost by a “situation”. 
Harnack’s fear that without historical critical study theological existence was endangered by 
‘unscholarly theologies’,933 Bonhoeffer diverted by declaring that theology’s status as a 
science was safe as long as the method of theological exposition adhered to objectivity, to 
matter-of-factness (Sachlichkeit), and proceeded from the viewpoint that God is the one and 
                                            
932
 cf. Schmitt, Concept, 49, 96. 
933
 DBWE 10:197. 
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only God.
934
 With Barth, Bonhoeffer agreed that God, understood as the wholly other, 
connected to God’s freedom for creation. In line with the anxieties of the Krisis of his 
context, he agreed that the Kierkegaardian “moment” was the determinative point in time.  
 
In his 1929 Barcelona presentation on Basic Questions of a Christian Ethics, Bonhoeffer 
referred thirteen times to the “moment”.935 Relevant was ‘each particular’, ‘present’, 
‘decisive’, ‘single’ moment that was ‘the moment itself’, ‘the moment of divine call’.936 
Moral action could not be influenced by yesterday but always needed to be established anew 
in immediate relationship with God’s will.937 Understanding this moment as an instance of 
importance and urgency, he connected it to the criterion of a “concrete situation”, which he 
mentioned nine times,
938
 and linked both to the need of a decision in historical time. Even 
though in this period of his work the ‘situation’ suspended the unit of the peoples (Volk), 
from loving the other in times of conflict with other nations,
939
 the situation is nonetheless 
bound to God
940
 and free from ties to positive law.
941
 But with the approach of the events that 
would in his assessment amount to a status confessionis, the quality of the “moment” 
changed to what he would call later in his Ethics the ambiguity of a situation that determines 
the opportunity for a genuine decision.
942
 Thus in his 1932/33 account of the Genesis story of 
the Fall, he concretized with theological depth what time meant in regards to boundaries, 
heritage and human life. Determinative in his account of salvation history and human history, 
for eternity and immanence, and for the reconciliation by God’s grace in Christ who ‘is the 
beginning, the new, the end of our whole world’,943 is the beginning ex nihilo and the 
nothingness resulting from the Fall. Returning a decade later to the issue of time, he 
commented that the new nothingness of the European secular reality, which urgently awaited 
the divine miracle of resurrected life, was rooted in the past developments of Roman and 
Greek antiquity, and Catholic and Reformation history.  
 
                                            
934
 DBWE 3:22-23. 
935
 Bethge called this phase in Bonhoeffer the ‘ethics of the immediate moment’; Bethge, Bonhoeffer, 119. 
936
 DBWE 10:365, 360, 365, 368, 371, 377. 
937
 DBWE 10:366. 
938
 Additionally Bonhoeffer refers 38-times to the ‘situation’; DBWE 10:360-378. 
939
 DBWE 10:371. 
940
 DBWE 10:377. 
941
 cf. DBWE 10:372. 
942
 cf. DBWE 6:248. 
943
 DBWE 3:22. 
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“Time”, counted in days, nights, years, and epochs, connected for Bonhoeffer to numbers as 
well as law, because both have become for humankind autonomous and are thought to hold 
self-contained knowledge of truth. Although time is in human knowledge understood in terms 
of periods of time which are counted according to the rotation of the earth, it is, in fact, 
created by God from beyond time as a natural dialectic of the rhythm of rest and movement, 
and points to God’s giving and taking.944 God’s created day ‘determines the essence of the 
world and of human existence’945 while numbers, although upheld by God’s word and 
command, are not the truth of God itself. Numbers are only ‘the language of an eternal law of 
the world that rests in itself, language that is silent about the Creator and sounds forth about 
the glory of the creature’.946 That which is fixed, law and numbers, ‘relies on itself and 
snatches its own power away from the Creator.’ Critical of his contemporary context, 
Bonhoeffer added that ‘in this age, that which is fixed boasts of its own being in opposition to 
God’.947 Humankind has become incapable of seeing God’s original way of rule over the 
world. 
 
To Bonhoeffer, humankind was disregarding the limit God has set in his grace to 
philosophical explanations and humankind’s possibilities for the purpose of saving humanity 
from nothingness. The biblical account of a beginning ex nihilo set for humanity a limit to 
philosophical explanations of the primeval beginning. The beginning as described in Genesis 
is ‘utterly unique’,948 because it is formless, empty, deep dark,949 obedient to nothing outside 
temporal terms, not to substance, nor to primal possibility. The nothing waits on God and 
exists only in God’s action.950 It is the moment, the instance (Augenblick), in which God is 
thinking
951
 in complete freedom.
952
 Therefore theological beginning has no beginning.
953
 In 
his omnipotence, in ‘utter supremacy’, God’s word summons that which comes to be out of 
                                            
944
 ‘The rhythm that is both rest and movement, that gives and takes and gives again and takes again and so 
points forever to God’s giving and taking, to God’s freedom beyond rest and movement – that is what the day 
is.’; DBWE 3:48. 
945
 DBWE 3:48. 
946
 DBWE 3:53. 
947
 DBWE 3:54. 
948
 DBWE 3:34. 
949
 DBWE 3:37. 
950
 DBWE 3:34. 
951
 DBWE 3:38. 
952
 DBWE 3:26. 
953
 ‘… freedom does not allow itself to be repeated. Otherwise freedom would have freedom as its own 
precondition, that is, freedom would be unfree, and no longer the beginning.’; DBWE 3:32. 
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nonbeing.
954
 In this moment of becoming, God sees his creation as good and prevents it from 
falling back into nothingness by willing to uphold and preserve it.
955
 Therefore the reality of 
every moment is from God.
956
 Fallen, sinful humankind is unable to think beyond this 
beginning, is unable to think into nothingness. Nothingness constitutes the end of 
humankind’s thinking, because fallen humankind lives in the middle between beginning and 
end, knowing neither the end nor the beginning. Humankind knows only ‘that it comes from 
the beginning and must move on toward the end’.957 However, fallen humankind mistakes in 
an ultimate attempt at explanation its circular philosophical thinking as a beginning of a 
creative nothingness.
958
 Stuck in the ‘anxiety-causing middle’,959 humankind has lost the 
beginning and the end with God and knows God only as beginning beyond the middle, as the 
Creator.
960
 Thus to Bonhoeffer, humankind which has set the creator-God at an immense  
transcendent distance has lost the insight that with creating ex nihilo, God has saved 
humanity from nothingness, the human attempt of explaining the nothing. 
 
The relevant moment for telling the earthly historical heritage of the anxiety-causing middle 
is the Fall as told in the biblical story of Genesis. The Fall tells ‘about the history of humanity 
with God’, it tells about humankind-for-God and also reversely about what God does for 
humankind.
961
 It is the primeval history of every human being, of all of humankind, of 
humanity. It is every person’s beginning, destiny, guilt, and end. It is ‘an event at the 
beginning of history, before history, beyond history, and yet in history.’962 At the event of the 
Fall, which foreshadows the Christ event, the tree of life and the tree of knowledge
963
 at the 
middle (Mitte) of the paradise of the Garden of Eden, are transposed to the middle (Mitte)
964
 
                                            
954
 DBWE 3:42-43, 76. 
955
 DBWE 3:45. 
956
 Bonhoeffer opposed the concept of creatio continua, of a continual creation from nothingness because it 
deprived God of freedom and uniqueness and ignored the reality of the fallen world. cf. DBWE 3:46-47. 
957
 DBWE 3:28. 
958
 ‘Nothingness, as humankind in the middle conceives it without knowing about the beginning, is the ultimate 
attempt at explanation.’; DBWE 3:33. 
959
 DBWE 3:30. 
960
 ‘… for us God as the beginning is no other than the one who in the beginning created the world and creates 
us, and because we can know nothing at all of this God except as the Creator of our world.’; DBWE 3:31. 
961
 DBWE 3:72. 
962
 DBWE 3:82 
963
 ‘The tree of knowledge is the tree of death. It stands immediately next to the tree of life, and the tree of life is 
endangered only by this tree of death.’; DBWE 3:89; emphasis in original. 
964
 The DBWE translates Mitte as “center” in the sense of location whenever Bonhoeffer talks about the trees in 
the Garden of Eden and the crucified Christ. Instead, I have used throughout the direct translation of “middle” 
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within the reality of time on earth, into this world. This middle is both, curse and promise.
965
 
God’s prohibition of not eating the fruit from the tree of knowledge, which turned out to be 
the tree of death, addressed the free person. After the transgression of the prohibition and the 
Fall, God’s promise of the nothingness of death placed Him as a boundary into the middle of 
the human condition, of human existence in time, in reality, and as a limit to possibilities.
966
  
 
Subsequent to transgressing God’s prohibition and being expelled from the presence and 
obedient unity with God and now living in the twilight of humankind’s existence (Dasein), 
thinking is restricted
967
 and life is understood as preserved only until death. The Fall is the 
moment when Adam’s dominion over the Garden Eden968 transformed to earthly dominion. 
Through the Fall, humankind has become sicut deus. Humankind, now “like God”, knows of 
itself about good and evil, has no limits, and acts out of its own resources, 
969
 out of its own 
ego.
970
 But humankind now is in a ‘state of death’,971 and grasps at life again. God in His 
grace promises, ‘that the promise of the death of death never means nothingness, but only 
life.’ It is the promise of peace ‘in the world of the resurrection’.972 It is the promise of 
Easter, the world-transcending event of God’s intervention from eternity.973  
 
God’s intervention at Easter ends Adam’s history, and the history through Christ starts with 
Christ as the new middle (Mitte), which by faith sets the human being free from final 
death.
974
 ‘But whoever grasps at life must die.’975 The history of earthly death, in which Cain 
usurps the Creator’s right over life and death,976 ends at Christ’s cross in the middle (Mitte) of 
time, in the middle of the fallen world that is upheld and preserved by God. The cross of 
                                                                                                                                       
for Mitte because it permits for a spatial as well as a temporal meaning in the sense of “in the middle of time” as 
well as “the middle of a place”, and it also relates to the term Mittler (mediator) for Christ. 
965
 DBWE 3:131-38. 
966
 cf. DBWE 3:86. 
967
 DBWE 3:140. 
968
 DBWE 3:83. 
969
 DBWE 3”113. 
970
 In the early 1940s Bonhoeffer returned to this topic in regards to conscience, i.e. the conscience of the natural 
human being who knows about good and evil, which is the ego’s attempt to justify itself to God; DBWE 6:277.  
971
 DBWE 3:112. 
972
 DBWE 3:136. 
973
 DBWE 10:487. 
974
 DBWE 3:92. 
975
 DBWE 3:89. 
976
 DBWE 3:145. 
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Christ is the decisive moment in time; it is the moment at which ‘God gives new life’.977 In 
the event of the desolation of human life, on the cross, every claim that history might make is 
finished, condemned, and destroyed.
978
 With love and omnipotence, God calls a new creation 
into life. It is a one-time event, a new event every time.
979
 This is the time, the moment, when 
the reality of God encounters the reality of the world.
980
 In his Ethics, Bonhoeffer also called 
this the moment, when the ultimate God addresses the penultimate reality, the history of this 
world. It is the moment when grace enters to address that which is never something present, 
but always something already past.
981
 Then, the relationship between the ultimate and the 
penultimate is resolved in Christ.982 Then, Christ becomes the middle of human existence, 
history, and nature, as Bonhoeffer stated in his 1933 Lectures on Christology.983 Thus for 
Bonhoeffer it is here, in Christ, where transcendence meets immanence and God’s promise of 
new life saves humanity from human nothingness. 
 
‘With God’s yes and God’s no to history’,984 with Jesus Christ’s incarnation and crucifixion, 
a lasting irremovable tension had entered every historical moment, which Bonhoeffer 
attempted to account for in Ethics with a concept of historical heritage. Because through 
Jesus Christ’s life and death history became thoroughly temporal and not just a transient 
bearer of eternally valid values of the past ‘human beings, placed in history, must give an 
accounting to themselves about the present time.’985 To him the contemporary situation of 
secularization was the result of a process that began when God’s time came to fulfillment 
with Jesus Christ’s appearance in Roman and Greek antiquity.986 In a sweeping account, 
Bonhoeffer moved through history, from antiquity through the Reformation and Modern 
revolutions to the presence of his time and place. By linking the Roman heritage to the 
Roman Catholic Church and the papacy, and the Greek heritage to the German history of the 
Reformation he contributed further to the Romanist-Germanist discourse. 
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 DBWE 6:158. 
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 DBWE 12:325-26. 
979
 DBWE 12:316. 
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 DBWE 6:158-59. 
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 DBWE 6:159, 163. 
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The major and most lasting difference between the Roman and the Greek heritage Bonhoeffer 
found in their respective foci on either Christ’s humanity or on Christ’s passion on the 
cross.
987
 The former stresses reconciliation whereas the latter is aware of the contradiction of 
not only between Christianity and antiquity but also between the natural and grace.
988
 This 
divide between stressing either reconnection or difference influenced, according to 
Bonhoeffer, on the Protestant side through the Lutheran Reformation and on the Catholic side 
through the 18
th
 century’s French uprising, a process which brought on both sides the same 
result, the process of secularization.
989
 This secularization focussed on the natural and the 
rational, and led in the final consequence to nothingness.
990
 Luther’s misunderstood doctrine 
of the two kingdoms destroyed the faith in God’s word as the forgiving of sins and instead 
sanctified the world and the natural order, liberated the human being, and led to a rationalized 
and mechanical world.
991
 Bonhoeffer sees this result as standing in peculiar contrast to the 
Reformation’s rejection of replacing the Roman historical heritage with the German pre-
Christian naturally grown ethnic (völkisch), that is, with its indigenous past.
992
 As the recent 
efforts within the National Socialist present prove, this only led to a mythologizing of 
history.
993
 The French Revolution brought about the similar result as regards the divination of 
nature and a cult of ratio that discovered eternal and naturally given human rights, and, 
finally, a liberated humanity that was focussed on nationalism and anti-clericalism. Liberated 
‘from the tutelage of church and state’, the human beings saw others only as a friend or 
enemy of human rights.
994
 In an atmosphere of truthfulness, technology rose and became an 
end in itself.
995
 And with this, the revolutionary concept of nation rebelled against governing 
                                            
987
 DBWE 6:107. 
988
 In the German Reformation, ‘the contradiction between the natural and grace is starkly opposed to the 
reconciliation of nature with grace in the Roman heritage.’; DBWE 6:107. 
989
 ‘The great process of secularization very quickly set in all along the line, at the end of which we stand today.’ 
DBWE 6:113 
990
 DBWE 6:127. 
991
 cf. DBWE 6:114. 
992
 German customary law in relation to Greek and Roman law is discussed by Otto Gierke in Das deutsche 
Genossenschaftrecht, vol. 3 which Bonhoeffer had quoted in Sanctorum Communio. Schmitt, in his 
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authority, the organic against the institutional, and becoming against being. This led to 
thinking from below instead of above and to the people themselves claiming sovereignty.
996
  
 
The French Revolution replaced the historical unity based on Jesus Christ with the new 
intellectual unity of the West.
997
 In its enmity toward God, whether ‘nationalist, socialist, 
rationalist or mythical’, its ‘God is the new human being’.998 Luther’s freedom of the 
Christian, combined with the Catholic heresy of the essential goodness of human beings, had 
resulted in deifying humanity.
999
 Now unbridled vitalism that absorbed all values in the self, 
confronted deified humanity with nothing (Nichts).
1000
 But once this revolution had 
succeeded technology, mass movements, and nationalism became deadly enemies.
1001
 In 
creating the illusion of new life, a rebellious, violent, anti-God, and antihuman nothingness 
unfolded.
1002
 Bonhoeffer sensed this as the ‘uniqueness of the moment’1003 in which ‘there is 
no future and no past, but only the present moment’.1004 This amnesia of past and future is ‘in 
essence the extraordinary situation’ of the borderline case. As ‘ultima ratio’, it lies beyond the 
laws of reason, the normal and regular, and, in fact, any possible regulation by law,
1005
 
including the positive and intrinsic laws of the state.
1006
 In the fear of nothingness, only ‘the 
miracle of a new awakening of faith’ can prevent ‘the final fall into the abyss.’1007  
 
Not only in his Ethics, but already in 1932/33 Bonhoeffer had stated that the miracle of Jesus 
Christ’s resurrection could affirm the earth and hail God as lord of the earth. This event 
annuls the curse and promises the new earth.
1008
 And in his Lectures on Christology he had 
affirmed that history’s boundary is the cross of Christ. Christ is the limit and middle of 
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history’s being.1009 Christ is the mediator (Mittler) of history,1010 the miracle that would 
create new life out of nothingness.
1011
 The church, the protector of the heritage of antiquity 
and Reformation, the witness to the miracle of Jesus Christ yesterday, today, and forever, and 
the hidden, invisible middle of the state,
1012
 ‘forces the custodian of power to listen and 
change their ways.’1013 This borderline situation of nothingness presented, additionally, the 
option of a decisive ‘free venture’ and of surrendering one’s ‘own decision and action to the 
divine guidance of history’.1014 It is the risky moment of an action in the presence of time at 
which a genuine encounter with life, with actual people, touches, transforms, and forces the 
whole person toward a decision that makes oneself stronger and more mature.
1015
 
Reminiscent of Kierkegaard, Bonhoeffer stated that this is the hour in which God reveals 
himself as creator, before whom we can only live as creature. It is the moment that calls for 
action in accordance with Christ ‘the origin, essence, and goal of all reality’.1016\ 
 
Summarizing, it can be said that Bonhoeffer’s account of history is not linear but circular. In 
the penultimate time after the Fall, in the middle of the physical life of the human being, God 
fulfills with the Christ event his promise of preserving the human being. He replaces death 
with life, with new life. In Bonhoeffer’s account of salvation history and historical heritage, 
the Adam-event of the Fall and the Christ-event of the cross both reach a heightened tension 
in a situation of nothingness, in an emptiness. It is a human situation which completely 
differs from God’s situation of ex nihilo at the absolute beginning of theology, beyond which 
human beings cannot venture. For human beings the important moment of nothingness is the 
moment of the present time between past and future in which unity, dominion, and the 
identity of the ruler over the earth is altered. The situation of the nihilism of the Fall is 
marked by the deification of the human being who has become sicut deus and has absorbed 
God’s right over life and death. However, the Fall has been caught by the fulfillment of 
                                            
1009
 ‘Christ is at the center of history by being both its boundary and the center, that is, history lives between 
promise and fulfillment.’; DBWE 12:325.  
1010
 Bonhoeffer explained further: ‘History with all its promises, has reached its boundary here. By its nature it 
has come to an end. But with that the boundary is simultaneously once again the middle (Mitte). … In the place 
where history should also stand, Christ stands before God. Thus he is also the mediator (Mittler) of history.’; 
DBWE 12:326. 
1011
 cf. DBWE 6:131-32. 
1012
 DBWE 6:132; cf. DBWE 12:326. 
1013
 DBWE 6:133. 
1014
 cf. DBWE 6:274. 
1015
 cf. DBWE 6:248. 
1016
 DBWE 6:263. 
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God’s promise of preserving humanity from the abyss, through the God-man Jesus Christ in 
the moment of the nothingness at the cross. This moment in time is a standing promise also 
for the contemporary situation of humanity’s continuous secular fall from faith. This 
demands patiently awaiting God’s miracle of resurrection, taking the penultimate world 
seriously, and free human venturing at the risky moment of extraordinary pressure.  
 
4.4.3  Human Creativeness, God’s Promise and Urgency 
 
For Schmitt, history is a linear movement from a beginning to an end with a line of events 
and changes on the trajectory. For Bonhoeffer, the history of humanity is circular from the 
Fall to salvation, from God to God. In the middle is the penultimate reality of this world and 
of the human being in which Christ is its middle as the fulfillment of God’s promise of 
preserving and giving life. The contemporary situation of secularization is for Schmitt the 
result of a process that stretched over centuries on the trajectory of history. For Bonhoeffer 
secularization has an ancient foundation in the Roman-Greek difference of understanding 
Christ either according to reconciliation or as a contradiction and is the result of subsequent 
wrong interpretations that led to a focus on the natural and rational. For Schmitt, the Roman-
Greek controversy is a jurisprudential discourse on the juristic and natural person and the 
relation of unity in multiplicity. However, both agree that the process of secularization ended 
in liberalism, a rationalized and mechanical world, and the positivist system-thinking such as 
Kelson’s self-contained legalism for Schmitt, and languages such as numbers and law for 
Bonhoeffer. For both the present “concrete situation” had consolidated in an extraordinary 
urgent moment of nothingness at the edge of the normal and of law. This nothingness of the 
moment is for Bonhoeffer a human situation that is separated from God’s situation of ex 
nihilo, which belongs exclusively to God the creator at the beginning of theology, beyond 
which the human mind cannot venture. For Schmitt, in this situation of the moment of 
nothingness the human being creates out of nothing, that is, out of ex nihilo. Schmitt’s ex 
nihilo-nothingness of the human being is for Bonhoeffer the deification of the sicut deus, the 
human being having become like God.  
 
Nonetheless, Bonhoeffer’s account that earthly history holds a tension, which disappeared 
through secularization but immediately led to new conflict, has similarities to Schmitt’s steps 
on the trajectory of history in which tensions lead to neutralizations which immediately turn 
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also into new conflicts. But tensions are for Schmitt multiple human intellectual and political 
events which are solved by the exchanges of human elites. Thus they are a line of domains 
and steps that are objectively evaluated at a moment of urgency. This makes it possible to 
compare them and to draw analogies between them, as well as dismissing those particular 
facts that may hold normative power. For Bonhoeffer, there is only one tension. It is the 
tension that was brought about by God in His incarnation and in the crucifixtion of Christ, 
which can only be solved through faith in Christ. It is solved on the cross. The nothingness of 
the present moment, in the moment of nothingness on the cross at which there is no future 
and no past, this extraordinary moment of amnesia, is thus for Bonhoeffer a moment that 
ignores the presence and is one of utter subjectivity. With Christ at the middle of life and his 
permanent presence in the middle of history, analogies are impossible. Christ is the fact of 
God’s promise that cannot be dismissed with human creativeness. 
 
Overall, the time element of the decision discloses not only an immense urgency but also the 
diverging substance in Bonhoeffer’s and Schmitt’s thought. While Schmitt declared that in 
their contemporary modern time God had ceased to be an essence, Bonhoeffer countered this 
with the claim that God’s essence in Christ was there at any moment in time and in the 
middle of the present time. Similarly, Bonhoeffer refuted, by insisting on God’s miracle in 
Christ in the present age, Schmitt’s banishing of miracles from the technological age. 
Nonetheless, for Bonhoeffer and for Schmitt, the historical developments had reached a 
moment of nothingness that added to their concrete situation a heightened and even 
unbearable pressure of urgency. This demanded from both a clarification as regards their 
respective intent. 
 
4.5 Intent: Idea, Interpretation, and Simplicity 
 
“Intent” highlights the anthropological nature of decision. As the essence of decision, “intent” 
is generally understood in the sense of aim, plan, or a state of mind that envisions a solution 
to a problem, a situation, a Krisis. More than motivation or an interest, it is will. In the 
centrality of the intent’s place within the formation of a decision, in this innermost essence of 
the presence of time, person, and location, the choices and urgency become released towards 
a human activity. As a question of knowledge and will, “intent” determines subsequent 
actions that become manifest in the reality of the world. Within jurisprudential decisions, 
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normative concepts of “ought” and a methodological technic help to project allocations that 
attach to meaning.1017 In theology, ecclesiastic dogma and the preaching of the gospel are 
pivotal for meaning and faith. Schmitt never expressly declared his intention apart from 
wanting to advance socially through using his abilities and linguistic talents.1018 His intent 
must be drawn out of his writings for which his early work on questions of will and guilt 
lends itself as a foremost source, as well as his 1934 preface to the second edition of Political 
Theology. Contrary to this, Bonhoeffer announced even before starting his career that he 
would reform the church and soon set out to devise a concept of church. Since 1933 he 
demanded protecting the church with a declaration that condemned the political heresy 
behind the status confessionis. For both Schmitt and Bonhoeffer, “directness”, understood in 
the sense of immediacy, was a prominent feature for determining the will and the act that was 
captured in “intent”. 
 
4.5.1  Schmitt: Dolus Directus? 
 
Schmitt, who was motivated by the possibility of making a formative contribution to the 
theory of state in a time of urgent historic momentum and contextual Krisis, determined that 
the political fragmentation and insecurity of his time was in need of a unifying idea and 
“personality”.  Liberalism, bourgeois democracy and parliamentarism had failed to provide 
the normative standard for life in the reality of politics due to an only fictional quality of the 
individual, the never-ending discussions, and the many constitutional genuine and pretense 
compromises. Instead, could a new metaphysical thought provide the intent, the will for 
action, to move history into its next domain with its new elite? 
 
In his 1910 methodological study on criminal guilt and types of guilt (Über Schuld und 
Schuldarten),1019 Schmitt had indirectly defined intent (Vorsatz) when he questioned the 
systematic location of the element of guilt within the legal assessment of an accused’s 
infringement of a criminal prohibition. He questioned if, in fact, intent and negligence were 
                                            
1017
 cf. Hans-Martin Pawlowski, Einführung in die Juristische Methodenlehre: Ein Studienbuch zu den 
Grundlagenfächern Rechtsphilosopie und Rechtsoziologie, 2nd ed. (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 2000), 206. 
1018
 Mehring, Schmitt, 23. 
1019
 During his university studies, and due to his foremost interest in Criminal Law, Schmitt wrote his 
dissertation on criminal guilt and types of guilt, such as intent and negligence, which addressed the, at that time, 
still unresolved systematic relationship between the intent of the accused and his guilt.  
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types of guilt at all.1020 Schmitt objected to the nominal theory’s insistence that intent as a type 
of guilt instantaneously establishes guilt (dolus directus), that is, if the accused knew that the 
action taken would lead to the success of violating the criminal prohibition. He disagreed that 
the will and want of success would immediately transfer guilt. For Schmitt, this directness in 
the relationship between intent and guilt necessitated a clarification in regards to the question 
if intent was a type of guilt or rather independent of guilt. As a matter of criminal illicitness 
(Rechtswidrigkeit), this concerned the accused’s will and want of the factual success, that is, 
the violation of the negative value (Unwert) of the criminal statute.1021 This meant for Schmitt 
that the criminal evaluation had a two-fold objective. It had to be established, firstly, whether 
the accused factually contravened the behavioural “ought” that the negative value of the legal 
norm had set as a benchmark,1022 and, secondly, whether the accused willed and wanted the 
factual change of the present “is” into a new and diferent “is”. Regarding the second 
requirement, Schmitt concluded that formal and material guilt, the objective and subjective 
will and want of successfully violating the negative value of the criminal norm, had to be 
separated in the process of establishing illicitness. For him, a precondition for the illicitness 
of the success of an action was that, from an objective perspective, a human being of sound 
mind had embraced with an act-of-will (Willensakt) and its actualization 
(Willensbetätigung),1023  with idea and conduct, the factual success of violating the legal 
standard of the norm (objektive Tatbestandsverwirklichung). However, even though an 
objective consciousness of the prohibition is needed, a subjective consciousness, the 
concretely accused’s idea and conduct of infringing the legal prohibition, was not required.  
 
For Schmitt, thus, simply proving a discrepancy between the accused’s purpose and the 
state’s purpose was not a compelling reason for establishing subjective guilt.1024 Rather, due 
to the meta-legal quality of its material content, subjective will and want, the guilt, was not a 
                                            
1020
 The methodological difficulties that arise for the systematic evaluation of a criminal case due to negligence 
(Fahrlässigkeit) and due to omissions over against actions are of no consequence for the discourse on “intent” 
within this thesis and therefore will be disregarded despite their inclusion in Schmitt’s analysis. 
1021
 From the concept of guilt Schmitt separated matters of causality between the accused’s action and its 
success. He considered causality a matter outside of the concept of guilt and a precondition for the ascription of 
guilt (Schuldzurechnung); Schmitt, Schuld, 33.  
1022
 cf. Schmitt, Schuld,16, 50, 54-55. 
1023
 ‚Die vom Rechte gewünschte Vorstellung wird also als Maβstab benutzt, an dem die wirklich vorhandene 
Vorstellung, und damit der Willensakt und die Willensbetätigung, gemessen wird.‘; Schmitt, Schuld, 55. 
1024
 ‚Schuld ist die den Zwecken des Staates nicht entsprechende Zwecksetzung, ergibt sich ebenfalls noch kein 
zwingender Grund, in der subjektiven Stellungnahme des Täters zur Norm das die Schuld konstituierende 
Moment zu sehen.‘; Schmitt, Schuld, 75. 
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matter of positive law1025 but belonged outside of the value-judgement of the state. Guilt 
belonged to the realm of consequences, of penalty-ascription (Strafzumessung),1026 which 
becomes relevant only once the facts and objective intent, and thus objective illicitness, had 
been established. Consequently, Schmitt did not divide guilt into an objective and subjective 
part, but dismissed guilt completely from the objective to the subjective realm. He separated 
objective and subjective responsibility for an act-of-will and its actualization. However, in 
this process of repudiating a dolus directus, Schmitt had indirectly defined intent as being an 
objectively present idea and conduct, an objectively present act-of-will and its actualization, 
whose success is measured over against a legal “ought”, a legal standard of the legal order of 
the state. Objective intent was independent of subjective guilt which freed subjective 
thoughts and ideas from the state’s evaluation and moved them to a personal meta-legal 
position. 
 
Abstracting the subjective from the objective, thoughts and ideas from facts, and identifying 
the former as a meta-legal element, reappeared in various ways throughout his subsequent 
work, as for example within judgements, his theory of state, and the relation of office to 
person. The “principle of collegiality” was the meta-legal element regarding the correctness 
of a judgement, and Justice stood in a meta-physical connection to the statute-law of the state. 
Although the subjective will and personality of the judge or the law-giver, whoever is 
identified as such by a political system, may enter a judgement or the statute law respectively 
in the process of interpreting, reasoning, or promulgating, this subjective element remained 
abstracted from the system and inconsequential for the judge or lawmaker. 
 
Just as criminal law provisions defined the negative value (Unwert) as a behavioral standard 
for the single person, Schmitt had determined in Der Wert des Staates und die Bedeutung des 
Einzelnen that law was the tool that provided Justice as the standard, the behavioural “ought” 
within the state. But in the contextual factual reality of the Weimar Republic, the 
constitutional “ought” had proven to be an insufficient normative standard; that is, the will of 
the German people was unclear. Despite its core substance, the Weimar Constitution fell 
short of being the standard for providing Justice, due to its many compromises as well as the 
                                            
1025
 ‚Die Frage nach dem materiellen Inhalte der Schuld ist eine metagesetzliche‘; Schmitt, Schuld, 16. ‚…, daβ 
der Begriff der Schuld nicht ins positive Strafrecht, sicher aber nicht in die Lehre von Vorsatz und 
Fahrlässigkeit gehört. ... Die Frage nach der Schuld ist in jeder Hinsicht eine meta gesetzliche.‘; Schmitt, 
Schuld, 155 note 1. 
1026
 Schmitt, Schuld, 36.  
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
159 
 
failure of the bourgeois ideas of parliamentary democracy and individualism. In the Weimar 
context, the “ought” was missing, that is, missing was the standard that expressed the exact 
intent of the unit of the people. The subjective will of the unit of the people could not be 
provided by the objective factuality of the constitution, because the unit of the people was 
outside the Constitution’s power. However, a unifying abstract idea, such as the national 
myth Italian Fascism used, could provide stability and security to the unit. This national will, 
then, needed to be represented and actualized, that is, it needed to be objectively transformed 
into the “is”. But the Constitution fell short in providing a process of “how” to implement the 
political idea. The leadership was unclear because of the indecisive pretense-compromises 
regarding the executive branch of the bourgeois division of powers. Consequently, the will of 
the German people was still undecided and suspended between the “ought” and the empirical, 
factual “is”, between a yet to be concretized abstract idea and a concrete legal reality. Thus, 
for Schmitt, in the Weimar context, the focus of the objective will mutated from violating an 
existing legal standard to establishing, that is, to creating this standard. 
 
Schmitt opted against the status quo of the vulnerable and unsatisfactory relative stability and 
artificial legality of the present Weimar context. Instead, he was determined to find an 
effective intellectual principle of legitimacy,1027 which became a topic of high relevancy by 
late 1932.1028  For solving the problem of the absence of an abstract unifying idea, and of how 
to transform legitimacy into legality, Schmitt regarded as fruitless a flight into a “social 
technic” such as Kelsen’s pure methodology and abstract normativity,1029 or defining the 
“political” in the sense of the ‘Machiavellian concept of politics’ as a ‘pure technic’.1030 
Ideologies such as Bolshevism he dismissed as an “economic technic” that was hostile to 
ideas, because ideas suggest the possibility of a pre-existing, transcendent authority,1031 such 
as the unit of the people. But no political system could survive even for one single generation 
                                            
1027
 Hofmann, Legitimität, 87-88. 
1028
 Schmitt, Legalität und Legitimität. 
1029
 cf. Hofmann, Legitimität, 87. 
1030
 Carl Schmitt, Römischer Katholizismus und politische Form, 5th ed. (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2008), 27; own 
translation. 
1031
 ‚Imponierend ist die geistige Konsequnz des Anti-Geistigen, mit der in der Springflut des Sozialismus junge 
Bolschewisten aus dem Kampf  für das ökonomisch-technische Denken einen Kampf gegen die Idee machten, 
gegen jede Idee überhaupt. Solange nämlich ein Rest von Idee besteht, herrscht auch die Vorstellung, daβ vor 
der gegebenen Wirklichkeit des Materiellen etwas präexistent ist, transzendent, und das bedeutet immer eine 
Autorität von oben.‘; Schmitt, Katholizismus, 45. 
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on a technic of power alone.1032 Therefore his concept of history and the method of structural 
analogies served as guiding criteria for finding a new “normality”, that is, for finding an idea 
for a new domain with the accompanying exchange of the intellectual elite. A structure of a 
political organization was needed that matched the structure of the metaphysical image of 
modern secularity in analogy to the transfer of theological images to political structures in 
previous centuries, ages, and domains.  
 
Concretely, in an effort at turning the urgency of the Weimar Krisis into a new stable 
“normality”, Schmitt wrote almost simultaneously the books The Crisis of Parliamentary 
Democracy (1923), Political Theology (1922), and Roman Catholicism and Political Form 
(1923). Respectively, he simultaneously analyzed the situation of bourgeois failure and 
ideological need, devised the methodological principle of analogy for the structural transfer 
of idea to order, and concretized this methodological-structural analogy in relation to 
theology. The latter two publications picked up and elaborated on the theme of Schmitt’s 
1919 work on “The Visibility of the Church”. In this essay, he had discussed the possibility 
of an opposition between concrete-factual reality and the idea within the church, even though 
according to Schmitt this was inadmissible in Christ in whom the human being and the divine 
cannot be brought into conflict.1033 ‘Although God became man and man heard his Word in 
human speech, the dualism that came into the world through the sin of man’ turned divine 
thought into a means for earthly aims.1034 Because every political idea needs to take a position 
towards the goodness or evilness of the nature of the human being,1035 Schmitt clarified that 
he understood the Trinitarian Dogma as not presenting a clear yes or no answer to this for 
political theory’s decisive question. In distinction from the Protestant teaching of the human 
being’s complete corruption, the Catholic dogma speaks about an only wounded, weakened, 
or marred human nature which permits gradations and adjustments. Most notably, this also 
permits merging opposites.1036 And in Politische Theologie, he claimed that, in distinction to 
the Lutheran position of non-dignity (Nichtswürdigkeit) of the human being, the Catholic 
                                            
1032
 Schmitt, Katholizismus, 28, and similarly also 46. 
1033
 cf. Schmitt, “Visibility”, 54. 
1034
 Schmitt, “Visibility”, 53. 
1035
 Schmitt, Politische Theologie, 61. 
1036
 Schmitt, “Visibility”, 13. 
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position keeps open the possibility of the naturally good.1037 However, the subsequent 
absolute naturalism that dismissed theological sin altogether, had to be rejected, because it 
banned any external authority and even demanded the abolition of fatherly authority in the 
family. In dismissing theology, political ideas also disappear, and this paralyses political 
decisions.1038 Instead, holding on to the idea of sin, he declared in Roman Catholicism and 
Political Form that the idea belongs to the political because there is no politics without 
authority.1039 
 
With both, theology and earthly conflict remaining, the essential task to mediate fell upon the 
Catholic Church. Through descending from above, Christ the mediator had turned the 
invisible into the visible, into the Church.1040 Following his own earlier argument in “The 
Visibility of the Church”, he declared in Roman Catholicism that the Catholic Church appears 
to be able to unify as a complexio oppositorum1041 almost any contradictory idea, and prides 
itself in unifying all forms of state and government within its autocratic monarchy.1042 This 
unifying ability stretched even as far as theologically accepting the Old and the New 
Testament side-by-side,1043 and was able to answer to Marcion's either-or with an as-well-as. 
However, most ingenious of the Catholic Church was turning priesthood into an office.1044 
The office of the priests and the Pope represent the idea of God,1045 and the pope is personally 
authorized by Christ,1046 the God who “became human” in historical reality.1047 The question 
as to the legitimacy of the pope’s concrete person can remain undecided.1048 The Church 
                                            
1037
 Schmitt, Politische Theologie, 62; own translation; Nichtwürdigkeit is here translated literally because it 
clarifies its relation to human dignity and connects to Schmitt’s prior assessment of the insignificance of the 
individual. He appears to blame the Lutherans for the “fact” of individual insignificance.  
1038
 Schmitt follows here an argument of Donoso Cortes that Schmitt involves in an argument with Mikhail 
Bakunin (1814-1876); Schmitt, Politische Theologie, 68. 
1039
 Schmitt, Katholizismus, 28. 
1040
 cf. Schmitt, “Visibility“, 50, 52, 53. 
1041
 Schmitt, Katholizismus, 11-12. 
1042
 ‚Es scheint keinen Gegensatz zu geben, den sie nicht umfaβt. Seit langem rühmt sie sich, alle Staats- und 
Regierungsformen in sich zu vereinigen, eine autokratische Monarchie zu sein, ...‘; Schmitt, Katholizismus, 11. 
1043
 ‚Aber auch theologisch herrscht überall die complexio oppositorum. Altes und Neues Testament gelten 
nebeneinander, ...‘; Schmitt, Katholizismus, 12. 
1044
 ‚... seine groβe Leistung besteht darin, daβ er das Priestertum zu einem Amte macht, ...‘; Schmitt, 
Katholizismus, 23. 
1045
 Schmitt, Katholizismus, 36. 
1046
 ‚... sein Amt geht, in ununterbrochener Kette, auf den persönlichen Auftrag und die Person Christi zurück.‘;  
Schmitt, Katholizismus, 24. 
1047
 ‚Christus ... den in geschichtlicher Wirklichkeit Mensch gewordenen Gott.‘; Schmitt, Katholizismus, 32. 
1048
 ‘But whether the given pope was in fact the legitimate pope could not be decided with reference to his 
infallibility. Among several rival popes, there can be only one legitimate pope.’; Schmitt, „Visibility“, 55. 
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transforms spiritual tasks and functions into public office. For this, it is essential that the 
office is separated from the person who happens to occupy it.1049 To Schmitt, it is this 
rationality of the Roman-Catholic Church that captures the human nature in distinction to the 
domination and utilization of matter within the capitalist economic-technical materialism of 
modernity.1050 The formal superiority over the matters of human life is the essence of the 
political idea of the Roman-Catholic’s complexio oppositorum. The Church successfully 
formed the substance (substantielle Gestaltung) of the historical and social reality, despite the 
complexio’s formal character remaining in concrete existence.1051 Subsequently, in his 1927 
The Concept of the Political, Schmitt added to the unifying effect of the complexio 
oppositorum the criteria of friend and enemy. Through determining ‘the utmost degree of 
intensity of a union or separation, of an association or disassociation’1052 this principle was 
meant to “unify” the unit of the people. However, it amended Schmitt’s theory of the 
complexio oppositorum insofar as it “unified” not by inclusion but by exclusion. 
 
For Schmitt, the formal abstraction of office from person as part of the unifying character of a 
complexio oppositorum is to the highest degree rational and based on the strict 
implementation of the principle of representation.1053 The church is thus a concrete personal 
representation of a concrete personality, the carrier of juristic spirit, and the heir of Roman 
jurisprudence.1054 Because the Church’s rationality was grounded in the institutional, it is 
essentially juristic1055 and provides, according to Schmitt, a fitting jurisprudential model for 
the state. As proof of the jurisprudential connection and to secular modernity, Schmitt 
insisted that within the privatized economic mechanized reality the same abstraction of office 
                                            
1049
 ‘The visible Church is always the official Church, which means that, as far as it is concerned, the 
transformation of spiritual tasks and functions into [public] offices, the separation of the office from whomever 
happens to occupy it, is essential.‘; Schmitt, “Visibility“, 53. 
1050
 ‚Der Reationalismus der römischen Kirche erfaβt moralisch die psychologische und soziologische Natur des 
Menschen und betrifft nicht, wie Industrie und Technik, die Beherrschung und Nutzbarmachung der Materie.‘; 
Schmitt, Katholizismus, 23. 
1051
 ‚Von der politischen Idee des Katholizismus aus betrachtet, liegt das Wesen der römisch-katholischen 
complexio oppositorum  in einer speziefisch formalen Überlegenheit über die Materie des menschlichen Lebens, 
wie sie bisher kein Imperium gekannt hat. Hier ist eine substantielle Gestaltung der historischen und sozialen 
Wirklichkeit gelungen, die trotz ihres formalen Charakters in der konkreten Existenz bleibt, ...‘; Schmitt, 
Katholizismus, 14. 
1052
 Schmitt, Concept, 26-27. 
1053
  Schmitt, Katholizismus, 14. 
1054
 ‚... die Kirche aber eine konkrete, persönliche Representation konkreter Persönlichkeit. Daβ sie im gröβten 
Stil die Trägerin juristischen Geistes und die wahre Erbin der römischen Jurisprudenz ist, ...‘; Schmitt, 
Katholizismus, 31. 
1055
 ‚Dieser Rationalismus liegt im Institutionellen und ist wesentlich juristisch.‘; Schmitt, Katholizismus, 23. 
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from person can be found in judges on international courts.1056 In both cases, in the Church 
and at the courts, the matter concerned was sovereignty,1057 a topic he attended to in his 
Political Theology.  
 
Elucidating the relationship of idea to will, as well as its execution, Schmitt determined in his 
1928/29 Constitutional Theory1058 that the pretense-compromises gave two options: either a 
party or a party-coalition could develop and implement a political program subsequent to 
winning the electoral popular vote, or a leader could develop a political idea prior to an 
election, campaign on it, and realize his idea subsequent to electoral success. Parallel to an 
increasingly fragmented parliamentary representation, due to economic interests, Schmitt’s 
original support for safeguarding the core of the republican idea of the Weimar Constitution 
changed. The identity of the keeper of the Constitution, the Supreme Court, the 
Reichsgericht,1059 transformed in 1931 to the Reich-president1060 with restricted commissarial 
decree powers.1061 But parallel to the rapid turn-over in the position of the Reich-Chancellor, 
Schmitt switched to call for authoritarian decree powers. Observing the increasing “success” 
of Hitler’s preconceived idea of National Socialism on the streets and in German elections, 
Schmitt accepted in 1933 the new reality of a strong leader who “wills” his idea. He 
republished his Political Theology, and implied in its new foreword his agreement with the 
German Christians,1062 and thus indirectly suggested the exchange of the republican idea with 
the National Socialist idea, as well as an analogical transfer of the structural-institutional and 
theological form of representation into the juristic form of the office of the sovereign.  
 
Overall, Schmitt’s rejection of the theory of dolus directus that is, his early abstraction of the 
subjective will from an objective assessment of the intended will of factually violating the 
negative value of a legal standard, became decisive for his entire work. He abstracted 
subjective guilt from objective intent. A metaphysical objective collegiality became decisive 
for the correctness of a judgement in abstraction from the subjective resposibility of a judge. 
                                            
1056
 cf. Schmitt, Katholizismus, 51. 
1057
 ‚Der Papst besteht darauf, der Souverain des Kirchenstaates zu sein, ...‘, [Bedenken gegen einen solchen 
Gerichtshof] ‚entspringen alle dem Begriff der Souveränität.‘; Schmitt, Katholizismus, 31, 51. 
1058
 Carl Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, trans and ed. Jeffrey Seitzer (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008). 
1059
 Carl Schmitt, “Das Reichsgericht als Hüter der Verfassung (1929)”, 63-109. 
1060
 Carl Schmitt, Der Hüter der Verfassung. 
1061
 Article 48, para 2 Weimar Constitution, in Hildebrandt, Verfassungen, 81. 
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 Schmitt, preface to Political Theology, 2
nd
 ed. (Munich: Duncker & Humblot, 1934), 1-4; Mehring, Schmitt, 
338. 
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In the state, the factual law did not automatically enfold a normative force; instead, a meta-
legal Justice was needed. Subsequently, the idea of Christ grounded the political idea of the 
Church to authorize the office of the Catholic pope in abstraction from the person holding 
this position. Because of the Catholic Church’s capacity of unifying oppositional ideas and 
the principle of personal representation of concrete personality, Schmitt considered the 
Church’s institution and theological form of representation a fitting analogical, 
jurisprudential model for the state. The added criteria of distinguishing friend from enemy 
within a concept of the political was meant to unify the people, but excluded those who did 
not fit the meta-physical myth of equality. Although attempting to save, until at least late 
1932, the republican idea of the Weimar Constitution under an increasingly authoritarian 
president, Schmitt accepted in 1933 the replacement of the failed bourgeois idea of 
parliamentary democracy and fictional individualism with the idea of National Socialism. He 
then turned to ending the suspension of the peoples’ will between abstract idea and concrete 
reality. 
 
4.5.2 Bonhoeffer: Actus Directus 
 
For Bonhoeffer “intentionality”, in the sense of “directed immediacy”, occupied the most 
central part of a decision. Bonhoeffer’s early work on a concept of church and subsequently 
on a concept of God turned, with the “crisis of 1933”, into a faith-centered Christology of 
confessional magnitude. “Decision” became to denote God’s intentionality and the human 
being’s willingness of hearing and doing the will of God, as revealed in the person of Jesus 
Christ. Bonhoeffer rejected the interpretative self-reflective consciousness (actus reflexus) of 
the self-enclosed idealist system that stood opposed to an outwardly directed consciousness 
of hearing God’s revelation and direct application of God’s will (actus directus).1063 In the 
phenomenological language of his early work, the central problem was that ‘act should be 
thought of as pure intentionality, alien to being.’1064 Theologically speaking, he meant that 
there is no method for human beings to place themselves into God’s truth,1065 and God cannot 
                                            
1063‚Daβ er [der Akt] sich bewuβt vollzieht nötigt zur Unterscheidung zwischen direktem Bewuβtsein (actus 
directus) und dem Bewuβtsein der Reflexion (actus reflexus); in jenem ist das Bewuβtsein reines „gerichtet 
auf“, in  diesem vermag es sich selbst gegenständlich, sich seiner selbst in der Reflexion bewuβt zu werden.‘; 
DBW 2:23; DBWE 2:28; emphesis in original. 
1064
 ‚Akt soll seinsfremd als die reine Intentionalität gedacht werden.‘; DBW 2:23; DBWE 2:28. 
1065
 ‘There is, therefore, no method for the knowledge of God; … for they are not able to place themselves into 
the truth.’; DBWE 2:92. ‘… there is in fact no “method”, no way of reaching the ultimate.’; DBWE 6:167. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
165 
 
be reached through an idea of God.1066 Rather, ‘God alone can speak of God’,1067 thus knowing 
God is always an act of faith in the revelation in Christ.  
 
Sinful humanity, from which the single human being cannot be abstracted,1068 has through the 
Fall into Original Sin died to hearing and doing God’s will. In Creation and Fall, Bonhoeffer 
insisted that based on Adam’s and Eve’s Original Sin of listening to and acting on the snake’s 
temptation, the center of the human condition becomes the inter-connectedness of the tree of 
knowledge and the tree of life of the Garden of Eden. Instead of directly hearing God’s voice 
the human being interprets, discusses, reasons, and reflects in philosophical thought about the 
transcendent as its object. But reflection displaces ‘the intentionality that is characteristic of 
the act’.1069 Furthermore, reflection that rationalizes reality through the category of possibility 
disrupts the immediacy, the act-of-relating (Aktbezug), to God and prevents the human being 
from understanding the true self.1070 In his Act and Being, and further in his Inaugural 
Lecture, Bonhoeffer explained that in questioning the self, the self cannot ‘appear as an 
object’ and ‘capture itself’ because ‘it views itself as something transcendent to itself’ and 
thereby ‘encounters the boundary of transcendence’.1071 Finding the self, transcended within 
the self, it now encounters the two possibilities of either misappropriating transcendence and 
drawing it into the self, or reaching beyond the self in an ever-renewed relation to 
transcendence.1072 The self can either stay enclosed within the self or acknowledge its limits 
and knowledge from outside the self. Nonetheless, as he writes in Act and Being, the human 
cognition which draws anything objective into itself cannot turn the transcendent ‘into an 
object of knowledge’ because the transcendent is ‘the basis of the very possibility of all 
knowledge’.1073 Therefore, Bonhoeffer asserted ‘God always remains subject’ and evades 
human cognition. With the objective position already taken in cognition, revelation takes the 
                                            
1066
 ‘It is certain that when we speak of God, this idea of God comes naturally to mind; but it is equally certain 
that God as such is not reached through it’; DBWE 2:92. 
1067
 DBWE 2:92. 
1068
 For Bonhoeffer the single person cannot be divorced from humanity through abstraction; DBW 2:117-18. 
DBWE 10:404. 
1069
 DBWE 2:28. 
1070
 DBWE 10:405. 
1071
 DBWE 10:390. 
1072
 cf. DBWE 10:390-91. 
1073
 DBWE 2:91. 
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non-objective position.1074 Because revelation is able of tearing the human being out of the 
self-imposed boundary of thinking that is ‘characterized by the possibility of being 
transcended’, out of self-focused reflection, no room remains for a concept of possibility in 
theology.1075 Instead of speaking about God which keeps thinking self-enclosed outside the 
truth,1076 the question about the human being is answered from and before God, from beyond 
existence,1077 from the transcendent. True self-understanding lies in the actus directus, 
because the human being’s ‘unity is grounded in God’s word directed towards him’.1078 For 
Bonhoeffer, the essence of the actus directus lies ‘in its intentionality towards Christ which is 
freely given by God’ in the way in which ‘Christ touches upon existence in its historical, 
temporal reality’.1079 This is because ‘faith rests in itself as actus directus’,1080 in pure 
intentionality. 
 
The truly self-understanding human being knows itself placed into the truth by Christ in 
judgement and in grace and thus stands in the decision; that is, this human being of unity, of 
self-understanding, stands in God’s decision “for” the human being. At the same time, the 
human being exists and decides, that is, exercises its human will, under God’s realm.1081 In the 
re-creation of the unity of the human self that is presupposed in salvation history with 
Christ’s mediation between the old and the new life,1082 the human being is through the cross 
reconciled to the tree of life in the penultimate time and ‘no longer know(s) good and evil’.1083 
For the pardoned sinner, the interpreted world of the ego dies. Instead, being of oneness 
means knowing that ‘existence is founded alone in God’s Word’,1084 in direct, immediate 
relation to the Word, that is, without interpretation.1085 In his Ethics, Bonhoeffer explained 
                                            
1074
 ‘Epistemologically speaking, only the nonobjective position leaves room for revelation, since the objective 
position is drawn by the I into itself, which leaves free the being of what is, although it cannot become objective. 
But if revelation is nonobjective, it follows theologically that God always remains subject and always evades 
humanity’s cognitive clutches.’ DBWE 2:91. 
1075
 DBWE 10:403. 
1076
 ‘… as long as they speak ‘about’ God, their thinking will remain self-enclosed outside the truth.’; DBWE 
2:92, emphasis in original. 
1077
 DBWE 10:403. 
1078
 DBWE 10:405. 
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 DBWE 2:100. 
1080
 DBWE 2:128. 
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 DBWE 12:327. 
1083
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1085
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that this human being hears and at once does the will of God in simplicity (Einfalt) and 
‘without conflicting thought’.1086 Renewed in their mind and in con-formation 
(Gleichgestaltung) with the child of God,1087 to Jesus Christ in whom God “became human” 
(Menschgewordene),1088 the single-minded (einfältig) discernment of God’s will is no longer a 
choice between various possibilities, no intuition, feeling, natural impression upon the human 
heart, or a system of rules, but it is heart, intellect, observation, and the experience of 
working together while nonetheless depending entirely on God’s grace.1089  
 
However, despite the need for immediate simplicity, only the person who combines 
simplicity with wisdom keeps the single truth of God in sight and at the same time recognizes 
that which is significant within the factual.1090 Such a person, Bonhoeffer clarifies in Ethics, 
looks beyond principles at the essence of things. With a fresh vision, this person observes and 
selects the essential instead of being blinded by limiting principles. Simplicity and wisdom 
are united because ‘there is no true simplicity without wisdom, and no wisdom without 
simplicity.’ But Bonhoeffer insists further, that as an idea the unity of simplicity and wisdom 
is doomed to failure. This unity does not lay ’somewhere beyond reality in the realm of 
ideas’.1091 They are reconciled in Jesus Christ, the only place where God and the reality of the 
world, were wisdom and simplicity, are reconciled. ‘The name of Jesus Christ is not an 
abstract concept’1092 that is ‘primarily concerned with formation (Gestaltung) of the world by 
planning and programs’.1093 The figure (Gestalt) of the God-man Jesus Christ, the ‘once-ness 
                                            
1086
 DBWE 6:318. 
1087
 DBWE 6:321; Bonhoeffer was fascinated with ‘the problem of the child in theology’; DBWE 10:128. His 
book Act and Being climaxes in a reference to the classical Protestant dogma of fides directa that describes’ the 
act of faith which, even though completed within a person’s consciousness, could not be reflected in it.’ He 
connects this to a child’s openness to an eschatological future; DBWE 2:158-59. In his Inaugural Lecture 
Bonhoeffer connects the actus directus to ‘the relaxed disposition of a child toward its father’; DBWE 10:407. 
And in Ethics Bonhoeffer added a discourse between a child and his teacher on telling the truth; DBWE 16:602-
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editor’s afterword to the German edition to DBWE 2:177) it does remind one of the connection Kierkegaard 
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Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 532.  
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of historical personality’,1094 the divine miracle, discloses the mystery of the world in the 
“center” between God and the world and reconciles God and the world in the midst of history 
– Ecce homo.1095  
 
Combining his criticism of idealistic system-enclosed reflection (actus reflexus) with his 
rejection of abstract ideas of God, Bonhoeffer explained in the 1932 article Concerning the 
Christian Idea of God1096 that ideas do not challenge human beings in their existence. Ideas fit 
into man-made systems. In idealist philosophy, history is conceived as the realization of ideas 
consisting of general single historical facts. Thereby the fact of Jesus becomes a symbol of 
God, a transient bearer of eternal values and ideas that are ‘taught by him according to the 
will of God.’1097 In the context of explaining in his Lectures on Christology1098 the Docetic 
heresy of early Christianity, Bonhoeffer stated the recurrence of a similar separation of flesh 
and mind in modernity.1099 The modern concept of history as a carrier of religious ideas 
turned Christ into the representative (Vertreter) of such ideas which brought about a 
distinction that is similar to the Docetic separation of idea from appearance. God’s 
appearance as human being is his personality and the idea of the human being is his human 
nature. Jesus’s appearance as human being is incidental, as opposed to the substance, the 
idea, that is God.1100 In abstracting idea from appearance, the historical person of Jesus is 
reduced to the embodiment of a particular preconceived religious idea above and beyond 
history  which suppresses Jesus’s humanity in favour of an image (Bild) of the human being 
and turns his “becoming human” (Menschwerdung) into a means to an end.1101 Instead, 
Bonhoeffer asserted that in Christianity ‘history is not interpretive’ and ‘does not enter our 
system of ideas and values’ but ‘sets for us our limitations’.1102 It is the place of decision in its 
most inward sense of refusing or acknowledging, of deciding for or against God, while facing 
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 DBWE 10:182. 
1095
 DBWE 6:82-83. 
1096
 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, “Concerning the Christian Idea of God”, The Journal of Religion 12, no. 2 (April 
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Christ. Similar to his earlier claims in Act and Being, he stated that the person of Christ, in 
whom God and human being are ‘in the most complete communion’,1103 challenges human 
existence by leading into the situation of personal decision.1104  
 
To the human being who is standing in God’s decision and is being lead into personal 
decision, God’s revelation in the historical fact of Jesus Christ is God’s self-witness in reality 
that discloses the will of God. In its intentionality, this will of God is meant to be 
immediately heard and acted on by human beings in immediate simplicity of faith. 
Furthermore, as Bonhoeffer stated in Ethics, in faith the decision of God has become known 
to the human being as the ultimate reality.1105 Through ‘participating in God’s reality revealed 
in Christ’ who became real (Wirklichwerden), the antithesis of worldly ethics ‘between ought 
and is, idea and realization, motive and work, is occupied in Christian ethics by the relation 
between reality and becoming real, between past and present, between history and event 
(faith)’.1106 Worldly opposites that are portrayed as mutually exclusive exist within the Christ-
reality in their original unity, as accepted in faith in God’s ultimate reality.1107 The person and 
the work are ‘originally and essentially one’ because ‘human beings are indivisible 
wholes’.1108 United in one, they can only together be either good or bad. 1109 With God’s 
revelatory word already been spoken, the human being lives from this true reality, regardless 
of any human decisions.1110 As long as faith knows God as ultimate reality, all laws and 
norms are abstractions in separation from origin and goal.1111 Therefore, motives and 
consequences of actions must not be measured over against ready-made ethical standards 
because ‘an ethic of disposition or intention is just as superficial as an ethic of 
consequences.’1112  
 
In the indivisible whole of the God-reality which is under His decision, the given and 
revealed word in Christ is proclaimed from the office of preaching to the human beings who 
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are drawn into the life of the created church-community of Christ. Bonhoeffer insisted that 
human beings participate as members of the human and created community in the indivisible 
whole of God’s reality from creation to goal, from origin to the kingdom of God.1113 They are 
drawn into the life of the church-community in which Christ exists among human beings. In 
the mystery of Christ existing as church-community, in the hiddenness of historicity, the 
single human being in Christ exists through the church-community that brings Christ. This 
guarantees the continuity of that human being in Christ and a self-understanding ‘no longer 
from within himself but rather from within the Christ’.1114 There Christ lets himself be 
proclaimed as the subject of the spoken word. He is proclaimed by the preachers who must be 
theologians.1115 Theological thinking is ‘not existential or speculative knowing’ but obedient 
thinking and functions as the memory of the church. Theological thought belongs in its 
entirety solely to the church,1116 the sanctorum communio. While theologians speak the Words 
of the past, the already spoken Word, the preacher speaks the past Word to the present, to the 
now, but not as existential confession or theological doctrine.1117 Preaching is done in 
remembrance,1118 and speaking such words can only be done as ecclesiastic thinking and 
knowledge.1119 Truly existential Words of the past can only be spoken where the living person 
Christ is himself present and speaks words about God. Here ‘everything depends on the 
office.’1120 Preachers who know that Christ seeks to speak through them to the church-
community ‘proclaim the gospel by the full power of the authority of the community of 
faith’. Then this word is for the hearers ‘a word of decision’.1121 
 
Overall, in Bonhoeffer’s theology God’s intentionality places the human being into His 
decision of revealing himself in Christ. God intends direct faith. In faith, the human being 
hears and acts on the disclosed will of God in the immediate simplicity of actus directus, that 
is, without the possibility of interpretation in actus reflexus. Immediate simplicity, combined 
with the wisdom of intellect and experience, connects God’s truth to significant facts of 
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reality and to the fact of Jesus Christ. Jesus Christ, this once-ness of personality, is a 
historical fact that sets limits for human beings and challenges the human being into personal 
decisions, and is not an abstract idea for worldly use within philosophical systems or political 
programs. It is in the intentionality of the directness of faith, in the Christ-reality of faith, that 
the human being finds the indivisible wholeness of the true self. The person and work are one 
whole and cannot be abstracted and measured in their intent and consequences against 
worldly ethical standards and human decisions. And laws and norms cannot be abstracted 
from the world in separation from their origin and goal, that is, from God. Theology and 
preaching belong entirely to the church. In theological obedient thinking to the past 
revelation, the preacher transforms revelation into ecclesiastic knowledge of the present. The 
preacher’s office is authorised by the community of faith as long as Christ seeks to speak 
through the preacher’s proclamation, which is a word of decision, God’s decision, to those 
who hear it in faith. Thus Bonhoeffer’s intent was to establish God’s intentionality. 
 
4.5.3 Intent and Intentionality 
 
“Intent” and “intentionality” mark for Bonhoeffer and Schmitt the most central part of the 
decision, and expose the innermost differences of their positions. With the immediacy of 
intentionality, Bonhoeffer addressed Schmitt’s abstractions which were rooted in the latter’s 
earliest theories. Schmitt’s objection to dolus directus and Bonhoeffer’s embrace of actus 
directus are located at the diametrically opposing sides of Justitia’s scale while addressing the 
same issues.  
The rejection of a dolus directus, the immediacy between the violation of a legal standard and 
guilt within criminal law, helped Schmitt to separate the objective intent from the subjective 
guilt.  This separation transformed through a variety of intermittent stages eventually into the 
abstraction of idea from factual reality. Abstracting subjective thought from the evaluation of 
the human being as its object, led to turning Christ into an idea of man to be represented to 
the people. This abstracted the office from person, and divided the institutional church into a 
formal carrier of juristic spirit and into a material, substantial part for social formation. 
Schmitt intended to provide with the method of politically distinguishing between friend and 
enemy, and the modos of structural analogies between theology and juristic models, to 
overcome the dualities that entered the world with the sin of man. Thus the abstracted idea of 
God that the Catholic Church, the heir of Roman jurisprudence, was authorized by Christ to 
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represent and implement, together with the unity-creating complexio oppositorum, provided 
the form for Schmitt that could be applied in an analogy to the contemporary secular context 
for the purpose of consolidating and representing the unit of the people, and for implementing 
a political idea in the modern state. 
 
To measure subjective motives and intentions, and their consequences, over against standards 
such as laws, which are abstract from the ultimate reality of God, was for Bonhoeffer a 
superficial activity. Instead, in God’s intentionality the human being is willing to hear and do 
the will of God as revealed in Jesus Christ in direct immediacy (actus directus), without 
interpretation or self-reflection. The actus directus draws the whole human being outside of 
philosophical systems into continued relation to the limits of transcendence and revelation. 
Separating God from reality as an idea in distance to the world is a heresy. Based on this 
separation it is impossible to know and apply God’s idea. Rather it is in Jesus Christ where 
God and reality meet in simplicity and wisdom, beyond principles. Jesus Christ is the place at 
which in once-ness the human being is united to the truth of God. Original Sin did not bring 
dualism to the world, but the Fall had separated the human being from God and had moved 
humanity under the one-dimensional ultimate reality of God’s decision. In God’s 
intentionality, Christ reconciled the human being to the wholeness of the self. Knowing God 
is an act of faith in His revelation in Christ. In opposition to Schmitt’s complexio 
oppositorum through which ideas are unified, it is for Bonhoeffer the sanctorum communio in 
which human beings participate in the indivisible whole that God intentionally united, and 
where the Word of the past as revealed in Jesus Christ is spoken by preachers that are 
authorized by the church community. 
 
The function Schmitt assigns to Christ is that of an archetype of non-conflict. In Christ as the 
God “becoming human”, God and human beings cannot move into conflicting positions. The 
archetype Christ thus can be used as an ideal model for ending the conficts that came into the 
world with Original Sin. For Bonhoeffer, in Christ, as the one person in history in whom God 
“had become human”, God’s revelation can be heard and acted on by human beings in the 
directness of non-conflicted simplicity. Christ is not an idea for removing conflict, but in 
God’s intentionality the uninterpreted immediacy of the simplicity of faith is without 
conflicting thought. Christ, understood as God “becoming human” (Mensch werden), 
separates him into idea and personality, but as “having become human” (Menschgewordener) 
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he is the Trinitarian Christ who is the One in historical once-ness.1122 For Schmitt, the human 
being, whose act-of-will (Willensakt) is objectively evaluated over against human (criminal) 
law, lives under legal decisions. Bonhoeffer’s human being lives despite human decisions in 
an act-of-relating (Aktbezug) to God’s ultimate reality, His Word and decision. Thus, 
according to Bonhoeffer, it is not the lawyer, but the preacher who speaks ‘a word of 
decision’.1123 The specific shape in which Schmitt’s and Bonhoeffer’s view of intent and 
intentionality became actively manifested will be discussed in the following chapter.  
 
4.6 Active Manifestation: Synchronisation (Gleich-schaltung)  
or Conformation (Gleich-gestaltung)? 
 
The element of “active manifestation” provides to the intent the external material structure. It 
is the active implementation of an envisioned resolution. Generally, its purpose is to change a 
present situation and, specifically, it is meant to alleviate a concrete need. For both 
Bonhoeffer and Schmitt, the German words Gestalt, and its more active version of 
Gestaltung, became central to implementing their visions. In his 1923 Roman Catholicism 
and Political Form, Schmitt stated that ‘Formation (Gestaltung), figure (Figur) and symbol’ 
follow from the representation
1124
 of an idea. In the “crisis of 1933” Bonhoeffer criticized 
using the once-ness of the historical fact of Jesus as symbol.
1125
 In his Lectures on 
Christology he defined Christ as Gestalt,
1126
 and in the 1940s he connected ethics to 
formation (Gestaltung).
1127
  
 
The German word Gestalt is a difficult word to translate and is best served by being 
circumscribed. The term Gestalt appeared in the late 19
th
 century, connected to meaning, 
essence, content, and perception, and was used interchangeably with “form”.1128 Later Gestalt 
became the essence of a figure that determined exactly what the figure was,
1129
 and the word 
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Gestalten came to describe ideas that were used in or developed through thoughts.
1130
 As a 
‘doctrine of the group as a whole’,1131 Gestalt is ‘not definable in terms of its parts or of the 
conditions under which it arises.’ It is immediately known and not analyzed, described, or 
modified by experience. Supposedly, Gestalt completes itself and is measured as good 
according to its degree of domination.
1132
 In his essays on Goethe and Schiller which Ernst 
Cassirer published in 1921 under the title Idee und Gestalt he declared that the “form” of any 
philosophical system of thought is united in its method because method denotes the point at 
which the subjective and objective moments connect and separate and is the most personal 
element of mirroring the intellectual process.
1133
 In the course of the 1920s, Gestalt rose to 
prominence as an approach to change. Gestalt incorporated, amongst others, the principles of 
simplicity, proximity, and continuity and used as a general focus of interest the “figure” as a 
concept of perception, and “ground” as the unbound and formless context to “figure” for 
providing the connection to past memories and present moment.
1134
 Schmitt and Bonhoeffer 
used the terms Gestalt and Gestaltung with references to form, figure, and symbol for 
manifesting their intent in regards to the synchronization (gleich-schalten) and conformation 
(gleich-gestalten) of human beings.  
 
4.6.1 Schmitt: Subject, Content, and Self-significance 
 
In his book Roman Catholicism and Political Form, Schmitt praised the Catholic Church’s 
“jurisprudential invention” of representing the idea of Christ. His Political Theology provided 
the method of “how”, the structural analogy, for transforming the Christian idea into a 
jurisprudential idea (Rechtsidee) and the “who”, the sovereign, for applying it. His analysis in 
The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy criticized liberal parliamentary democracy and 
delivered the connection to other contemporary political ideas. Subsequently, in his 
Constitutional Theory, he defined the concept of representation as it was built on the political, 
foundational idea of homogenous identity of the ruler and the ruled. On this basis, he 
                                            
1130
 Pillsbury, “The Units of Experience“, 486. 
1131
 Pillsbury, “The Units of Experience“, 484. In DBWE Gestalt is explained as referring ‘to an integrated 
structure and pattern that comprises a whole and is more than the sum of its parts’; DBWE 12:300 note 3. 
1132
 Pillsbury, “The Units of Experience“, 486, 487. 
1133
 Ernst Cassirer, Idee und Gestalt: Goethe / Schiller / Hölderlin / Kleist: Five Essays (Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 
1921), 79. 
1134
 cf. Erving Polster and Miriam Polster, Gestalt therapy integrated: Contours of theory and practice (New 
York: Brunner and Mazel, 1973), 30. 
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participated in developing the statute-law that synchronized (gleichschalten) the provincial 
administrations to a centralized federal institution, the state, and in 1933 he accepted the 
political idea of National Socialism. Adapting to this idea, he turned to structurally form this 
new reality in reference to normativism, decisionism, and institutionalism, and to define the 
political idea of homogeneous identity of the German people in racial terms, represented by 
the Gestalt of a dictator and as their highest judge. 
 
According to Schmitt, as a reaction to the processes of mechanization and objectification of 
all social relations since the 16th century,
1135
 the Catholic Church had preserved the Roman 
rationalism in a way that captured human nature.
1136
 It was not an apparatus of mechanized 
soulless formality,
1137
 since the Church had preserved the matter of human life, rational 
creativity and humanity.
1138
 Through centralizing its bureaucracy, organization, and its 
hierarchical administrative structure, the Catholic Church had utilized the universalism of the 
Roman Empire.
1139
 This had enabled the Church to unify, in a complexio oppositorum, 
different, even oppositional ideas, by responding to an either-or situation with an as-well-
as,
1140
 instead of synthesising antithesis into an always absent higher third.
1141
 Schmitt 
understood the Catholic Church as being able of combining ambiguity with precise 
dogmatism and a will to decision (Dezision).
1142
 For Schmitt, ‘this rationalism is grounded in 
the institutional and is essentially juristic’.1143 The jurist, the ‘theologian of the existing 
order’, was similarly capable of accommodating different political forms and power-
complexities.
1144
  
 
For Schmitt it was the strict execution and the strength of the concept of representation that 
had determined for the Church the formation (Gestaltung), figure (Figur), and visible 
symbol.
1145
 He understood the political idea of the Roman Catholic Church as a juristic 
                                            
1135
 Schmitt, Katholizismus, 28. 
1136
 Schmitt, Katholizismus, 23. 
1137
 cf. Schmitt, Katholizismus, 19. 
1138
 Schmitt, Katholizismus, 24. 
1139
 Schmitt, Katholizismus, 9. 
1140
 Schmitt, Katholizismus, 11-12. 
1141
 Schmitt, Katholizismus, 19. 
1142
 Schmitt, Katholizismus, 14. 
1143
 ‚Dieser Rationalismus liegt im Institutionellen und ist wesentlich juristisch‘; Schmitt, Katholizismus, 23. 
1144
 Schmitt, Katholizismus, 49-50; own translation. 
1145
 Schmitt, Katholizismus, 14, 31, 37. 
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representational-institutional form that personified in the office of the pope the idea of 
Christ’s mediating function. In his earlier writings, Schmitt had insisted that the essence of 
the Church was Christ the mediator who had descended, because mediation can only proceed 
from above.
1146
 With Christ, ‘divinity entered humanity’, and also the corporate entity which 
is the great institution of mediation, namely the Church.
1147
 Drawing in 1923 a connection to 
the Roman law of antiquity, Schmitt added that the church represents the civitas humana; she 
facilitates in every moment the historic connection to the “becoming human” 
(Menschwerdung) and crucifixion of Christ. Thus the Church represents Christ personally, 
the God who “became human” in historic reality.1148 For Schmitt, God entered through Christ 
the human social body of citizens. Here he was represented by the Church. Schmitt also built 
on his earlier thought that only in the realm of mediation between God and the world human 
personality exists,
1149
 that is, here the personality of Jesus Christ, the mediator, exists. 
Schmitt now views the church as a ‘concrete, personal representation of concrete 
personality’1150 with the figure of the pope in the middle between the church and the Papal 
state, whose sovereign the pope is insisting to be.
1151
 The greatest achievement of the 
Catholic Church was for Schmitt having turned the priest into an office.
1152
 And the pope was 
not a prophet,
1153
 but authorized in a personal mandate in a straight line from Christ himself 
and thus was bestowed with a dignity that was abstracted from the person, but was 
nonetheless not impersonal as that of the modern civil servant.
1154
 Thus, as Schmitt had 
                                            
1146
 cf. Schmitt, „Visibility“, 50, 52. 
1147
 Schmitt, „Visibility“, 57. 
1148
 ‚Sie repräsentiert die civitas humana, sie stellt in jedem Augenblick den geschichtlichen Zusammenhang mit 
der Menschwerdung und dem Todesopfer Christi dar, sie repräsentiert Christus selbst, persönlich, den in 
geschichtlicher Wirklichkeit Mensch gewordenen Gott.‘; Schmitt, Katholizismus, 32. 
1149
 Schmitt, „Visibility, 51. 
1150
 ‚... [ist] die Kirche aber eine konkrete, persönliche Repräsentation konkreter Persönlichkeit.‘; Schmitt, 
Katholizismus, 31, own translation. 
1151
 Schmitt, Katholizismus, 31. At the time of Schmitt’s writing in 1923, the sovereignty of the Pope as head-of-
state of the Vatican was a contentious point of discussion because the founding document of the Vatican state, 
the Lateran Contract between the Italian state and the Papacy, was signed only six years later in 1929.  
1152
  ‚... seine groβe Leistung liegt darin, daβ er das Priestertum zu einem Amte macht ...‘; Schmitt, 
Katholizismus, 23. 
1153
 Schmitt, Katholizismus, 23. 
1154
 ‚ ... erhält der Priester eine Würde, die von seiner konkreten Person ganz zu abstrahieren scheint. Trotzdem 
ist ‚... seine Würde nicht unpersönlich wie die des modernen Beamten, sonder sein Amt geht, in 
ununterbrochener Kette, auf den persönlichen Auftrag und die Person Christi zurück.‘; Schmitt, Katholizismus, 
24. 
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declared earlier, the unity of God, mediated in history through mortal man, assumed the form 
of a legal succession.
1155
  
 
To his previous differentiation between public and private law and the discourse on juristic 
persons, Schmitt added now the thought that in distinction from economically grounded 
juristic persons, such as shareholder-corporations,1156 the juristic person of the Catholic 
Church carried a juristic spirit. It is capable of juristic form (Gestalt) because of its pathos of 
public representational authority.
1157
 Even though Schmitt called the pope the agent 
(Stellvertreter) of Christ,
1158
 he clarified that in distinction to the ‘simple agency’ (einfache 
Stellvertretung) of private law,
1159
 representation needed an authoritarian person or an idea, 
which upon being represented was also immediately personified.
1160
 What could personify 
through being represented was the idea of God, the people of the democratic ideology, or 
abstract contents such as freedom and equality.
1161
 And the personified authority needed an 
ethos of conviction because a technic of power was insufficient for the survival of any 
political system.
1162
 Within the hierarchy of values in the world, the political idea of 
Catholicism lives also in the juristic form and the historical forms of power.
1163
 Apart from 
the ethos of Justice, the Roman Church represents, according to Schmitt, the glory and honor 
of its own power based on the reigning, ruling, and victorious Christ. The perpetual 
opposition between Justice and Glory that is rooted in a general human antagonism becomes 
visible in the public institution of the Catholic Church instead of remaining a private 
Christian matter.
1164
 Thus the Church makes visible God, the idea, and Justice, as-well-as 
Christ, power and Glory. 
                                            
1155
 Schmitt, „Visibility“, 57. 
1156
 Shareholder corporations are collective forms that are defined in the German Commercial Code 
(Handelsgesetzbuch) which belongs to the area of private law. 
1157
 Schmitt, Katholizismus, 31. 
1158
 Schmitt, Katholizismus, 24. 
1159
 In German Private Law, the most basic version of agency is called simple (einfache) Stellvertretung.  
1160‚Repräsentieren im eminenten Sinne kann nur eine Person und zwar – zum Unterschied von der einfachen 
“Stellvertretung” – eine autoritäre Person oder eine Idee, die sich, sobald sie repräsentiert wird, ebenfalls 
personifiziert.‘; Schmitt, Katholizismus, 36; emphasis in original. 
1161
 ‚Gott, oder in der demokratischen Ideologie das Volk, oder abstrakte Ideen wie Freiheit und Gleichheit sind 
denkbarer Inhalt einer Repräsentation, ...‘; Schmitt, Katholizismus, 36. 
1162
 ‚Kein politisches system kann mit bloβer Technik der Machtbehauptung auch nur eine Generation 
überdauern. Zum Politischen gehört die Idee weil es keine Politik gibt ohne Autorität und keine Autorität ohne 
ein Ethos der Überzeugung.‘; Schmitt, Katholizismus, 28. 
1163
 Schmitt, Katholizismus, 36. 
1164
 Schmitt, Katholizismus, 53. 
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That the political idea in its institutional form of the Catholic Church could serve as a model 
for the structural formation (Gestaltung) of the state, Schmitt hinted at when he referred in 
Roman Catholicism and Political Form to representation as being ideologically and 
theoretically contained in parliamentarism. He criticised as “odd” that the members of 
parliament who represent the whole of the people receive an independent dignity over against 
the voters despite their dignity being rooted in the peoples.
1165
 To him the parliament was the 
unit that personified the peoples (Volk), and was meant to represent, in similarity to the idea 
of the complexio oppositorum, a variety of interests and parties.
1166
 Observing the increasing 
failure of the parliament, Schmitt assessed in The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy that 
democracy missed publicity, and that individualism could not claim dignity and personality 
by nature. However, the political idea of Roman Catholicism suggested that the political idea 
of a single dignified personality could represent and unify a state and overcome the ‘radical 
dualisms that ruled his contemporary epoch in a variety of forms (Gestaltungen)’.1167 
According to his The Concept of the Political, the friend-enemy antagonism could, in fact, 
have a unifying effect. However, in Politische Theologie, while referring to the Protestant 
theology’s teaching of a non-political God who is the “wholly other”,1168 Schmitt turned to 
connecting the “theological” political idea of papal representation to the sovereign of a state 
and to Dezision.  
 
Dezision is, according to Schmitt’s Politische Theologie, a specific jurisprudential form that 
is revealed by the exception,
1169
 the extremus necessitas casus,
1170
 the utmost urgent case. 
This form is a two-fold decision. It decides on an extreme danger to the existence of the state, 
and on the measures for returning to normality.
1171
 The one who decides on this formative 
Dezision is the sovereign.
1172
 In the confusion and exceptional situation of the nothingness of 
the Krisis, the subject of sovereignty and the decision become independent of any concrete 
                                            
1165
 Schmitt criticized jurisprudential interpretations of Art 21 Weimar Constitution that referred to the 
parliament as a “representational organ” of the state; Schmitt, Katholizismus, 44. 
1166
 Schmitt, Katholizismus, 43, 44. 
1167
 Schmitt, Katholizismus, 16; own translation. 
1168
 Schmitt, Politische Theologie, 7. 
1169
 Schmitt, Politische Theologie, 19. 
1170
 Schmitt, Politische Theologie, 17. 
1171
 cf. Schmitt, Politische Theologie, 14, 18-19. The word “normality“ refers in Schmitt’s Political Theology to 
norms of the legal order and to legal standards. 
1172
 ‚Souverän ist, wer den Ausnahmezustand entscheidet.‘ And : [Der Souverän] ‚entscheidet sowohl darüber, 
ob der extreme Notfall vorliegt, als auch darüber, was geschehen soll, um ihn zu beseitigen.‘; Schmitt, 
Politische Theologie, 13, 14. 
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statute-law (konkreten Tatbestand),
1173
 that is, of any normative legal foundation. 
Nonetheless, the sovereign continues to be tied to legal order because the state continues to 
exist despite the legal system’s suspension.1174 With his concise declaration that ‘Sovereign is 
he who decides on the exception’, Schmitt captured and combined in the situation of nihilism, 
a need for normative substance, and personality. For establishing and substantiating the form-
principle of Dezision, Schmitt reconnected to his abstraction of the objective from the 
subjective of his early career, and criticized those efforts of the modern theory of state that 
used “form” for transferring any subjectivity into objectivity,1175 such as in Gierke’s, and 
Kelsen’s theories. 
 
Schmitt challenged Gierke’s devaluation of the ruler, Weber’s technical bureaucracy, the 
positivist normativism of Kelsen, and Krabbe’s disregard for personality. For Gierke, 
according to Schmitt, it is not the will of the ruler that is the final source of Justice, but that 
the ruler is only the organ of the state who is called to proclaim the legal consciousness that 
emerges from the life of the people, and thereby fuses the personal will of the ruler to the 
state as an organic whole. A state reduced to stamping statute-law loses its sovereignty.
1176
 
Weber’s concept of form, defined by Schmitt as a conceptual precision of legal content 
whose normative regulation is simply the causal component of approval, is ruled, according 
to Schmitt, by predictability, bureaucracy, and general technical functionality.
1177
 Instead, 
what is necessary is a specific formation (Gestaltung) for the purpose of applying a juristic 
idea (Rechtsidee) to a concrete, real case.
1178
 For Kelsen, the final point of reference with the 
highest competence in the state is not a person, but the sovereign order of a unity of a system 
of norms.
1179
 To Schmitt, Kelsen’s systematic unit, meant as an independent act of 
jurisprudential cognition, was simply a mathematical mythology
1180
 with the purpose of 
                                            
1173
 German law knows the difference between Sachverhalt and Tatbestand. The former contains the facts of the 
case which are in need of evidence if their existence is questioned, while the latter is the statute-law under which 
the facts are to be subsumed. This difference explains Schmitt’s statement that the ‘exception is that which 
cannot be subsumed’, it is a Sachverhalt for which no Tatbestand exists, and that the Dezision is a specific-
juristic element of form; Schmitt, Politische Theologie, 19. 
1174
 cf. Schmitt, Politische Theologie, 14, 18-19. 
1175
 Schmitt, Politische Theologie, 35. 
1176
 Schmitt, Politische Theologie, 31, 32. 
1177
 Schmitt, Politische Theologie, 34. 
1178
 Schmitt, Politische Theologie, 35. 
1179
 Schmitt, Politische Theologie, 27. 
1180
 Schmitt, Politische Theologie, 28. 
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discarding any arbitrariness.
1181
 But in political reality no highest, that is, no greatest power 
functions according to the certainty of natural law.
1182
 Kelsen’s words of “order”, ”system”, 
and ”unit”, paraphrase the same content, and the word “constitution”, as the state’s terminal 
point of ascription, is a possible tautology to unity.
1183
 Kelsen fails to show how a point of 
ascription can establish itself. His state is a legal order in itself, and any perceptions to the 
contrary are personifications and hypostatizations.
1184
 Finally, Krabbe’s1185 antagonism 
between personal and impersonal, and between person and idea, disregards that the 
correlation between personality and formal authority emerged from a specific juristic interest 
that forms the essence of legal decisions.
1186
  
 
Instead, in similarity to his earlier Gesetz und Urteil, Schmitt declared again in Politische 
Theologie that any transfer of a legal idea into a different aggregate condition, such as a 
judgement, loses its purity because a moment is added that neither derives from the content of 
the legal idea or the applied general positive norm. The content of the statute law transforms 
into a different quality in the process of its application to a case, in a moment of indifference, 
when ‘the juristic deduction is not traceable in the last detail to its premises’.1187 However, in 
Politische Theologie, Schmitt used the earlier discourse not to explain the “how” of the 
interpretive inclusion of content alien to the norm, but for revealing the judge, the “who”, and 
for establishing the judge’s independence from law. Now, every transformation of a general 
norm in the course of evaluating a concrete case contains a distinctive designation of the 
authoritative person or institution, the “who”, whose jurisdiction cannot be taken from the 
legal norm itself. Thus now, every constructive element of a decision, content and subject, is 
born from nothing when viewed from a normative perspective.
1188
 Calling on Thomas 
Hobbes, the ‘classical decisionist type’, Schmitt declared, that within the reality of the juristic 
life the “who” of the decision was decisive for correctness and jurisdiction. Thus, ‘the 
contrast between subject and content of a decision, and the significance of the self 
                                            
1181
 Schmitt, Politische Theologie, 46. 
1182
 Schmitt, Politische Theologie, 26. 
1183
 cf. Schmitt, Politische Theologie, 27-28. 
1184
 Schmitt, Politische Theologie, 27. 
1185
 Schmitt discusses at length the theory of state of Hugo Krabbe (1857-1936); Hugo Krabbe, Die Moderne 
Staatsidee, 2
nd
 ext. ed. (Haag: Nijhoff, 1919); Schmitt, Politische Theologie, 22. 
1186
 Schmitt, Politische Theologie, 36. 
1187
 Schmitt, Politische Theologie, 36; own translation. 
1188
 cf. Schmitt, Politische Theologie, 37-38. 
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(Eigenbedeutung)
1189
 of the subject are the problem of juristic form.’1190 Juristic form does 
not have the emptiness of an a priori form or the form of technical precision.
1191
 It is coming 
into existence in the juristic concrete and thus is, in essence, not objective, impersonal 
purpose. It is a subject with a significant self, that is, it is of personality and content. 
 
Thus having established with the principle of Dezision the subject and jurisdiction of the 
sovereign, Schmitt proceeded to manifest his position from Roman Catholicism and Political 
Form with a sociological method. In Politische Theologie he legitimized, authorized, and 
qualified the type of the sovereign. This methodological purpose was served, according to 
Schmitt, with a structural analogy, between theological and juridical conceptualizations, that 
transfers theological forms to the theory of state within the secularized context of the 20
th
 
century. The main example Schmitt used was the analogy between the exception and the 
miracle in theology,
1192
 because of the similarity that becomes apparent in the way in which 
the exception, the form-element of Dezision, is born from outside normativity. That is, both, 
exception and miracle breach natural causality and originate from the nothingness of the 
chaos. Additionally, he argued that in the course of history the idea of God as the highest 
power had lost its essence,
1193
  became immanent, and was replaced with the rising idea of 
the lawfulness of nature. Nature, as the new concept of legitimacy, had upended the 
monarchic principle and had claimed that all power resides in the pouvoir constituant of the 
peoples.
1194
 In the revolutionary tensions, in the heightened intensity of the issue of decision, 
the decision manifested itself in the increasing significance of the nature of man as good or 
evil, and in the theological dogma of Original Sin.
1195
 Through drawing parallels to thinkers 
of that revolutionary time, Schmitt mocked the Lutheran dogma of Original Sin as mandating 
                                            
1189
 The term Eigenbedeutung which Schmitt used, has been translated by George Schwab with the words 
“proper meaning of the subject”; Schmitt, Political Theology, 35. However, I translated the term literally 
because as “significance of the self” it also captures the attached sense of personality and independence of the 
subject’s self. Translating „Bedeutung“ as “significance” also connects to Schmitt’s earlier work on Der Wert 
des Staates und die “Bedeutung” des Einzelnen (emphasis added) which is a discourse on the “significance” of 
the individual in relation to the state. 
1190
 ‚In dem Gegensatz von Subjekt und Inhalt der Entscheidung und in der Eigenbedeutung des Subjekts liegt 
das Problem der juristischen Form.‘; Schmitt, Politische Theologie, 40, own translation. 
1191
 ‚Sie hat nicht die apriorische Leerheit der transzendentalen Form; denn sie ensteht gerade aus dem juristisch 
Konkreten. Sie ist auch nicht die Form der technischen Präzision;‘; Schmitt, Politische Theologie, 40. 
1192
 Schmitt, Politische Theologie, 44. 
1193
 cf. Schmitt, Politische Theologie, 53-54; Schmitt, “Neutralizations”, 90. 
1194
 Schmitt, Politische Theologie, 51. 
1195
 cf. Schmitt, Politische Theologie, 61-62. 
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obedience to every authority
1196
 and complained that the decisionist and the personalist 
element of the concept of sovereignty was lost.
1197
 And he rejected the anarchists who, based 
on the axiom of the goodness of the human being and corrupt government, rejected any and 
all government. Indirectly, through the counterrevolutionaries of the 19
th
 century, Schmitt 
turned to suggesting the current need of a particular type of leadership and sovereign. 
Although ‘dictatorship was not legitimacy’, Schmitt appears to call for a decision which is 
‘pure, not rationalized, not discussed, not justifying, that is, built out of the absolute nothing’ 
by someone who has the courage to political Dezision.
1198
 
 
Schmitt’s Constitutional Theory became a decisive step in the transfer of the Catholic 
Church’s political idea of the institutional official representation of the idea of Christ into a 
jurisprudential-political idea (Rechtsidee) and its representation in the Weimar state and 
beyond. He evaluated the Weimar Constitution in the broader, general context of the 
emergence of, and in comparison to constitutions since the American and French 
Revolutions. Schmitt found the concrete political form of being (Daseinsform) of the 
Constitution, its core, its essence, in the idea of a democratic republic, combined with a 
federal-state structure and a parliamentary-representative legislative authority and 
government. However, it was not just the bourgeois idea of individualism and parliamentary 
democracy that had failed, according to his assessment in The Crisis of Parliamentary 
Democracy. It was also the combination of the three forms for a state (Staatsformen) – 
monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy – and their recurrence in the bourgeois separation and 
balance of powers
1199
 that had led to the problem of the pretense-compromises. Most notably 
the problem appears within the four alternative forms (Gestalten) of government at the point 
where the monarchic principle, resting on the concept of representation, and the democratic 
principle, resting on the concept of identity of the peoples, intersect.  
 
Although identity and representation are oppositional concepts, they are not mutually 
exclusive but are two points of orientation in the concrete formation (Gestaltung) of the 
                                            
1196‚Obwohl er [Donoso Cortes] hier mit dem Lutherischen Dogma übereinzustimmen scheint, hat er doch eine 
andere Haltung als der Lutheraner, der sich jeder Obrigkeit beugt;‘ Schmitt, Politische Theologie, 62. 
1197
 Schmitt, Politische Theologie, 52. 
1198
 Schmitt, Politische Theologie, 69; own translation; emphasis added. 
1199
 cf. Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 202, 204, 215. 
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political unit (Einheit), the state.
1200
 Just as a state can never exist without a form that depicts 
it as an essential part the political identity, no state exists without representation.
1201
 Because 
for Schmitt in a true democracy the political unit of the peoples can never be present in real 
identity, it therefore had to be personally represented by a human being.
1202
 Needed is a form 
that depicts, that is, images (darstellen) the political unit which does not exist by nature but 
rests on human decision.
1203
 Thus representation as a political principle of form is, according 
to Schmitt, an existential, never a normative occurrence.
1204
 In representation, an invisible 
being is made public and is visibly recalled. In the dialectic of the concept, the presumed 
invisible is nonetheless present.
1205
 Representation must be public; it can never be a private 
matter. This type of representative being cannot be inferior, because elevation into publicity 
affords glory and dignity. Already in his early Der Wert des Staates und die Bedeutung des 
Einzelnen it is only the “official” in his official capacity, the civil servant, who had 
impersonal dignity. He insisted thus that representation must be differentiated from private 
matters, and their forms of agency, authorization, managment, mandates, commissions, 
etc.
1206
 If the parliamentary representative is treated as an agent who handles the economic 
interests of the voters, representation is not present.
1207
 Now going beyond his earlier concept 
of the “official”, he declared that because representation belongs to the sphere of the political 
it has an existential essence, cannot be captured with norms, and goes beyond a mandate 
                                            
1200
 ‚Diese beiden Möglichkeiten, Identität und Repräsentation, schlieβen sich nicht aus, sondern sind nur zwei 
entgegengesetzte Orientierungspunkte für die konkrete Gestaltung der politischen Einheit‘. Schmitt, 
Verfassungslehre, 206. 
1201
 ‚Es gibt also keinen Staat ohne Repräsentation, weil es keinen Staat ohne Staatsform gibt ...‘; Schmitt, 
Verfassungslehre, 207. 
1202
 Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 206. 
1203
 ‚... und zur Form wesentlich Darstellung der politischen Einheit gehört. ... [ denn Politische Einheit] nicht 
von Natur aus vorhanden ist, sondern auf einer menschlichen Entscheidung beruht.‘; Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 
207-08. 
1204
 Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 209. 
1205‚Repräsentieren heiβt, ein unsichtbares Sein durch ein öffentliches Sein sichtbar machen und 
vergegenwärtigen. Die Dialektik des Begriffes liegt darin, daβ das Unsichtbare als abwesend vorausgesetzt und 
doch gleichzeitig anwesend gemacht wird.‘; Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 209. 
1206
 ‚Was nur Privatsache ist und nur privaten Interessen dient, kann wohl vertreten werden; es kann seine 
Agenten, Anwälte und Exponenten finden, aber es wird nicht in einem speziefischen Sinne repräsentiert.‘; 
Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 210. Schmitt demanded that the concept of representation be differentiated from 
similar concepts of private law and referrenced in this respect the ‘upcoming’ work of Gerhard Leibholz; 
Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 208. Schmitt criticized Gierke’s investigation into the history of law as not always 
consistent in the use of the words ”representation”, ”authorization”, and ”agency”; Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 
214. He also observed that the Anglo-Saxon language does not differentiate between a private, business law 
version and a public law version of “representation”. Schmitt refers to Johann Caspar Bluntschli who had made 
this differentiation already in his book Allgemeine Staatslehre (Stuttgart: J.G. Cotta, 1875), 488; Schmitt, 
Verfassungslehre, 209. 
1207
 Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 213. 
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(Auftrag).
1208
 Representation produces the unity of the peoples in their political form. The 
personality within the publicity gives value to representation and character to political life. 
Personality is in public representation, not in the concept of the state, that is, not in the status 
of the political unit.
1209
 The state is for Schmitt a combination of two principles of formation 
(Gestaltungsprinzipien): Identity denotes the peoples who as a political unit, by virtue of its 
political consciousness and national will, are able to differentiate between friend and enemy 
while representation images (darstellen) this political unit through government.
1210
  
 
For Schmitt, in representation, here reminiscent of Kierkegaard, a higher form of being 
appears. Appearing is a higher, intensified form of the being of the political unit of a 
concrete, existing peoples which is always represented as a whole. This political unit, the 
German nation, differs from the natural being (Dasein) of a coincidental group of people
1211
 
because it is established according to the principle of differentiating between friend and 
enemy. This principle which Schmitt had developed shortly before in The Concept of the 
Political did not only differentiate between nations but served also for detecting the stranger 
within a nation. Combined in Verfassungslehre with the elements of sovereignty and identity, 
it would, according to Schmitt, define the specific character of Germany. He clarified that the 
German Reich of the Weimar Constitution was no longer a federation (Bund) in the sense of 
the 1871 Constitution. This previous federation between various independent German 
countries had the purpose of preventing war among them and for mutual protection against 
other nations. Their substantial homogeneity, that is, the concrete concord of being 
(seinsmäβige Übereinstimmung) of the population and their structural organizational 
homogeneity that was based on the monarchic principle, had enabled the member-states to 
transfer sovereignty to the federation in regards to questions of true conflict.
1212
 Such 
questions concerned, according to Schmitt, conflicts with an enemy who is the existentially 
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other and alien, the utmost intensification of being-different.
1213
 However, the Weimar 
Republic had overcome this model with the political unit of the German people as the 
constitution’s foundational power, and thus had stated in the preamble that “the German 
people are united in their roots.” 1214 The sovereignty regarding questions of protection, 
determining the enemy, and the situations of conflict rests with the Weimar state’s 
representation as a whole.  
 
Consequently, the Weimar federal structure incorporates the previously separate states into 
the overall organization of the Weimar state. The declaration that federal law overrides 
provincial law
1215
 makes it a constitutional duty for the provinces (Länder) to execute federal 
administrative orders and presidential decrees.
1216
 Schmitt regarded it as constitutionally 
permissible that federally ordered alterations (Um-schaltungen) could reorganize inter-
provincial boundaries, regroup the provinces and even abolish one against its will, but not to 
the point of abolishing the federal structure altogether, and could differentiate between 
groups of population within a province.
1217
 Even though at the time of writing this 
Verfassungslehre in 1928/29 Schmitt demanded a constitutional act of the political unit of the 
German people
1218
 for transforming the Weimar state into a unitary state (Einheitsstaat), his 
“theory of federally ordered administrative alterations” presented the jurisprudential 
foundation for the 1933 Act of Synchronization (Reichsstadthaltergesetz). This Act 
reorganized (gleich-schalten) the provinces with a focus on the Führer as the representative 
of their combined whole of a racially differentiated population into Aryans and non-Aryans, 
according to the friend-enemy distinction.  
 
With his active participation in developing the Act of Synchronization Schmitt manifested in 
reality the political idea of a superior identity over against enemies. Identity is represented, as 
a whole, by a dignified personality in methodological analogy to the Roman jurisprudential 
model as exemplified by the Catholic Church. Schmitt called this new organizational 
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formation (Gestaltung), this synchronization (Gleich-schaltung), the ‘new constitutional law’. 
In a final manifesting move, Schmitt declared in June 1934 the Führer, the representative 
“figure” that unified the German people into an exclusive, racially defined superior identity, 
to be also their highest judge who decides in place of the whole nation on the content and 
scope of restoring “normal justice”.1219 In accordance with the foreword to his republished 
Politische Theologie, which named institutionalism as the meta-personal third type of 
formative jurisprudential thought – in addition to the impersonal-normativist and the 
situational, personal-decisionist types
1220
 – he attempted to manifest the institutional type 
with his 1934 theory Über die Drei Arten des rechtswissenschaftlichen Denkens. However, 
this failed because the National Socialist sovereign judge could not to be brought back into an 
institutional “normal”, not even the kind that grounded his totalitarian position.  
 
Thus Schmitt actively manifested for the formation (Gestaltung) of the state a secularized 
version of the idea of God, as figure and symbol, and as represented to the world through the 
office of the pope. The formative element (Gestalt) of a people, unified in racial identity, was 
represented by the figure of a dignified personality in public office who provided content and 
was justified by the courage to act on the formative principle of Dezision. Synchronization as 
the formative method of a new institutionalism was meant to establish and supersede the 
representative decisionist formation. But Schmitt’s attempt to ground the idea of National 
Socialism in a new institutional “normal” that defined content, failed due to the self-
significant absolute sovereign’s absorption of the Gestalt of the homogenous people into one 
synchronized identity that was represented solely by his figure of personality, and who had 
stepped and remained outside any normative or institutional structure. 
 
4.6.2 Bonhoeffer: Idea, Appearance, and the Person 
 
Bonhoeffer proceeded to actively manifest and preserve God’s intentionality as instituted and 
spiritually continued in the form and figure of the Sanctorum Communio, the Christ existing 
as church community. Realizing the dangers a self-significant sovereign, who was 
legitimized through an analogy to a Christian institutional form, presented to the Protestant 
Church he insisted on a status confessionis and entered the inner-church discourse on 
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constitutional matters and the public space with presentations, lectures, engagement in the 
ecumenical movement, and support of the work of the Confessing Church. 
 
He grounded his objection to the political developments, and in due course his resistance,
1221
 
in the form of the institution of the Protestant Church as a worldly manifestation and 
continuation of the divine revelation in the person of Christ. In his Christology and his 
salvation history, rendered with his contemporary times in mind, Bonhoeffer grounded and 
manifested his objection to the dangers of replacing the Christian divinely revealed message 
in Christ with a human self-declared absolute dictator shrouded in the mythical idea of a 
national unit in identity with his self. Parallel to the political developments and to his various 
activities, the weight of his theology shifted from an emphasis on the form of the 
institutional, in Sanctorum Communio, to the Gestalt of Christ in his Christology Lectures 
and finally to an emphasis on the con-formation (Gleich-gestaltung)
1222
 of all human beings 
to Christ and its ecclesiastic form in Ethics.  
 
His early work on the Church as a spiritual institution sui generis, centered on Christ, in 
independence of the state, and on establishing the difference of theology from modern 
philosophical concepts in Act and Being, proved a good foundation for objecting to the state’s 
1933 attempt of synchronizing (gleichschalten) the church to a state, under a Reich-bishop 
who was, similar to the provincial governors, personally accountable to an absolute, and 
shortly thereafter tyrannical, human leader. In the April 1932 essay Concerning the Idea of 
God,
1223
 Bonhoeffer drew a connection between the idea of God and the idealist conception 
of history which he both assessed as being adverse to an understanding of Christ as a once-
ness in history, and to God’s personality as beyond ideas. Fully in line with his earlier 
assessment in Act and Being, he insisted in this essay that in idealist philosophy the fact of 
Jesus Christ becomes, through reinterpretation, only a ‘transient bearer of eternal values and 
ideas’ who teaches new truth according to God’s will. This keeps God’s will and truth within 
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the human system of ideas. What is ignored is that the essence of history sets limits for 
human beings and is the place that leads ‘into the situation of personal decision’, ‘a decision 
for or against God’.1224 This decision, Bonhoeffer continued, is executed in facing Christ, that 
is, God’s ‘self-revelation of personality’.1225 In the act of human faith, executed by God 
himself, human beings “transcend” the limits of the self. At the intersection between God’s 
self-revelation and faith as the act of receiving, ‘the personalities of God and of man come in 
contact with each other.’ Differentiating between the formal and the material within faith, he 
stated that the ‘idea of faith’ as the counterpart to the ‘formal idea of self-revelation’ is 
‘primarily directed toward the authority of God, not to the content of his word’ because ‘it is 
the authority that gives weight to the content, not the reverse.’1226 Thus the human “idea” of 
faith only recognizes God’s authority for determining the content of His Word, His 
revelation. 
 
But by the fall of 1932, Bonhoeffer began to rethink and concretize his position on 
authoritative personality, of content being secondary to authority, and the personal aspect of 
the decision of faith. Instead, it was the primacy of the Word, standing under God’s decision, 
and the Gestalt of Christ who forms (gestalten) the human being, that gained strength in his 
theology. In his November 1932 address of Thy Kingdom Come! Bonhoeffer insisted on the 
institutional separation of the juristic person of the Church over against the juristic person of 
the state, but stated that both were part of the one kingdom of God. Church and state are the 
two forms of miracle and order ‘in which God’s kingdom on earth presents itself’.1227 Within 
this kingdom ‘the church limits the state, just as the state limits the church.’1228 And in his 
summer 1933 Lectures on Christology, he clarified that Christ is not the center of a visible 
state-church but the hidden center of the history that is made by the state, and that in his form 
as church Christ is the mediator between the state and God. The church with Christ at its 
center mediates between state and God. Because it is the state’s nature to create with its 
actions law and order for bringing the goal of its people closer to fulfillment, the messianic 
idea always lays hidden behind the state’s idea of creating order.1229 Thus the messianic idea 
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directs the laws which the state uses for fulfilling the people’s goals. However, the church 
constitutes the limit of the state; it judges and justifies the state. In the cross, ‘in God’s 
entering into history and having to die within history’, the church proclaims ‘the affirmation 
of the law and order of the state and its ultimate breaking and abolition’.1230 Thus to those 
who live by the cross, Christ’s form (Gestalt) is present in both forms, in the form of the 
church and the form of the state.
1231
  
 
Bonhoeffer added a warning in the early 1933 radio address The Führer and the Individual in 
the Younger Generation. He warned that glorifying a human leader presents dangers and that 
such a “personality” can only and will always fail. Instead of having authority qua office as a 
father or teacher, the authority of a leader by ideology is constantly at risk of losing the 
people’s and the follower’s allegiance.1232 The difference between leadership by office or by 
person is, that the former is ‘beyond personality’ and recognizes given limits and 
responsibilities.
1233
 The latter, the leadership by person though means unconditional 
obedience, a radical surrender of one’s own rights and responsibility as an individual, and a 
transfer of limitless freedom to the leader as the only personality. This form of collectivism 
leads to an extreme individualism and a ‘political-messianic idea’.1234 This figure, seeing 
himself as an ultimate authority, will break under the load of responsibility,
1235
 because of his 
ignorance of a true leader’s task of leading the led into responsibility, of eternal limitations 
and penultimate responsibilities before God, and of his neglect of communal reciprocal 
responsibilities.
1236
  
 
Thus by spring 1933, with Hitler’s ascent to power and the beginning synchronization 
(Gleichschaltung) of the church to the state, the earlier reference that human beings 
“transcend” in faith the limits of the self, migrated to putting a weight on the limitations God 
places on the human being. And the references to “idea” in regards to God’s self-revelation of 
personality, which meets in faith with human personality, disappear. The importance 
Bonhoeffer placed on formal authority over material content became more qualified with a 
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differentiation between the limited authority based on office, over against that based on an 
abdication of individual freedom and responsibilities to a limitless, free leader. The former 
came to stand for obedience to God’s limitations to power, while the latter referred to a 
human personality of unbound power nonetheless weighed down by an overload of human 
responsibility. Togeather with the extreme human personality that had in 1933 assumed the 
position similar to a human being sicut deus, as described in his late 1932 account of 
Christian history in Creation and Fall, the thought of God as personality disappeared and 
became almost completely eliminated from Bonhoeffer’s vocabulary. Bonhoeffer must have 
realized the danger his earlier description of a point of contact between the personality of 
God and the personality of man at the intersection between God’s self-revelation and faith 
presented. This could be misconstrued into an understanding that the human being may 
receive godlike powers at such an intersection. Any mentioning of such a meeting-point of 
“personalities” disappeared. Instead, Bonhoeffer clarified in his Lectures on Christology that 
personality is an apersonal concept, realized in the concept of power and history, and is the 
opposite to person.
1237
 Now it was not Christ’s personality but his work that is of importance, 
that is, the material content. Building on his account of salvation history, Bonhoeffer focused 
on Christ as the mediator at the center of history and the human condition, that is, not only at 
the center of history but also at the center of human existence and nature, and proceeded to 
define Christ as Gestalt.
1238
  
 
Christ’s form, that is, his Gestalt is, according to Bonhoeffer’s Lectures on Christology, His 
Word, sacrament and church-community. Christ’s Gestalt “is” the Word having become 
human, and was not just a represented and functional membership. Because ‘Christ is Word’, 
God’s truth to which He has bound himself,1239 Christ is neither idea nor prophet.1240 God’s 
logos, in the form (Gestalt) of Christ and the human ‘word in form of an idea’,1241 are 
mutually exclusive, because the “idea of God” that is embodied in Christ is not accessible by 
any person at any time.
1242
 Christ’s presence, his existence, is preaching as this takes form in 
the sermon. The Word, God’s revelation in Jesus Christ, is God’s Word “having become 
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human” (menschgeworden) in human word. God’s Word spoken in freedom as personal 
address of speaking and response of one to another calls to responsibility and desires 
community.
1243
 The continuity between Word and creature, which is lost to fallen creation, is 
provided for in the sacraments of the church-community where the God-human Jesus Christ 
is wholly present and not only as an idea.
1244
 The sacrament is the form (Gestalt) of the 
Word, the Word in bodily form that becomes reality in the midst of the world. Bonhoeffer 
clarifies, that the sacrament ‘does not represent (repräsentieren) the “Word”, for only that 
which is not present can be represented (repräsentiert).’1245 Thus the sacrament is not the 
hiddenness of a bodiless Word, and not the question ‘about the possible union of divinity’ 
with humanity; instead it is about the hiddenness of the God-human who is nonetheless 
present.
1246
 As reality of the Word and the sacrament, Christ “is” the church-community, that 
is, the bodily form he takes ‘between his ascension and his second coming’ and not simply a 
concept that functions for its members.
1247
 History lives between the promise of the messiah 
and fulfillment. Because it cannot fulfil the promise by itself, history wants to glorify itself in 
an impossible fulfillment of a degenerate (entartete) promise;
1248
 that is, the salvation history 
in Christ cannot be fulfilled by a self-pronounced human absolute leader claiming faithful 
followers. 
 
Further, Bonhoeffer explicitly clarified that Jesus Christ, the God who has become human 
(Menschgewordene) is not the representative (Repräsentant) of an idea of God. One should 
not speak of a God “becoming human” (Menschwerden), which is the “how” question. But 
instead the question should be “who” “became human” (Menschgeworden).1249 To avoid, in 
regards to revelation, a new version of the Docetic heresy,
1250
 which is based on an abstract 
idea of God that is known before revelation and independent of the human element,
1251
 it has 
to be presupposed that ‘the God revealed to us is identical with God himself’. Otherwise, due 
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to the Docetic antithesis of idea and appearance, there would be only an appearance or an 
idea.
1252
 Since the “how” question, the material thinking of how God became human, has 
proven itself over time to be unanswerable,
1253
 Bonhoeffer refers to the Formula of 
Concord’s two states for Jesus Christ, the state of humiliation (status exinanitionis) and the 
state of exaltation (status exaltationis)
1254
 and the concept of identity of substance,
1255
 that is, 
that Christ’s person “is” God’s revelation.1256 Bonhoeffer added that already Luther had 
spoken of the divinity and humanity of Jesus as if they were one nature for the purpose of 
preventing a deified human being.
1257
 It is the ultimate mystery of the Trinity, the Three in 
One, that the humiliated One is He “who” has already become human, is not visibly glorified 
by Jesus Christ even though He is the God of glory.
1258
  
 
For Bonhoeffer, Jesus Christ, the person, the God who has become human, the Gestalt is not 
an idea, separated from appearance. This God-human, the crucified and the risen one, does 
not represent (repräsentieren), but reconciles in Stellvertretung all human beings. In the 
midst of history as a divine miracle, and as the mystery of the world, Christ attacks the heart 
of an era filled with contempt for humanity.
1259
 In Ethics, Bonhoeffer added that all formation 
(Gestaltung) of the world proceeds from this Gestalt of Jesus Christ. But he clarified that this 
Gestaltung differs from forming the world with plans and programs, or with Christian ideas, 
teachings, and principles. Rather, reversely, formation (Gestaltung) con-forms (gleich-
gestalten) to the unique form (Gestalt) of Jesus Christ,
1260
 of being judged by God and having 
risen. Formation is thus not an independent process or condition that can somehow be 
detached from the form of Jesus Christ, but only happens from and toward this form.
1261
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Being con-formed (gleich-gestaltet) with the One who has become human therefore means to 
be really human;
1262
 to be loved and judged by God. Con-formed human beings do not 
attempt to outgrow human nature through deifications, establish themselves as models above 
other people, or are forced to submit in false uniformity to an ideal type, that is, to a 
particular image of the human. They recognize themselves as sinners, die to their own will 
and let God’s justice prevail over them.1263 They are no longer in a state of disunion from 
God that splits everything in conflicts between is and ought, as the Pharisees do. After 
considering innumerable facts, Pharisees determine their own correct decisions from their 
self-proclaimed position as lawgiver and judges.
1264
  
 
Being con-formed also means being a transfigured, new human being. The human being is 
without independent form. Instead the form of Jesus Christ takes form in the human 
beings.
1265
 This then is the risen Christ, the final sovereign approval of God “for” the new 
human being.
1266
 Their forms are not imitations
1267
 or repetitions of Christ’s form because 
they are not transformed into the form of God, but into human beings before God, in the form 
that belongs to them,
1268
 into what is each ‘one’s own true nature’1269 and ‘that which belongs 
to each one of us, is in each case something different’.1270 Bonhoeffer also called this a 
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complete inner change of existing form, a metamorphosis, which induces a renewal of the 
mind to living as children of light, that is, in the form of the child of God.
1271
  
 
Being con-formed means that for the church-community as the Sanctorum Communio, as the 
Christ existing as church community, the term Gestaltung is solely reserved for Jesus Christ 
who takes form (Gestalt) in Christ’s Church and no other form besides Christ’s own. Also, 
the church is not an independent form apart from the form of Jesus Christ. Here Christ takes 
form among human beings. The body of Christ forms the church in the image of humanity in 
Stellvertretung for all human beings.
1272
  
 
Summarizing, it can be said that for Bonhoeffer it is not a deified human personality who 
represents an idea of God in abstraction to appearance that stands at the center of the 
formation (Gestaltung) of human worldly life. This position belongs to the Gestalt in earthly 
reality, to the ”figure” of Jesus Christ who “is” God’s Word, His revelation and Christ’s 
person in One. Neither Christ nor human beings represent God. Christ instead stands through 
Stellvertretung on the cross at the center of a triangular relationship between God, the self, 
and others,
1273
 in order to reconcile the human beings to God’s love and into community with 
each other. Obedience to God’s will in the time between Christ’s ascension and return, in the 
time in Adam under Original Sin means being formed, transformed, and con-formed in faith 
to a new human being according to God’s will as revealed in Christ. 
 
4.6.3 Gestalt  
 
Both Bonhoeffer and Schmitt manifested a form (Gestalt) through forming (gestalten). The 
center of Schmitt’s theory is that in Roman juristic spirit a human being in office was 
authorized by an idea to represent this idea to a group of people for the purpose of unifying 
them into the identity of an institution with consolidated content. This structure is legitimized 
through an analogy to the Catholic Church whose pope was directly authorized by Christ to 
represent the idea of God, and to form with the complexio oppositorum among the faithful a 
unity based on dogmatic content. Schmitt manifested an institutional form (Gestalt) and a 
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figure of personality for the purpose of exchanging the idea and the elite of the Weimar 
normal. An abstraction between content and subject led to the formation (Gestaltung) of a 
synchronized (gleich-schalten) identity between a representative figure of self-significant 
personality and a racially defined unit of the people. But his form-principle of Dezision 
eventually transcended the method of structural analogy and the self-declared human judge 
implemented the content of his political idea beyond any restraints.  
 
Bonhoeffer responded, opposed, and resisted the formation (Gestaltung) of Schmitt’s theory 
of state through disclosing the heresy on which it was built. Bonhoeffer’s con-formation 
(gleich-gestalten) confronted Schmitt’s institutional synchronization on the basis of rejecting 
a separation of idea and appearance and Schmitt’s concept of representation.1274 He exposed 
the disunity of idea and appearance and manifested instead the One-ness of the Trinity and 
the once-ness of the Gestalt of Christ in historical presence. God, Christ, and Word are 
identical; they are an identity that differs from Schmitt’s racial identity of the people insofar 
as the latter needs to be represented for appearing as personality. For Bonhoeffer, there is 
only the one person of Jesus Christ who is identical with the content, the revelation of God. 
Jesus Christ “is” God’s revelation, and reversely God’s revelation is the one who has become 
human (Mensch geworden). For Schmitt in representation, which differed from private forms 
of agency such as Stellvertretung, the invisible idea, the political program, is present because 
this higher form becomes personified. The idea becomes personality; it becomes human 
(Mensch werden); divinity enters humanity. The political idea, whose content is identity, is 
not identical with the human being, the representative. The unity of the peoples as a whole, 
the unity in the Gestalt of the people, is represented and publically appearing in personality. 
Thus representation presents (darstellen) the content, the idea, the unity, the Gestalt as 
personified in the subject, the one significant, dignified, public personality. The political idea 
in the form, the Gestalt, of the unit of the identical people is present in a personality when it 
is represented.  
 
For Bonhoeffer, however, representation is only there where that which is to be represented is 
not present, but absent. Because for Schmitt the political idea of the Gestalt of the people 
                                            
1274
 The consistency with which Bonhoeffer used, in the discourse on Gestalt, the German word Repräsentation 
for representation but not Stellvertretung, a term he exclusively reserved throughout his theology for 
reconciliation, exposes that Bonhoeffer was very conscious about the juristic difference between the concept of 
representation and Stellvertretung.  
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needs to be present in order to turn through representation into personality, representation in 
analogy to the idea of God is impossible for Bonhoeffer. Instead, for Bonhoeffer, it is not an 
idea that is appearing as personified presence, but rather Jesus Christ “is” the personified 
Word of God, the content and person in One, who is present in the Church and in the 
sacraments. Schmitt’s model of representation and the Trinitarian God are incompatable. The 
God-human Christ is the human Gestalt, the person, who is identical with the Word of God, 
revelation, content, and is present in historical reality, that is, exists in historical presence in 
the Gestalt of the church.  
 
What Schmitt called the “contrast between subject and content”, between idea and form 
(Gestalt), Bonhoeffer called the heresy of the “antithesis between idea and appearance”. 
Schmitt solved the contrast with the “significance of the self of the subject” 
(Eigenbedeutung) which stands in analogy to the God who becomes human (Mensch werden) 
when divinity entered humanity. Bonhoeffer contradicted this with Christ as the one who had 
become human (Menschgewordenen) in the once-ness of appearing in historical reality and 
that this Christology had nothing to do with the ‘union of divinity with humanity’, because 
there was no point at which the personality of Christ and a human being of personality could 
meet. Thus divinity does not becomes human (Mensch werden) in a human self as sicut deus, 
but in Christ God’s divinity had become human (Mensch geworden) as essence and in the 
once-ness of history. Bonhoeffer consigns Schmitt’s “who” back to the irrelevant position of 
the “how”-question that cannot explain the modus of the divine “becoming human” (Mensch 
werden). Rather the only relevant “who” is the One who “became human” in factual reality 
(Menschgewordene), at one time in human history. 
 
For Schmitt, the “how” superceded the “who”. The “how” of representation was the modus 
operandi of unifying for the purpose of overcoming the conflict between human beings that 
had entered the world through Original Sin. It meant to identify the correct type of human 
being according to the concept of friend and enemy and to institutionally synchronize 
(Gleich-schaltung) those “who” belong to the form of the figure of the leader, the sovereign. 
However, as Bonhoeffer insisted, unifying is not reconciling, unity is not wholeness. Political 
unity qua human program differs decisively from the reconciliation of human beings to God 
who had been separated from God since the Fall into Original Sin. Reconciliation restores 
wholeness to the single human being and to community. This was only possible through 
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Christ’s Stellvertretung on the cross, through Christ “who” was standing in for absent 
humanity, through Christ who was present on the cross. Only faith in the once-ness of Christ 
on the cross could reconcile to a con-formed (gleich-gestaltet) life in personal wholeness 
under the God-identity. It is not the Gestalt of a unity in form of the institutional “how” that 
is decisive, but the form of the “who”, the Gestalt of the Christ who ended the dis-union (Ent-
zweiung)
1275
 of human beings from God, from other human beings, from the world, and from 
themselves, a dis-union which entered the world with eating of the forbidden fruit and was 
the consequence of knowing good and evil. It is not the exception emerging from chaos but 
the God-human Christ, the humiliated one who let the law have its way and took sin upon 
himself that is the miracle of the God who had become human. This Gestalt makes possible 
faith in the Word precisely because he did not take recourse to an exception at the decisive 
moment.
1276
 By not displaying his divinity but remaining in the form of human nature His 
Gestalt provokes faith in His redemptive work on the cross.  
 
Overall, for Schmitt it is decisive “how” the idea is implemented in reality, that is, “how” the 
Gestalt of the people becomes unified to an identical unit that, in turn, becomes personified in 
the representative personality. Decisive is for Bonhoeffer, the “who”, the reconciling God-
human Stellvertreter Christ who continues to be present in the Church of the penultimate 
time. And it is faith in Christ that con-formes (gleich-gestalten) the human self to wholeness 
and restores human community to the form of God’s intentionality. God’s decision of 
revealing Himself in the Gestalt of the body of Jesus Christ con-forms the human being of 
faith to His will, who in turn form the world with human decisions in recognition of the 
limitations placed by the transcendent God. 
 
4.7 Conclusion: Forced Unity or Reconciled Wholeness?   
 
In the irony of life, Bonhoeffer’s 1932 prediction that an absolute leader will fail under the 
overload of responsibility was confirmed when Schmitt’s transfer of the Roman Church’s 
institutionalism into state-institutionalism failed due to the totalitarian sovereign’s refusal to 
resubmit to a new “normality” and instead assumed in 1934 the responsibility for the whole 
                                            
1275
 DBWE 6:300. 
1276
 See ‘If he had replied to the question, are you the Christ? By doing a miracle, then the statement that he 
became a human being like us would no longer be true, since at the decisive moment an exception would have 
been made. … the form of the irritant is the form that makes possible all our faith in Christ.’; DBWE 12:358. 
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nation but had destroyed it by 1945. Similarly ironic is that in the final analysis Schmitt’s 
theory of state ended in a system with one final point of ascription, that is, at exactly the point 
which he most vehemently criticized in Kelsen’s positivist system, however with the decisive 
difference that this point was for Schmitt the dictator and for Kelsen the constitution. But 
both extremes lost their substance and capitulated to power and facts. In Kelsen, the 
substance of the decision disappeared in the logic of the norm and in Schmitt in the decision 
itself in the absoluteness of the exception.
1277
 In comparison, Bonhoeffer’s final point of 
ascription, the God-man Christ who revealed God’s Word, combines the search for a decisive 
word in the penultimate reality with that of ethical leadership and thus provides for substance 
in the decision. 
 
Bonhoeffer’s and Schmitt’s position and response to the events of their time were compared 
according to a definition of the concept of decision that was comprised of the elements of 
alternatives for choices, the timing for resolving the problem, the intended goal, and the 
implementation of the envisioned goal in a manifested form. Schmitt’s constitutional theory 
analyzed the Weimar Consitution and detected, apart from an essential core, problems for the 
juristic person of the state in the pretense-compromises of defective leadership and in the 
formation of a precise political program. The Constitution had not brought the political 
developments of the 19
th
 century to a close because it compromised on the democratic and 
monarchic principle of leadership. The flawed pretense-compromises demanded that the unit 
of the people, which is prior to the constitution and is determined by excluding those who are 
inequal, needed to choose between the alternatives of office or person, of responsibility or 
trust, and of representation or identity.  
 
Bonhoeffer, similarly interested in bringing to a close the developments of the 19
th
 century as 
regards the progressive separation of the church from the state, proceeded to develop a 
concept of church that could stand independently as an alternative form of life over against 
the state. Taking serious the constitutional prescription for the juristic person of the church as 
a corporation of public law with a personality as defined in private law, he searched for a 
fitting structure for the institution among the legal corporate structures of the commercial and 
civil law codes. He determined that the church’s communal form sui generis differed from 
                                            
1277
 Christian Graf von Krockow, Die Entscheidung: eine Untersuchung über Ernst Jünger, Carl Schmitt, 
Martin Heidegger (Frankfurt/Main: Campus Verlag, 1990), 65. 
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other legal collective forms in that it combined community (Gemeinschaft), society 
(Gesellschaft), and an federation of hierarchical structure (Herrschaftsverband), and centered 
on the divine essence of God’s revelation beyond the human ethical sphere. This form 
captured God’s revealed will to rule in love which, as prior to community, is focused in a 
vertical direction toward the horizontal relations among the multitude of the equally sinful 
human beings to each other, as well as the hierarchical direction of the faithful to God. Christ, 
as the person without sin, stands as “Christ existing as church-community” at the middle 
(Mitte) of the church and provides for the continuity of God’s revelation within the reality of 
the world. The choice between church and state received relevance with the approach of the 
status confessionis that the state had forced upon the church with the heresy of 
synchronization and race legislation. 
 
For both Bonhoeffer and Schmitt, the respective constitutional and confessional problems 
could only be solved with assessing the situation of their present time and era. Schmitt’s 
linear trajectory of time is occupied with a succession of domains with central ideas and 
corresponding elites which strive to eliminate conflict through political neutralization and 
depolitcization. But in the moment of reaching this void, the nothingness, new conflict arises 
which demands human creations ex nihilo for building a new domain, an idea and an elite. In 
every domain, the structure of the political idea and institution corresponds to the prevailing 
metaphysical perception. The domains are comparable to each other according to the method 
of structural analogy. Thus the Weimar situation which had reached the extremely urgent 
point of nothingness was in need of a human creation ex nihilo for a structural political and 
institutional solution that matched the contemporary metaphysical situation of secularization.  
 
In Bonhoeffer’s account of a circular salvation history that perceives the human being’s life 
as moving from God to God, God is the only one who creates ex nihilo which is the 
transcendental limit for the human mind. God’s ex nihilo situation is separated through the 
Fall into Original Sin, from the existential urgent human situation of exceptional nothingness. 
Already in the pen-ultimate time of emptiness, while being-in-Adam as this is marked by the 
deification of the human being as sicut deus, humanity is in need of being preserved through 
the fulfillment of God’s promise of reconciliation, his promise of Easter, that transforms in 
the moment of nothingness on the cross the human being to being-in-Christ. With similarities 
to Schmitt’s line-up of domains, Bonhoeffer assessed the contemporary Weimar situation as 
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having reached, through a process that stretched back to antiquity, a situation in which deified 
humanity had become confronted with a nothingness that immediately turned into new 
conflicts. In this fear of nothingness, the miracle of Christ, standing at the middle of history, 
mediates between the death of nothingness and reconciled life and thus stands invisibly in the 
middle of the state. In the one kingdom of God, Christ is the middle of church and state. 
 
Schmitt intended to solve the difficult situation of urgent nothingness with creative 
abstractions while Bonhoeffer sees the solution in the simplicity and wisdom of the 
immediacy of God’s intentionality. Bonhoeffer’s insistence on an actus directus, on an 
application without interpretation, rejected Schmitt’s abstractions that go back to his earliest 
work on the dismissal of a dolus directus which had removed subjective will to a meta-
physical level outside the reach of the state. His separation of objective intent, which 
underwent an evaluation over against a legal standard, an ought, and subjective guilt which 
remained outside of being measured against an ought, laid the foundation for Schmitt’s 
subsequent abstractions of office from person, fact and reality from idea, subject from 
content, and the formal from the material. He intended to overcome the conflict that had 
entered the world with Original Sin and reunite the abstractions in a structural analogy to the 
Catholic Church which supposedly had captured the Roman juristic rationality. The church’s 
ability of uniting ideas through a complexio oppositorum had made possible a prepresentation 
of the idea of God in which Christ is the archtype of non-conflict. The representative office of 
the pope was authorized by Christ but acted in abstraction from the concrete person who was 
holding that position. Transferred to the state, a sovereign personality, directly authorized by 
the pre-constitutional unit of the people, could represent the identity of the people as united 
by the principle of differentiating between friend and enemy. This would solve the leadership 
problem as it had been posted by the constitutional pretense-compromises. For Bonhoeffer 
instead, Christ is not the non-conflicted model for a conflicted world. Christ is the Trinitarian 
God in whom Christ, God and Word are united in immediate one-ness and who had entered 
the historicity in once-ness. Bonhoeffer understood God as having intended with his 
revelation through Christ to humankind a direct, unmediated, simple, immediate reaction in 
the behavious among human beings. Original Sin was not the foundation for dualisms, but for 
the separation from God and humanity. Thus God had revealed that human beings should 
participate in his church, the Sanctorum Communio, in the indivisible whole that He had 
intentionally united through faith in Jesus Christ.This is where the Word of God was revealed 
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by preachers who were authorized by the community. The human being does not live 
according to human evaluations of their acts-of-will but despite human decisions the human 
being lives in an act-of-relating under God’s decision.  
 
In the active implementation of his theory of state Schmitt synchronized all life to the 
Führer-principle. Bonhoeffer detected and disclosed the underlying modern version of the 
Docetic heresy that separated idea from appearance. This heresy had become manifest in 
applying to the state Schmitt’s structural analogy of his understanding of the Roman 
Church’s juristic model. Hidden underneath the “how” of transfering the idea of God into 
appearing as a “who” in the reality in the world was a forcefully united division. The division 
of idea and appearance was unified through the friend-enemy principle in structural analogy 
to the complexio oppositorum, and represented by the sovereign in structural analogy to the 
pope’s office and its divine authorization. Bonhoeffer redirected Schmitt’s form, Gestalt, of 
the unit of the people as represented by a significant personality with analogical divine 
authorization to the person, Gestalt, of Christ. This replaced the forced unity of identity of the 
people and the sovereign with reconciled wholeness through Stellvertretung of Christ on the 
cross. He redefined representation by clarifying that only something absent, that is, what is 
not present could be represented. Representing the idea of God in Christ could not be 
represented because the Gestalt of Christ was present. In the Gestalt of Christ, representation 
was impossible because God, Word, and Christ are One and continue to be present in this 
world in the church. What is decisive is not the process of the “how” of “becoming human” 
(Mensch werden), of becoming a personality, but the once-ness of the person of Christ “who” 
“had become human” (Mensch geworden) in the penultimate reality of human history. It is 
not divinity that becomes human, that becomes a human God, a sicut deus, but it is in Christ 
that divinity has become human as essence and in the once-ness of history. It is not the 
significance of the self of the subject that turns content into a subject, a personality, a 
sovereign for the purpose of synchronizing (gleich-schalten) every human being to his human 
image, but the significant One in the middle of life “who” con-forms (gleich-gestalten) 
human beings to God’s vision of replacing divisions with the wholeness of the self and of 
true community. It is in God’s intentionality to end disunion with his decision of fulfilling on 
the cross His promise of preserving the world. 
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In the overall assessment, Schmitt’s Dezision was meant to solve the problems of the 
constitutional pretense-compromises, as this presented a problem between representation and 
identity, and the conflicts within society. The sovereign ruler’s decision of implementing a 
new political idea on the trajectory of history was legitimized by Schmitt with a structural 
analogy to Roman juristic rationalism which rests in the Catholic Church’s ability to unite 
controversial ideas and its institutional invention of an office that represents the idea of Christ 
in the world. In his theory of state this meant that a personality in the Gestalt of the sovereign 
represented and implemented the political idea that was embedded in the Gestalt of the unit 
of the people who were forcefully united, by way of exclusion and through synchronization 
to him in identical form. Bonhoeffer disclosed that a modern version of the Docetic heresy 
was hidden within the structural elements of Schmitt’s theory of state. Underlaying Schmitt’s 
theory of state was an abstraction between idea and appearance which carried the structural 
method for creating identity, the forced unity in Gestalt of the people and leader, an idea 
becoming personality, and the principle of representation. Bonhoeffer replaced these 
elements with the immediacy of simplicity, the reconciling to wholeness and community 
through Stellvertretung, the Gestalt of Christ, the person of Christ “having become human” 
once in history, and the identity of God, Word, and Christ in the Trinitarian God who 
continues to be present in the world. For Bonhoeffer, God’s decision of keeping his promise 
of upholding humanity through faith in Christ ends the separations in the penultimate world 
in the true sense of the word Ent-scheidung. 
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Chapter 5: 
Conclusion 
 
This thesis asked, by way of a comparative study that indirectly engages Bonhoeffer’s 
theology with Schmitt’s theories, in what way possible exposure to the jurisprudential 
paradigm might have prompted Bonhoeffer to use juristic concepts within his theology and 
might have entailed uncovering, objecting to, and redirecting with his theological 
understanding of “decision”, the foundational structural elements that underlay Schmitt’s 
jurisprudential concept of Dezision in which an individual personality decides with finality 
over jurisdiction and the implementation of an abstract idea. 
 
In the overall and final analysis, Bonhoeffer’s theology of divine decision provides a 
correction to the paradigm associated with Schmitt’s human Dezision. It is based on his 
insistence of a heresy. He disclosed that a modern version of the Docetic heresy which had 
separated the idea of God from the appearance of Jesus Christ in earthly reality, had returned 
within his Weimar political context. Now, a structural analogy to Christ and His church let a 
political idea appear in the reality of the world through the represention by a sovereign 
dictator. This led Bonhoeffer to assigning significance to whom it was truly due, to God in 
Jesus Christ and His revelation. Insisting on spiritual independence from the state over 
against human Dezision complemented Bonhoeffer’s concept of the church as “Christ 
existing as church community”, and his understanding of the single human being in 
community with God and others. 
 
Bonhoeffer’s exposure to the jurisprudential paradigm of thought provided him with insights 
that enabled him to make use of juristic concepts, informed him on the theory of state and 
indirectly also on Schmitt’s theories. The intellectual connection to jurisprudential thought 
was foremost facilitated through his close friendship to Leibholz, his brother-in-law. 
Bonhoeffer’s closeness to Leibholz’s academic work could be traced to their interconnected 
Habilitation theses in 1929, and their coordinated early public objection to the approaching 
National Socialist system in November 1932. Both their Habilitation theses were concerned 
with questions of conscience and the extent of human knowledge. Additionally, Leibholz’s 
inquiry into political public representation was connected to Bonhoeffer’s earlier Sanctorum 
Communio, which had established Christ as an agent (Stellvertreter) for humanity on the 
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cross. Their public objection to the approaching National Socialism in 1932 exposed 
closeness in their argument in regards to the relationship of the state to the church and vice 
versa. Bonhoeffer also benefitted from Leibholz’s in-depth knowledge of Fascism, and his 
warning of the dangers that approached the church through collectivization, and the state’s 
attempts to absorb matters of faith. Leibholz had gained this in-depth knowledge through his 
intellectual and academic closeness to, as well as his personal acquaintance with, Schmitt 
between the years 1926 and at least 1932. Leibholz had even delayed publishing his 
Habilitation thesis until he had included references to Schmitt’s Constitutional Theory and he 
knew that Schmitt was working in 1932 on the upcoming Act of Synchronization. In the 
argument of their 1932 objection, both Bonhoeffer and Leibholz portrayed an impersonal 
office as being conscious of the importance of limits to authority, a position that differed 
from Schmitt’s personality-leader who was impersonal in an abstracted sense that avoided 
limits. And by 1932/33 Bonhoeffer appears to have been familiar with Schmitt’s definition of 
the concept of the political as a conflict between friend and enemy. Also, at this point in time, 
the most relevant books that disclosed Schmitt’s theory of state and its references to theology 
had already been published. 
 
The circumstances that led Bonhoeffer and Schmitt to engage with the topic of “decision” 
were, for both of them, rooted within their contemporary “age of crisis”. As was typical for 
their context, both Schmitt and Bonhoeffer referred to a Krisis in an organic, humanistic-
individualistic dimension. In assessing the Krisis both were inspired, similarly to their peers, 
by the Kierkegaardian divide between the eternal and the temporal, and they additionally 
proceeded from their contemporary discourse on juristic persons and natural persons. For 
both this involved Gierke’s focus on the difference between the Romanist absolute and the 
Germanist relativist concept of person but which differed in regards to the relationship of the 
multiplicity of natural persons within the unity of a juristic person. For Schmitt, this 
concerned the question of the position of the individual in relation to the state, and for 
Bonhoeffer the relation of the church and its members to the state, to God, and to each other. 
For Schmitt, the Modern individual was insignificant, isolated, and indecisive. He based this 
assessment on a disconnection between law and judgement, normative Justice and empirical 
facticity, between occasion and reality, and between liberalism and democracy. To him the 
individual was peripheral to legal judgements. Value and dignity came only with office. And 
just as the “normative power of the factual” is a fiction in regards to the Constitution, so is 
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the freedom and equality of the individual of individualism a fiction because natural rights 
qua existence were impossible. Thus the insignificant individual could not be violated in its 
essence by the law of the state, the mediator (Mittler), which was used in times of mediation 
(Mittelbarkeit) for implementing Justice. For Bonhoeffer, the “crisis of 1933” turned the 
widespread perceived insignificant individual into the self-significance (Eigenbedeutung) of 
one single individual, that is, into an extreme individualism in which single persons abdicate 
all rights and responsibilities to a new authoritative leader. The implementation of 
synchronizing the church to the state with a Führer-principle that demanded allegiance to the 
totalitarian leader as the only one of significance  ̶  combined with the persecution embedded 
in the Aryan legislation  ̶  amounted, for Bonhoeffer, to a crisis of the magnitude of a status 
confessionis. It threatened the recently constitutionally implemented independence of the 
Protestant Church from the state. In 1933 this “too much law” of the state violated the 
significance (Bedeutung) of the person of Jesus Christ, the mediator (Mittler) between God 
and human being as well as the essence of human beings within the church.   
 
For both Bonhoeffer and Schmitt, the alternatives they identified as leading towards a 
decision were based on the 1919 Weimar Constitution, but Schmitt envisioned a collective 
model while Bonhoeffer supported a community-based concept. For Schmitt, this meant that 
the pre-constitutionally existing unit of the people had decided on a political collective form 
for the state that had a parliamentary democracy at its core. However, constitutional pretense-
compromises had left undecided the question of executive leadership either according to the 
monarchic or democratic principle. What remained undecided was the alternative between 
parliamentary responsibility and trusting in a president. Hidden behind these constitutional 
labels was for Schmitt the choice between representation of the people and identity of the 
ruler and the ruled. Either way, it demanded a people unified by excluding those who were 
inequal according to a selection between friends and enemy. For Bonhoeffer instead, the 
prescription of the Weimar Constitution that there was no longer a state-church meant that the 
Christian faith could no longer serve as state-ideology, and thus the church had become 
altogether an alternative way of life to the state. Therefore, a concept of church was needed 
that, although complying with the constitutional legal requirements, nonetheless established 
the church’s institutional (iura circa sacra) as well as a full spiritual independence (iura in 
sacra). His Sanctorum Communio, the “Christ existing as church community” turned the 
Protestant Church into a community sui generis by way of defining its form, will, and 
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meaning. He combined legal institutionalism and Christian spirituality and freed the human 
being to an alternative life within the one kingdom of God that comprised of the church and 
the state. In the constitutionally prescribed form of a corporation of public law (Körperschaft 
des öffentlichen Rechts), with a legal personality determined by private law, the church was 
for Bonhoeffer in its institutional character a juristic person. For the Church’s constitutionally 
prescribed personality of private law, he identified the miracle of the person of Jesus Christ, 
the God who once appeared as natural person in history, as the personality of the Church. 
Setting Christ at the spiritual middle (Mitte) of the church and human life was meant to 
capture the divine essence of God’s revelation beyond the human ethical sphere. Christ 
continues to be present in the word through the sacraments of his church and the church’s 
existence among human beings. As a communal person (Gesamtperson), ruled in love by 
God’s will, the church, in essence, differed for Bonhoeffer from any collective person 
(Kollektiverson), especially from the juristic person of the state. 
 
Bonhoeffer as well as Schmitt made use of concepts taken from the other’s paradigm of 
thought and differentiated between the legal realm of public and private law – a separation 
that had developed during the 19
th
 century’s constitutional fights of the bourgeoisie for 
economic independence and a realm of rights separate from the state. Schmitt insisted that 
constitutional law and representation belonged to public law in distinction to contract law 
which was part of private law. Bonhoeffer’s use in his theology of legal institutes of private 
law, such as a particular form of agency (Stellvertretung) and a specific form of taking on 
debt (Schuldübernahme), emphasized the position of the church’s independence from the 
state and the church’s meaning as the worldly existence of Christ as reconciler between 
humanity-in-Adam and humanity-in-Christ. Additionally, for the purpose of determining the 
concrete institutional form of the Protestant Church within the fallen world of Adam, 
Bonhoeffer drew upon elements from juristic institutional models for economic activities that 
had been codified in the Commercial and Civil Codes in the late 19
th
 century, such as 
association (Verein) and forms of societies. For the church as Sanctorum Communio, he 
settled on an institutional character sui generis which varied from defined forms and was 
comprised of a combination of community (Gemeinschaft), society (Gesellschaft), and a 
federation of authentic rule with hierarchical structure (Herrschafts-verband), because it best 
captured the spirit of the mutual relations of the three realities of unity, community, and 
singleness. It confirmed the dissimilarity of the plurality within the unity in which, 
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nonetheless, are all of equal sinfulness and it combined the elements of superiority of and 
subordination to God. 
 
For both, the Kierkegaardian “moment” had in their contemporary present, in the Krisis, 
consolidated to an extraordinary urgent “concrete situation” of nothingness at the edge of the 
normal and law. A point was reached in history at which compromises were insufficient and 
decisions were required. Schmitt insisted on a human creative ex nihilo decision and 
Bonhoeffer saw a need for human adherence to limits which are given once one 
acknowledged a prior decision made ex nihilo, that is, God’s decision at creation and beyond 
which the human mind could not venture. Schmitt’s view of history as a linear trajectory of 
time that held a sequence of exchanges of central domains with their respective central idea 
and elite group grounded his combination of the urgent nothingness of the human present 
with a human creative ex nihilo decision. The neutrality and depoliticization of conflict that 
each domain strived to resolve would lead to the moment of nothingness but would 
immediately be again filled with conflict, leading to new ideas ex nihilo and their 
implementation with decisions of the new elite. For Bonhoeffer, history is a movement from 
God to God with the post-Fall penultimate reality of the human being in the middle, and 
which is centered on Christ as the fulfillment of God’s promise of preserving and giving life. 
In this middle, the human being lives either in-Adam or through faith in-Christ. The once-
ness of God appearing in worldly time separated God’s creation ex nihilo from the 
nothingness of the human situation. The Fall into Original Sin and death in the Adam-event 
separated humanity from the tree of life at the middle (Mitte) of Eden, and exposed humanity 
to the problems of human knowledge and self-perception as sicut deus. The Fall 
foreshadowed the Easter event of Christ on the cross in the middle (Mitte) of history. The 
moment of nothingness on the cross, when God fulfilled his promise of preserving humanity 
and Christ reconciled sinful humanity to God and life, is the moment of confessing that God 
is the creator ex nihilo. At the Fall and at the cross, each time, the dominion over the human 
being and the identity of the ruler over the earth is altered. Schmitt’s view of history as a 
succession of domains, ideas, and elites permitted comparisons and drawing analogies which 
are impossible in Bonhoeffer’s understanding of Christ as a fact of God’s promise at the 
middle of human life and who continues to be present in the Church. 
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Bonhoeffer did not develop a method that was specifically designed for applying juristic 
concepts within his theology. Instead he made use of already available juristic concepts, but 
without transferring the juristic, philosophical method as well. For him, there is no method 
for human beings to place themselves into God’s truth. God cannot be reached through an 
idea of God and can be known only as an act of faith in the revelation in Jesus Christ.1278 Faith 
is also the only way of solving the tension that was brought about by God through His 
incarnation and in the crucifixtion of Christ. Christ, as the fact of God’s promise in the 
middle of history and the human life, makes systematic analogies and human creativeness 
impossible. Christ remains the essence and the miracle also in the technological modern age, 
because in the personal moment on the cross He “is” the “method” that reconciles in His 
Gestalt the subjective and the objective into wholeness. Schmitt, however, developed a 
method for structural analogies between theological and juridical conceptualizations, for the 
purpose of transferring theological forms to the theory of state within the secularized context 
of the 20
th
 century. With his sociology of juristic concepts, he established that the 
metaphysical image a particular epoch has of the world is of the same structure as that which 
is immediately understood to be an appropriate form for the political organization of that age. 
Thus in the modern secular age, the “systematic structure” of the Catholic Church’s 
representation of the idea of Christ through the office of the pope and the Church’s unity-
creating principle of merging opposite ideas through the complexio oppositorum was 
transferrable analogically to the modern state. Thus the political idea transforms through 
representation into a personality who creates unity and implements the political idea. In 
support of the transferred model, the principle of differentiating between friend and enemy 
was meant to overcome dualities and to create a unity in structural analogy to the complexio 
oppositorum. The systematic of analogies also provided for transfers of theological dogma 
into concepts of the modern age, such as God to the political leader, Original Sin to the origin 
of conflict, and miracle to exception which both breach the natural causality of normativity. 
Christ becomes the archetype of non-conflict and serves as an idea for solving conflict among 
human beings, while the creation ex nihilo legitimizes the human creativeness underneath 
decisions.  
 
                                            
1278
 To Bonhoeffer on method see Patrick Dunn, “Discipleship as Theological Prolegomenon: Implications for 
the Relation of Theory and Praxis in the Work of Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Bonhoeffer” (PhD diss., University 
of Stellenbosch, 2018), https://scholar.sun.ac.za. 
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Bonhoeffer’s theology laid bare the fundamental structure of and the elements which served 
Schmitt’s Dezision. They amounted to a heresy in its attempt at synchronizing the church to 
the state. Underneath Schmitt’s solution of Dezision, was hidden a modern version of the 
Docetic heresy that separated idea and appearance, the separation of divinity and humanity in 
Christ. According to Schmitt, Dezision is a specific jurisprudential form over jurisdiction and 
content that is revealed by the exception. He legitimized Dezision through the method of 
structural analogy between theological thought and jurisprudential institutions. Schmitt 
intended to overcome the political conflicts of his context through applying to the state a 
structural analogy to the Roman juristic rationalism that he thought the Catholic Church had 
captured. Through inventing the office of the pope, who was directly authorized by Christ, 
the idea of God was represented to the world. In this the idea “becomes human” (Mensch 
werden), divinity enters humanity, and using dogma, the church unifies ideas through the 
principle of the complexio oppositorum.  Analogically, in the office of the sovereign a 
political program becomes personality and is represented in identity with the unit of the 
people which was unified through the friend-enemy principle. In Schmitt’s assessment, in the 
personality of the authoritarian sovereign the constitutional problem of leadership would be 
decided because representation and identity would be unified. Schmitt’s structural analogy 
was based on a line of abstractions that reached back to his early rejection of a dolus directus. 
He had separated objective intent from subjective guilt and had removed the subjective to a 
meta-physical position removed from the state’s evaluation over against normative standards. 
However, Bonhoeffer recognized that in Dezision the subjective absorbs with the significance 
of the self all other subjects as well as the content of the idea. The idea becomes Gestalt in 
personality and represents the Gestalt of the unit of the people. The self-elevated sovereign 
would forcefully unite the political idea and the unit of the people and synchronize (gleich-
schalten) them to the self, based on an analogy between the idea of Christ as political idea 
and of Christ giving authority to the sovereign.   
 
Bonhoeffer’s theology of “decision” insisted on the unity of the divinity and humanity in 
Christ. This challenged and redirected the structural elements of Schmitt’s analogy that 
underlay his Dezision. His insistance on God’s decision, that is, his view on the theological 
form over jurisdiction and content that the God-human Christ, the Gestalt who is present in 
the world, revealed, entailed a rebuttal to Schmitt’s juristic Gestalt over jurisdiction and 
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content which becomes revealed by a self-significant sovereign personality. Bonhoeffer’s 
theology challenged Schmitt’s  
- forced unity of identity with wholeness through reconciliation in Stellvertretung on 
the cross,  
- political idea with revelation,  
- synchronization (gleich-schalten) of all with conformation (gleich-gestalten) to 
Christ,  
- representation of political ideas with Trinitarian identity,  
- view of an idea “becoming human” (Mensch werden) in the appearance of personality 
with personality “having become human” (Mensch geworden) in the once-ness of the 
person of Jesus Christ.  
 
Overall, Bonhoeffer’s confession of faith entails a challenge and redirection of Schmitt’s 
institution of myth. Bonhoeffer’s theology redirects the self-significance of Schmitt’s form, 
Gestalt, as a synchronized personified idea, to Christ, the only figure, Gestalt, of significance. 
It was not the forced unity of ideas into an identical group and imaged by the Gestalt of a 
sovereign that was decisive. Rather, decisive is the reconciled wholeness of the human being 
to God and the dissimilarity of the plurality of God’s community. Bonhoeffer’s Sanctorum 
Communio sets reconciliation against Schmitt’s forced unity of the complexio oppositorum. 
Also, Bonhoeffer refuted Schmitt’s identity as represented by the sovereign to Christ’s 
Stellvertretung on the cross, to the moment of God fulfilling in Christ His promise of 
sustaining humanity. Identity existed instead in the Trinitarian unity of God, Word, and 
Christ which made representation impossible. Because only that which is absent could be 
represented, representation was impossible due to the presence of Christ in the sacraments of 
the church, and of God’s continually revealed Word in the church within historical time. 
Bonhoeffer exchanged Schmitt’s process of “how”, his act-of-will of turning idea into 
personality, with the “who” of the person of Jesus Christ and the once-ness of “having 
become human”. In God’s intentionality, the human being of faith is in actus directus, in an 
act-of-relating in single-minded obedient simplicity and wisdom con-formed to the 
significant Gestalt of Christ in the middle of life. For Bonhoeffer, the Krisis of significance 
(Bedeutung) is not solved with the heresy of self-significance (Eigenbedeutung) that conquers 
insignificance (Bedeutungslosigkeit), but only with the One whose significance (Bedeutung) 
has to be confessed. For Bonhoeffer, God’s decision of self-revelation and redemption serves 
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as corrective to the Dezision of the self-significant. Not a human forced unity by exclusion, 
but God’s decisions of self-revelation and of reconciling through Christ, ends the separations 
of the human being to God and to other human beings in the true sense of the word de-cision 
(Ent-scheidung) 
 
Thus in the concluding analysis, Bonhoeffer’s view on decision entails a rebuttal to Schmitt’s 
Dezision on all accounts from history, goal, method, to the identity of the actor by way of 
focusing on a Creator God who “had become human” in the person of Jesus, and continues to 
be present in the reality of the Church. In effect, Bonhoeffer adjusted juristic concepts of 
private law and set them over against Schmitt’s jurisprudence of developing concepts within 
public law. For Schmitt, compromises were only pretenses for avoiding decisions and for 
Bonhoeffer compromises were simply impossible. For Bonhoeffer, it was impossible to 
compromise in one’s faith, that is, in regards to the presence of God’s Word in the God-man 
Christ and in the this-worldly church. Most importantly, by denying Christ, the self was 
removed from the decisions that truly mattered, that is, from God’s promise of reconciling to 
wholeness. Faith meant trusting in God’s creative first ex nihilo decision as well as God’s 
final decision at the moment of nothingness. 
 
For Bonhoeffer, decisions were not a question of the lawbreaker over against the law-abiding 
person because then Christ ‘would have died on the cross in vain.’1279 Nonetheless, as long as 
the world exists or until Christ returns, the questions of the “who” as well as the “how” of 
judging and deciding, person and process, decision and responsibility, will continue to be 
suspended in the tension between those in-Adam and those in-Christ.  
  
                                            
1279
 DBWE 9:452. 
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Afterword: 
“Who are you?” 
 
‘Who are you?’ Bonhoeffer asked in his 1933 Lectures on Christology, and he used this 
question as the focal point for developing the Christological question of the Gestalt of Christ 
in the immediate context of the beginning efforts of the state that would amount to a status 
confessionis which was legitimized by a heresy. The same question of “Who are you?” 
confronted Schmitt when it was directed at him
1280
 during his incarceration from 1945-47.
1281
  
 
The question of “Who are you?” that was directed at Schmitt by the detaining authorities was 
connected to a request for providing some transparency for his person apart from his theories. 
Schmitt perceived this inquiry as an encroachment, if not a violation of his personality, 
essence, being, and existence.
1282
 Being confronted in this way by his captors made him feel 
‘naked’ in his humanity and powerless, just as Adam and Eve when they were expelled from 
paradise.
1283
 In response he quoted in Ex Captivitate Salus the words ‚Der Feind ist unsere 
eigene Frage als Gestalt’ (The enemy is our own question as Gestalt )1284 which were written 
by his favorite poet of his early years, Theodor Däubler (1876-1934).
1285
 And he redirected 
the question “Who are you?”, at least in thought, back at the interrogator and wondered about 
the essence of power as well as whether the anthropological question of “who” the human 
being is, starts with those who are powerful (Mächtigen) or those who are unconscious 
(Ohnmächtigen), or rather, “without power”.1286 He concluded that this question had fallen 
out of fashion in favor of not asking questions at all. Instead, one had to respond to questions 
that questioned the self and were asked by the new elite of the new level of being 
(Daseinsstufe).
1287
 The one who has the power to ask is for Schmitt the enemy who, in turn, is 
the self and the brother, but overall the other. This dialectic tension within the enemy, which, 
                                            
1280
 Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus, 3
rd
 ed. (Berlin:Duncker & Humblot, 2010), 9. 
1281
 Mehring, Schmitt, 440-48. 
1282
 Schmitt, Ex, 9. 
1283
 Schmitt, Ex, 79. 
1284
 Schmitt, Ex, 90; own translation. For Ruth Groh this sentence is the so-far-unsolved problem of the Schmitt 
research; Ruth Groh, Arbeit an der Heillosigkeit der Welt: zur politisch-theologischen Mythologie und 
Anthropologie Carl Schmitts (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1998), 64. 
1285
 Mehring, Schmitt, 50-53. 
1286
 Schmitt, Ex, 10, 79. Schmitt is playing with the German words Macht and Ohnmacht. The latter means 
unconsciousness but if divided in the syllables “ohne” and “Macht” it means “without power”. 
1287
 Schmitt, Ex, 86-87. 
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according to Schmitt, entered the world at the beginning of history with the story of Cain and 
Abel, classifies the self. Thus this is the tension that provides the form (Gestalt) of the 
self.
1288
 However, he insisted, a scientist speaks about problems of objectivity and a 
researcher about forces and power in church, state, party, class, profession, and generation. 
He, as a jurist, not a theologian, was trained to maintain objectivity and to avoid 
psychological self-reflection.
1289
 Consequently, Schmitt refused to be pressured with the 
question “Who are you?” into a tension in which a self-reflection may classify him in a 
particular Gestalt. 
 
Finding himself in a situation that had reversed his position from judge to accused, Schmitt 
returned to his jurisprudential foundation in criminal law and his writing about guilt and 
forms of guilt in which he had abstracted, in objection to a dolus directus, the objective intent 
from subjective guilt. Having been inspired in early years by Kierkegaard
1290
 he had resorted 
in Political Theology to this ‘Protestant theologian’ in support of explaining that the 
exception confirms the norm.
1291
 Schmitt seemed to have returned now to Kierkegaard’s 
assessment that subjectivity, the internality of the subject, is the non-objective and cannot be 
directly expressed.
1292
 However, Kierkegaard meant to reach in the subjective the point of 
nothingness of actual existence, because it exposes the truth, that is, Christ. Schmitt, to the 
contrary, wanted now to hide the subjective self behind the objective to avoid subjective 
guilt. Thus he interpreted the question “Who are you?” to inquire into the personality of 
individuality, which he differentiated from a meaning in the sense of subjectivity for the 
purpose of avoiding inquiry into one’s own subjectivity.  
 
By not inquiring into personal subjectivity, he was able to abstract from his person his 
activities in the various offices as scientist, researcher, and jurist, especially as jurists are 
supposedly trained to objectivity anyways. With returning to the separation between objective 
intent and subjective guilt, and to his abstraction of office from person in Gesetz und Urteil, 
                                            
1288
 cf. Schmitt, Ex, 89-90. 
1289
 Schmitt, Ex, 76, 89 
1290
 Especially Schmitt’s book on Romanticism engaged with Kierkegaard. 
1291
 Schmitt, Politische Theologie, 21. Schmitt had quoted from Kierkegaard’s Repetition; Søren Kierkegaard, 
Wiederholung (Düsseldorf: Diederichs, 1955). 
1292
 Søren Kierkegaard, Gesammelte Werke, trans. Hans Martin Junghaus, vol 6: Abschlieβende 
unwissenschaftliche Nachschrift zu den Philosophischen Bocken, 3rd ed. (Güthersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 
1994), 265, 283, 350. 
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he attempted to prevent any inquiry into his personal responsibility, unless it can be first 
proven factually, from an objective perspective, that he, Schmitt, the accused, had willed and 
wanted to violate any legal prohibition. Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege!
1293
 Ironically, 
for the purpose of avoiding criminal responsibility, Schmitt’s rejection of the “normative 
power of the factual” had turned into an insistence on a legal norm and the factual – an 
indirect acknowledgement of Kelsen’s system? 
 
The subjective moral guilt that remained even though criminal guilt was excluded in the 
absence of objective intent, Schmitt dismissed with reaffirming his early separation of the 
moral from the political. This he accomplished by applying his friend-enemy axiom which, 
according to his own definition, identifies enemies for one’s own protection. Schmitt, the 
jurist, recognized that if the own self acknowledged the conflict with the other, the enemy 
could question the very self. Thus he referred to the extension of the Däubler quote: ‚Und er 
wird uns, wir ihn zum selben Ende hetzen’ (And he will hunt us, and we him, to the same 
end).
1294
 For being able to claim that the enemy could classify the self, the own Gestalt,
1295
 he 
redirected the beginning of the history of conflict from the Original Sin to the story of Cain 
and Abel. This changed it from being a conflict between God and human being to a conflict 
among human beings. A conflict between human beings permitted to identify the objective 
intent of the enemy which, in turn, enabled opposing and negating the enemy’s status of 
classifying the self. For the purpose of safeguarding the own subjective self, the friend, from 
the intruding other, the enemy, he turned to calling the other a friend.
1296
  
 
Also, acknowledging the enemy, the other, now as the new elite, withdrew from the 
interrogator the power over the self. At the same time, this affirmed Schmitt’s concept of 
history as a trajectory of never-ending exchanges of domains and elites, which is the 
consequence of constant conflict between dichotomist ideas that endanger the Gestalt of the 
unity of the group, nation, race, and also the self. To determine which ideas were dangerous 
or rather who, which personality, embodied such dangerous ideas, afforded the method of 
                                            
1293
 This was the central jurisprudential question of the post-war Nuremberg Trials regarding offences against 
humanity which had been “only” principles grounded in legitimacy until the 1946 United Nation Declaration of 
Human Rights grounded them in a legal form.  
1294
 Meier, The Lesson, 1. 
1295
 ‚Wen kann ich als meinen Feind anerkennen? ... Indem ich ihn als Feind anerkenne, erkenne ich an, daβ er 
mich in Frage stellen kann.‘; Schmitt, Ex, 89. ‚Man klassifiziert sich durch seinen Feind.‘; Schmitt, Ex, 90. 
1296
 “Weh dem, der keinen Freund hat, denn sein Feind wird über ihn zu Gericht sitzen.“; Schmitt, Ex, 90; 
emphasis in original. 
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differentiating between friend and enemy, that is, an objective assessment of the intent of the 
other. Thus, by redirecting the question “who are you?”, which had challenged his abstraction 
between office and person, he asserted his definition of the political and his theory of history 
as an exchange of elites. Accepting the new elite removed the enemy and protected the 
consistency of his self against moral assertions of subjective guilt. 
 
Schmitt’s early abstractions threw a long shadow over the theorist beyond theology. His 
theories cannot simply be exclusively reduced to a fight for power, for being or non-being, 
solely determined by a ‘pseudo-theological myth of the enemy’.1297 They also cannot be 
limited to a concern of ‘How should I live?’,1298 and a reduced inquiry mainly into Schmitt’s 
Political Theology and his friend-enemy distinction.
1299
 Rather, Schmitt did not recognize, or 
he disregarded, the dangers that are entailed in transferring and transforming mythologies. 
Schmitt had replaced the 19
th
 century Christian ideology of the state with a political ideology 
of pseudo-unity that could be enforced with a myth of racial identity and a sovereign who 
was legitimized with an analogy to a juristic, political idea that he had found captured in the 
institution of the church. Schmitt was thus not a theologian but rather could be called a 
“political ideologian”.1300 He had ventured into the political field but had not remained 
objective as he claimed. With the sovereign he had overridden the objective with the 
subjective. But in the last consequence, he remained true to his abstractions. His final 
abstraction removed responsibility from decision for the purpose of protecting the self. This 
abstraction permitted Schmitt to withdraw into the inner self and enabled rejecting any 
responsibility as his own. Thus he called himself in 1945 a Christian Epimetheus.1301 He 
referred to the mythical story of Prometheus’s brother and husband to Pandora who had 
unleashed havoc. But Schmitt downplayed Epimetheus’ personal responsibility.1302  
 
                                            
1297
 Groh, Arbeit, 73. 
1298
 Meier, The Lesson, 76. 
1299
 Meier, The Lesson,  xxi-xxiv. 
1300
 Meier claims that Schmitt was a political theologian who applied his own theories with an understanding of 
acting in history according to a command of obedience. Meier, The Lesson, viii. But if theology is defined as the 
question about God, about the divine, Schmitt, who was thinking of the self and obedience to the self, cannot 
have been a theologian. If Bonhoeffer’s view is applied, Schmitt remained enclosed within the self, which 
would make Schmitt a political philosopher. 
1301
 Schmitt, Ex, 12. 
1302
 Hollerich, “Carl Schmitt”, 109. 
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Bonhoeffer’s theology is a profound rejection of the position of self-justification which 
Schmitt took in 1945 in response to the question of “Who are you?”. For Bonhoeffer, the 
Gestalt that sets the standard is not the self but Christ, and guilt and responsibility are not 
deferred or refused but accepted. Already in 1933, Bonhoeffer took the effect the question of 
“Who are you?” can have on the self as the point of departure for his Lectures on 
Christology. According to Bonhoeffer’s description of the human logos’ reaction to being 
confronted with this question depicts exactly Schmitt’s 1945 response. Bonhoeffer described 
the “how” of the human response. When the human logos’ autonomy is confronted and 
threatened from the outside, the demand is negated because ‘it is the last thing it [the logos] 
has the power to do’. This is not a defense, but the acknowledgment of the power of self-
negation because self-negation affirms the own logos and thus assimilates the counter-logos 
into itself, as is done in idealism.
1303
  
 
But for Bonhoeffer, the Gestalt of Jesus, who is no longer an idea or a threatening word but a 
person in history, turns the question of “who are you?” around. This question thus addresses 
the “Word made flesh”, the “who”, which is outside the logos’ classification system, and thus 
becomes the question of faith for the dethroned human reason.
1304
 Thus by redirecting the 
question to his accuser, Schmitt, in 1945 in the position of the accused, now a dethroned 
theorist and jurist, refused to accept the “who” question from outside his self and remained in 
the “how” question. This means that from Bonhoeffer’s perspective, Schmitt, despite 
continual attacks on Kelsen’s closed system of legality, was caught in the philosophical 
system of the idealist self and refused the encounter with the outside other. Instead, Schmitt 
took recourse to the dialectic structure of conflict that was embedded in the dialectic of the 
political and in his concept of history. 
 
It appears as if Bonhoeffer was talking straight to Schmitt’s concept of the political for 
overcoming conflict, his discourse on intent and guilt, and his view on the “rightness” of 
judgements, when Bonhoeffer discussed the attitude of judges, i.e. the Pharisees who 
question Jesus. He criticized them as being obsessed with fact-based correct decisions. Every 
moment of their lives is a situation of conflict, a state of disunion.
1305
 They divide the world 
                                            
1303
 DBWE 12:302. 
1304
 cf. DBWE 12:302. 
1305
 DBWE 6:310. 
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into good and evil, and satisfy their conscience when a prohibition is not defied because 
‘whatever is not prohibited is permitted’.1306 In general, guilt is scarred over by success.1307 In 
their “objective attitude”, the Pharisees acted as if they possessed the knowledge of good and 
evil but without realizing that they had lost their true nature by having fallen away from their 
origin,
1308
 from God. In splitting everything into “is and ought”, they did not see that even 
what is permitted is in disunion from God,
1309
 and that success was a denial of judgement.
1310
 
Bonhoeffer, similar to Kierkegaard, assessed that those who are judging do nothing but 
accuse others and can never arrive at doing, thus can never reach the next stage, the religious 
stage. Rather, a child-like attitude of accepting God’s Word in the simplicity and the 
immediate obedience of the actus directus was needed.  
 
The decision that affected the world was for Bonhoeffer not the Pharisee’s decision, but 
God’s decisions of the Fall into Original Sin and His reconciliation through Christ in the 
middle of history. The standard for the judgement of the “is” over against the “ought” was 
not human law but Christ. Christ was not an idea, a fiction, or an analogy, but a fact of 
reality. Christ’s Stellvertretung in the reality on the cross demands responses that are tied to 
God and the other. Being con-formed to Christ meant being free for taking on guilt 
(Schuldübernahme), just as Christ took on the guilt for humanity, for others.1311 In the 
moment of nothingness on the cross, he renounced support from human laws.1312 Christ took 
on an unmediated objective and also subjective guilt over against human laws, in distinction 
to Schmitt’s rejection of the transfer of subjective guilt. For those who take on guilt, the 
“rightness” of their human decision remains hidden, but the “hope” for God’s justification 
remains. This differs from Schmitt’s assessment in Gesetz und Urteil that a human 
metaphysical principle justifies the judge.   
 
Bonhoeffer overcame Schmitt’s “how”-attitude with a focus on the “who” by redirecting the 
question of “Who are you?” away from the self and toward Christ, toward the Word of God. 
This “who” is God, is not the self, and is not a human representative of the idea of God. The 
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 DBWE 6:307. 
1307
 DBWE 6:88. 
1308
 DBWE 6:315. 
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”who”-question does not concern the immanence of the “how” and one’s own authority, but 
becomes the religious question of transcendence, other authority, existence, limits, and the 
love for the neighbor. In the words of Bonhoeffer’s early writings, the redirected question is 
no longer that of the fallen Adam, but it is, until God’s self-revelation, the question of the 
obedient Adam.
1313
 However, the question of “Who are you?” is once more redirected by the 
powerless resurrected One, by Christ. It is addressed to the now convicted human being, but 
is at the same time answered with justification and grace, and with giving the human being of 
faith in Christ the boundary to his existence.
1314
 With his Christology of Christ as the center 
of the confession of faith, Bonhoeffer sets Christ as the insurmountable ethical counterpart 
over against the human being’s self. 
 
In the final consequence, Schmitt resorted to self-justification and Bonhoeffer lived and died 
in the hope for God’s justification and grace. In 1945 Schmitt’s recourse to his earliest 
abstraction between objective intent and subjective guilt, as well as to his abstraction of his 
official theories from his person, served to avoid inquiry into, and an evaluation of his own 
self, his Gestalt, over against legal and moral standards. In the position of the accused, he 
protected the self. He applied his friend-enemy principle in order to discover the intent of his 
inquirer, and, in application of his theory of history, he preferred to accept the new political 
idea and elite as the new domain. Bonhoeffer instead rejected losing one’s true nature and 
resorting to a self-negation that leads to remaining in the enclosed idealist self, and moreover 
removed the human being from revelation and from the Gestalt of Christ. The Gestalt of 
Christ demands from the human being, who is reconciled to God and con-formed to Christ, 
not abstractions that abscond with self-justification from guilt and responsibility. Instead, it 
meant making ethical concrete decisions in the particular context of one’s life, and trusting in 
God’s promise of reconciled wholeness, while leaving the final decision to God because  
‘responsibility is the whole response of the whole person to reality as a whole.’1315 
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